Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A mother brought suit on behalf of herself and her minor son, alleging that the son developed leukemia after attending school near and residing close to a manufacturing plant operated by General Electric Company. The plant, located in Pittsfield, Massachusetts, produced electrical transformers and capacitors containing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) for decades. The plaintiff claimed that GE’s use, disposal, and storage of PCBs caused the son’s illness, and sought recovery under various legal theories, including strict liability, negligence, fraudulent misrepresentation, nuisance, improper transportation of hazardous material, and loss of consortium. The complaint included claims related to the defective design and use of PCB materials, as well as their disposal and remediation.The plaintiff originally filed suit in Massachusetts state superior court. GE removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, asserting federal officer removal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), based on its wartime production of PCB-containing devices for the federal government and its later remediation efforts pursuant to a consent decree with the EPA. The plaintiff moved to remand the case to state court, arguing that GE failed to meet the requirements for federal officer removal. The district court agreed, ordered remand, and stayed that order pending appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s jurisdictional determination de novo. It held that GE satisfied both the “acting under” and “for or relating to” elements of the federal officer removal statute, due to its extensive work producing PCB-containing devices for the federal government. The court reversed the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for the district court to determine whether GE has a colorable federal defense. View "Czerno v. General Electric Company" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a resident of Salem, South Carolina, frequently visited her local post office. During one visit, after experiencing poor service, she was confronted and physically attacked by a postal employee, resulting in significant injuries. The Postmaster, rather than assisting her or calling for help, allegedly exacerbated the situation by physically handling her and preventing her from seeking help. The plaintiff claimed the employee had a history of aggressive behavior known to postal management.The plaintiff initially filed suit in South Carolina state court against the individual employees and the United States. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, which, after the government substituted itself for the individual defendants under the Westfall Act and moved to dismiss, dismissed all claims. The district court determined the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) did not waive sovereign immunity for most claims, including those arising from assault and battery, and that the claims for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention were barred by the discretionary function exception. The court also dismissed the Bivens constitutional claims and the FOIA claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of most claims, holding that the FTCA’s intentional tort exception precludes claims against the government for injuries arising from assault and battery by a postal employee, even if pleaded as negligence. However, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded as to a narrow aspect of the negligence claim against the Postmaster, holding that under the Supreme Court’s decision in Sheridan v. United States, a claim may proceed if the government employee negligently created the risk of harm, independent of the tortfeasor’s employment status. The Fourth Circuit otherwise affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "Lusk v. Merchant" on Justia Law

In January 2011, a sixteen-year-old girl was driven by her thirty-seven-year-old cousin from Fort Kent to Bangor during a family emergency. During the drive, the cousin asked her inappropriate sexual questions and touched her breasts, leg, and genitals over her clothes. Later, at a relative’s apartment, he exposed himself to her and threatened to harm her family if she disclosed the events. More than a decade later, the woman initiated a lawsuit against her cousin for negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), and intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress (IIED), seeking damages for the harm she suffered.The Penobscot County Superior Court held a bench trial and found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding her one million dollars in damages. The court found the defendant liable on all three claims. The defendant appealed, arguing that the statute of limitations barred the claims and that the plaintiff had not met her burden of proof.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and held, first, that the claims were not barred by the statute of limitations because state law permits actions based on certain sexual acts toward minors to be brought at any time, and the defendant’s conduct met the required statutory definitions. On the merits, the Court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support liability for negligence and NIED, as the plaintiff did not establish the type of physical injury required for negligence, nor did the relationship between the parties rise to the level required for NIED. However, the Court affirmed the finding of liability for IIED, determining that the defendant’s conduct was so extreme and outrageous that severe emotional distress could be inferred. The Court vacated the judgment on the first two counts and affirmed the judgment on the IIED claim. View "Nadeau v. Nadeau" on Justia Law

