Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A three-year-old child, Charlie L., was brought to the emergency department at PIH Health Hospital-Whittier with abdominal pain. The emergency department physician ordered "stat" X-ray and ultrasound images, which were remotely reviewed by Dr. Peyman Kangavari, an on-call radiologist. Dr. Kangavari reported that the images showed no bowel obstruction. The child was discharged but returned to the hospital shortly after with severe symptoms, leading to multiple surgeries and long-term health issues.In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Charlie L., through his mother, filed a negligence action against Dr. Kangavari, alleging medical malpractice for failing to diagnose the bowel obstruction. Dr. Kangavari moved for summary judgment, supported by an expert declaration from Dr. John Lieu, asserting adherence to the standard of care. Charlie L. opposed the motion with an expert declaration from Dr. Ravi Srinivasa. The trial court ruled that Health and Safety Code section 1799.110 applied, requiring stricter qualifications for expert witnesses in emergency medical cases. The court found Dr. Lieu qualified but Dr. Srinivasa not, and granted summary judgment for Dr. Kangavari.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1799.110’s stricter qualifications for expert witnesses apply to on-call radiologists providing emergency medical services. The court found that neither Dr. Lieu nor Dr. Srinivasa met the qualifications required under section 1799.110. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment for Dr. Kangavari and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Charlie L. v. Kangavari" on Justia Law

In January 2021, Bertrand Nedoss, an 87-year-old resident of an assisted-living facility in Morton Grove, Illinois, wandered out of the facility, developed hypothermia, and died of cardiac arrest. His estate filed a negligence and wrongful-death lawsuit against Welltower Tenant Group, the facility’s owner, and Frontier Management, its operator. Welltower and Frontier were insured under a "claims made" policy by Church Mutual Insurance Company, effective from July 1, 2020, to July 1, 2021. The estate filed the lawsuit in October 2021, after the policy expired. However, nine days after Bertrand’s death, an attorney for the Nedoss family sent a letter to the facility, claiming an attorney’s lien and demanding evidence preservation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois ruled that the attorney’s letter qualified as a "claim" under the policy, triggering Church Mutual’s duty to defend. The court entered partial summary judgment for Welltower and Frontier and stayed the rest of the federal case pending the outcome of the state lawsuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. On the eve of oral argument, Welltower and Frontier settled with the estate, and the state-court case was dismissed. This development mooted the appeal. The stay order was the only possible basis for appellate jurisdiction, and the partial summary judgment was not a final order. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that the dismissal of the state-court case removed the justification for the stay and rendered any appellate ruling on the stay irrelevant. View "Church Mutual Insurance Company v. Frontier Management, LLC" on Justia Law

Father Constantine P. Rogakos, an 86-year-old retired Greek-Orthodox priest, visited Bon Secours-DePaul Medical Center for an outpatient abdominal ultrasound. He used a cane due to a shuffled gait and had a history of falls. At the hospital, he was provided a wheelchair to reach the waiting room. In the ultrasound room, he was instructed to change into a medical gown. While changing, he leaned on a wheeled hospital stretcher, which moved, causing him to fall and sustain severe injuries. He later died from these injuries.The Administrator of his estate filed a wrongful death and survivorship action against the hospital, alleging negligence by the sonographer, Joanna Regan, for failing to assist and ensure the stretcher's wheels were locked. The circuit court denied the hospital's motion to strike and refused to allow a hospital stretcher as a demonstrative exhibit. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding $2,000,000. The hospital's post-trial motions were denied.The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the circuit court's decisions, including the admissibility of Father Rogakos' statements under the Dead Man’s Statute, the refusal to grant a multiple causes jury instruction, and the exclusion of the stretcher as a demonstrative exhibit. The hospital appealed to the Supreme Court of Virginia.The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment. It held that the Dead Man’s Statute did not preclude the introduction of Father Rogakos' statements as they were conveyed by non-interested witnesses. The court also found no error in the circuit court's refusal to grant the multiple causes jury instruction, exclusion of the stretcher as a demonstrative exhibit, and denial of the hospital's motion to strike, as the evidence supported the jury's verdict. View "Bon Secours-DePaul Medical Center v. Rogakos-Russell" on Justia Law

