Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In a personal injury case, the plaintiff, Jerry Cradduck, sued Hilton Domestic Operating Company, Inc. for negligence related to an incident at a spa in 2019. During the trial, Cradduck's attorney, Todd Samuels, failed to appear due to a medical emergency, leading to a series of events that included a mistrial and ultimately the dismissal of the complaint. The trial court dismissed the case primarily because Samuels did not provide timely evidence of his medical condition and continued to work on other cases shortly after claiming he was too ill to speak.The Superior Court of Riverside County initially granted an eight-day continuance after Samuels' medical emergency but later dismissed the case when neither Cradduck nor Samuels appeared as ordered. Samuels' failure to provide adequate medical evidence and his continued legal work in other cases led the court to question the legitimacy of his claims. The court also found Samuels' conduct sufficiently egregious to warrant a referral to the State Bar of California.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The appellate court affirmed the judgment, agreeing that the trial court had acted within its discretion based on the evidence and circumstances presented. The appellate court also referred attorney Narine Mkrtchyan to the State Bar for her uncivil and disrespectful conduct during the proceedings. The judgment was affirmed, and the defendants were awarded their costs on appeal. View "Cradduck v. Hilton Domestic Operating Co." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, Kathleen Keaten and her daughter Delaney Keaten, lived in a Section 8 housing complex managed by the defendants, Terra Management Group, LLC, and Littleton Main Street LLC. They complained about physical ailments due to suspected methamphetamine fumes from the apartment below. The defendants evicted the tenant in the lower unit but failed to preserve evidence from the apartment. The Keatens later filed a lawsuit under the Colorado Premises Liability Act, alleging permanent injuries from the fumes.The Arapahoe County District Court held a bench trial and ruled in favor of the Keatens, awarding significant damages. The court found that the chemical fumes from the lower unit caused the Keatens' injuries, relying on expert testimony and meth residue levels. The court also drew an adverse inference against the defendants for failing to preserve evidence from the lower unit.The defendants appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the defendants should have known about their potential liability and upheld the adverse inference sanction. The defendants then petitioned the Supreme Court of Colorado for certiorari review.The Supreme Court of Colorado held that a duty to preserve evidence arises when a party knows or should know that litigation is pending or reasonably foreseeable. The court concluded that any error in the trial court's adverse inference sanction was harmless because the causation finding was based on independent evidence. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. View "Terra Mgmt. Grp. v. Keaten" on Justia Law

Connie Grabowski, a second-grade teacher for the South Bend Community School Corporation, was involved in an incident where a student, S.J., caused her to trip and fall. Grabowski filled out a worker’s compensation accident report form, naming S.J., who was the grandson of a school board member. Following this, the school conducted an investigation into Grabowski’s conduct, placed her on administrative leave, and offered her a last-chance agreement, which she declined, leading to her resignation.Grabowski filed a lawsuit for wrongful termination, alleging that the school retaliated against her for indicating an intent to file a worker’s compensation claim. The trial court denied the school’s motion for summary judgment, and the case proceeded to trial. The jury found in favor of Grabowski, awarding her $600,000 in damages. The school appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying its motions for judgment on the evidence.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that there was no evidence that the school discharged Grabowski solely to avoid workers’ compensation liability. The court emphasized that Grabowski’s own theory of the case was that the school’s actions were motivated by the desire to protect the board member’s grandson, not solely to avoid workers’ compensation liability. Therefore, the jury’s verdict could not stand, and the case was remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the school corporation. View "South Bend Community School Corporation v. Grabowski" on Justia Law

Randy Wiertella died in the Lake County Adult Detention Facility on December 10, 2018. Dennis Wiertella, as the Administrator of Randy's estate, filed a lawsuit claiming that Randy's constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by Jail staff Diane Snow, RN, and Christina Watson, LPN. Randy had been booked into the Jail without his essential medications for heart disease, diabetes, high blood pressure, and a psychiatric disorder. Despite multiple requests, he did not receive all necessary medications, leading to his death from hypertensive cardiovascular disease.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio denied Snow and Watson's motion for summary judgment, which sought dismissal based on qualified immunity. The court found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether Snow and Watson were aware of the substantial risk to Randy's health and whether they failed to respond reasonably.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Snow and Watson were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that both nurses were aware of Randy's serious medical conditions and the need for continuous medication. Despite this knowledge, they failed to ensure that Randy received his essential medications in a timely manner. The court concluded that their actions were unreasonable and violated Randy's constitutional rights. The court affirmed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings on the Estate's § 1983 claim. View "Wiertella v. Lake County" on Justia Law