A student attended high school within a public school district from 1998 to 2001. While she was a minor, a teacher employed by the district sexually assaulted her on several occasions. The assaults occurred off campus, but the teacher was able to take the student off school grounds after sanctioned activities, with no apparent measures in place by the district to prevent such conduct. The student later reported the incidents, resulting in the teacher’s criminal conviction and termination from employment. Years later, the student filed a civil suit against the district, alleging that it was negligent in supervising and protecting her while she was at school.In the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, the district moved for summary judgment, arguing it was immune from liability under Education Code section 44808 because the assaults happened off campus. The student countered that immunity does not apply when on-campus negligence leads to off-campus injury, pointing to the teacher’s ability to escort her from school without intervention as evidence of negligent supervision. The superior court denied summary judgment, finding a triable issue existed as to whether the district’s on-campus negligence proximately caused the off-campus harm.Upon petition for extraordinary writ, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the matter. The appellate court held that the location of the alleged negligent act, not the situs of the injury, is the key factor under Education Code section 44808. It concluded that school districts are not immune from liability for off-campus injuries if their negligence occurred on school property and proximately caused the injury, following the rule articulated in Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School District. The writ petition was denied, and the trial court’s decision was left in place. View "Victor Valley Union High Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A group of parents, guardians, and children alleged that prenatal exposure to acetaminophen, the active ingredient in Tylenol and similar over-the-counter drugs, caused attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) and/or autism spectrum disorder (ASD) in children. The defendants were manufacturers, pharmacies, and retailers of acetaminophen products. The plaintiffs’ claims centered on the companies’ alleged failure to warn about the risk of these neurodevelopmental disorders associated with prenatal acetaminophen use.These cases were consolidated and transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. In the Rutledge action, the district court excluded all five of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses on general causation, concluding their methodologies were unreliable, and granted summary judgment to defendants. In the Phippen action, which involved only ADHD claims, the district court excluded another expert, Dr. Ness, and again granted summary judgment to defendants. The district court also rejected defendants’ arguments that federal drug labeling law preempted the plaintiffs’ claims, holding that federal law did not bar additional, specific pregnancy-related warnings.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed whether the district court properly exercised its gatekeeping role under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 in excluding the plaintiffs’ expert testimony. The Second Circuit held that the district court exceeded its discretion in excluding the testimony of Drs. Baccarelli, Hollander, and Pearson, because their methodologies were consistent with those generally accepted in their fields and their reasoning was within the range of scientific debate. The appellate court affirmed the exclusion of testimony from Drs. Cabrera and Louie. In light of its rulings, the Second Circuit vacated the summary judgments, remanded both cases for further proceedings, and directed reconsideration of Dr. Ness’s exclusion in Phippen. The court also affirmed that federal law did not preempt the plaintiffs’ state-law failure-to-warn claims. View "Rutledge v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

A child born via surrogate suffered a brachial plexus injury during delivery, allegedly caused by shoulder dystocia due to her large size. The physician, who managed the surrogate’s prenatal care and performed the delivery, was accused of failing to disclose certain risks and alternatives—such as the option of cesarean section—to the surrogate and the child’s parents. The child, through a guardian ad litem, and her parents filed suit against the physician and his insurer, raising claims for negligence and for failure to obtain informed consent. Prior to trial, the parents’ claims and those against certain other defendants were dismissed by stipulation. The child’s claim focused on whether the physician had a legal duty to provide information and obtain informed consent regarding her care, as well as the surrogate’s.The Winnebago County Circuit Court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants on the informed consent claim, finding that only the surrogate was the physician’s patient and that the claim could only be brought through her. The child’s negligence claim proceeded to a jury, which found the physician was not negligent and awarded no damages. The child appealed only the summary judgment dismissal of the informed consent claim, arguing that she independently qualified as a patient entitled to informed consent under Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals certified the question to the Supreme Court, seeking clarification on whether an unborn or minor child is a “patient” under Wis. Stat. § 448.30 and entitled to informed consent with an independent right to legal action.The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the child was a patient under Wis. Stat. § 448.30 before her birth. The physician owed a duty to obtain informed consent from the surrogate for both herself and the child. Upon being born alive, the child had an independent right to pursue an informed consent claim. The Court reversed the circuit court’s partial summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings on the child’s informed consent claim. View "Brekke v. Midwest Medical Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A woman was shopping at a grocery store in Florida when she slipped on spilled dish soap and fell. Security footage showed that after the fall, she continued shopping and later purchased champagne. She later sued the store for premises liability, alleging significant physical injuries that she claimed severely limited her activities, including being unable to lift her children, bend, or play in the pool. During discovery, she repeated these claims in interrogatory answers and deposition testimony. The store hired a private investigator, who recorded her performing many of the activities she claimed she could not do, such as lifting her children, bending, carrying groceries, and playing in the pool.The Circuit Court for Broward County held an evidentiary hearing, after which it found by clear and convincing evidence that the woman intentionally and repeatedly lied about her limitations and that her testimony was not credible. The court found that her fraudulent conduct “comprehensively infected the integrity” of the case and dismissed her entire complaint with prejudice as a sanction for fraud on the court.The Fourth District Court of Appeal reviewed the dismissal. Applying what it termed a “more stringent abuse of discretion standard” to the sanction, it affirmed the finding of fraud but reversed in part, holding that only the claims dependent on her subjective testimony (pain and suffering, lost wages) should be dismissed, while her claim for medical expenses should be reinstated.The Supreme Court of Florida held that the correct standard of appellate review involves reviewing factual findings for competent, substantial evidence, legal conclusions de novo, and the choice of sanction for abuse of discretion—not a heightened or “more stringent” abuse of discretion standard. The Court quashed the Fourth District’s decision, reinstated the trial court’s order dismissing the entire complaint with prejudice, and disapproved conflicting case law to the extent it applied a different standard. View "Publix Supermarkets, Inc. v. Goga" on Justia Law

