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Plaintiff filed suit against DCFS and a private foster care agency, alleging claims of negligence and failure to perform statutorily mandated duties which resulted in sexual abuse by her foster mother's two sons. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of nonsuit and postjudgment awards of attorney fees, but reduced costs by $6,988.37. The court held that the trial court properly granted nonsuit, because plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to permit the jury to find in her favor. In this case, there was no evidence Children's Institute owed plaintiff a duty to protect her from the brothers because their sexual abuse was not foreseeable or imminent. Furthermore, the evidence presented by plaintiff was insufficient to permit a jury to find the county's breach of three mandatory duties was a proximate cause of her injuries. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied leave to file a fifth amended complaint, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded attorney fees for unreasonably denied requests for admission. Finally, the court modified the postjudgment order to reflect trial costs are additionally taxed for disallowed costs for investigative expenses. View "Doe v. Department of Children & Family Services" on Justia Law

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Williams, a musician, sued the Fremont Corners Shopping Center for negligence and premises liability after he was assaulted in its parking lot at about 1:30 a.m after performing in the Peacock Lounge in the shopping center. Fremont and Peacock asserted they were not aware of prior similar incidents; the shopping center had lighting and security cameras. Williams responded by offering records of service calls from the Sunnyvale Department of Public Safety, showing five calls for service to Fremont in the preceding year, including police reports of a simple assault, a battery with serious bodily injury, and a physical altercation with an unknown suspect, which resulted in the victim suffering a broken jaw. The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of Fremont. The landowner had no duty to take affirmative measures, beyond those in the record, to discover criminal activity on the premises. Williams could not support his allegations that the assault was reasonably foreseeable. The evidence demonstrated that the owner was generally aware of the possibility of fights erupting at or near Peacock but a general knowledge of the possibility of violent criminal conduct is not in itself enough to create a duty under California law, Williams has not asserted what measures Fremont should have taken to prevent the harm that he endured. View "Williams v. Fremont Corners, Inc." on Justia Law

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Claimant Mark Pilling filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits which insurer Travelers Insurance denied. An administrative law judge (ALJ) reversed insurer’s denial, but the Workers’ Compensation Board reversed the ALJ’s order and reinstated insurer’s denial on the ground that claimant was a nonsubject worker because he was a partner in the business for which he worked and he had not applied for coverage as a nonsubject worker. The Court of Appeals affirmed the board’s order. On claimant’s petition, the Oregon Supreme Court granted certiorari review and concluded that, even assuming claimant was a nonsubject worker, he was entitled to coverage because the business for which he worked made a specific written application for workers’ compensation coverage for him, which insurer accepted. Therefore, the Court reversed the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Workers’ Compensation Board and remanded to the board for further proceedings. View "Pilling v. Travelers Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals ordering the Industrial Commission of Ohio to vacate its order denying the request of Joshua Pilarczyk for permanent total disability (PTD) compensation, holding that the court of appeals erred in relying on the report of Dr. Kenneth Gruenfeld in making its decision. Dr. Gruenfeld undertook an independent psychological evaluation of Pilarczyk at the request of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation and then issued a report stating that Pilarczyk was likely able to perform sustained remunerative employment despite his psychological disability. The Commission denied Pilarczyk's request for PTD compensation based in part on Dr. Gruenfeld's report. The court of appeals concluded that the Commission abused its discretion by denying PTD compensation based on Dr. Gruenfeld's report and issued a writ of mandamus ordering the Commission to vacate its order denying PTD compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Dr. Gruenfeld's report was equivocal and ambiguous, and therefore, it did not constitute "some evidence" in support of the Commission's determination that Pilarczyk could engage in sustained remunerative employment. View "State ex rel. Pilarczyk v. Geauga County" on Justia Law

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In this equitable contribution action brought by Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (collectively, Nationwide) against Erie Insurance Exchange the Supreme Court vacated the final judgment of the circuit court granting Erie's demurrer and dismissing Nationwide's claim for equitable contribution, holding that the circuit court erred as a matter of law. In Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 293 Va. 331 (Nationwide I), the Supreme Court resolved an insurance coverage dispute between Nationwide and Erie. Thereafter, Nationwide brought this action seeking reimbursement for Erie's share of a monetary settlement that Nationwide had paid to a tort claimant while the case was on appeal. The circuit court sustained Erie's demurrer to the claim. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court should have denied Erie's demurrer to the claim of equitable contribution based upon the coverage allocation that the Court had determined in Nationwide I. The Court remanded the case to the circuit court to enter an order awarding contribution to Nationwide consistent with the Court's allocation of coverage liability in Nationwide I and with the views expressed in this opinion. View "Nationwide Mut. Fire Insurance Co. v. Erie Insurance Exchange" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the determination of the Workers' Compensation Commission that Carnell Carrington was not entitled to temporary benefits for a total disability caused by kidney failure unrelated to his employment, holding that the court of appeals did not err. At the time he began working for his employer in 1992, Carrington had a preexisting kidney job. In 2006, Carrignton received a kidney transplant but returned to work without restrictions. In 2014, Carrington's kidney condition deteriorated severely, rendering him totally disabled from performing any work. The Commission concluded that Carrington was not entitled to continuing temporary total-disability benefits because neither his preexisting kidney disease nor his kidney failure had any connection to his employment. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the two-causes rule articulated in Bergmann v. L & W Drywall, 222 Va. 30 (1981), did not apply to the facts of this case. View "Carrington v. Aquatic Co." on Justia Law