Mark Uhlenbrock was convicted by a jury for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(B) by posting nude images and videos of his ex-girlfriend, YT, on Reddit, along with explicit stories written in her name. Some of the images were taken with her consent during their relationship, while others were recorded without her knowledge. Uhlenbrock's posts included personal details about YT, such as her occupation and employer, and invited men to proposition her. YT discovered the posts through a family friend and reported Uhlenbrock to the FBI.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas denied Uhlenbrock's motion to dismiss the indictment on First Amendment and vagueness grounds. During the trial, the court allowed testimony about Uhlenbrock's prior similar conduct, which included a 2016 guilty plea for cyberstalking YT. The jury found Uhlenbrock guilty, and the district court sentenced him to 60 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and restitution. The court also revoked his supervised release from the 2016 case and sentenced him to an additional 12 months in prison. Uhlenbrock appealed both the new conviction and the revocation of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions. The court held that Uhlenbrock's posts constituted unprotected defamation and that the application of § 2261A(2)(B) did not violate the First Amendment. The court also found that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Uhlenbrock's prior conduct. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Uhlenbrock intended to harass or intimidate YT and that his conduct caused her substantial emotional distress. The court also rejected Uhlenbrock's claims of constructive amendment of the indictment and double jeopardy. View "USA v. Uhlenbrock" on Justia Law

A disabled woman, T.M.B., was sexually assaulted by an employee of West Mont, a nonprofit organization contracted by the State of Montana to provide community-based services for developmentally disabled individuals. T.M.B. sued both the State and West Mont, alleging they owed her a nondelegable duty of care. The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants, concluding neither owed a nondelegable duty of care for the employee’s criminal acts. T.M.B. appealed.The District Court of the First Judicial District, Lewis and Clark County, found that the State had satisfied its statutory obligations by contracting with West Mont to provide services and did not owe a nondelegable duty to T.M.B. because she was not under state custody or control. The court also found that West Mont did not owe a nondelegable duty, as there was no statute or rule explicitly stating such a duty existed for state contractors operating community homes.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It affirmed the District Court’s decision regarding the State, agreeing that the State did not have a close, continuing relationship with T.M.B. that would impose a nondelegable duty. However, the Supreme Court reversed the decision regarding West Mont, finding that the relationship between West Mont and T.M.B. was sufficiently close and continuing to impose a nondelegable duty under Restatement (Second) of Agency § 214. The court held that West Mont had a duty to protect T.M.B. from harm due to her dependence on their care and supervision. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "T.M.B v. West Mont" on Justia Law

Jack Greener, a Brazilian jiu jitsu (BJJ) student, suffered a fractured neck and spinal cord injury during a sparring session at Del Mar Jiu Jitsu Club, owned by M. Phelps, Inc. Greener sued, alleging negligence by his instructor, Francisco Iturralde, and vicarious liability by M. Phelps, Inc. The defendants argued that the primary assumption of risk doctrine absolved them of liability, as BJJ is an inherently risky sport.The Superior Court of San Diego County instructed the jury using option 2 of CACI No. 471, which holds a sports instructor liable if they unreasonably increased the risks to the student beyond those inherent in the sport. The jury found in favor of Greener, awarding him $46 million in damages. The defendants appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in its jury instructions and verdict form, and in excluding certain evidence.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the trial court correctly instructed the jury on option 2 of CACI No. 471, as the evidence showed that Iturralde's actions unreasonably increased the risk of injury to Greener. The court emphasized that Iturralde, as an instructor with superior knowledge and skill, should be held to a different standard than a student coparticipant. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence, as it was either irrelevant or cumulative.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the trial court properly applied the increased risk standard and that the exclusion of evidence did not constitute an abuse of discretion. The court suggested that the Judicial Council Advisory Committee on Civil Jury Instructions consider revising CACI No. 471 to minimize confusion and avoid the need to cross-refer to other instructions. View "Greener v. M. Phelps, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Lisa Lombardo, Daniel Bates, and James Bates sued Gramercy Court as heirs of Elizabeth Stein, alleging wrongful death, negligence, elder abuse, and gross negligence due to the care Stein received at Gramercy Court's nursing facility. Stein developed bedsores and died shortly after being transferred back to the hospital. Gramercy Court petitioned to compel arbitration based on an agreement Lombardo signed on Stein's behalf, but the trial court denied the petition.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found that Stein's durable power of attorney did not grant Lombardo the authority to sign arbitration agreements on Stein's behalf. The court also determined that Stein did not give Lombardo ostensible authority through her actions. Additionally, the court ruled that the arbitration agreement was not enforceable against Lombardo's or the other plaintiffs' individual claims.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that Lombardo did not have actual or ostensible authority to bind Stein to the arbitration agreement. The durable power of attorney did not explicitly grant Lombardo the authority to enter into arbitration agreements, and there was no evidence that Stein's conduct led Gramercy Court to believe Lombardo had such authority. The court also concluded that the arbitration agreement did not apply to the plaintiffs' individual claims, as Lombardo was not a party to the agreement in her individual capacity. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's order denying Gramercy Court's petition to compel arbitration. View "Lombardo v. Gramercy Court" on Justia Law

