Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Caroline Adams suffered a spinal cord injury while sledding on property owned by Moose Hill Orchards, LLC, which operates under the name Mack’s Apples. Adams and her husband, Christopher Estrella, filed a lawsuit against Moose Hill for negligence and loss of consortium. The incident occurred in January 2022 when the plaintiffs visited Moose Hill, which allows the public to use a hill on its property for sledding at no charge. Moose Hill also operates a seasonal stand selling hot beverages and other goods to sledders. Adams was injured during sledding and is now paralyzed from the waist down.The Superior Court granted Moose Hill's motion to dismiss the case, citing recreational use immunity under RSA 508:14, I. The plaintiffs argued that the immunity should not apply because they were on the property for a purpose related to Moose Hill's business, which customarily charges for its goods. The trial court denied the plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire reviewed the case and upheld the trial court's decision. The court concluded that Moose Hill qualifies for immunity under RSA 508:14, I, because it allows the public to use its land for recreational purposes without charge. The court distinguished this case from Soraghan v. Mt. Cranmore Ski Resort, where the ski resort charged for access to its recreational facilities. The court found that Moose Hill's sale of hot beverages was incidental to the free recreational use of the sledding hill and did not negate the "without charge" requirement of the statute. Therefore, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims. View "Adams v. Moose Hill Orchards, LLC" on Justia Law

Torrey Kath brought a personal injury lawsuit against Michael Prochnow and Prochnow Farms, alleging that Prochnow moved a semi-truck while Kath was underneath, causing significant injury. Kath and Prochnow entered into a Miller-Shugart agreement, where Prochnow accepted damages, and Kath agreed to collect solely from Prochnow’s insurers. The case was dismissed with prejudice after a stipulation of dismissal was filed.Kath then filed a declaratory judgment action against Farmers Union Mutual Insurance Company (FUMIC), which insured Prochnow under a farm liability policy. Kath sought declarations that the policy covered his injuries and that the Miller-Shugart agreement was reasonable and binding on FUMIC. The District Court of Stutsman County granted Kath summary judgment on the coverage issue, interpreting the policy’s motor vehicle exclusion as not applying to the coverage added by a farm employer liability endorsement.FUMIC moved for summary judgment, arguing it had no duty to indemnify Prochnow because the personal injury action had been dismissed with prejudice. While this motion was pending, Kath and Prochnow successfully moved to vacate the dismissal and entered a $2 million judgment against Prochnow, to be paid solely by FUMIC. The district court then denied FUMIC’s motion for summary judgment, holding that the judgment in the personal injury action rendered FUMIC’s motion moot and granted summary judgment in favor of Kath on the second count of his complaint.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that the policy’s motor vehicle exclusion applied to Kath’s injuries, and thus, the policy did not provide coverage. The court concluded that the endorsement did not supersede the motor vehicle exclusion and that the policy, when read as a whole, excluded coverage for injuries related to the use of motor vehicles. View "Kath v. Farmers Union Mutual Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In this case, the decedents, Robert and Elise Sandiford, and Deon Detes Abrams, Sr., died after their vehicles collided on State Route 99 (SR 99) and struck a tree on land owned by Union Pacific Railroad Company (Union Pacific). The relatives of the decedents sued Union Pacific, alleging negligence for failing to remove the tree or take measures to protect the public from the dangerous condition it posed. Union Pacific moved for summary judgment, arguing it owed no duty to remove the tree. The trial court denied the motion, finding no judicial exception to the ordinary duty of care under Civil Code section 1714.The trial court's denial of summary judgment was based on the application of factors from Rowland v. Christian, which did not support creating an exception to the ordinary duty of care. Union Pacific then filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, seeking to overturn the trial court's decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that Union Pacific did not have a duty to remove the tree or take other measures to protect the driving public from the alleged dangerous condition posed by the tree. The court considered the foreseeability of harm, the certainty of injury, and the closeness of the connection between Union Pacific’s conduct and the injury. It also weighed public policy factors, including moral blame, the policy of preventing future harm, the burden on the defendant, and the availability of insurance. The court concluded that public policy clearly supported creating a judicial exception to the ordinary duty of care, thus granting Union Pacific's petition for a writ of mandate and directing the trial court to grant Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment. View "Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves the Schrivers, who sought damages after their cat, Gypsy, died following a veterinary procedure and was subjected to an unauthorized necropsy by Dr. Raptosh and Lakeshore Animal Hospital. The Schrivers claimed non-economic damages for emotional distress and loss of companionship, arguing that the emotional bond between pet and owner should be compensable. They also sought economic damages based on the pet's value to them.The District Court of the Third Judicial District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Raptosh and Lakeshore on several claims, including negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and lack of informed consent. The court denied the Schrivers' claim for emotional distress damages related to trespass to chattels/conversion but allowed the "value to owner" measure of economic damages for the loss of Gypsy.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision in part and reversed in part. The court upheld the denial of emotional distress damages for trespass to chattels/conversion, agreeing that such damages are limited to independent torts of negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court also affirmed the summary judgment on the negligent infliction of emotional distress claim, holding that veterinarians do not have a duty to prevent emotional harm to pet owners. However, the court reversed the summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim related to the unauthorized necropsy, finding that a jury should decide if the conduct was extreme and outrageous. The court affirmed the use of the "value to owner" measure of damages, excluding sentimental value.The case was remanded for further proceedings on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. The Schrivers were awarded costs on appeal, but attorney fees were not granted to Dr. Raptosh and Lakeshore, as the primary issue of liability remains unresolved. View "Schriver v. Raptosh" on Justia Law

