Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A woman was shopping at a grocery store in Florida when she slipped on spilled dish soap and fell. Security footage showed that after the fall, she continued shopping and later purchased champagne. She later sued the store for premises liability, alleging significant physical injuries that she claimed severely limited her activities, including being unable to lift her children, bend, or play in the pool. During discovery, she repeated these claims in interrogatory answers and deposition testimony. The store hired a private investigator, who recorded her performing many of the activities she claimed she could not do, such as lifting her children, bending, carrying groceries, and playing in the pool.The Circuit Court for Broward County held an evidentiary hearing, after which it found by clear and convincing evidence that the woman intentionally and repeatedly lied about her limitations and that her testimony was not credible. The court found that her fraudulent conduct “comprehensively infected the integrity” of the case and dismissed her entire complaint with prejudice as a sanction for fraud on the court.The Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed the dismissal. Applying what it termed a “more stringent abuse of discretion standard” to the sanction, it affirmed the finding of fraud but reversed in part, holding that only the claims dependent on her subjective testimony (pain and suffering, lost wages) should be dismissed, while her claim for medical expenses should be reinstated.The Supreme Court of Florida held that the correct standard of appellate review involves reviewing factual findings for competent, substantial evidence, legal conclusions de novo, and the choice of sanction for abuse of discretion—not a heightened or “more stringent” abuse of discretion standard. The Court quashed the Fourth District’s decision, reinstated the trial court’s order dismissing the entire complaint with prejudice, and disapproved conflicting case law to the extent it applied a different standard. View "Publix Supermarkets, Inc. v. Goga" on Justia Law

Frank Egan brought claims alleging injury from asbestos exposure against Union Carbide Corporation and others. In an earlier lawsuit, Egan had asserted similar claims against Union Carbide, but those claims were dismissed without prejudice by stipulation. Egan then filed a new suit raising the same type of allegations, contending that the defendants placed asbestos into the stream of commerce, causing his injuries. Union Carbide, a corporation organized under New York law with its principal place of business in Texas, responded that North Dakota courts lacked personal jurisdiction over it and raised this defense in its answer.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, granted Union Carbide’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found Union Carbide did not have sufficient contacts with North Dakota to justify exercising personal jurisdiction. Egan argued that Union Carbide had waived this defense by not raising it in the prior litigation and that the company’s business registration in North Dakota constituted consent to jurisdiction, but the district court rejected these arguments.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that merely registering to do business in North Dakota does not amount to consent to general personal jurisdiction, as North Dakota law explicitly states that such registration alone is insufficient. The court further held that a defendant does not waive a personal jurisdiction defense by failing to raise it in an earlier case that was dismissed without prejudice. Finally, the act of negotiating a dismissal in the earlier litigation did not amount to the purposeful availment required by due process for establishing personal jurisdiction. Thus, the judgment dismissing Egan’s claims against Union Carbide was affirmed. View "Egan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A patient filed a medical malpractice action after a surgery was performed on her uninjured foot instead of her injured foot. The surgeon settled and was dismissed from the case prior to trial, and the case against the hospital proceeded to a jury trial. The jury awarded the patient substantial economic and noneconomic damages, apportioning 65% of the fault to the hospital and 35% to the surgeon. The hospital moved to reduce the noneconomic damages to the statutory cap, and the patient challenged the constitutionality of this cap.The District Court of Williams County held that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages was constitutional and reduced the noneconomic damages accordingly. The court apportioned fault and entered an amended judgment in favor of the patient, reflecting the statutory cap and including interest and costs. The hospital paid the full amount of the amended judgment, and the patient accepted payment and filed a satisfaction of judgment, though the satisfaction did not strictly comply with statutory requirements. Later, the patient filed a notice of appeal, challenging the constitutionality of the statutory cap, and the hospital filed a conditional cross-appeal regarding allocation of damages.The Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that by accepting full payment of the amended judgment and filing a satisfaction—without reserving any right to appeal—the patient waived her right to appeal. The court clarified that in non-divorce cases, voluntarily accepting the full amount of a judgment without expressly preserving any appellate issues constitutes waiver of the right to appeal. As a result, both the patient’s appeal and the hospital’s cross-appeal were dismissed. The court expressly abrogated any contrary rule suggested by the earlier decision in Tyler v. Shea, 4 N.D. 377, 61 N.W. 468 (1894). View "Cowan v. Slann" on Justia Law

