Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A former student alleged that the director of his school’s childcare program sexually abused him during the 2001-2002 school year, both on campus and at her residence. The childcare program was operated by West End YMCA on the school’s campus, and the director was employed by West End YMCA, not by the school district. The student, as plaintiff, brought suit against several parties, including the school district, asserting multiple causes of action related to negligence and abuse.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County reviewed the district’s motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication on four causes of action asserted against it. The court granted summary adjudication in favor of the district on two causes—negligent hiring/retention and failure to perform mandatory duties—but denied it as to the first (negligent supervision of students) and fourth (negligent supervision/failure to warn, with respect to Johnson) causes of action. The school district sought writ relief from the partial denial, specifically contesting the denial as to the fourth cause of action.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court focused solely on the fourth cause of action, which alleged negligent supervision of the program director. Applying the standard from C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Dist., the Court of Appeal held that liability for negligent supervision requires actual or constructive knowledge by the district’s supervisory employees of the individual’s dangerous propensities. The record contained no evidence that any district employee had actual or constructive knowledge of the director’s inappropriate conduct. Accordingly, the appellate court granted the writ of mandate and directed the superior court to enter summary adjudication in favor of the district on the third, fourth, and seventh causes of action, awarding costs to the district. View "Rancho Cucamonga Central School Dist. v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law

A fire at a property in Washington, D.C. in 2015 resulted in the deaths of two tenants. The parents of the tenants sued both the property’s record owner, Len Salas, and his father, Max Salas, who managed the property, for wrongful death in a D.C. trial court. The jury found both defendants jointly and severally liable and awarded multimillion-dollar verdicts. After the verdict, both Len and Max filed for bankruptcy in different jurisdictions. In Max’s bankruptcy case, the court held he was entitled to an unlimited homestead exemption in the property. Subsequently, in Len’s bankruptcy case in Tennessee, the estate’s interest in certain avoidance and recovery rights under the Bankruptcy Code was sold at auction, with the plaintiffs purchasing those rights.The plaintiffs then filed an adversary proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, seeking to avoid transfers and recover property. The bankruptcy court denied their motion for summary judgment and granted partial summary judgment to Max on the fraudulent conveyance claims. Plaintiffs sought and received leave from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee to pursue an interlocutory appeal. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s partial grant and denial of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, but did not certify the order for appeal or designate it as a final order.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that it lacked jurisdiction. The court determined that because the district court’s order was neither final nor properly certified for interlocutory appeal, it could not exercise appellate jurisdiction under the relevant statutes. As a result, the Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Brekelmans v. Salas" on Justia Law

An employee of an independent home inspection company was injured while inspecting a private residence, slipping and falling on outdoor steps made of wooden railroad ties. The inspector was hired by his employer to conduct a safety inspection at the home for the homeowner's insurance company. The homeowner did not direct his work, provide tools, or control how he performed the inspection. The inspector admitted the steps were visible and that he was not watching where he stepped, and he received workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries. He and his wife sued the homeowner for negligence, premises liability, and loss of consortium, alleging the steps were hazardous.The Superior Court of Ventura County granted summary judgment for the homeowner, relying on the Privette doctrine, which generally prevents employees of independent contractors from suing the person who hired the contractor for work-related injuries. The plaintiffs argued that the homeowner was not a “hirer” under Privette and that there was a factual dispute about whether the “concealed hazard” exception from Kinsman v. Unocal Corporation applied. They pointed to evidence that the steps were sometimes slippery and that the homeowner had mentioned this to her gardener years earlier.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the judgment. The court held that the Privette doctrine applied because the homeowner, by allowing the inspection and paying for insurance, was effectively a hirer. The court further found that the concealed hazard exception did not apply, as there was no evidence the condition was concealed or that the inspector could not have discovered it with reasonable care. The court affirmed summary judgment for the homeowner, and the derivative loss of consortium claim failed as well. View "Andrews v. Wagner" on Justia Law