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Guerrero was trying to drive to his job at BNSF Railway through a snowstorm early one morning. His car skidded, collided with a snowplow, and he was killed. His widow sought compensatory damages from BNSF under the Federal Employer’s Liability Act (FELA, 45 U.S.C. 51–59). The district court ruled in favor of BNSF. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Stating that the question of whether Guerrero was within the scope of his employment when the accident occurred was a close one, the court declined to resolve the issue. Guerrero was not heading to his normal job, but had accepted a special assignment; his union contract provides that “the time of an employee who is called after release from duty to report for work will begin at the time called.” Looking at the evidence favorably to Guerrero, he was not commuting, but was “on the clock” and working on the special assignment. No jury, however, could find that BNSF was negligent in any action it took or failed to take with respect to Guerrero. FELA does not make the employer the insurer of the safety of his employees while they are on duty. The only action BNSF took was to ask Guerrero to come to work under conditions known to both parties. View "Guerrero v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

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Croce, the Chair of Human Cancer Genetics at Ohio State University (OSU), has published over 650 papers during his 45-year career; 12 were subject to corrections and two more were withdrawn with Croce’s consent. New York Times reporter Glanz emailed Croce, asking to discuss “promising anti-cancer” research. After a meeting, Glanz emailed Dr. Croce, stating that the scope of the story had broadened and that Glanz had made records requests at OSU and other institutions. Glanz later sent a letter on Times letterhead to OSU and to Croce with pointed questions, many of which followed allegations made by others against Croce. Croce retained counsel and responded, denying the allegations as “false and defamatory.” Glanz sent another email that contained additional allegations. Croce’s counsel again responded, denying each allegation. Ultimately, the Times published an article on its website (and social media) with the title, “Years of Ethics Charges, but Star Cancer Researcher Gets a Pass”; and text, “Dr. Carlo Croce was repeatedly cleared by Ohio State University, which reaped millions from his grants. Now, he faces new whistle-blower accusations.” The article appeared on the front page and above the fold in the printed edition and detailed various allegations against and criticisms of Croce. Croce brought defamation, false light, and intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. The article is a standard piece of investigative journalism that presents newsworthy allegations made by others, with appropriate qualifying language. View "Croce v. New York Times Co." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Court of Appeals (WCCA) reversing the judgment of the compensation judge dismissing Petitioner's claim petition seeking workers' compensation benefits for post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which Petitioner claimed resulted from numerous traumatic incidents that he experienced while working, holding that the WCCA erred. At issue on appeal was the correct interpretation of Minn. Stat. 176.011, subs.15(d), which requires an employee seeking workers' compensation benefits where the alleged injury is PTSD arising out of employment to prove that the employee has been diagnosed with PTSD by a licensed psychologist or psychiatrist using the latest version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in making a diagnosis. The Supreme Court held (1) Minn. Stat. 176.011, subs.15(d) does not require a compensation judge to conduct an independent assessment to verify that the diagnosis of the psychologist or psychiatrist conforms to the PTSD criteria set forth in the DSM before accepting the expert's diagnosis; and (2) the WCCA erred by overriding the compensation judge's choice between two competing medical experts because the expert opinion adopted by the compensation judge had an adequate factual foundation for the diagnosis. View "Smith v. Carver County" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgments of the court of appeals in this construction dispute, holding that Ohio's construction statute of repose, Ohio Rev. Code 2305.131, applies to any cause of action, whether sounding in contract or tort, so long as the cause of action meets the requirements of the statute. Plaintiff filed this action against several defendants, companies involved in the design and construction of a public school building, alleging claims for breach of contract. Defendants argued that the statute of repose on section 2305.131 barred Plaintiff's claims because substantial completion of the project occurred more than ten years before the claims were filed. The trial court agreed and dismissed the claims as time barred. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that section 2305.131 does not apply to breach of contract claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 2305.131 applies to both contract and tort claims. View "New Riegel Local School District Board of Education v. Buehrer Group Architecture & Engineering, Inc." on Justia Law