Allen Turner died from surgical complications, leading his daughter, Norkesia Turner, to sue Drs. William Thompson and Heather Nolan, and their employer, the Medical Center of Central Georgia, Inc. (MCCG), for medical malpractice and wrongful death. The jury awarded Turner approximately $7.2 million in noneconomic damages for wrongful death. MCCG moved to reduce this award to the statutory cap of $350,000 under OCGA § 51-13-1 (b) and (c), but the trial court denied the motion, citing the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, which found such caps unconstitutional.MCCG appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court's decision, reasoning that the Nestlehutt decision foreclosed MCCG's argument. The Court of Appeals held that the $7.2 million award did not need to be reduced to the statutory cap. MCCG then petitioned the Supreme Court of Georgia for a writ of certiorari, which was granted to address whether the Court of Appeals properly applied the precedent regarding the constitutional right to trial by jury.The Supreme Court of Georgia did not decide whether the application of OCGA § 51-13-1’s caps to the $7.2 million award would violate Turner’s constitutional right to a jury trial. Instead, it found that the lower courts had not applied the correct analytical framework from Nestlehutt to the wrongful death claim. The Supreme Court clarified that the holding in Nestlehutt was specific to medical malpractice claims and did not control the issue in this case. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "THE MEDICAL CENTER OF CENTRAL GEORGIA, INC. v. TURNER" on Justia Law

A local housing authority, authorized by state statute and activated by city government, faced a personal injury lawsuit. The plaintiff alleged that the authority negligently failed to ensure the safety of the apartment complex where she was shot. The authority claimed sovereign immunity, arguing it was an instrumentality of the state, a municipal corporation, and an instrumentality of the municipality.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the housing authority, concluding it was protected by sovereign immunity under all three claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed, focusing on the authority's status as an instrumentality of the municipality. The appellate court relied on case law regarding state instrumentalities and concluded that the authority was entitled to sovereign immunity.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the Court of Appeals had incorrectly applied state instrumentality case law to determine municipal instrumentality immunity. The Supreme Court noted that the Georgia Constitution does not explicitly extend sovereign immunity to municipalities or their instrumentalities, and any such immunity must be derived from common law as of 1776. The Court found that neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals had conducted the necessary common law analysis to determine if the housing authority was entitled to sovereign immunity as an instrumentality of the municipality.The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further consideration under the proper analytical approach, specifically examining the common law scope and nature of sovereign immunity as it applied to municipal instrumentalities. View "GUY v. HOUSING AUTHORITY OF THE CITY OF AUGUSTA" on Justia Law

Bettie Leverette was shopping at a Walmart store in Conyers, Georgia, when two Walmart employees moving a 2,000-pound box on a pallet jack backed into her. Leverette initially reported no significant injury but later went to the hospital with head pain, blurred vision, and nausea. She was diagnosed with a mild traumatic brain injury and post-concussion syndrome. Leverette sued Walmart, claiming her symptoms were caused by the employees' negligence. At trial, Leverette's family and expert witnesses testified about her injuries and the projected costs of her future care, estimated between $2 million and $3.5 million. Walmart argued that Leverette's symptoms were due to pre-existing conditions and presented expert testimony to support this.The trial court gave a jury instruction on nominal damages at Walmart's request. Walmart suggested in closing arguments that nominal damages could be as low as $10 or as high as $500 but should not be $3 million. Leverette's counsel argued for over $5 million in damages. The jury awarded Leverette $1 million in nominal damages, leaving other damage categories blank. Walmart moved for a new trial, arguing the award was excessive, but the trial court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on precedent that nominal damages have no maximum limit.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine if the $1 million award exceeded the limits on nominal damages under Georgia law. The court concluded that nominal damages, as adopted from English common law, are intended to be a trivial sum, important for the fact of the award but not meaningful in amount. The court overruled the Court of Appeals' precedent allowing large nominal damages and vacated the judgment. The case was remanded for the lower courts to resolve case-specific issues, including whether the error was invited by Walmart and the appropriate remedy. View "WALMART STORES EAST, LP v. LEVERETTE" on Justia Law