Dustin Clover sustained injuries while removing irrigation drip tape from a seed field while working for Crookham Company in 2018. Clover filed a complaint against Crookham, alleging that his injuries fell within an exception to the exclusive remedy rule under the Worker’s Compensation statutes, which allows for a separate civil action if the employer commits an act of “willful or unprovoked physical aggression.” Crookham moved for summary judgment, arguing that Clover failed to provide evidence supporting his claim. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of Crookham. Clover’s motion for reconsideration was also denied, leading to this appeal.The district court of the Third Judicial District of Idaho found that Clover’s injuries occurred during the course of his employment and were covered by worker’s compensation. The court concluded that Clover did not present sufficient evidence to show that Crookham’s actions fell under the “willful or unprovoked physical aggression” exception to the exclusive remedy rule. The court noted that there were no prior incidents or complaints about the drip tape lifter’s safety and that Crookham had used the equipment for nine seasons without injury.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that Clover failed to demonstrate that Crookham consciously disregarded knowledge that the drip tape lifter was unsafe. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain evidence and denying Clover’s motion for reconsideration. The court concluded that Clover did not present new facts sufficient to raise a genuine dispute of material fact. Consequently, the district court’s grant of summary judgment and denial of the motion for reconsideration were affirmed. Crookham was awarded costs as the prevailing party on appeal. View "Clover v. Crookham Company" on Justia Law

Houston Police Department Officers Richard Corral and C. Goodman were involved in a high-speed chase of a suspect who had solicited an undercover detective and fled in a stolen vehicle. During the pursuit, Corral's patrol car hit a curb and collided with a pickup truck driven by Ruben Rodriguez and Frederick Okon. Corral claimed the accident occurred because his brakes did not stop him in time. Rodriguez and Okon sued the City of Houston, alleging Corral's negligent driving caused their injuries.The trial court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that Corral was protected by official immunity because he acted in good faith and that the emergency exception to the Tort Claims Act applied. The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas affirmed, holding that a fact issue existed regarding whether Corral knew his brakes were not functioning properly, which precluded summary judgment.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that Corral acted in good faith as a matter of law. The Court found that Corral's statement about the brakes not working did not reasonably support an inference that he had prior awareness of any defect. The Court emphasized that the summary-judgment evidence showed Corral's brakes were functional but did not stop him in time. The Court also held that the City conclusively established Corral's good faith in making the turn during the pursuit, and the plaintiffs failed to raise a fact issue to controvert this proof.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the case, holding that the City’s governmental immunity was not waived under the Tort Claims Act because Corral was protected by official immunity. View "CITY OF HOUSTON v. RODRIGUEZ" on Justia Law

A fugitive led police on a high-speed chase in Austin, during which Officer Bullock collided with Noel Powell's minivan, causing injuries. Powell, who was not at fault, sued the City of Austin for damages. The City claimed immunity under the Tort Claims Act's emergency exception, which applies if the officer was responding to an emergency and did not act with reckless disregard for safety.The trial court denied the City's plea to the jurisdiction, and the City appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Third District of Texas affirmed, finding a fact issue regarding whether Officer Bullock's actions were reckless, thus requiring further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the officer's conduct did not violate any specific law or ordinance applicable to emergency actions. The court also found that Powell did not raise a fact issue regarding the officer's recklessness. Consequently, the Tort Claims Act did not waive the City's immunity. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and rendered judgment dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. View "THE CITY OF AUSTIN v. POWELL" on Justia Law