Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, a couple and their two minor children, brought suit against their neighbor after a long history of escalating neighborhood disputes. The neighbor’s husband exhibited a pattern of threatening and violent behavior, including verbal threats, physical assault, gun-related incidents, and other menacing acts. The central incident occurred when the husband violently attacked one plaintiff with a baseball bat, after which he barricaded himself and ultimately died by suicide with a firearm. Plaintiffs alleged that the neighbor was negligent in failing to control her husband, failing to warn others, and providing false assurances about the absence of firearms and the husband’s dangerousness.The Contra Costa County Superior Court, treating the defendant’s demurrer as a motion for judgment on the pleadings, granted it and dismissed the action as to the neighbor. The court found that the complaint failed to establish that she had a special relationship with her husband or the plaintiffs that would give rise to a duty to protect the plaintiffs from his conduct. It also ruled there was no viable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and denied leave to amend, finding no reasonable possibility of amendment. Plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial was denied.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, held that the trial court correctly found no duty for the neighbor to protect plaintiffs from her husband under negligence principles, as the plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing her ability to control him or a special relationship that would give rise to such a duty. The court also determined that, although the existing complaint did not adequately allege negligent misrepresentation due to insufficient allegations of reasonable reliance, plaintiffs should have been granted leave to amend their complaint to attempt to state such a claim. The judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sproul v. Vallee" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs, identified as Jane Roe and John Doe, brought a defamation lawsuit against Jenna Smith and her mother, alleging that Jenna had falsely accused John of sexual assault and Jane of being a non-consensual partner while all were students at a Los Angeles County high school. These accusations, made both to other students and school officials, led to an investigation by the school, which ultimately found John not responsible for the alleged misconduct. The plaintiffs claimed significant reputational and emotional harm from the spread of these accusations and sought damages, injunctive relief, and an order preventing future defamatory statements.After the complaint was filed under pseudonyms, the First Amendment Coalition moved to unseal the plaintiffs’ names. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, however, deemed the motion premature and directed the plaintiffs to file a formal motion to maintain anonymity. Both plaintiffs and defendants filed such motions without supporting evidence. The court granted both motions, allowing all parties to proceed pseudonymously. The Coalition then appealed the order granting anonymity to the plaintiffs, while no party appealed the order regarding defendants.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the matter and applied independent judgment on the constitutional issue. It held that, absent statutory authorization, litigating under pseudonyms should only occur in rare circumstances and requires an evidentiary showing of an overriding interest that outweighs the public’s right of access to court records. The court found that the plaintiffs’ generalized fears of reputational harm and potential future impact on employment were insufficient and unsupported by evidence. It reversed the Superior Court’s order granting plaintiffs anonymity, emphasizing that defamation plaintiffs are generally not entitled to proceed pseudonymously without robust factual support. View "Roe v. Smith" on Justia Law

A wealthy bond trader from New York, through a network of assistants, recruited women from across the United States to travel to his New York penthouse for what was represented as consensual sadomasochistic sexual encounters in exchange for money. The women were enticed with promises of cash, luxury experiences, and travel. However, once there, while some anticipated rough consensual sex, they were subjected to violent, nonconsensual acts, including severe physical abuse, sexual assault, and use of force far beyond what had been described or agreed to. The trader required the women to sign non-disclosure and purported consent agreements, often after they had used alcohol or drugs, and none received copies. The plaintiffs, six women, alleged lasting physical and psychological harm.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York conducted a jury trial on claims under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA) and state tort law. After deliberation, the jury found the defendant liable under the TVPA and awarded each plaintiff $500,000 in compensatory damages. Five plaintiffs received $120,000 in punitive damages each, and one plaintiff received $250,000. The jury did not find the defendant’s assistants liable, except for one minor battery claim. The defendant’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial were denied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, the district court’s jury instructions, and the availability of punitive damages under the TVPA. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict, the instructions properly conveyed the applicable law, and punitive damages are available under the TVPA. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in all respects. View "Moore v. Rubin" on Justia Law

A high-speed police pursuit in Iowa ended with a motorcycle crash that left the rider, Augustin G. Mormann, paralyzed and ultimately led to his death after life support was withdrawn. The chase began when an Iowa State Trooper attempted to stop Mormann for speeding, but he fled, weaving through traffic and entering residential neighborhoods. The trooper disengaged due to safety concerns, but Manchester police officer James Wessels continued the pursuit at speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour. During the chase on a county road, Wessels’s police cruiser struck Mormann's motorcycle, leading to a crash that caused catastrophic injuries. Mormann was hospitalized, tested positive for methamphetamine, and died after choosing to discontinue life support. His family subsequently filed a civil suit against Wessels and the City of Manchester.In the Iowa District Court for Delaware County, the plaintiffs asserted claims including constitutional violations and, ultimately, common law assault and battery. The district court dismissed the constitutional claims after a change in Iowa law but allowed the assault and battery claims to proceed to trial. The jury found Wessels liable for both torts, awarding $4.25 million in compensatory damages and $10,000 in punitive damages. The court denied post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that emergency response immunity under Iowa law does not shield a municipality or its officer from liability when the officer acts with reckless disregard for safety, as found by the jury. The court also concluded that the assault and battery claims were sufficiently pleaded under Iowa’s notice pleading standard, that there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdicts, and that the admission of the decedent’s dying declaration and evidence regarding police recording policies was proper. The punitive damages award was also upheld. View "Mormann v. City of Manchester, Iowa" on Justia Law

