Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A federal inmate, Dustin Rowland, developed a hernia after a pretrial detention fight. A physician deemed the hernia "reducible and stable," recommending non-surgical treatments. Rowland, desiring surgery, utilized the Bureau of Prisons' (BOP) Administrative Remedial Program, which involves a four-step grievance process. His initial requests were denied, but a later appeal led to approval for a surgical consultation. However, Rowland's final appeal was denied for procedural reasons, and he did not correct the deficiency. He eventually received surgery but filed a lawsuit claiming deliberate indifference to his medical needs, seeking damages under Bivens, injunctive relief for post-operative care, and a negligence claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed Rowland's Bivens claim, granted summary judgment against his injunctive relief claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and dismissed the FTCA claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction due to non-exhaustion. Rowland's motion for reconsideration was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the Bivens claim, noting that Rowland's case presented a new context not covered by previous Bivens cases and that the BOP's Administrative Remedial Program provided an adequate alternative remedy. The court also upheld the summary judgment on the injunctive relief claim, as Rowland failed to exhaust administrative remedies specifically for post-operative care. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the FTCA claim, emphasizing the jurisdictional requirement of exhausting administrative remedies before filing suit. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of Rowland's Rule 60(b) motion for reconsideration. View "Rowland v. Matevousian" on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Bryan C. Fagan, a surgeon, who called Judy Faulkner, a surgical scheduler, a vulgar name in the presence of several operating room personnel. Faulkner was not present during the incident but later heard about it from other staff members. She sued Fagan for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, claiming that the vulgarity constituted an attack on her professional abilities and was therefore slander per se.The Lee County County Court held a bench trial and ruled in favor of Faulkner on the defamation claim, awarding her $30,000 in damages, but ruled in favor of Fagan on the intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Fagan appealed the defamation ruling to the Lee County Circuit Court, which affirmed the County Court's decision. Fagan then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and rendered the judgments of the lower courts, holding that the trial court manifestly erred by finding the statement defamatory.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment on different grounds. The Supreme Court held that the trial court erred as a matter of law by denying Fagan’s motion for a directed verdict. The Court concluded that name-calling, even as offensive as the term used by Fagan, is not actionable as defamation in Mississippi. The Court found that Faulkner's proof fell short of establishing a prima facie case of defamation per se, as the vulgarity did not impute a want of professional capacity. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the Lee County Circuit and County Courts. View "Fagan v. Faulkner" on Justia Law

The case involves the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS) and allegations of negligence in handling child protective services (CPS) investigations. DHS received multiple referrals regarding potential child abuse involving J.F.L., a registered sex offender living with J.M.K. and her children. DHS conducted investigations in 2015 and 2018, concluding there was no evidence of abuse or neglect. However, in 2020, another referral led to the discovery of sexual abuse by J.F.L., resulting in his indictment and conviction on numerous charges.The plaintiffs, representing the children, sued DHS, claiming negligence, gross negligence, and other wrongful acts, asserting that DHS failed to follow its internal policies, which they argued created clearly established statutory rights. They also claimed negligent training and supervision by DHS. DHS sought summary judgment based on qualified immunity, arguing that its internal policies did not constitute clearly established law.The Circuit Court of Kanawha County denied DHS's motion for summary judgment, stating that a jury should decide whether DHS's actions were oppressive and whether mandatory duties were not followed. The court also denied summary judgment on the negligent supervision and training claims.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and concluded that DHS's internal policies, not being legislatively approved, could not create clearly established statutory rights. The court held that DHS was entitled to qualified immunity as the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that DHS violated any clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Additionally, the plaintiffs did not provide evidence of improper motive or oppressive conduct by DHS employees. Consequently, the court reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case with directions to grant summary judgment in favor of DHS and dismiss the action. View "West Virginia Department of Human Services v. David B., Guardian ad Litem and Next Friend of J.B. and M.B., and S.M., Individually" on Justia Law

