Joseph v. Auto Club Insurance Ass’n

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by Justia Inc
The Supreme Court granted Defendant Auto Club Insurance Association's bypass application for leave to appeal in this case to determine whether the minority/insanity tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1) applied to toll the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) of the no-fault act. Plaintiff Doreen Joseph sought to recover no-fault benefits for losses dating back 32 years before she brought her action. In denying Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, the circuit court relied on "Univ. of Mich. Regents v Titan Ins Co." to hold that the minority/insanity tolling provision tolls the one-year-back rule. The Court once again held that the minority/insanity tolling provision, which addresses only when an action may be brought, does not preclude the application of the one-year-back rule, which separately limits the amount of benefits that can be recovered: "We recognize the necessity for, and value of, stability in the law and take no pleasure in overruling a precedent of recent vintage by this Court. But 'Regents' itself simply failed to apply our then recent decision in 'Cameron,' resulting in a decision that patently failed to enforce the requirements of the statutes that it interpreted. Because the holding in Regents contravened the Legislature's clear and unambiguous language in MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1), Regents is overruled and we reinstate 'Cameron.'" The case was remanded back to the circuit court for further proceedings.

Harman Mining Co v. DOWCP

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by Justia Inc
These appeals arose from an ALJ's order, affirmed by the Benefits Review Board, finding that Gary Looney suffered disabling obstructive lung disease arising out of his work as a coal miner and awarding his widow black lung benefits payable by Looney's former employer. The court determined that the award of benefits was supported by the record and affirmed the award of benefits to Looney, denying his former employer's petition for review.

Venkateswarlu Thota, M.D., et al. v. Young

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by Justia Inc
Plaintiff brought this suit against defendant alleging negligence in the treatment of Ronnie Young. At issue was whether the presumed harm analysis applied to a broad-form submission in a single-theory-of-liability case when the negligence charge included both an improper defensive theory of contributory negligence and an improper inferential rebuttal instruction. The court held that it did not and that meaningful appellate review was provided through a traditional harm analysis. Inasmuch as the court of appeals ruled otherwise, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for further consideration.

Seals v. Morris County

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by Justia Inc
The issues in this appeal were whether, pursuant to "Contey v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.," 136 N.J. 582 (1994) or N.J.S.A. 48:3-17.1, an electric utility company is entitled to immunity for any negligence in its placement of a pole along a public roadway; and whether a county is entitled to immunity for any negligence on its part pursuant to the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 12-3. Early one winter morning, plaintiff John Seals was driving his pickup truck and descended a curved, snow-covered road in Washington Township that is owned and maintained by Morris County. Due to the road conditions and despite applying the brakes, plaintiff could not negotiate the curve and the vehicle struck an electric utility pole located several feet from the roadway. He alleged that the County negligently maintained a dangerous roadway condition and that the electric utility company negligently placed the pole. The trial court denied defendants' motions for summary judgment. The court distinguished "Contey," in which the Supreme Court held that a telephone company that placed its pole in compliance with a municipal ordinance owed no duty to a motorist. The trial court reasoned that because the County did not set standards for placing electric poles, and was not statutorily required to do so, the utility is subject to a negligence standard; and although "Contey" did not impose a duty on the County to conduct a safety study, it was not shielded by the TCA because it took "no action" to regulate placement of electric poles. The Appellate Division reversed the denial of summary judgment for JCP&L and vacated the denial of summary judgment for the County. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that neither "Contey" nor N.J.S.A. 48:3-17.1 conferred immunity on the utility for its negligence, if any, in placing the electric pole. If a governmental entity directs a utility where to place a pole (as in "Contey") the utility is immune from liability. When there is no governmental dictate, ordinary negligence standards apply. A utility will be liable if it places or maintains an electric pole where there is an unreasonable and unnecessary danger to travelers upon the highway. Whether the County is entitled to TCA immunity was remanded for further proceedings.

Roquemore v. ER Express

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by Justia Inc
Decedent died when a 28-ton beam struck an overpass, fell off of the trailer transporting it, and crushed the cab of his truck, which was on the highway behind the trailer. The district court granted motions for summary judgment in favor of companies responsible for loading the beam on the trailer, hiring the trucking company, and obtaining permits. The court construed Michigan Compiled Laws 257.719(1) as forbidding recovery from anyone other than the owner of a vehicle that collides with a lawfully established bridge. The Sixth Circuit reversed. The estate did not bring suit directly under the statute. In a common-law negligence case, all principles concerning common-law liability and defenses apply. The statute may imply that others who pay may be able to shift their liability to an owner, not that they can have no liability in the first instance. The fact that liability for all damages and injury is fixed on the owner of the vehicle even where concurrent or intervening acts of negligence precipitate the accident, does not imply that tortfeasors responsible for those concurrent or intervening acts cannot also be liable.