Three minor children and their grandfather brought negligence, wrongful-death, and professional-malpractice claims related to the death of Luke Laducer, who died while in custody at the Cass County Jail. Laducer had been taken to a hospital after attempting suicide but was medically cleared and then jailed. He was found unresponsive later that day and died of hemorrhagic gastritis and colitis. The plaintiffs previously filed a federal lawsuit, where the state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice due to failure to serve an expert affidavit as required by North Dakota law, and the constitutional claims were decided on summary judgment.After the federal litigation, the plaintiffs, now omitting Laducer’s adult relatives and including additional defendants, filed this action in the District Court of Cass County. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were barred by res judicata and the two-year statute of limitations. The District Court granted the motion, finding both bars applicable, and entered judgment dismissing the case with prejudice.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and held that res judicata did not apply because the prior federal court dismissal of the state-law claims was without prejudice and did not constitute a decision on the merits. Additionally, the Court held that the disability provisions of N.D.C.C. § 28-01-25 tolled the statute of limitations for the plaintiffs, who were minors or imprisoned at the time the claims accrued, and that the statutory time caps had not been exceeded. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "L.G.L. v. County of Cass" on Justia Law

An individual attending a senior swimming class at a municipal recreation center suffered serious injuries after tripping over the legs of a newly installed bench in the women’s locker room. She died 12 days later. Her estate sued the recreation center and the city that owned and operated it, alleging negligence and wrongful death based on the center’s decision to place a bench with extended legs in a confined space, which allegedly created a hazardous condition.The Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas granted summary judgment in favor of the city and recreation center, finding that they were entitled to political-subdivision immunity under Ohio law and that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the claim of a physical defect. The plaintiff appealed, and the Eighth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court found that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the bench constituted a physical defect under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4), which could remove immunity, and held that immunity was not definitively restored under R.C. 2744.03(A).The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that a political subdivision’s decision to place a particular model of bench in a locker room does not amount to a physical defect within the meaning of R.C. 2744.02(B)(4). The court clarified that a “physical defect” refers to a tangible imperfection that impairs the function of an object, and no evidence was presented that the bench was broken, malfunctioning, or otherwise physically flawed. Therefore, the exception to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B)(4) does not apply. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the appellate court and remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in favor of the city and recreation center. View "Steigerwald v. Berea" on Justia Law

A federal employee, Robert Duran, who held a full-time union leadership position with the National Border Patrol Council (NBPC), struck Tami Barrier with his vehicle while exiting a United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) station in Del Rio, Texas. Duran was leaving the station to collect pandemic-related supplies donated for CBP agents, a task requested by another union leader. The supplies were intended for distribution among multiple Border Patrol stations. Duran’s work entailed both union responsibilities and CBP overtime hours, and there was ambiguity regarding whether he was on duty at the time of the incident. Video evidence and timesheets provided conflicting accounts of his work hours, and there was dispute over whether collecting the supplies was a personal favor or part of his union duties.The United States District Court for the Western District of Texas granted summary judgment to the Government, finding that Duran was not acting within the course and scope of his employment when the incident occurred. The court concluded that the errand was not a CBP task and was not performed under CBP’s authority, so the United States could not be held vicariously liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that genuine disputes of material fact existed regarding whether Duran was acting within the scope of his employment under Texas law, including whether he was performing a “special mission” for CBP at the time. The court determined that a reasonable jury could find Duran’s actions benefited CBP and were performed with its implied approval. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Barrier v. USA" on Justia Law

Shawn and Tanya Maywald were injured in a collision when a northbound driver fell asleep and crossed into their lane, striking their vehicle. The vehicle that caused the crash was a 2019 Toyota 4Runner, which lacked a lane departure warning (LDW) system. The Maywalds alleged that the absence of LDW rendered the 4Runner defective and unreasonably dangerous, and they sued Toyota and others for strict product liability, negligent design, and loss of consortium.The Superior Court in Navajo County granted summary judgment for Toyota, finding that the 4Runner was not defective or unreasonably dangerous and that the absence of LDW did not cause the accident. The Arizona Court of Appeals vacated that decision, holding that the Maywalds had presented sufficient evidence for their strict product liability claim to proceed. The appellate court found that the risk/benefit analysis for strict liability could consider alternative designs and that there were factual disputes regarding negligence and causation; it reinstated all of the Maywalds’ claims.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case to clarify the requirements for strict product liability. The court held that a plaintiff must independently prove both that a product was defective and that the defect rendered it unreasonably dangerous. The court further clarified that the risk/benefit analysis must focus on the risks and benefits of the product as actually designed, not as compared to an alternative design. Applying this framework, the court concluded that the absence of LDW did not make the 4Runner defective for its ordinary use, so the Maywalds’ strict liability, negligent design, and derivative loss of consortium claims could not proceed. The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment for Toyota. View "MAYWALD v. TOYOTA" on Justia Law