In 1989, thirty-four members of the Kappa Gamma fraternity at Gallaudet University were photographed performing the Bellamy salute, which resembles the Nazi salute. Thirty years later, the president of Gallaudet described Kappa Gamma as the "face of systemic racism" at the university, and The Washington Post republished this statement, describing the photograph as depicting "anti-Semitic" behavior and a "Nazi salute." Four alumni of Gallaudet’s Kappa Gamma chapter, including the estate of a deceased member, sued Gallaudet and the Post for defamation and related torts.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint, concluding that none of the disputed statements concerned the plaintiffs and that many of the statements were not actionable. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case and disagreed in part with the district court. The appellate court concluded that the statements about the photograph did concern the individuals who appeared in it. However, the court agreed with the district court that these statements were protected opinions and thus not actionable. The court held that the statements describing the students in the photograph as the "face of systemic racism" and "anti-Semitic" were not provably false and were therefore protected opinions. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Florio v. Gallaudet University" on Justia Law

Theresa Johnson, individually and as executor of her deceased husband Nathaniel Johnson's estate, filed a wrongful-death action against Jackson Hospital & Clinic, Inc. Nathaniel, suffering from COVID-19, was admitted to Jackson Hospital on November 26, 2020. He was placed on a BiPAP device for breathing assistance. On December 6, 2020, he was to be moved to another floor. During the transfer, the BiPAP device was removed, and an oxygen mask was allegedly placed on him. However, Nathaniel experienced distress and died shortly after.The Montgomery Circuit Court initially granted Jackson Hospital's motion for summary judgment, but later set it aside to allow further discovery. Johnson argued that Jackson Hospital's actions were wanton and did not comply with public health guidance. The trial court ultimately denied Jackson Hospital's renewed motion for summary judgment, holding that Johnson's action could proceed under an exception in the Alabama Covid Immunity Act (ACIA).The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It found that Jackson Hospital was immune from Johnson's negligence claims under the ACIA and the May 8 proclamation issued by Governor Ivey, which provided liability protections for health-care providers during the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also determined that Johnson did not present clear and convincing evidence of wanton conduct by Jackson Hospital's staff. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama granted Jackson Hospital's petition for a writ of mandamus, directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of Jackson Hospital on all claims. View "Ex parte Jackson Hospital & Clinic, Inc." on Justia Law

