Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In September 2016, a high school student, almost 16 years old, was involved in a fistfight during an art class. The teacher, who weighed 375 pounds and had a back condition, intervened to stop the fight. While pulling one of the boys away, the teacher lost his balance and fell onto the plaintiff, breaking the plaintiff’s leg. The plaintiff sued the teacher and the school district for negligence, arguing that the teacher should not have intervened due to his physical condition and that the school district failed to train its teachers on safely handling physical altercations.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County held a 15-day trial, during which the jury viewed a video of the incident multiple times. The jury concluded that neither the teacher nor the school district was negligent and found that the plaintiff and the other boy were each 50 percent responsible for the harm. The plaintiff’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and a new trial was denied.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found substantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict that neither the teacher nor the school district was negligent. The court also upheld the trial court’s exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert witness on the grounds that the expert was not qualified to opine on classroom management and discipline. Additionally, the court found no error in the trial court’s refusal to give the plaintiff’s requested special jury instructions, as the standard instructions on negligence were deemed sufficient. The judgment and the order denying the plaintiff’s motion for JNOV and a new trial were affirmed. View "I.C. v. Compton Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

James Wilson III used earplugs manufactured by Hearos, LLC at a shooting range and subsequently suffered significant hearing loss. He filed a lawsuit against Hearos in state court, alleging various tort claims. Protective Industrial Products, Inc. (PIP), a non-party, removed the case to federal court. The district court noted the unusual removal by a non-party but proceeded as neither Wilson nor Hearos objected to the court's jurisdiction. The district court dismissed Wilson's claims as time-barred under Georgia law.The district court for the Southern District of Georgia found that Wilson filed his complaint three days before the statute of limitations expired but did not serve Hearos until 117 days after the limitations period ended. The court concluded that Wilson failed to demonstrate the required diligence in serving Hearos, leading to the dismissal of his claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that removal by a non-party is a procedural defect, not a jurisdictional one, and must be objected to within 30 days under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Since Wilson did not object within this period, he waived his right to challenge the removal. The court also affirmed that Georgia's service-and-diligence rule, rather than Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), applied to determine if Wilson's claims were time-barred. The court concluded that Wilson did not act with the required diligence to serve Hearos, affirming the district court's dismissal of his claims. View "Wilson v. Hearos, LLC" on Justia Law

An underage user of the Grindr application, John Doe, filed a lawsuit against Grindr Inc. and Grindr LLC, alleging that the app facilitated his sexual exploitation by adult men. Doe claimed that Grindr's design and operation allowed him to be matched with adults despite being a minor, leading to his rape by four men, three of whom were later convicted. Doe's lawsuit included state law claims for defective design, defective manufacturing, negligence, failure to warn, and negligent misrepresentation, as well as a federal claim under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA).The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Doe's claims, ruling that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) provided Grindr with immunity from liability for the state law claims. The court also found that Doe failed to state a plausible claim under the TVPRA, as he did not sufficiently allege that Grindr knowingly participated in or benefitted from sex trafficking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Section 230 barred Doe's state law claims because they implicated Grindr's role as a publisher of third-party content. The court also agreed that Doe failed to state a plausible TVPRA claim, as he did not allege that Grindr had actual knowledge of or actively participated in sex trafficking. Consequently, Doe could not invoke the statutory exception to Section 230 immunity under the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2018. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Doe's claims in their entirety. View "DOE V. GRINDR INC." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a former foster child, filed a lawsuit under the Child Victims Act against Cayuga County and other unnamed defendants, alleging negligence. The plaintiff claimed that the County placed her in a foster home where she suffered severe sexual and physical abuse from her foster parent over several years. She argued that the County had a duty to exercise reasonable care in selecting, retaining, and supervising her foster placement and breached this duty by failing to ensure her safety.The Supreme Court denied the County's motion to dismiss the complaint, recognizing that the plaintiff was asserting a common-law negligence claim rather than a statutory claim. The court distinguished this case from previous cases by noting that the plaintiff was in the County's custody. However, the Appellate Division reversed the decision, granting the County's motion to dismiss. The Appellate Division concluded that the plaintiff failed to establish that the County owed her a special duty under the three recognized categories of the special duty doctrine.The New York Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division's decision. The Court of Appeals held that municipalities owe a duty of care to children placed in foster homes because they have assumed custody of those children. The court determined that the special duty doctrine did not apply in this case, as the County had a common-law duty to safeguard the plaintiff from foreseeable risks of harm due to its custodial relationship. The court emphasized that this duty arises from the government's assumption of custody, which limits the child's avenues for self-protection. The Court of Appeals concluded that the County's motion to dismiss should be denied, and the case should proceed. View "Weisbrod-Moore v Cayuga County" on Justia Law

