Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Megan Miller was arrested and booked into the City of Troy’s pretrial detention facility, where she informed staff that she had been heavily using heroin and expected to go into withdrawal. Over the next two and a half days, Miller vomited continually. On the third day, she was found unconscious and unresponsive in her cell and was pronounced dead shortly after. Despite her continual vomiting, no jail official sought medical care for her, including Julie Green-Hernandez, who was responsible for monitoring detainees on the day of Miller’s death. Miller’s husband sued Green-Hernandez, claiming she violated Miller’s Fourteenth Amendment right to adequate pretrial medical care and acted with gross negligence under Michigan state law.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied Green-Hernandez’s motion for summary judgment, concluding she was not entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourteenth Amendment claim or state law immunity on the negligence claim. The court found that there were disputes of material fact regarding whether Green-Hernandez was deliberately indifferent to Miller’s serious medical needs and whether her conduct amounted to gross negligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Green-Hernandez’s appeal regarding qualified immunity due to lack of jurisdiction, as her arguments were based on factual disputes rather than purely legal questions. However, the court reversed the district court’s denial of Michigan governmental immunity. The Sixth Circuit held that while Green-Hernandez’s conduct could be considered grossly negligent, it was not the single most proximate cause of Miller’s death. The court concluded that Miller’s ingestion of fentanyl was the most immediate, efficient, and direct cause of her death, entitling Green-Hernandez to state law immunity. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Gillman v. City of Troy" on Justia Law

Clayton D. Richards underwent a medical procedure at Vanderbilt University Medical Center (VUMC) in August 2013, resulting in bilateral lower extremity paralysis. He initially filed a negligence lawsuit against VUMC in December 2014, which he later voluntarily dismissed. Richards refiled his complaint in January 2021, relying on Tennessee's saving statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 28-1-105, which allows a plaintiff to refile a lawsuit within one year of a voluntary nonsuit. However, the trial court dismissed his complaint, ruling that Richards did not comply with the saving statute's terms.The Circuit Court for Davidson County dismissed Richards' refiled complaint, holding that it was not filed within the one-year period required by the saving statute. Richards argued that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) provided him with a 120-day extension to the one-year saving statute, making his lawsuit timely. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal, agreeing that the 120-day extension did not apply to the saving statute.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-121(c) does not extend the one-year refiling period provided by the saving statute. The court emphasized that the 120-day extension applies only to statutes of limitations and repose, not to the saving statute. Consequently, Richards' refiled complaint was untimely, and the trial court's dismissal of the case was upheld. View "Richards v. Vanderbilt University Medical Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, administrators of the Estate of April Carden, filed a medical malpractice complaint against Hackensack Meridian Health, Dr. Alok Goyal, and South Plainfield Primary Care. They alleged that Carden's death was due to Allopurinol prescribed by Dr. Goyal, claiming negligence and vicarious liability. Dr. Goyal and SPPC's answer included a Specialty Statement indicating they practiced internal medicine and gastroenterology. Plaintiffs provided an affidavit of merit (AOM) from Dr. Fitzgibbons, a board-certified internist. Defendants argued Dr. Fitzgibbons was unqualified as she was not certified in gastroenterology.The trial judge denied defendants' motions to dismiss, finding the treatment involved internal medicine. Alternatively, the judge ruled that the AOM from Dr. Fitzgibbons was sufficient under Buck v. Henry. Defendants' motion for reconsideration was also denied. The Appellate Division reversed, requiring an AOM from a physician certified in each of Dr. Goyal's specialties, and remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case. It held that when a defending physician practices in multiple specialties, an AOM from a physician specializing in any one of those specialties suffices. The Court found that Dr. Goyal's treatment involved both internal medicine and gastroenterology, and thus, the AOM from Dr. Fitzgibbons, a board-certified internist, was adequate. The Court reversed the Appellate Division's judgment and remanded for further proceedings, emphasizing that plaintiffs must still prove negligence at trial. View "Wiggins v. Hackensack Meridian Health" on Justia Law