A wrongful-death medical-malpractice action was initiated by Donna Ratliff, representing the estate of Rhoda Gail McBride, against Dr. Frances Koe and Wills Valley Family Medicine, LLC. McBride had sought treatment for leg pain and was diagnosed with a blood clot, for which she was prescribed Coumadin, a blood thinner. McBride's daughter, Ratliff, claimed that neither she nor McBride were adequately informed about the necessity of regular blood tests to monitor the medication's effects. McBride subsequently suffered a fatal brain bleed due to "Coumadin toxicity."The DeKalb Circuit Court jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Koe and Wills Valley. However, the trial court granted Ratliff's motion for a new trial, vacating the jury's verdict. The trial court concluded that the defendants had not presented sufficient evidence to support their contributory-negligence defense, which alleged that McBride's failure to attend follow-up appointments contributed to her death.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's judgment. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the contributory-negligence defense, including testimony that McBride had been informed about the need for regular blood tests and the dangers of Coumadin. The court held that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence and that the trial court had erred in granting a new trial. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Koe v. Ratliff" on Justia Law

Aletha Porcaro was admitted to The Heights of Summerlin, a skilled nursing facility, for rehabilitation after surgery. Upon her discharge, she contracted COVID-19 and died eight days later. Her daughter, Rachelle Crupi, filed a lawsuit against The Heights and its parent companies, alleging that they failed to implement effective COVID-19 safety protocols. The claims included negligence, wrongful death, and other related causes of action.The Heights removed the case to federal court, which remanded it back to state court. In state court, The Heights moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) and Nevada’s Emergency Directive 011 granted them immunity from Crupi’s claims. The district court dismissed the professional negligence claim but allowed the other claims to proceed.The Heights then petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada for a writ of mandamus, seeking to dismiss the remaining claims based on the same immunity arguments. The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the petition and concluded that the PREP Act does not apply to a lack of action or failure to implement COVID-19 policies. The court also determined that Directive 011 does not grant immunity to health care facilities, as it applies to individual medical professionals, not facilities.The Supreme Court of Nevada denied the petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that neither the PREP Act nor Directive 011 provided immunity to The Heights for the claims brought by Crupi. The court affirmed the district court’s decision to allow the remaining claims to proceed. View "The Heights of Summerlin, LLC v. District Court" on Justia Law

Carolyn Greene visited her grandson at Children’s National Medical Center and slipped in a hallway, allegedly due to liquid left by a floor scrubbing machine operated by a hospital custodian. Greene claimed there were no warning signs and sustained severe injuries from the fall. She sued the hospital for negligence, asserting that the hospital's employee created the hazardous condition.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital, concluding that Greene failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the hospital was on notice of the wet floor. The court found that Greene's claims were speculative and lacked sufficient evidence to prove that the liquid was left by the scrubbing machine.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Greene presented enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that the hospital's employee created the dangerous condition. This included Greene's testimony about the liquid and the scrubbing machine, expert testimony supporting her claims, and inconsistencies in the custodian's account. The court emphasized that the evidence should be viewed in the light most favorable to Greene, the non-moving party, and that credibility determinations are for the jury to decide.The appellate court concluded that a jury could reasonably find that the hospital was on constructive notice of the hazard created by its employee, thus making summary judgment inappropriate. The case was remanded for trial. View "Greene v. Children's National Medical Center" on Justia Law

In this case, an automobile collision occurred on November 5, 2018, involving Raymond and Florence Trigger, who were struck by a truck driven by Benjamin C. Deese. Florence died at the scene, and Raymond succumbed to his injuries in January 2019. Jerald Brown, as the administrator of both estates, sued Deese for wrongful death, alleging negligence and wantonness. The jury awarded $50,000 for Florence's death and $1 for Raymond's death. Brown moved for a new trial, arguing that the $1 award was inadequate and violated equal protection principles. The Houston Circuit Court granted the motion for a new trial, and Deese appealed.The Houston Circuit Court had initially instructed the jury on negligence, wantonness, contributory negligence, and damages, including nominal damages. The jury's initial verdict awarded $0 for Raymond's death, which the court rejected, instructing the jury that a $0 award was not permissible. The jury then awarded $1 for Raymond's death. Brown's motion for a new trial argued that the $1 award was inadequate and inconsistent with the $50,000 award for Florence's death. The trial court granted the motion without stating reasons.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's order. The Court held that the adequacy of punitive damages in wrongful-death cases is not subject to review, as established in Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Street. The Court also found that the jury's verdicts were not inconsistent, as the jury was instructed, without objection, that it could award different amounts for each death. The Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in granting a new trial and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment on the jury's verdicts. View "Deese v. Brown" on Justia Law