Juan Mendez was approached by two Chicago police officers investigating a gunshot detected near his home early one morning. As the officers arrived and questioned Mendez and a juvenile on the porch, Mendez suddenly fled, jumping a fence and running down an alley. The officers pursued him, with one warning that Mendez had something in his waistband and then in his hand. During the chase, Mendez fell, got up, and turned toward the officers with an object in his hand. One officer, perceiving a threat, shot Mendez three times, resulting in paralysis from the waist down.Mendez filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, against the City of Chicago and the two officers, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, battery under Illinois law, and seeking indemnification from the City. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that, based on body-camera footage and the circumstances, a reasonable officer would have had probable cause to believe Mendez posed a threat to the officers’ safety. The court also found that, without a Fourth Amendment violation, Mendez could not prevail on his state law claims. Mendez appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the record independently and affirmed the district court. The Seventh Circuit held that Officer Szczur had probable cause to believe that Mendez posed a threat of serious physical harm under the totality of the circumstances, making the use of deadly force reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court also held that the state law battery and indemnification claims failed for the same reasons. The judgment for the defendants was affirmed. View "Mendez v City of Chicago" on Justia Law

An employee working as a practice manager at a healthcare facility in Cleveland, Tennessee, claimed that she contracted COVID-19 in December 2020 through workplace exposure to infected patients and coworkers. She sought workers’ compensation benefits, alleging disabling lung injuries and long-term complications as a result. Initially, the employer paid temporary disability benefits but later denied her request for total disability, relying on the opinion of a pulmonologist who concluded that her exposure to the virus could not be attributed primarily to her workplace given widespread community transmission.The Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims considered the employer’s motion for summary judgment, supported by the pulmonologist’s opinion that workplace exposure could not be established as the primary cause of the illness. The court excluded certain medical evidence offered by the employee and denied her request for a continuance to obtain a new medical expert. It subsequently granted summary judgment for the employer, finding that the employee had failed to present expert medical evidence of causation, an essential element of her claim.On appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board affirmed, holding that the employee’s challenge to the denial of a continuance was untimely and that summary judgment was appropriate due to her lack of expert proof on medical causation. The Supreme Court of Tennessee Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel reviewed the case and affirmed the Appeals Board’s judgment. The court held that, where an employee fails to provide expert medical evidence establishing that her injury arose primarily out of her employment, summary judgment for the employer is warranted. The court also found no reversible error in the handling of procedural issues and clarified that earlier case law regarding employer filing obligations did not preclude the employer’s defenses in this context. View "Graham v. CHI Memorial Healthcare System" on Justia Law

Kevil Wingo, a pretrial detainee at the Cobb County Adult Detention Center, died from a perforated gastric ulcer after repeatedly complaining of severe abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting. Jail nurses employed by WellStar Health Systems misdiagnosed his symptoms as drug withdrawal ("detox") and assured the sheriff’s deputies overseeing security that Wingo was medically stable. Despite Wingo’s persistent requests to be sent to a hospital and his deteriorating condition, the deputies deferred to the medical staff’s judgment, consistent with their training not to make independent medical decisions. Wingo was eventually moved to a padded cell for observation, where he died within hours.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted summary judgment in favor of the sheriff’s deputies on the plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, finding that they were protected by qualified immunity because they reasonably relied on medical professionals’ assessments. The district court also granted summary judgment to Deputy Wilkerson on a state law negligence claim, concluding that the plaintiffs’ expert could not establish causation with medical certainty regarding whether Wilkerson’s actions affected Wingo’s chance of survival.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Eleventh Circuit held that nonmedical jail officers cannot be found liable for deliberate indifference to a detainee’s serious medical needs when they reasonably rely on the advice of medical professionals. The court further found that the absence of expert testimony establishing causation prevented the state law negligence claim against Deputy Wilkerson from surviving summary judgment. Thus, all claims against the defendant deputies were disposed of in their favor, and the district court’s rulings were affirmed. View "Wingo v. Harris" on Justia Law

A property management company leased a single-family home to a tenant under an agreement that limited pets to “outside cat & chickens,” as handwritten in the lease. Despite this, the tenant kept two large dogs—a pit bull and a German shepherd—at the property. Neighbors described these dogs as aggressive, vicious, and frequently unrestrained, with some reporting prior biting incidents and expressing fear for their children’s safety. The landlord regularly visited the property but claimed to be unaware of the dogs' presence or their behavior. One day, while retrieving a baseball from the yard, a young boy was bitten by the pit bull.The boy’s father, acting as his guardian, sued the landlord in the Second District Court, Weber County, alleging negligence for allowing a dangerous condition—the pit bull—on the premises. Following discovery, the district court granted summary judgment to the landlord, holding that, as a matter of law, the landlord did not owe a duty to protect third parties from injuries caused by the tenant’s dog. The court also denied the plaintiff’s postjudgment motion challenging this ruling.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah considered whether Utah law recognizes circumstances in which a landlord may be held liable in negligence for injuries inflicted by a tenant’s dog. The court examined several premises liability theories, including those treating the dog as a dangerous condition or activity on the land, and reviewed relevant provisions from the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Ultimately, the court found no basis under Utah law, or the proposed extensions, to impose a duty on the landlord in this context. The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that the landlord did not owe a duty to protect third parties from injuries caused by a tenant’s dog under the facts presented. View "Tesch v. Bonneville" on Justia Law