William Herold worked for the University of Pittsburgh as a stationary engineer from 1976 to 2004, during which he was exposed to asbestos. He later became a foreman, a position without asbestos exposure, and retired in 2015. In 2019, Herold was diagnosed with mesothelioma, attributed to his asbestos exposure, and he died in 2022. His estate filed a common law negligence action against the University and other defendants in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas.The trial court denied the University’s motion for summary judgment, which argued that the Occupational Disease Act (ODA) provided the exclusive remedy for Herold’s claim. The court found that Herold’s mesothelioma, manifesting more than four years after his last exposure, was not compensable under the ODA. The Commonwealth Court affirmed, holding that the ODA’s exclusivity provision did not apply to Herold’s non-compensable claim, allowing the common law action to proceed.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case, focusing on whether the ODA’s exclusivity provision barred Herold’s common law action. The Court held that the ODA’s exclusivity provision extends only to claims asserting compensable disability or death, defined as occurring within four years of the last employment. Since Herold’s mesothelioma manifested beyond this period, the exclusivity provision did not apply, and the common law action was permissible. The Court also determined that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not require the claim to be adjudicated by the workers’ compensation authorities, as the issues were not complex or technical.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s decision, allowing the common law negligence action to proceed in the trial court. View "In Re: Estate of W. Herold" on Justia Law

The plaintiff filed a defamation lawsuit against the defendant after she called him a "white supremacist" on a social media page. The defendant made this statement during a heated political discussion on a town's Facebook page, which was in response to a joint statement by local officials regarding the killing of George Floyd. The plaintiff argued that the term "white supremacist" constituted defamation per se.The trial court, the Superior Court in the judicial district of Waterbury, granted the defendant's special motion to dismiss under Connecticut's anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a). The court determined that the defendant's statements were nonactionable opinions rather than actionable defamation per se. The court also awarded the defendant attorney’s fees and costs. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the trial court incorrectly concluded that he had failed to show probable cause that he would prevail on the merits of his defamation claim and that the court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees.The Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the term "white supremacist," without more, is a nonactionable opinion rather than actionable defamation per se. The court reasoned that the term lacks a precise meaning, cannot be objectively verified, and does not necessarily imply that the declarant knew existing, undisclosed defamatory facts. The context in which the defendant made the statement—a heated political debate on social media—further supported the conclusion that the statement was an opinion. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's award of attorney’s fees and costs to the defendant. View "Murphy v. Rosen" on Justia Law

Dr. Anita Jackson, an otolaryngologist, was convicted of various offenses related to her private medical practice in North Carolina. She was the leading Medicare biller for balloon sinuplasty surgery, a procedure treating chronic sinusitis. Jackson reused single-use medical devices, specifically the Entellus XprESS Multi-Sinus Dilation Tool, on multiple patients without proper sterilization, leading to potential contamination. She also incentivized employees to recruit Medicare patients for the procedure, often bypassing proper medical assessments. Additionally, Jackson falsified documents and patient signatures in response to Medicare audits.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina convicted Jackson on all counts, including violating the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) by holding for resale adulterated medical devices, violating the federal anti-kickback statute, making materially false statements, committing aggravated identity theft, mail fraud, and conspiracy. Jackson was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison and ordered to pay over $5.7 million in restitution. She moved for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial, which the district court denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Jackson argued that the devices were not "held for sale" under the FDCA, that her actions were protected under 21 U.S.C. § 396, and that the Government relied on a defective theory of per se adulteration. She also challenged the exclusion of certain evidence and jury instructions. The Fourth Circuit found no reversible error in the district court's rulings, holding that the devices were indeed "held for sale," that § 396 did not protect her conduct, and that the Government's theory was valid. The court also upheld the exclusion of evidence and the jury instructions. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit affirmed all of Jackson's convictions. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

A motorist, a physician, was injured when a truck struck the rear of her car while she was stopped at a construction site. She sued the truck driver and his employer for lost earnings and other damages. The superior court found that her future earning capacity was affected but dismissed her claim for future lost earnings, stating she failed to prove the amount of damages to a reasonable certainty.The superior court awarded her $1,036,491 for future medical and life care expenses, $79,961 for past lost income, and $500,000 in noneconomic damages. However, it dismissed her claim for future lost earning capacity. On appeal, the Alaska Supreme Court reversed the dismissal, stating that once the fact of damages for future lost earning capacity was established to a reasonable certainty, the court could reasonably estimate the amount from the evidence in the record. The case was remanded to the superior court to determine the damages for future lost earning capacity.On remand, the superior court used the evidence in the record to fashion a damages award. It found that the motorist's pre-accident earning capacity was $1,169,554 and estimated her post-accident earning capacity to be $1,018,087.40. The court calculated her annual expected loss of income to be $150,746.60 and determined that she would suffer this loss for 6.3 years, the average remaining work life for a woman her age. The total damages for loss of earning capacity were calculated to be $949,703.58, bringing the total award to $2,566,155.58.The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the superior court's estimation of lost earning capacity and found no clear error. The court affirmed the damages award, concluding that the superior court's method of calculating the damages was reasonable and grounded in the evidence. The superior court's order on remand was affirmed. View "Downing v. Shoreside Petroleum, Inc." on Justia Law