A Monongalia County deputy sheriff responded to a domestic dispute involving John D. Stewart, Jr., who suffered from mental illness. The deputy, after advising against backup, pursued Mr. Stewart, who allegedly threatened with a knife. The deputy shot Mr. Stewart, fatally wounding him. Amanda F. Stewart, Mr. Stewart’s daughter, filed a wrongful death action against the Monongalia County Commission and the deputy, alleging excessive force and negligence.The Circuit Court of Monongalia County dismissed claims against the Commission for direct liability but allowed claims for vicarious liability and against the deputy to proceed. The court also denied the motion to dismiss the demand for punitive damages, stating it was premature.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It affirmed the lower court’s decision to deny the motion to dismiss the vicarious liability claim against the Commission, finding the Commission is not immune from vicarious liability for the deputy’s negligence. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion to dismiss the negligence claim against the deputy, as the complaint sufficiently alleged facts to suggest the deputy acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner.However, the court reversed the lower court’s decision regarding punitive damages. It held that the Tort Claims Act prohibits punitive damages against the Commission and the deputy, as the deputy was sued in his official capacity. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Monongalia County Commission A/K/A Monongalia County Sheriff's Department and John Doe Deputy v. Amanda F. Stewart, Individually and/or as Administrator of the Estate of John D. Stewart, Jr." on Justia Law

Marco Cardenas filed a negligence lawsuit against Rajean Fossen following a motor vehicle accident near Hudson, Wyoming. During the trial, Cardenas moved for judgment as a matter of law on Fossen’s liability, which the district court denied, allowing the jury to decide. The jury found Fossen was not negligent. Cardenas then renewed his motion for judgment as a matter of law and filed a motion for a new trial, both of which the district court denied. Cardenas appealed, arguing the district court should have granted his motion for judgment as a matter of law and remanded the case for a new trial on causation and damages.The district court of Fremont County initially granted Cardenas’s motion for summary judgment on Fossen’s affirmative defense of comparative fault but denied summary judgment on Fossen’s liability, citing a genuine issue of material fact. After a four-day jury trial, the jury found Fossen was not negligent. Cardenas’s post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial were denied by the district court.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The court held that Fossen’s statements during the trial did not constitute an unqualified admission of liability. The evidence presented allowed for more than one reasonable inference, and the jury could reasonably conclude that Fossen was not negligent. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cardenas’s motion for a new trial, as there was sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s rulings, upholding the jury’s finding that Fossen was not negligent. View "Cardenas v. Fossen" on Justia Law

A baby, S.K., was injured during labor and delivery, allegedly due to the negligence of the delivering doctor, Dr. Goodman, who used a Mityvac obstetrical vacuum delivery system. The plaintiff, S.K.'s conservator, claimed that the use of the vacuum caused brain damage to S.K. and sought damages from Dr. Goodman’s employer, Obstetric & Gynecologic Associates of Iowa City and Coralville, P.C. (the clinic).A jury in the Iowa District Court for Johnson County found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding substantial damages. The clinic appealed, arguing that the district court erred in admitting a package insert from the vacuum, which contained hearsay statements about when the vacuum should not be used and potential harms from its use. The clinic contended that the insert's admission violated Iowa’s hearsay rule and prejudiced the trial's outcome.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and agreed with the clinic. The court found that the package insert contained hearsay and did not fit within any recognized exceptions, including the residual exception and the market reports exception. The court noted that the insert's admission was prejudicial, as it directly addressed a central dispute in the case and was emphasized in the plaintiff's closing argument. The court concluded that the erroneous admission of the insert deprived the clinic of a fair trial.The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. The court also addressed a procedural issue raised by the clinic regarding the plaintiff's certificate of merit affidavit, ultimately denying the clinic's motion to reverse on those grounds. View "S.K. v. Obstetric & Gynecologic Associates of Iowa City and Coralville, P.C." on Justia Law

In February 2013, the decedent was admitted to Elmcrest Care Center, suffering from Parkinson’s disease, dysphagia, and dementia. On August 4, 2017, he was found nonresponsive and later died in the hospital. The Estate of Jose de Jesus Ortiz, represented by Ericka Ortiz, filed a civil action against Elmcrest and its staff for elder abuse, neglect, negligence, willful misconduct, and fraud, alleging that their failure to provide necessary care led to his death. The trial court compelled arbitration based on an agreement signed upon the decedent’s admission.The arbitrator issued a First Interim Award on March 30, 2022, finding that the Estate did not meet its burden of proof on any claims. The award allowed for further submissions to address any omitted issues. The Estate requested an amendment, arguing the arbitrator had omitted damages for pre-death loss of dignity. The arbitrator issued a Second Interim Award on May 26, 2022, awarding $100,000 in damages for pre-death pain and suffering. Respondents moved to vacate this award, arguing the First Interim Award was final. The arbitrator denied the motion, stating the First Interim Award was not final and had omitted a necessary issue.The trial court initially denied the Estate’s petition to vacate the First Interim Award, ruling it was not final. However, it later vacated the Final Award and confirmed the First Interim Award, finding the First Interim Award had resolved all necessary issues. The Estate appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reversed the trial court’s order, holding that the First Interim Award was not final as it expressly reserved jurisdiction for further proceedings. The court directed the trial court to confirm the Final Award issued on September 30, 2022, which included the damages for pre-death pain and suffering. View "Ortiz v. Elmcrest Care Center, LLC" on Justia Law

