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This appeal stemmed from a wrongful death action alleging that a humidifier cleaning agent manufactured in Korea and sold in California caused Sunja An's death. Jayone was a California importer and distributor of Korean consumer products that sold the cleaning agent to a Los Angeles retail store where An allegedly purchased the product. Jayone filed a complaint against Aekyung, a Korean manufacturer and distributor of personal care and household products that sold the cleaning agent to Jayone. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of Aekyung's motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that Aekyung purposefully availed itself of the benefits of doing business in California and reasonably could expect to be subject to the specific jurisdiction of California courts. The court also held that the trial court applied the relatedness prong too narrowly, and that Jayone met its burden of showing that plaintiffs' wrongful death action was related to or arises out of Aekyung's sale of the Humidifier Mate. Finally, Aekyung has not made the requisite showing that jurisdiction would be unfair or unreasonable in California. View "Jayone Foods v. Aekyung Industrial Co. Ltd." on Justia Law

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Bard manufactures a surgical patch, consisting of two pieces of mesh that surround a flexible plastic ring. During a hernia repair, the patch is folded to fit through a small incision, then the plastic ring springs back into its original shape and flattens the mesh against the abdominal wall. Bard recalled several versions of the patch in 2005-2006 following reports that the plastic ring was defective. Sometimes the ring broke, exposing a sharp edge that could perforate the patient’s intestines. Other times the ring caused the patch to bend and warp, exposing the patch’s adhesive to a patient’s viscera. Before the recall, Bowersock underwent hernia repair surgery, involving a Bard patch. Roughly one year later, she died of complications arising from an abdominal-wall abscess. Her estate sued. Unlike defective patches in other injured patients, Bowersock’s patch did not adhere to her bowel or perforate her organs. Plaintiff's expert tried to present a new theory of causation: the patch had “buckled,” forming a stiff edge that rubbed against and imperceptibly perforated her internal organs. The court excluded that testimony, finding the “buckling” theory not sufficiently reliable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defense. The novel theory of causation was not peer-reviewed, professionally presented, consistent with Bowersock’s medical records or autopsy, or substantiated by other cases. View "Robinson v. Davol, Inc." on Justia Law

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Pro se plaintiff Elena Dogan appeals after the trial court granted a motion for nonsuit brought by her landlord, defendant Comanche Hills Apartments, Inc., and related individuals and entities at the close of her case. Dogan alleged she was injured when some concrete stairs at the apartment complex broke under her foot, causing her to fall. She claimed defendants were responsible for her injuries based on their control of the premises. Shortly after the filing of her initial complaint, the superior court granted Dogan a fee waiver. The case ultimately went to trial on a negligence theory. Several months before trial, Dogan filed a request to waive additional court fees and specifically asked for a waiver of court reporter fees. The request was denied with the stamped notation, "The Court does not provide Court Reporter Services." As a result, there was no court reporter at trial and no reporter's transcript on appeal. Dogan sought to challenge the trial court's decision to grant a nonsuit in defendants' favor. Defendants argued in response that Dogan could not establish error due to the absence of a reporter's transcript. After initial briefing in this case was complete, the California Supreme Court issued its decision in Jameson v. Desta, 5 Cal.5th 594 (2018), holding that the San Diego Superior Court's policy on providing court reporters "is invalid as applied to plaintiff and other fee waiver recipients, and that an official court reporter, or other valid means to create an official verbatim record for purposes of appeal, must generally be made available to in forma pauperis litigants upon request." As defendants appropriately conceded in their post-Jameson supplemental brief, Jameson applied retroactively to all cases, including this one, not yet final on appeal. Because there was no way to now provide a reporter for a trial that has already occurred, the Court of Appeal determined it had no choice but to reverse and remand for a new trial at which an official court reporter would be furnished. View "Dogan v. Comanche Hills Apartments" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the summary judgment entered by the superior court in favor of Defendant on Plaintiff’s complaint asserting that Defendant was negligent and had caused Plaintiff economic harm, holding that claim preclusion cannot operate to bar a subsequent suit brought in district or superior court by a person who was not an actual party in a previous small claims action. A third party driving a vehicle owned by Plaintiff was involved in a collision with a vehicle driven by Defendant. In a small claims matter, Defendant sued the third party, and the district court found the third party was negligent. Plaintiff then brought this action against Defendant. The superior court applied the doctrine of res judicata to the earlier small claims judgment and determined that the earlier judgment conclusively resolved the issue of which driver was at fault. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment, holding that, because of the unique limitations of small claims procedure, claim preclusion did not bar this suit by a person who was, at most, in privity with the defendant in the small claims case. View "Ring v. Leighton" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals affirming the circuit court’s order dismissing Petitioner’s complaint against the Village of Sister Bay alleging that some summer concerts held in a public park were a public and private nuisance, holding (1) the court of appeals erred in failing to view each concert as a new nuisance prompting a new notice of injury period; but (2) Petitioner’s written notice of injury was not timely filed. On appeal, Petitioner asserted that it should not be barred from bringing future nuisance actions against the Village because it failed to complain within 120 days as required by Wis. Stat. 898.80(1d)(a) about a noise nuisance from the date the first concert was held in 2014. The Supreme Court held (1) contrary to the decision of the court of appeals, each concert alleged to be a nuisance constitutes a separate event for purposes of filing a written notice of injury; but (2) Petitioner’s written notice of injury, which was not served within 120 days after the date of the last concert alleged to be a nuisance, was not timely filed. View "Yacht Club at Sister Bay Condominium Ass’n, Inc. v. Village of Sister Bay" on Justia Law