Robert Carbone, a Connecticut resident, sued two Swiss organizations and several individuals from California, Illinois, and Switzerland for defamation and other tortious conduct. Carbone, a member of the two Swiss organizations, claimed that the defendants used websites to publish defamatory statements about him and facilitate his removal from the organizations. He filed the lawsuit in Ohio, arguing that the defamatory statements passed through servers located in Ohio, which hosted the organizations' websites.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio dismissed Carbone's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found that Carbone failed to establish that the defendants had sufficient contacts with Ohio to justify the court's jurisdiction over them. The defendants had not purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of acting in Ohio, as the servers' location in Ohio was chosen by third parties, not the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the defendants did not purposefully avail themselves of the privilege of acting in Ohio, as their only connection to the state was the location of the servers, which was a decision made by third parties. The court also found that Carbone's claims did not arise from the defendants' activities in Ohio, as the allegedly defamatory statements were not directed at Ohio or its residents. Therefore, the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants in Ohio would not comply with the Due Process Clause. View "Carbone v. Kaal" on Justia Law

Carl and Roberta Culp filed a lawsuit alleging federal and state law claims against various defendants, including Fort Wayne and Allen County police officers. The claims included excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, criminal mischief, and violations of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The incident in question occurred on August 20, 2018, when Carl Culp, a double amputee, expressed suicidal intentions during a psychiatric appointment, leading to police intervention.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on most claims, leaving only Carl Culp’s § 1983 excessive force claim and state law claims against Officers Woods and Schulien for trial. A jury found in favor of the defendants on all claims except for Roberta Culp’s state law battery claim against Officer Woods, awarding her nominal damages of $1. The Culps appealed the summary judgment decision, and Woods and Schulien cross-appealed the denial of costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants, as the defendants’ brief complied with the local rules. The court also found that the Culps failed to present evidence of discrimination or failure to accommodate under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The court assumed, without deciding, that these laws applied to law enforcement actions but concluded that the evidence did not support the Culps' claims.Regarding the cross-appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to deny costs to both parties, recognizing the mixed outcome of the case. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in its entirety. View "Culp v. Caudill" on Justia Law

In 2012, Bill Simmon, an employee of Vermont Community Access Media, Inc. (VCAM), invited Ciara Kilburn and her minor sister Brona to VCAM’s premises to record a commercial. Simmon secretly recorded the sisters changing clothes using VCAM’s equipment and shared the videos online, where they were viewed millions of times. In 2020, the Kilburns filed a lawsuit against Simmon for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), and negligence per se, and against VCAM for vicarious liability, negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED).The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, dismissed claims against Vermont State Colleges and did not instruct the jury on vicarious liability or NIED. The jury found Simmon liable for invasion of privacy and IIED, and VCAM liable for negligent supervision. Each plaintiff was awarded $1.75 million in compensatory damages against both Simmon and VCAM, and $2 million in punitive damages against Simmon. The court denied VCAM’s motions to exclude evidence, for a new trial, and for remittitur, and also denied plaintiffs’ request to hold VCAM jointly and severally liable for Simmon’s damages.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. It held that emotional-distress damages were available to plaintiffs for VCAM’s negligent supervision because the claim was based on intentional torts (invasion of privacy and IIED) for which such damages are recoverable. The court found no error in the jury’s award of damages, concluding that the evidence supported the verdict and that the damages were not excessive. The court also ruled that plaintiffs waived their claim for joint and several liability by not objecting to the jury instructions or verdict form before deliberations. View "Kilburn v. Simmon" on Justia Law