On February 11, 2021, Twitter suspended Project Veritas, an investigative journalistic organization, for allegedly violating its policy against publishing private information. Four days later, CNN's Ana Cabrera and Brian Stelter discussed the suspension on-air, with Cabrera suggesting that Twitter banned Veritas for "promoting misinformation." Veritas disputed this characterization, asserting that the suspension was due to a violation of Twitter's "doxxing" policy. When CNN refused to issue a retraction, Veritas sued for defamation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted CNN's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding that Cabrera's statements were substantially true under New York defamation law and thus not actionable. The court found that the statements about misinformation were not significantly different in their impact on Veritas's reputation compared to the actual reason for the suspension.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that Veritas plausibly alleged a defamation claim under New York law, as the statements made by Cabrera were not substantially true and could have a different effect on the audience's perception compared to the actual reason for the suspension. The court also determined that Veritas plausibly alleged that the statements were made with actual malice, as Cabrera had previously tweeted the correct reason for the suspension, indicating knowledge of the true facts.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court erred in dismissing the case and remanded it for further proceedings. The main holding was that Veritas's defamation claim was plausible because the statements were not substantially true and were made with actual malice. View "Project Veritas v. Cable News Network, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lorenza Maksimow slipped and fell on an ice patch in a public parking lot in the City of South Lake Tahoe. She sued the City, alleging the ice patch constituted a dangerous condition of public property under Government Code sections 830 and 835. The City moved for summary judgment, arguing that Maksimow could not establish the existence of a dangerous condition or that the City had actual or constructive notice of such a condition. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of the City.The Superior Court of El Dorado County found that Maksimow failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding the City’s actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition. The court sustained the City’s objections to certain evidence presented by Maksimow, including climatological data and expert testimony, and concluded that there was no evidence to support the claim that the City had notice of the ice patch.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Maksimow did not present sufficient evidence to establish that the City had actual or constructive notice of the ice patch. The court noted that while City employees may have been aware of snowfall and the presence of an abandoned vehicle in the parking lot, there was no evidence that they had actual knowledge of the specific ice patch that caused Maksimow’s fall. Additionally, the court found that the evidence did not support an inference that the ice patch existed for a sufficient period of time to impute constructive notice to the City. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the City. View "Maksimow v. City of South Lake Tahoe" on Justia Law

The case involves Alexander Raheb, who slipped and fell on April 13, 2019, at TD Garden in Boston, owned and operated by Delaware North Companies, Inc. Raheb purchased a hotdog and a beer at a concession stand and, while walking to his seat, slipped on a liquid on the concourse floor, rupturing his left quadricep tendon. The liquid had been spilled seconds earlier by another patron. Raheb sued Delaware North under the special mode-of-operation notice theory, claiming negligence.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of Delaware North, concluding that the courts of Massachusetts would not apply the mode-of-operation theory under the circumstances presented. The court found that Raheb did not provide sufficient evidence to show that Delaware North's mode of operation created a foreseeable risk of harm.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the mode-of-operation theory did not apply. The court emphasized that the mode-of-operation theory, as established in Massachusetts, applies primarily to self-service contexts where the business's method of operation creates foreseeable risks. The court found that Raheb's situation, where patrons carry drinks from a concession stand to their seats at a sporting event, did not meet the criteria for this theory. The court noted that Raheb's evidence did not distinguish TD Garden's operations from any other similar establishment and did not show that the mode of operation created a recurring hazard. Therefore, the court held that Raheb could not proceed to a jury on the mode-of-operation notice theory. View "Raheb v. Delaware North Companies, Inc. - Boston" on Justia Law