Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries
Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County v. State
Barry Chrisman was seriously injured when a tree fell on his work vehicle while driving through a riparian management zone (RMZ) in a recently logged forest area. The RMZ, a buffer of trees left standing to benefit wildlife and water quality, was part of the Lugnut timber area managed by the Washington Department of Natural Resources (DNR). Chrisman and his employer sued the State of Washington, Sierra Pacific Industries, and Precision Forestry Inc. for negligence, arguing that the defendants were not immune under the Forest Practices Act of 1974, which provides immunity for forestland owners when a tree required to be left standing in an RMZ falls and causes injury.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that they were immune under the statute as forestland owners required to leave the RMZ trees standing. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. The appellate court held that Sierra and Precision were not forestland owners because they did not have the right to harvest RMZ trees and that only entities with the authority to determine RMZ parameters are entitled to immunity. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the RMZ was properly drawn.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that the defendants are immune under the Forest Practices Act. The court determined that the statute provides broad immunity to forestland owners, including those in actual control of the land with the right to sell or dispose of timber. The court concluded that Sierra and Precision fit the definition of forestland owners and that the immunity applies regardless of whether the RMZ was properly drawn. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County v. State" on Justia Law
Al-Saray v. Furr
On November 10, 2014, a traffic accident occurred at the intersection of Wellington Road and Market Place Avenue involving vehicles driven by Sharon Elizabeth Furr and Janaia Spurlock. Tamara Al-Saray, a passenger in Spurlock's vehicle, suffered significant injuries, including a traumatic brain injury. Spurlock attempted a left turn with a solid green light, requiring her to yield to oncoming traffic. Furr, traveling westbound at the speed limit, collided with Spurlock's vehicle. Al-Saray filed claims against both drivers for negligence but later nonsuited her claims against Spurlock. The trial court excluded evidence of Spurlock's guilty plea for failure to yield.The Prince William County Circuit Court denied Furr's motions to strike the evidence and for reconsideration, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the claim that Furr failed to maintain a proper lookout. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Al-Saray, awarding her $7,000,000 in damages. Furr appealed to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which reversed the trial court's decision, ruling that the evidence was insufficient to establish Furr's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident. The Court of Appeals majority found that the evidence was purely circumstantial and did not exclude other possible causes of the accident.The Supreme Court of Virginia reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Al-Saray, was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. The Court emphasized that proximate cause can be established by circumstantial evidence and that the jury's inference of Furr's negligence was reasonable. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to address Furr's remaining assignments of cross-error. View "Al-Saray v. Furr" on Justia Law
L.W. v. Audi AG
A minor, L.W., suffered severe injuries when an Audi Q7, allegedly defective, surged forward and crushed him against a garage wall. L.W., his mother, and two siblings filed a products liability suit against Audi AG and Volkswagen Group of America Inc. (VWGoA), claiming the vehicle lacked necessary safety features. Audi AG, a German company, manufactures vehicles sold in the U.S. through VWGoA, which markets and sells them to authorized dealerships, including in California.The Superior Court of Placer County granted Audi's motion to quash service of summons, finding no personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish Audi's purposeful availment of California's market or a substantial connection between Audi's activities and the plaintiffs' injuries. The court also found that exercising jurisdiction would not be reasonable or consistent with fair play and substantial justice.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that Audi, through VWGoA, deliberately served the U.S. market, including California, and thus could reasonably anticipate being subject to suit in California. The court held that the plaintiffs met their burden of demonstrating Audi's purposeful availment and the relatedness of the controversy to Audi's contacts with California. The court also found that exercising jurisdiction over Audi would be fair and reasonable, given California's significant interest in providing a forum for its residents and enforcing safety regulations.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order granting the motion to quash and remanded the case with directions to enter a new order denying the motion. The plaintiffs were awarded their costs on appeal. View "L.W. v. Audi AG" on Justia Law
Brehme v. Irwin