Frank Egan brought claims alleging injury from asbestos exposure against Union Carbide Corporation and others. In an earlier lawsuit, Egan had asserted similar claims against Union Carbide, but those claims were dismissed without prejudice by stipulation. Egan then filed a new suit raising the same type of allegations, contending that the defendants placed asbestos into the stream of commerce, causing his injuries. Union Carbide, a corporation organized under New York law with its principal place of business in Texas, responded that North Dakota courts lacked personal jurisdiction over it and raised this defense in its answer.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, granted Union Carbide’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court found Union Carbide did not have sufficient contacts with North Dakota to justify exercising personal jurisdiction. Egan argued that Union Carbide had waived this defense by not raising it in the prior litigation and that the company’s business registration in North Dakota constituted consent to jurisdiction, but the district court rejected these arguments.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that merely registering to do business in North Dakota does not amount to consent to general personal jurisdiction, as North Dakota law explicitly states that such registration alone is insufficient. The court further held that a defendant does not waive a personal jurisdiction defense by failing to raise it in an earlier case that was dismissed without prejudice. Finally, the act of negotiating a dismissal in the earlier litigation did not amount to the purposeful availment required by due process for establishing personal jurisdiction. Thus, the judgment dismissing Egan’s claims against Union Carbide was affirmed. View "Egan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A patient filed a medical malpractice action after a surgery was performed on her uninjured foot instead of her injured foot. The surgeon settled and was dismissed from the case prior to trial, and the case against the hospital proceeded to a jury trial. The jury awarded the patient substantial economic and noneconomic damages, apportioning 65% of the fault to the hospital and 35% to the surgeon. The hospital moved to reduce the noneconomic damages to the statutory cap, and the patient challenged the constitutionality of this cap.The District Court of Williams County held that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages was constitutional and reduced the noneconomic damages accordingly. The court apportioned fault and entered an amended judgment in favor of the patient, reflecting the statutory cap and including interest and costs. The hospital paid the full amount of the amended judgment, and the patient accepted payment and filed a satisfaction of judgment, though the satisfaction did not strictly comply with statutory requirements. Later, the patient filed a notice of appeal, challenging the constitutionality of the statutory cap, and the hospital filed a conditional cross-appeal regarding allocation of damages.The Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that by accepting full payment of the amended judgment and filing a satisfaction—without reserving any right to appeal—the patient waived her right to appeal. The court clarified that in non-divorce cases, voluntarily accepting the full amount of a judgment without expressly preserving any appellate issues constitutes waiver of the right to appeal. As a result, both the patient’s appeal and the hospital’s cross-appeal were dismissed. The court expressly abrogated any contrary rule suggested by the earlier decision in Tyler v. Shea, 4 N.D. 377, 61 N.W. 468 (1894). View "Cowan v. Slann" on Justia Law

Three minor children and their grandfather brought negligence, wrongful-death, and professional-malpractice claims related to the death of Luke Laducer, who died while in custody at the Cass County Jail. Laducer had been taken to a hospital after attempting suicide but was medically cleared and then jailed. He was found unresponsive later that day and died of hemorrhagic gastritis and colitis. The plaintiffs previously filed a federal lawsuit, where the state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice due to failure to serve an expert affidavit as required by North Dakota law, and the constitutional claims were decided on summary judgment.After the federal litigation, the plaintiffs, now omitting Laducer’s adult relatives and including additional defendants, filed this action in the District Court of Cass County. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were barred by res judicata and the two-year statute of limitations. The District Court granted the motion, finding both bars applicable, and entered judgment dismissing the case with prejudice.The Supreme Court of North Dakota reviewed the case and held that res judicata did not apply because the prior federal court dismissal of the state-law claims was without prejudice and did not constitute a decision on the merits. Additionally, the Court held that the disability provisions of N.D.C.C. § 28-01-25 tolled the statute of limitations for the plaintiffs, who were minors or imprisoned at the time the claims accrued, and that the statutory time caps had not been exceeded. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "L.G.L. v. County of Cass" on Justia Law