In July 2019, Brent Bartlett, an off-duty police officer with the Juneau Police Department (JPD), rear-ended Arlene Tripp’s vehicle while driving his personal car under the influence of alcohol, resulting in her injury. Bartlett, who had a history of alcohol abuse and PTSD, was found to have a blood alcohol content of 0.239. Bartlett’s partner, also a JPD officer, was aware of his issues but did not report them. The Tripps sued the City and Borough of Juneau (CBJ), JPD, and the police chief, alleging negligent training and supervision of Bartlett.The Superior Court of Alaska, First Judicial District, dismissed the case, ruling that JPD did not owe a duty of care to the public to protect them from harm caused by officers’ off-duty alcohol consumption. The court found no statutory duty under AS 18.65.130 or CBJ’s Drug-Free Workplace policy and JPD Conduct Rule 114. It also determined that existing precedent did not impose such a duty and that public policy considerations did not support recognizing a duty of care in these circumstances.The Supreme Court of Alaska affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The court held that neither statutes nor precedent imposed a duty of care on JPD to train officers against excessive off-duty alcohol consumption. It also concluded that public policy did not favor imposing such a duty, as it was not foreseeable that training officers on alcohol consumption would reduce the likelihood of them driving under the influence while off duty. The court emphasized that the connection between JPD’s conduct and the Tripps’ injuries was too remote and that the moral blame lay with Bartlett’s criminal conduct. Therefore, the dismissal of the lawsuit was upheld. View "Tripp v. City and Borough of Juneau" on Justia Law

In 2020, Sarah E. Martin was injured in a car accident involving an 18-wheel tractor-trailer driven by Charles Streeter, an employee of Al-Amin Brothers Transportation, LLC. Martin sued the LLC, several individuals, and 18 fictitiously named defendants. In January 2023, Martin settled with the original defendants, agreeing to release them and related parties from any claims arising from the accident. Subsequently, Martin amended her complaint to add PEI Ohio, Inc. and Premium Transportation Group, Inc. (the corporations) as defendants, alleging various negligence and breach of contract claims.The Jefferson Circuit Court enforced the settlement agreement in favor of the corporations, dismissed Martin's third amended complaint, and awarded attorney fees to the corporations. Martin filed a fourth amended complaint, which remains pending. The circuit court certified its orders as final under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., and Martin appealed both the enforcement of the settlement and the attorney fee award.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and determined that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in certifying the orders as final under Rule 54(b). The court found that the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims were closely related, the need for review might be mooted by future developments in the circuit court, and there was a possibility of having to consider the same issue again, particularly regarding attorney fees. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama dismissed Martin's appeals, emphasizing the preference to avoid piecemeal litigation and the need for a final judgment on all pending claims before appellate review. View "Martin v. PEI Ohio, Inc." on Justia Law

Barry Chrisman was seriously injured when a tree fell on his work vehicle while driving through a riparian management zone (RMZ) in a recently logged forest area. The RMZ, a buffer of trees left standing to benefit wildlife and water quality, was part of the Lugnut timber area managed by the Washington Department of Natural Resources (DNR). Chrisman and his employer sued the State of Washington, Sierra Pacific Industries, and Precision Forestry Inc. for negligence, arguing that the defendants were not immune under the Forest Practices Act of 1974, which provides immunity for forestland owners when a tree required to be left standing in an RMZ falls and causes injury.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that they were immune under the statute as forestland owners required to leave the RMZ trees standing. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision. The appellate court held that Sierra and Precision were not forestland owners because they did not have the right to harvest RMZ trees and that only entities with the authority to determine RMZ parameters are entitled to immunity. The court also found a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the RMZ was properly drawn.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case and held that the defendants are immune under the Forest Practices Act. The court determined that the statute provides broad immunity to forestland owners, including those in actual control of the land with the right to sell or dispose of timber. The court concluded that Sierra and Precision fit the definition of forestland owners and that the immunity applies regardless of whether the RMZ was properly drawn. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Snohomish County v. State" on Justia Law