Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Katharine Blackwell, a regular customer at a car dealership, slipped and fell on a wet floor that had just been mopped by a dealership employee. The employee did not place a wet-floor sign before or during mopping and left the area unattended while retrieving a sign, which was stored about a minute away. While the employee was gone, another employee called Ms. Blackwell to the service desk, leading her to walk across the freshly mopped, unmarked area and fall. She had not seen the mopping take place and received no warning about the hazard.Ms. Blackwell filed suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, asserting negligence under premises liability and negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision. After discovery, the dealership moved for summary judgment, arguing it had insufficient time to warn Ms. Blackwell before she fell, relying on precedent from Rehn v. Westfield America. The circuit court granted summary judgment on both claims, finding that although the dealership had notice of the wet floor, there was no genuine dispute that it lacked time to post a warning sign.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed summary judgment on the negligent hiring and supervision claim but reversed with respect to premises liability, concluding that a jury could find the dealership failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or warn of the hazard. The dealership sought review by the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that, under Maryland law, the knowledge element for an invitee’s premises liability claim is satisfied when an owner’s employee knowingly creates a dangerous condition. Where creating the hazard is a foreseeable consequence of an assigned task, whether the owner acted reasonably to prevent or warn of the danger is a jury question unless only one reasonable conclusion is possible. The Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment, allowing the premises liability claim to proceed. View "DARCARS Toyota of Silver Spring v. Blackwell" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on statements made by an attorney during a media interview concerning the fallout from a business partnership between two individuals, one of whom was accused of embezzlement and criminal wrongdoing. The attorney commented publicly about the circumstances that led to the criminal charges against his client and the civil dispute with his client’s business partner. After criminal charges against the client were dismissed, the business partner sued the attorney and his former law firm for defamation and defamation per se, specifically challenging statements in the interview that allegedly impugned his reputation and business fitness.Prior to trial, the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Bannock County, granted summary judgment on ordinary defamation claims due to a lack of pleaded special damages and dismissed one defendant by stipulation. The case proceeded to a jury trial solely on defamation per se claims. The plaintiff requested a jury instruction defining defamation per se to include statements imputing conduct incompatible with the plaintiff’s lawful business, trade, or profession. The district court declined, instructing the jury that defamation per se was limited to statements imputing criminal conduct punishable by imprisonment or involving moral turpitude. The jury found for the defendants, and the district court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed whether the district court erred in its jury instructions on defamation per se. The Court held that Idaho law does recognize statements imputing unfitness in the conduct of a person’s business, trade, or profession as a category of defamation per se. The district court’s failure to instruct the jury on this category constituted prejudicial error. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, denying attorney fees to the respondents. View "Taylor v. Davis" on Justia Law

A newborn, Layla, was admitted to Druid City Hospital in July 2019, where her condition deteriorated, prompting a transfer to Children's Hospital's neonatal intensive care unit. Despite medical intervention, Layla passed away shortly after her transfer. Nearly two years later, her parents filed a wrongful-death lawsuit against the hospital, a physician, and several fictitiously named defendants, alleging failures in timely transfer and communication. The complaint specifically described one fictitious defendant as the physician responsible for Layla's care during the events in question.After the statute of limitations had expired, the parents amended their complaint to substitute Dr. Sam Gentle for one of the fictitiously named defendants, alleging he had delayed Layla's transfer. Dr. Gentle moved for summary judgment in the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County, arguing that the claims against him were barred by the statute of limitations and did not relate back to the original filing because the plaintiffs knew or should have known his identity earlier. The circuit court granted summary judgment, finding that the original allegations lacked specificity required by the Alabama Medical Liability Act and that the parents failed to exercise due diligence in identifying Dr. Gentle before the limitations period ended.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the summary judgment under the same standard as the lower court. The Supreme Court held that for a substitution of a fictitiously named defendant to relate back, plaintiffs must exercise due diligence to ascertain the party’s identity. Because the parents had information in medical records indicating Dr. Gentle’s involvement but did not investigate further before the statute expired, the Court concluded that due diligence was not shown. As a result, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Gentle. View "Bauman v. Gentle" on Justia Law