The case involves a car accident where Thomas Irwin rear-ended Linda Brehme's vehicle. Brehme's Personal Injury Protection (PIP) carrier paid benefits but not up to the policy limits. Brehme filed a personal injury complaint against Irwin, seeking damages for pain and suffering, disability, impairment, loss of enjoyment of life, and past lost wages. At trial, Brehme attempted to admit evidence of her projected future medical expenses, but the trial judge denied the motion because she had not exhausted her PIP limits. The jury awarded Brehme $225,000 for pain and suffering and $50,000 for past lost wages, totaling $275,000. Irwin's carrier paid the final judgment, and Brehme's counsel signed a warrant to satisfy the judgment.The Appellate Division dismissed Brehme's appeal as moot, noting that she had accepted and received the full judgment amount and signed a warrant to satisfy the judgment before indicating her desire to appeal. The court found that Brehme's acceptance of the judgment precluded her from appealing the trial judge's ruling barring evidence of future medical expenses.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and held that a plaintiff who accepts a final judgment may still appeal if they can show that they made their intention to appeal known before accepting payment and executing the warrant to satisfy the judgment, and that prevailing on the appellate issue will not impact the final judgment other than to potentially increase it. The court found that Brehme did not express her intention to appeal before accepting payment and executing the warrant, and that the issue of future medical expenses was not separable from the underlying final judgment. Therefore, the appeal was properly dismissed as moot. The court affirmed the Appellate Division's decision and referred the matter to the Civil Practice Committee to assess whether to clarify Rule 4:48-1. View "Brehme v. Irwin" on Justia Law
Suprynowicz v. Tohan
The plaintiffs, Kayla Suprynowicz and Reilly Flaherty, discovered through genetic testing that they are half-siblings and that their biological father is the defendant, Narendra B. Tohan, a reproductive endocrinologist. They allege that the defendant used his own sperm to impregnate their mothers during in vitro fertilization (IVF) procedures without their parents' consent, causing them mental anguish, physical injury, and compromised familial relations. Kayla Suprynowicz also claimed that the defendant's sperm carried a genetic trait causing her to contract a cerebral condition and mast cell activation disorder, reducing her earning capacity.The trial court, Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford, granted the defendant's motion to strike the plaintiffs' amended complaint, determining that their negligence claims sounded in wrongful life, which is not a legally cognizable cause of action in Connecticut. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs' claims presented the paradox of alleging harm that could only have been avoided if they had never been born, a hallmark of wrongful life claims.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court incorrectly determined that the plaintiffs' negligence claims sounded in wrongful life rather than ordinary negligence. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims bore none of the hallmarks of wrongful life claims and could be properly adjudicated as ordinary negligence claims. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's deception was directly responsible for their injuries and losses, and they sought compensation for these injuries rather than being restored to a state of nonbeing. The court reversed the trial court's judgment with respect to the plaintiffs' negligence claims and remanded the case with direction to deny the defendant's motion to strike as to those claims and for further proceedings. View "Suprynowicz v. Tohan" on Justia Law
Lewis v Sood
Clarence Lewis, an inmate at Hill Correctional Center, sued various medical staff members, alleging they were deliberately indifferent to his health issues, violating the Eighth Amendment. Lewis claimed misdiagnosis and mistreatment of diabetes, COPD, irritable bowel syndrome, and Hepatitis C. He also contended that his grievance about a delay in diabetes medication was not properly addressed.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois denied Lewis's motions for recruited counsel, stating he could represent himself and obtain relevant documents. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Sood, Dr. Bautista, Nurse Vollmer, and Administrator Lindor, concluding no reasonable juror could find deliberate indifference. The court also granted summary judgment for Dr. Paul, citing claim splitting due to a similar prior lawsuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the judgment in favor of Dr. Sood, Dr. Bautista, Nurse Vollmer, and Administrator Lindor, finding no reasonable likelihood that recruited counsel would have changed the outcome. The court noted that Lewis's disagreement with his diagnoses and treatments did not constitute deliberate indifference. As for Administrator Lindor, her limited role and the lack of harm from the medication delay further supported the judgment.However, the court vacated the judgment in favor of Dr. Paul, agreeing with Lewis that the district court's application of claim splitting was erroneous. Dr. Paul had raised this defense too late, effectively acquiescing to the claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings regarding Dr. Paul, with the district court advised to reconsider Lewis's request for recruited counsel if the claim proceeds to trial. View "Lewis v Sood" on Justia Law
3137, LLC v. Town of Harwich
Justin and Jared Brackett own and operate two restaurants in Harwich, Massachusetts: Ember Pizza, Inc. and The Port Restaurant and Bar, Inc. Both establishments held liquor and entertainment licenses issued by the town. Allegedly, they violated Harwich's noise ordinance and Massachusetts COVID-19 restrictions, leading to suspensions and restrictions on their permits. In response, they sued Harwich, several town officials, and other individuals in federal district court, asserting various federal and state claims.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts largely granted the defendants' dispositive motions, rejecting all of Ember and The Port's claims. The court also denied their request for leave to amend their complaint, finding that an amendment would be futile. Ember and The Port then appealed the district court's decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's rulings. The appellate court held that Ember and The Port failed to state a plausible claim for relief under federal law, including their First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and procedural due process claims. The court also found that the Massachusetts Civil Rights Act claims and common law claims, including civil conspiracy and defamation, were inadequately pleaded. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for leave to amend the complaint, as the proposed amendments would not have cured the deficiencies in the original complaint. View "3137, LLC v. Town of Harwich" on Justia Law