Two young children, ages four and two, were severely injured after falling from a second-floor bedroom window in an apartment building in Lodi, California, where they lived with their mother. The accident occurred shortly after the property owner replaced the apartment’s windows during a renovation that did not include installing fall prevention devices on the upper-floor windows. The children’s guardian ad litem sued the property owner and its manager, alleging negligence based on both general negligence and negligence per se, claiming that the absence of fall prevention devices violated the California Building Standards Code and proximately caused the injuries.The case was heard in the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda. Prior to trial, the defendants sought to defeat the negligence per se claim, arguing the building was exempt from current code requirements because it complied with the code at the time of its original construction in 1980. The trial court denied their motion, allowing both negligence theories to proceed to trial. After plaintiffs presented their case, the court granted a nonsuit for the entire complaint, ruling there was no duty owed under general negligence given lack of foreseeability, and that the window replacement qualified for a code exemption, negating negligence per se.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the matter de novo. The appellate court affirmed the nonsuit on the general negligence claim, finding the harm was not sufficiently foreseeable to impose a duty. However, it reversed the nonsuit as to negligence per se, holding that replacing the window did not qualify for the “original materials” exemption in the Building Code, and thus the defendants were required to comply with current safety standards. The case was remanded for retrial on the negligence per se claim. View "Jimenez v. Hayes Apartment Homes" on Justia Law

A man seeking treatment for mental health issues voluntarily admitted himself to a hospital in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Medical staff determined he needed emergency medication and began to physically restrain him when he refused a shot. An off-duty police officer, working as a hospital security guard and wearing his police uniform, intervened. He twisted the patient's arm behind his back, and when the patient pulled away to relieve pain, the officer punched the patient’s head into a cinderblock wall, causing head trauma. The patient remained nonviolent throughout and was smaller in stature than those restraining him.Following the incident, the Chattanooga Police Department conducted an internal investigation. Opinions within the review process were divided, but the interim chief ultimately found no policy violation. The patient filed suit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, multiple state-law torts, and municipal liability against the City for failing to train or supervise the officer. The district court granted summary judgment for the officer on all but the assault and battery claim, finding qualified immunity on the excessive force claim, and granted summary judgment for the City on all claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Sixth Circuit held that, although a reasonable juror could find the officer’s use of force excessive under the circumstances, the law was not clearly established that an officer in this situation could not use such force. Therefore, the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. The court also found that the City was not liable under Monell since the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that a final policymaker’s actions were the moving force behind his injury. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Guptill v. City of Chattanooga" on Justia Law

A member of the Kuwaiti royal family was defrauded by a Baltimore restaurateur, who convinced her to send nearly $7.8 million under the guise of investing in real estate and restaurant ventures in the United States. The restaurateur used the funds to acquire multiple properties, including a condominium in New York City and a home in Pikesville, Maryland, but secretly held ownership in his own name and for his personal use. After the fraud was uncovered, the investor sued the restaurateur for fraud and sought to impose a constructive trust over the properties purchased with her funds. Around the same time, she attempted to file a notice of lis pendens to protect her interest in the Pikesville property, but the notice was recorded against the wrong property and was thus ineffective.During discovery, the investor learned that World Business Lenders, LLC (WBL) had issued three loans to the restaurateur, each secured by properties acquired with her funds. She then filed suit against WBL in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, alleging that WBL aided and abetted the restaurateur’s fraud by encumbering the properties with liens, thereby hindering her ability to recover on any judgment. Following a bench trial, the district court found for WBL on two of the loans, but found WBL liable for aiding and abetting fraud in relation to the loan secured by the Pikesville home, awarding compensatory and punitive damages.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment for WBL on the first two loans but reversed as to the Pikesville loan. The Fourth Circuit held that WBL was not willfully blind to the restaurateur’s fraud in any of the loans as a matter of law and remanded with instructions to enter final judgment for WBL on all claims. View "Al-Sabah v. World Business Lenders, LLC" on Justia Law