A patient received treatment for diabetes at VA facilities from 2016 to 2022. In early 2020, he reported worsening symptoms and expressed dissatisfaction with his medical care, believing negligence contributed to his condition. Two years later, he filed a complaint with the Office of the Inspector General, alleging improper diagnosis and treatment at VA facilities. He also submitted a Standard Form-95 (SF-95) to the Office of the General Counsel, naming himself as claimant and his wife as a witness and property owner. The agency denied his claim, and he was informed of his right to sue. The couple then filed a pro se lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), alleging negligent medical care caused kidney disease. Subsequently, the wife filed her own SF-95, asserting power of attorney, but the agency denied this claim as duplicative and because the couple had already sought judicial remedy.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, following a magistrate judge’s recommendation, dismissed the wife’s claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, dismissed both plaintiffs’ claims as time-barred, and denied leave to amend as futile. The plaintiffs objected, but the district court adopted the recommendations and dismissed the case with prejudice. The plaintiffs appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the district court erred in finding the wife failed to exhaust administrative remedies for her property damage claim, because the administrative filing gave sufficient notice for that claim. However, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal on the alternative ground that all claims were barred by the FTCA’s statute of limitations, as the plaintiffs’ injuries and property damages were or should have been known more than two years before the administrative claims were filed. The denial of leave to amend was also affirmed. View "Ellsworth v. Dallas Texas Department of Veteran Affairs" on Justia Law

OneTaste, Inc., a company founded in 2004 that promoted “orgasmic meditation,” sued Netflix for defamation in 2023. The lawsuit was based on a Netflix documentary that featured allegations from former employee Ayries Blanck, who claimed she was sexually assaulted and abused in connection with her employment and participation in OneTaste’s activities. The documentary included statements from Blanck’s sister and other former associates, as well as references to earlier media investigations and reports about alleged exploitative and abusive practices at OneTaste. OneTaste asserted that Netflix published false statements with actual malice, despite being provided with information it claimed disproved the allegations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed Netflix’s special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16). Netflix argued its conduct was protected activity and that OneTaste could not demonstrate a probability of prevailing, especially on the element of actual malice. After considering the pleadings and both parties’ evidence, the trial court concluded that OneTaste failed to present sufficient evidence that Netflix published the challenged statements with actual malice. The court also found OneTaste’s additional evidence did not establish that Netflix was aware of probable falsity or recklessly disregarded the truth. As a result, the court granted Netflix’s motion to strike the complaint.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that OneTaste did not meet its burden to show a probability of prevailing on the defamation claim because it failed to produce evidence of actual malice by Netflix. The court also rejected OneTaste’s constitutional and public policy challenges to the anti-SLAPP statute and denied its requests for judicial notice of materials not considered by the trial court. View "Onetaste Incorporated v. Netflix, Inc." on Justia Law

David Ray Gunter, who had a mechanical heart valve and required daily anticoagulant medication (Coumadin), was arrested and detained at two North Carolina county jails. During his detention, Gunter did not consistently receive his prescribed medication, missing doses over several days due to failures by the contracted medical provider and jail staff. After his release, he suffered serious medical complications, including blood clots and subsequent surgeries. Gunter alleged these injuries were the result of inadequate medical care during his incarceration.The United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina granted summary judgment for defendants on Gunter’s constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including deliberate indifference and Monell claims, finding insufficient evidence that jail officials or contracted medical providers acted with deliberate indifference or that county policies caused the deprivation. The district court also granted summary judgment to Southern Health Partners, Inc. (SHP) on the medical malpractice claim, finding that Gunter’s expert testimony did not establish a breach of the standard of care by SHP, and excluded expert evidence it found speculative. However, the district court found genuine disputes of fact regarding medical malpractice claims against two individual medical providers, but ultimately found no proximate cause. The district court denied Gunter’s motion to compel deposition of the defendants’ expert as untimely and granted a motion to strike a post-deposition declaration from Gunter’s expert.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Gunter’s deliberate indifference claim against the medical provider defendants, the Monell claim against the counties, and the medical malpractice claims against SHP and two medical providers, holding that genuine disputes of material fact remained. The appellate court also reversed the exclusion of certain expert testimony and the grant of the motion to strike, but affirmed the denial of the motion to compel. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Swink v. Southern Health Partners Inc." on Justia Law