Mbahaba v. Morgan

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by Justia Inc
Plaintiff Regina Mbahaba, individually and as next friend of her minor daughter, Benita Nahimana, appealed a superior court order that dismissed her direct claims against Defendant Thomas Morgan, and granted him summary judgment in her action seeking to pierce the limited-liability veil of the company he managed. Defendant owned Property Management Services a/k/a Property Services Company, a limited liability company that managed an apartment building where Plaintiff and her family rented an apartment from 2005-2006. Plaintiff’s daughter, Benita, was poisoned by lead while living in the apartment, prompting an inspection by the New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services, which revealed "lead exposure hazards" in the home. As a result of the alleged injury to Benita caused by the lead contamination, Plaintiff filed lawsuits against Defendant and Biren Properties. Shortly after Plaintiff filed Suit, Defendant formed another property management LLC, which Plaintiff alleged he created in an attempt to avoid liability from her suit. Defendant moved to dismiss the action against him personally, arguing that, because he supervised the property on behalf of the LLC, he could not be "held personally liable for the debts or actions of the company." Ultimately, the claims against Defendant individually were dismissed, but the trial court allowed the plaintiff’s claims against the LLC to proceed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Defendant's management of the apartment and his superior knowledge of its hazardous condition suffice to established an individual tort duty to avoid "exposing [the plaintiff] to an unreasonable risk of harm." Thus, because these allegations stated facts entitling Plaintiff to relief, her negligence claim survived Defendant’s motion to dismiss. With regard to Plaintiff's attempt to disregard Defendant's LLC to hold him liable, the Court concluded that Defendant correctly argued that he had every right to establish a new LLC and to transfer the original LLC’s clients to it. "However, that Defendant made this 'fresh start' when his company remained a party to this case, could permit a finding that the limited-liability identity was used to promote an injustice upon the plaintiff. Thus, based upon our review of the depositions and other evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, we cannot conclude that Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part the trial court's decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Hrynkiw v. Trammell

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by Justia Inc
Dr. Zenko J. Hrynkiw and Zenko J. Hrynkiw, M.D., P.C., appealed a judgment entered in favor of Thomas and Barbara Trammell in their medical-malpractice action. In 2005, Dr. Hrynkiw, a neurosurgeon, performed fusion surgery on Thomas's spine to relieve pain in his lower back and pain and numbness in his right leg and foot caused by a herniated disk that was creating pressure on a nerve. Immediately following the surgery, Thomas experienced weakness, numbness, and pain in his lower extremities. A second surgery provided Thomas no relief, and he was permanently partially disabled. In 2007, Thomas and his wife Barbara sued Dr. Hrynkiw, alleging negligent diagnosis, treatment and postoperative care. Barbara asserted a claim of loss of consortium. Dr. Hrynkiw raised two issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred by not granting Hrynkiw's judgment as a matter of law on the Trammells' claim relating to Dr. Hrynkiw's postoperative care because the Trammells failed to present substantial evidence that any of Thomas's injuries were probably caused by Dr. Hrynkiw's postoperative care; and (2) whether the trial court erred in allowing hearsay testimony under the learned-treatise exception when, Hrynkiw says, the foundational requirements of Rule 803(18), Ala. R. Evid., were not met. Finding sufficient evidence to support the judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court.

Aurora Consol. Health Care v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n

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by Justia Inc
After Employee suffered a work-related injury and was terminated by Employer due to Employer's inability to accommodate his physical restrictions, Employee filed a worker's compensation claim for permanent and total disability. The Labor and Industry Review Commission (LIRC) determined that Employee was permanently and totally disabled as a result of his work injury. LIRC made this determination after denying Employer's last-minute request to cross-examine or make further inquires of Dr. Jerome Ebert, an independent physician appointed by the Department of Workforce Development to examine Schaefer and report on the cause of his disability. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Employer did not have a statutory right to cross-examine Dr. Ebert, (2) LIRC did not violate Employer's due process rights when it declined to remand for cross-examination, and (3) LIRC did not erroneously exercise its discretion by declining to remand for a third time to allow Dr. Ebert to be questioned further.

Shipley v. Dep’t of Roads

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by Justia Inc
Jamin Stoddard and Brian Shipley were injured in a collision with a train owned by the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Company (BNSF) at a grade crossing in Cass County. Stoddard's guardians and Shipley brought actions against the Nebraska Department of Roads (NDOR) and Cass County under the State Tort Claims Act (STCA) and the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA), alleging that the governmental entities negligently designed the grade crossing and negligently failed to install various warning devices. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the State and the County. At issue on appeal was whether the negligence claims fell within the discretionary function exceptions to the limited waiver of sovereign immunity under the PSTCA and the STCA. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in concluding that all of the claims which were the subject of these appeals fell within the discretionary function exceptions of the PSTCA and the STCA.

Graham v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., et al.

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by Justia Inc
Plaintiff sued Hartford seeking coverage under his life insurance policy for accidental dismemberment benefits after he suffered serious injuries to his eyes when a can of oven cleaner exploded in his face. The district court dismissed plaintiff's suit, concluding it was untimely because it was brought three years after the loss, outside the policy's time limitations for bringing legal actions against Hartford. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that he brought suit within Arkansas's five-year statute of limitations for breach of contract actions, Ark. Code Ann. 23-79-202(b). The court agreed with plaintiff and held that prior case law was inconsistent with Hartford's contention that the "period prescribed by law" referred to in section 23-79-202 meant something other than the full five-year period set forth in Ark. Code Ann. 16-56-111. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.