Zia Chishti, formerly CEO of a technology company, and his wife brought claims against Tatiana Spottiswoode, her attorneys, and related parties. Chishti and Spottiswoode had a prior romantic relationship, and Spottiswoode was later employed by Chishti’s company under an arbitration agreement. In 2017, Spottiswoode accused Chishti of harassment and assault, leading to confidential arbitration, which resulted in an arbitral award in her favor. Years later, Spottiswoode was subpoenaed to testify before Congress about forced arbitration in sexual assault cases, where she recounted her experiences involving Chishti. After her testimony, Spottiswoode and her attorney made public statements to the media and on social media regarding the matter. Chishti alleged these statements were defamatory and part of a campaign to damage his reputation, causing him to resign from his executive roles. His wife also claimed loss of consortium.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The district court found that Spottiswoode’s statements before Congress were protected by legislative privilege under District of Columbia law, and that the post-hearing public statements were protected opinions or shielded by the fair reporting privilege and the First Amendment. The court also concluded that the other tort claims were duplicative of defamation, that the conspiracy and loss of consortium claims failed without a viable underlying tort, and that the breach of contract claims were barred by privilege or insufficiently pleaded.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed. The appellate court held that witness statements to Congress and related communications were absolutely privileged under District of Columbia law. It further held that post-hearing statements were protected as opinion or by fair reporting, and that related tort and contract claims failed for lack of an actionable underlying claim. The dismissal with prejudice was affirmed. View "Chishti v. Spottiswoode" on Justia Law

After being injured in a car accident caused by Andrew Clark, who was driving a vehicle owned by his mother Tracy Clark, Nadia Marin sued Andrew for negligence and Tracy for negligent entrustment. Marin suffered multiple injuries and eventually was diagnosed with complex regional pain syndrome after undergoing extensive medical treatment and surgeries. Before trial, Marin made a $2 million offer of judgment, which the Clarks did not accept. At trial, the Clarks conceded liability, and the jury was left to determine damages, ultimately awarding Marin over $2 million.In the Eighth Judicial District Court, the Clarks challenged the outcome on several grounds. They argued that the court did not allocate enough trial time for their defense, improperly allowed Marin to withdraw deemed admissions, and issued an unsupported jury instruction. The Clarks also moved for a new trial on the basis of alleged attorney misconduct. The district court denied their motion for a new trial, upheld the jury verdict, and awarded Marin expert and attorney fees, including the full amount of her contingency fee agreement. The court also granted Marin’s motion to assign the Clarks’ claims against their insurer to her in execution of the judgment.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment, denial of a new trial, award of expert fees, and the assignment of the Clarks’ claims against their insurer. The court concluded that the Clarks had a meaningful opportunity to present their defense and that the district court had not abused its discretion regarding the deemed admissions, jury instructions, or expert fee award. However, the Supreme Court reversed the attorney fee award, holding that post-offer attorney fees under NRCP 68 must be limited to work performed after the offer of judgment, not the entire contingency fee. The court remanded for reconsideration of attorney fees consistent with this clarification and overruled prior precedent to the extent it was inconsistent. View "Clark v. Marin" on Justia Law

A group of individuals who had received traffic citations under a local ordinance enacted by the City of Tuskegee permitting automated photographic enforcement of traffic laws brought suit against the City, certain city officials, and JENOPTIK, the company involved in the installation and operation of the enforcement devices. The plaintiffs challenged the validity of the ordinance, raised constitutional concerns, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as damages, including tort claims for negligence, invasion of privacy, and fraud. The City later enacted resolutions cancelling outstanding citations, refunding fines, and ultimately suspending enforcement of the ordinance.The case was initially filed in the Macon Circuit Court. The City and JENOPTIK moved to dismiss, arguing lack of a justiciable controversy, mootness, lack of standing, and other grounds, including lack of personal jurisdiction over JENOPTIK. The trial court denied these motions to dismiss, treating them as motions under Rule 12 and excluding extraneous materials, but did not provide detailed reasoning.On review, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that because the plaintiffs either paid the fines or failed to contest the citations under the administrative procedures provided in the ordinance, and because the City subsequently nullified the citations and provided for reimbursement, their claims challenging the legality of the ordinance were moot. The Court directed the trial court to dismiss those claims. However, the Supreme Court denied the petitions insofar as they sought dismissal of the plaintiffs’ tort claims, holding that the City and JENOPTIK did not demonstrate a clear right to mandamus relief on those claims at this stage. The Court likewise declined to dismiss the tort claims against JENOPTIK for lack of personal jurisdiction based on the current record. View "In re: Busby v. City of Tuskegee" on Justia Law