A fatal accident occurred in 2016 when a bicyclist, Jonathan Tansavatdi, collided with a turning truck at an intersection in the City of Rancho Palos Verdes. The bicycle lane on Hawthorne Boulevard ended before the intersection, forcing cyclists to share the roadway. Jonathan’s mother, Betty Tansavatdi, sued the City, alleging that the intersection constituted a dangerous condition of public property and that the City failed to adequately warn of this danger.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially granted summary judgment for the City based on the affirmative defense of design immunity under Government Code section 830.6. The trial court found the City had established all elements of design immunity regarding the absence of a bicycle lane. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the finding of design immunity but remanded the case for consideration of the failure to warn claim. The California Supreme Court, in Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639, held that design immunity does not categorically preclude failure to warn claims and remanded the matter, leaving open whether design immunity applies if warnings were part of an approved design.Upon remand, the City renewed its motion for summary judgment, arguing that all warning signs and markings at the intersection were part of the 2009 approved design plans. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, held that when a public entity has provided some warning of a dangerous condition as part of an approved and reasonable design, complaints about the adequacy of that warning fall within the scope of design immunity. The court affirmed summary judgment for the City and upheld the award of expert fees, finding the City’s section 998 settlement offer valid. View "Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes" on Justia Law

A bystander was injured in June 2023 when a police dog owned by a municipality mistakenly attacked him during a pursuit. The injured party, seeking damages for his injuries, timely submitted a statutory notice of claim to the municipality. In the notice, he offered to settle his personal injury claim for “one hundred thousand dollars ($250,000),” creating an internal inconsistency between the written and numerical amounts. The municipality did not accept the offer within the 60-day statutory period.After the offer was not accepted, the injured party filed a complaint in the Superior Court in Gila County. The municipality moved to dismiss, asserting that the notice failed to comply with Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-821.01(A)’s requirement to state a specific amount for which the claim can be settled. The Superior Court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and granted it, finding the notice insufficient. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, reversed, holding that contract law principles should be used to resolve the inconsistency, and concluding that the written amount controlled, thus satisfying the statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case. It held that strict compliance with the statutory requirement is necessary: a notice of claim must state a single, specific settlement amount that leaves no room for doubt. The court rejected the use of contract interpretation principles or extrinsic evidence to resolve conflicting figures in the notice, emphasizing that the municipality has no obligation to investigate or seek clarification. Because the notice contained two different amounts, it did not comply with § 12-821.01(A). The Supreme Court vacated the appellate decision and affirmed summary judgment for the municipality. View "TERBORG v TOWN OF PAYSON" on Justia Law

A family rented military housing located within the Naval Amphibious Base Coronado in California, managed by San Diego Family Housing (SDFH) and Lincoln Military Property Management. During their tenancy, the family experienced repeated water intrusion and mold contamination, which allegedly caused health issues and property damage. After reporting these problems, remediation was attempted, but the family was dissatisfied with the response and subsequent actions. They ultimately vacated the property and brought claims in California state court for negligence and other state law issues against SDFH, Lincoln, and InDepth, a mold remediation company.SDFH and Lincoln removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, asserting federal enclave, federal agency, and federal officer jurisdiction. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on derivative sovereign immunity and later, after supplemental briefing and a Statement of Interest from the United States, rejected all grounds for federal jurisdiction. The district court found no evidence that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over the property, no sufficient nexus for federal officer removal, and insufficient grounds for federal agency status. The court remanded the case to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s remand order after the Supreme Court remanded for consideration in light of Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that no basis for federal jurisdiction existed: (1) federal enclave jurisdiction was not established due to lack of evidence of federal government assent to exclusive jurisdiction; (2) federal officer removal requirements were not satisfied, as defendants were not “acting under” a federal officer; and (3) SDFH did not qualify as a federal agency. The district court’s remand to state court was affirmed. View "CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC" on Justia Law

A sixteen-year-old girl, after suffering a rape, was admitted to an adolescent psychiatric unit for mental health treatment. While in the facility, she alleged that another patient, Z.L., touched her buttocks with his foot and later, while she was awake, put his hand down her pants and touched her vagina. The incident allegedly occurred in a common room under indirect staff supervision. After reporting the event and undergoing a sexual assault exam, she was discharged from the facility three days later. Her co-conservators filed a medical malpractice action against the health facility, claiming that inadequate supervision enabled the alleged assault and caused her further harm.The matter proceeded to a seven-day jury trial in the District Court of Campbell County. The court approved a special verdict form with a threshold question asking whether Z.L. “inappropriately touched” the plaintiff; the form did not define this term. The jury answered the question in the negative and returned a verdict for the defendant hospital. The plaintiffs objected to the structure of the verdict form and the absence of a legal definition for “inappropriate touch.” They moved for a new trial, which was denied, and the court awarded costs to the defendant after finding the plaintiffs’ objections to costs untimely.The Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the case. It held that the plaintiffs had properly preserved their objections for appeal, but found no error in the special verdict form or jury instructions, concluding that the language used was consistent with the evidence and arguments presented. The court determined the district court did not abuse its discretion in responding to jury questions, denying a new trial, or awarding costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, denial of a new trial, and the award of costs. View "Rose v. Campbell County Health" on Justia Law