Dr. Armin Oskouei, owner of two medical facilities, filed a defamation lawsuit against defense attorney Zachary Matthews. Oskouei alleged that Matthews made defamatory statements suggesting that Oskouei performed illegal surgeries. Matthews moved to strike the lawsuit under Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute, which allows for the dismissal of claims that infringe on free speech when there is no probability of the plaintiff prevailing. The trial court denied Matthews’s motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Oskouei could not establish a probability of prevailing because he had not shown that Matthews acted with actual malice.The trial court found that Matthews’s statements arose from protected activity but concluded that Oskouei had a probability of prevailing on his defamation claims. The court noted that a reasonable jury could infer that Matthews did not have a good faith basis for his statements. The Court of Appeals, however, determined that Matthews’s statements were conditionally privileged and that Oskouei had not shown actual malice, as required to defeat the privilege.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to address whether a plaintiff must show actual malice to defeat a conditional privilege defense. The court concluded that the actual malice standard does not apply in such cases. Instead, under OCGA § 51-5-9, a plaintiff must show that the defendant used the privilege as a pretext for private malice, meaning the statement was made with ill will or intent to injure. The court vacated the Court of Appeals’s opinion and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The court also overruled several other cases that had incorrectly applied the actual malice standard to conditional privilege defenses under Georgia law. View "OSKOUEI v. MATTHEWS" on Justia Law

In 2019, Colby James Bray died while in the custody of the Idaho Department of Juvenile Corrections (IDJC). His parents, Jeffrey and Michelle Bray, acting as personal representatives of his estate, filed a wrongful death suit in federal court one day before the two-year statute of limitations expired. They later voluntarily dismissed the federal case and refiled in state court nearly three years after Colby's death. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The district court granted the motions and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The Brays appealed, arguing that Idaho Code section 5-234 and 28 U.S.C. section 1367(d) tolled the statute of limitations. The district court had concluded that section 5-234 did not toll the time for filing the state complaint and that section 1367(d) did not apply to IDJC due to Eleventh Amendment immunity. The court also awarded costs and attorney fees to the defendants.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's ruling that section 5-234 did not toll the statute of limitations. It also agreed that the claims against Meacham and the Individual Defendants were time-barred under section 1367(d) because the Brays did not file within 30 days after the federal court dismissed those claims. However, the court found that section 1367(d) did toll the time for filing the complaint against IDJC, but IDJC was immune from the claims under Idaho Code section 6-904B(5). The court upheld the district court's award of attorney fees and costs to the defendants and awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal to the respondents. View "Bray v. ID Dept of Juvenile Corrections" on Justia Law

Jane Roe, a student at Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, reported to President Paige Patterson that she had been sexually assaulted by a fellow student, John Doe. Patterson notified the police, and Doe was expelled for violating the campus firearms policy. Later, Patterson was removed from his position by the university's board, partly due to his handling of Roe's complaint. In response, a group of donors published a letter accusing Roe of lying about the assault and claiming the encounters were consensual. Roe sued Patterson and the university for defamation, alleging that Patterson's agent provided the defamatory content for the letter.The federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of Patterson, concluding that Colter, Patterson's chief of staff, had not acted as Patterson's agent in drafting the letter. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit found that there was a fact issue regarding Colter's agency and certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Texas.The Supreme Court of Texas held that a person who supplies defamatory material to another for publication can be liable if they intend or know that the material will be published. Additionally, a defamation plaintiff can survive summary judgment without identifying specific statements made by the defendant if the evidence is legally sufficient to support a finding that the defendant was the source of the defamatory content. The court emphasized that the plaintiff must show that the defendant was the source of the defamatory statements through direct or circumstantial evidence, but need not provide verbatim evidence of the underlying communication. The case was remanded to the Fifth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "ROE v. PATTERSON" on Justia Law