Mark Stanford, an incapacitated resident of a Mississippi nursing facility, suffered severe burns after starting a fire in his room. The Mississippi State Department of Health determined that the nursing center failed to adequately supervise Stanford and maintain a safe environment, citing the facility for violating federal regulations regarding the safety and supervision of residents. Stanford, through his conservator, brought a lawsuit alleging negligence and medical malpractice against the nursing facility and related entities.Brandon Nursing and Rehabilitation Center moved to compel arbitration based on an agreement signed in 2017 by Stanford’s brother, Russell Phillips, who acted as Stanford’s health surrogate during his admission. Stanford opposed arbitration, arguing that the agreement was invalid because Phillips lacked authority under Mississippi’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act to bind Stanford, since Stanford’s adult son—a higher-priority family member under the statute—was reasonably available and willing to serve as surrogate. The United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi held that Phillips was not a proper surrogate under the statute and denied the motion to compel arbitration.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit applied de novo review to both the denial of arbitration and interpretation of state law. The Fifth Circuit determined that the key issue was whether, under Mississippi’s Uniform Health-Care Decisions Act, a health care provider must ensure that no higher-priority family member is “reasonably available” before accepting decisions from a lower-priority family member acting as surrogate. Noting the statutory ambiguity and lack of controlling Mississippi precedents, the Fifth Circuit did not resolve the merits but instead certified this question of state law to the Mississippi Supreme Court for authoritative interpretation. View "Stanford v. Brandon Nursing" on Justia Law

A fatal motor-vehicle collision occurred on September 23, 2021, when Cody Conboy, an employee of Comfort Systems USA (Arkansas), Inc., crossed the center line while driving from his home to a remote jobsite. The accident resulted in the deaths of Tammy Gardner and five-year-old Christopher Skala, and injuries to three-year-old Xavior Skala. Conboy regularly traveled to various worksites as part of his employment, and his employer provided compensation for travel or per diem. The estates of the decedents and the guardian for the injured child initiated legal action against Comfort Systems and Conboy, alleging both direct and vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.The Independence County Circuit Court consolidated the related cases and ultimately granted summary judgment in favor of Comfort Systems. The circuit court concluded that the “going-and-coming” rule, which bars liability for accidents occurring during an employee’s commute, should apply not only in workers’ compensation cases but also in tort cases involving employer liability. The circuit court found that Conboy was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, and that Comfort Systems had no control over his travel. Consequently, all claims against Comfort Systems were dismissed with prejudice, while claims against Conboy remained pending.The Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, and after further appellate proceedings, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed the case. The Supreme Court held that the going-and-coming rule from workers’ compensation law does not govern tort cases involving respondeat superior liability. Instead, Arkansas courts must apply traditional respondeat superior analysis to determine if an employee was acting within the scope of employment. The Supreme Court further found that summary judgment was improper because reasonable minds could differ as to whether Conboy was acting within the scope of his employment. The court also held it was error to grant summary judgment on direct-liability claims where no such relief was requested. The case was reversed and remanded, and the court of appeals’ opinion vacated. View "SKALA v. COMFORT SYSTEMS USA, INC." on Justia Law

Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the New York Legislature enacted Article 8-A of the Workers' Compensation Law to allow both employees and volunteers who participated in rescue, recovery, and cleanup operations at designated sites to seek compensation for health conditions resulting from exposure to hazardous materials. In this case, a volunteer who had received lifetime workers’ compensation benefits for conditions contracted during his service died in July 2016. His spouse filed a claim for death benefits with the Workers' Compensation Board (WCB) more than two years after his death.A Workers’ Compensation Law Judge initially awarded death benefits to the claimant. However, after administrative review requested by the Uninsured Employers’ Fund, the WCB disallowed the award, concluding that the death benefits claim was untimely under Workers’ Compensation Law § 28’s two-year statute of limitations. The Board found that Article 8-A did not exempt such claims from the two-year limit, and that the claim was not for an occupational disease. The Appellate Division, Third Department, affirmed the Board’s decision, holding that the statutory extension for filing claims under Article 8-A (Workers’ Compensation Law § 168) applies only to claims filed by “participants” themselves, not by their survivors or beneficiaries. The dissent would have remitted the matter for further proceedings under Workers’ Compensation Law § 163, regarding notice requirements.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division’s order. The Court held that the statutory extension of time for filing certain claims under Workers’ Compensation Law § 168 applies solely to claims brought by statutorily defined “participants,” and not to claims brought by their survivors or beneficiaries. Consequently, the spouse’s claim for death benefits was barred by the two-year limitation period in Workers’ Compensation Law § 28. View "Matter of Garcia v WTC Volunteer" on Justia Law