Beck v. United States
Air Force Staff Sergeant Cameron Beck was killed in a collision with a car driven by Blanca Mitchell, a civilian government employee, on Whiteman Air Force Base. Beck was on active duty and driving home for lunch when the accident occurred. Mitchell pleaded guilty to careless and imprudent driving. Beck’s wife and son received benefits from the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Defense. They filed a wrongful death claim, which the Air Force denied, but allowed them to pursue the claim in federal court under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the Feres doctrine, which grants the government immunity for injuries arising out of activities incident to military service. The court concluded that Beck’s death was incident to his service because he was on active duty and on-base at the time of the accident. The court also denied the plaintiffs' requests for additional discovery and to file supplemental suggestions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court agreed that the Feres doctrine applied, as Beck was on active duty, on-base, and subject to recall at the time of the accident. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying additional discovery, as the facts necessary to resolve the jurisdictional inquiry were undisputed and the additional facts sought were not material to the determination of whether Feres applied. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Beck v. United States" on Justia Law
Mallet v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision
While incarcerated at Woodborne Correctional Facility, Antonio Mallet sought medical care for urinary obstruction and painful urination, symptoms indicative of prostate cancer. Despite a cystoscopy revealing concerning results, prison doctors did not conduct further tests for prostate cancer, instead prescribing medication for a benign enlarged prostate. Mallet was released on parole in January 2019 and was diagnosed with late-stage prostate cancer in May 2021. He filed a lawsuit on February 25, 2022, against the State of New York, the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), its acting commissioner, and three medical providers, alleging deliberate indifference to his medical needs and other constitutional violations, as well as state law claims for malpractice and negligence.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Mallet’s constitutional claims as untimely, reasoning that the claims accrued by the time he was released from custody in January 2019, thus falling outside the three-year statute of limitations for Section 1983 claims in New York. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found it plausible that Mallet’s deliberate indifference claim had not accrued by February 25, 2019, making his complaint potentially timely. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the deliberate indifference claims against Dr. Makram and Dr. Stellato, finding them plausible, but affirmed the dismissal of the claim against Professor Ritaccio and the constitutional claims against New York State, DOCCS, and Annucci due to sovereign immunity. The court vacated the dismissal of the remaining constitutional claims and state law claims, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Mallet v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision" on Justia Law
Gee v. National Collegiate Athletic Assocation
Matthew Gee, a former University of Southern California (USC) football player, died in 2018 at age 49. The coroner attributed his death to the combined toxic effects of alcohol and cocaine, along with other health issues. His widow, Alana Gee, donated his brain to Boston University’s CTE Center, where it was determined he had Stage II Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE). Alana Gee filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), alleging that CTE was a substantial factor in her husband's death and that the NCAA negligently failed to take reasonable steps to reduce his risk of contracting CTE.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled in favor of the NCAA, finding that the assumption of risk doctrine applied. The jury concluded that the NCAA did not unreasonably increase the risks to Matthew Gee over and above those inherent in college football, nor did it unreasonably fail to take measures that would have minimized the risks without altering the essential nature of the sport. Alana Gee appealed the judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the assumption of risk doctrine and in refusing her proposed jury instruction on the liability of an unincorporated association for the acts of its members.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that the assumption of risk doctrine applied because repeated head hits are an inherent risk of college football. The court also found that any instructional error regarding the NCAA’s responsibility for the actions or inactions of its members was harmless. The court concluded that the NCAA did not have a duty to mitigate the inherent risks of the sport and that the failure to take additional safety measures did not increase those inherent risks. View "Gee v. National Collegiate Athletic Assocation" on Justia Law