Jessenia Burton, a student driver, was involved in a car accident during a drivers' education course on April 30, 2017. Burton and her parents sued several defendants, including West Bend Mutual Insurance Company, which provided coverage for the vehicles used in the course. Burton retained neuropsychologist Dr. Daniel Tranel, who conducted an evaluation and diagnosed her with a concussion, postconcussion syndrome, PTSD, and major depressive disorder. Dr. Tranel's report included summaries of psychological and neuropsychological tests administered to Burton.The Iowa District Court for Polk County granted West Bend's motion to compel the production of Dr. Tranel's psychological test material and test data. The court reasoned that since Burton made her mental condition an element of her claim, the information was discoverable under Iowa Code section 228.6(4)(a). The court ordered the information to be produced to West Bend and its attorneys, issuing a protective order to limit further disclosure.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The court held that Iowa Code section 228.9 explicitly prohibits the disclosure of psychological test material and test data in a judicial proceeding to anyone other than a licensed psychologist designated by the individual. The court emphasized that the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, and the only exception to this prohibition is disclosure to another licensed psychologist. The court concluded that the district court erred in granting the motion to compel and vacated the protective order. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "Burton v. West Bend Mutual Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Nancy Johnson and Domenico Zurini were involved in a motor vehicle accident in Omaha, Nebraska. Just before the 4-year statute of limitations expired, Johnson and her husband filed a negligence complaint against Zurini in the district court for Douglas County. After attempting to serve summons, they discovered that Zurini had died before the complaint was filed. They then had a special administrator appointed and moved to revive the action in the name of the special administrator. The district court initially granted the motion, and the Johnsons filed an amended complaint naming the special administrator as the defendant. The special administrator entered a voluntary appearance and then moved to vacate the order of revivor and dismiss the amended complaint, arguing that no viable action had been commenced within the statute of limitations. The district court agreed and dismissed the action as time barred.The Johnsons appealed, and the case was moved to the Nebraska Supreme Court's docket. The court reviewed whether the Johnsons properly commenced their negligence action within the applicable statute of limitations. The court noted that the original complaint, which named a deceased person as the sole defendant, was a legal nullity and did not validly commence an action under Nebraska law. The court also found that the amended complaint, which named the special administrator as the defendant, was filed after the limitations period expired and did not relate back to the original complaint under Nebraska's relation back statute.The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the original complaint was a legal nullity and did not commence an action. The amended complaint was time barred, and the relation back statute did not apply. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to vacate the order of revivor and substitution. View "Johnson v. Antoniutti" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs John and Jane Doe, on behalf of their minor children Janie Doe 1 and Janie Doe 2, alleged that Prosper Independent School District officials, Superintendent Holly Ferguson and former Transportation Director Annamarie Hamrick, failed to prevent school-bus-driver Frank Paniagua from sexually abusing their children. The abuse, which occurred during the 2021-22 school year, was captured on the bus’s video surveillance and reflected in GPS tracking data. Plaintiffs claimed that Ferguson and Hamrick had subjective knowledge of the abuse but failed to act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas denied Ferguson and Hamrick's motions to dismiss based on qualified immunity, concluding that the complaint plausibly alleged that the defendants were aware of Paniagua’s inappropriate behavior and demonstrated deliberate indifference by failing to take necessary action to stop the abuse. The court allowed the claims under Title IX against Prosper ISD and claims under § 1983 against Paniagua’s estate to proceed, while dismissing the equal-protection and failure-to-train claims without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the interlocutory appeal concerning the denial of qualified immunity for the supervisory-liability claims under § 1983. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that Ferguson and Hamrick had subjective knowledge of the abuse. The court emphasized that mere access to information, such as surveillance footage and GPS data, does not equate to subjective knowledge. Consequently, the court vacated the district court's denial of qualified immunity and granted qualified immunity to Ferguson and Hamrick for the supervisory-liability claims under § 1983. View "Doe v. Ferguson" on Justia Law