After a patient underwent knee replacement surgery, a suturing needle became dislodged and was lost inside her knee during the procedure. The surgical assistant attempted to locate the needle but was unsuccessful. The surgical team, including the supervising surgeon, searched for the needle and ordered x-rays, which were reviewed by radiologists. The needle was not detected at that time, and the surgery was completed without informing the patient of the possible retained foreign object. Subsequent follow-up appointments and further x-rays revealed the presence of the needle, which was eventually removed in a later procedure. The patient suffered complications requiring additional surgeries and prolonged antibiotic treatment.The patient initiated a medical negligence lawsuit in Jefferson Circuit Court against the surgical assistant, radiologists, and the hospital. The surgeon settled and was dismissed. The trial court granted summary judgment to the surgical assistant and radiologists, finding that expert testimony was required to establish a breach of the standard of care and that such testimony was absent. The court also determined that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to the surgical assistant and that neither expert identified the radiologists’ standard of care. The patient’s motion to reconsider was denied.On appeal, the Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the orthopedic expert could testify against the radiologists despite not being in their specialty, and that expert testimony was not required against the surgical assistant based on res ipsa loquitur exceptions. The Court of Appeals concluded that genuine issues of material fact remained for jury determination.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated summary judgment for both the surgical assistant and radiologists. The Court held that expert testimony specifying the applicable standard of care was required in medical negligence cases and was lacking against the radiologists. It further held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply to the surgical assistant, as the evidence showed no negligence and exclusive control was absent at the relevant time. View "DIAGNOSTIC X-RAY PHYSICIANS, PSC (DXP) V. LLOYD" on Justia Law

A man, Mark, died in a car crash while riding as a passenger in an Uber vehicle. His estate, represented by his wife Sheridan, brought claims against Uber and the driver, including wrongful death and survival actions. Both Mark and Sheridan had accepted Uber’s terms-of-use agreements, which contained arbitration clauses. Uber moved to compel arbitration, arguing that Mark’s agreement covered survival claims and Sheridan’s agreement covered wrongful death claims brought by the estate on behalf of statutory beneficiaries.The Circuit Court of Cook County compelled arbitration of the survival claims based on Mark’s agreement but denied Uber’s motion to compel arbitration of the wrongful death claims, reasoning that Sheridan’s agreement only covered disputes arising from her own use of Uber’s services, not Mark’s. Uber appealed. The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, reversed, holding that the arbitration agreement between Sheridan and Uber included a delegation clause requiring an arbitrator to decide whether the wrongful death claims were subject to arbitration. The appellate court found the agreement was not unconscionable and remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of the State of Illinois reviewed the case to determine whether Sheridan’s individual arbitration agreement obligated the estate to arbitrate the arbitrability of wrongful death claims, which arose from Mark’s use of Uber’s services. The court held that it did not. The court found no clear and unmistakable evidence that Sheridan, acting as statutory beneficiary or personal representative, agreed to delegate to an arbitrator the issue of arbitrability for wrongful death claims arising from her husband’s use. The court reversed the appellate court’s judgment and affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Uber’s motion to compel arbitration of the estate’s wrongful death claims, allowing those claims to proceed in court. View "Geller v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

This case stems from a fatal plane crash in which a pilot, Chelsea Brittney Infanger, collided with exhaust stacks owned by a processing plant near the Burley Municipal Airport in Idaho. The stacks, which extended over 100 feet high, were situated within the runway’s approach path and had been the subject of prior regulatory concern. The pilot’s parents brought a wrongful death suit, alleging that the Idaho Department of Transportation’s Division of Aeronautics negligently failed to regulate or mitigate the known risk posed by these stacks, arguing that various statutory, common law, special relationship, and contractual duties compelled the Division to act.After settlements with other defendants, the case proceeded against the Division in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County. The Division moved for summary judgment, contending it owed no individualized duty to the deceased under the Airport Zoning Act, common law, or through a special relationship, and that it was immune under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The district court agreed, holding that the Division’s statutory duties were general obligations to the public, not specific duties to individual aviators, and found no basis for liability under special relationship or contract theories. The court granted summary judgment to the Division, and the plaintiffs appealed.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that the Airport Zoning Act did not create a tort duty to a particular class of persons, but rather imposed general obligations for public safety, and thus could not support a negligence per se claim. The Court also found that the plaintiffs did not preserve or demonstrate the elements necessary for a special relationship or assumed duty sufficient to impose liability. The Court declined to award attorney fees, but granted costs to the Division. View "Infanger v. State of Idaho, Idaho Department of Transportation" on Justia Law