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In this case stemming from an electrician’s injuries after an aerial lift malfunctioned the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s partial grant of Defendant’s motion to exclude expert testimony and grant of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on all claims. While Plaintiff, the electrician, was working approximately thirty feet in the air on the raised platform of the aerial lift, the lift malfunction and tipped over. Plaintiff sustained serious injuries. Plaintiff sued Defendant, the manufacturer and designer of the lift, bringing strict liability claims, negligence claims, and an implied warranty claim. The district court partially granted Defendant’s motion to exclude Plaintiff’s expert opinions on the issues of unreasonably dangerous conditions, defect, causation, and alternative design and then entered summary judgment for Defendant on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant on the strict products liability design and manufacturing defects claims. View "Pitts v. Genie Industries, Inc." on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Appellate Court reversing the trial court’s judgment in favor of Plaintiff in this personal injury case, holding that that Appellate Court correctly determined that governmental immunity barred Plaintiff’s action. Plaintiff brought this action against the Town of East Haven seeking damages for injuries he received when he was struck by an unregistered vehicle driven by a third party. Plaintiff alleged that the accident would not have occurred had an East Haven police officer, who responded to an incident involving the third party shortly before Plaintiff was struck, properly directed that the third party’s vehicle be towed in accordance with police department tow rules. The jury rejected the Town’s claim of governmental immunity, concluding that the officer had a ministerial duty under the tow rules to have the third party’s vehicle towed. The Appellate Court reversed, concluding that the Town was immune from suit because its tow rules did not impose on the officer a clear ministerial duty to tow the third party’s vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the officer had no clear ministerial duty to tow the third party’s vehicle. View "Ventura v. Town of East Haven" on Justia Law

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This appeal was one of many civil and criminal cases arising out of the attempted murder of Lee Abraham, allegedly orchestrated by Dr. Arnold Smith. The trial court sanctioned Smith’s attorney, William Bell, for violating its order sealing a portion of a document. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sanctioning Bell, the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed. View "Smith v. Hickman" on Justia Law

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Sixteen years after he had been sexually abused by an Oregon Youth Authority (OYA) employee, plaintiff filed suit; the issue on review was plaintiff’s 42 U.S.C. section 1983 claim against defendant Gary Lawhead, former superintendent of the OYA facility where the abuse had occurred. Plaintiff alleged defendant had violated his federal constitutional rights through deliberate indifference to the risk that the OYA employee would sexually abuse youths housed at the facility. The trial court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s section 1983 claim on the basis that the claim accrued at the time of the abuse in 1998 and, consequently, was untimely. The Court of Appeals reversed, relying on T. R. v. Boy Scouts of America, 181 P3d 758, cert den, 555 US 825 (2008). The Oregon Supreme Court allowed defendant’s petition for review to address when plaintiff’s cause of action under section 1983 accrued. Applying federal law, the Court held that an action under section 1983 accrues when a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know of the injury and the defendant’s role in causing the injury. Therefore, the trial court erred by dismissing plaintiff’s claim in reliance on the principle that a section 1983 claim accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury alone, which, in this case, it determined was necessarily when the abuse occurred. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, reversed the trial court's judgment, and remanded the case to the trial court to reconsider its summary judgment decision under the correct accrual standard. View "J. M. v. Oregon Youth Authority" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the circuit court affirming the decision of the South Dakota Department of Labor and Regulation awarding partial summary judgment in favor of Claimant for existing medical expenses she incurred after she suffered a workplace injury to her right foot that required surgery. This appeal concerned Claimant’s second motion for partial summary judgment to recover existing medical expenses after the Department first award partial summary judgment for Claimant’s incurred medical expenses. Employer and its insurer paid the outstanding medical expenses and then argued that a decision on the second motion was unnecessary because the issue was moot. The Department granted partial summary judgment in favor of Claimant. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment affirming the Department’s decision and remanded to the circuit court with instructions that the court order the Department to vacate its order and dismiss Claimant’s claim for medical expenses, holding that the claim for medical expenses set forth in Claimant’s motion for partial summary judgment became moot prior to the Department’s final order granting summary judgment and was moot when the circuit court reviewed it on appeal. View "Skjonsberg v. Menard, Inc." on Justia Law