Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff brought a suit under Puerto Rico law after her mother died while residing in an assisted living facility. The plaintiff alleged that the facility's staff, including a licensed practical nurse, incorrectly informed treating physicians that her mother was a Jehovah's Witness. As a result, necessary blood transfusions were not administered, and the mother died from heart failure. The facility’s insurer had denied coverage for the incident under its general liability policy, claiming that the alleged wrongful acts were excluded as “professional services.”The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico first granted partial summary judgment for the insurer, finding that certain actions—such as failing to call 911—were excluded as “professional services,” but allowed the case to proceed on claims related to record-keeping and miscommunication, concluding those were not “professional services” under existing precedent. After the case was reassigned, the new district judge reaffirmed that ruling, and a damages trial resulted in a verdict against the facility. Subsequent to a decision by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court in Rivera-Matos v. Commonwealth, which clarified the scope of “professional services” exclusions, the district judge permitted the insurer to relitigate the coverage issue, ultimately finding that the exclusion did apply to the acts in question and entering judgment for the insurer.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the plaintiff had forfeited her argument that the Puerto Rico Supreme Court’s decision should not be applied retroactively, as she had not raised it below. The court further found no plain error in the application of the new precedent. The judgment of the district court in favor of the insurer was affirmed. View "Garcia-Navarro v. Universal Insurance Company" on Justia Law

After Hurricane Ida struck Louisiana in August 2021, Terrebonne Parish, which operates Houma’s electric system, requested help from Lafayette Utilities Systems (LUS) to restore power. LUS, in turn, sought assistance from the City of Wilson, North Carolina, leading to mutual aid agreements signed by Terrebonne Parish, LUS, and the City of Wilson. As a result, thirteen City of Wilson employees, including Kevin Ray Worrell, traveled to Louisiana to assist with power restoration. These workers stayed in Lafayette and commuted daily to Houma. On September 10, 2021, while driving a City of Wilson vehicle back to the hotel after work, Worrell was involved in an accident, injuring the plaintiffs.The plaintiffs initially filed tort actions in the St. Mary Parish district court, which were consolidated and removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana based on diversity jurisdiction. The defendants moved for dismissal or summary judgment, arguing that Mr. Worrell was entitled to immunity under the Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act (LHSEADA). The district court agreed, finding that Worrell acted as a “representative” of Terrebonne Parish under the statute and thus was immune from liability. The district court also determined that commuting from the work site fell within emergency preparedness activities covered by the Act.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified questions to the Supreme Court of Louisiana regarding the definition of “representative” under the LHSEADA. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that Worrell, as an employee of the City of Wilson, North Carolina, working pursuant to mutual aid agreements that explicitly preserved his status as a City of Wilson employee and independent contractor, was not a “representative” of the State of Louisiana or its subdivisions for purposes of LHSEADA immunity. Therefore, he was not entitled to statutory immunity. The Court found it unnecessary to reach the second certified question. View "BREAUX VS. WORRELL" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Wisconsin legislature enacted a statute granting immunity to health care providers from civil liability for certain acts or omissions occurring between March 12, 2020, and July 11, 2020. Savannah Wren, whose pregnancy was considered high risk, experienced the stillbirth of her child after multiple visits to Columbia St. Mary’s Hospital. She alleged negligent care and subsequently filed suit for medical malpractice, wrongful death, and negligent infliction of emotional distress against the hospital and associated medical professionals.The Milwaukee County Circuit Court considered the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the immunity provided by WIS. STAT. § 895.4801. Wren challenged the statute’s constitutionality on several grounds, including vagueness, overbreadth, and violations of her rights to redress, jury trial, due process, and equal protection. The circuit court struck her supplemental equal protection claim and ultimately dismissed her complaint with prejudice, finding the statute constitutional.Upon appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. It held that § 895.4801 was facially unconstitutional because it deprived litigants of their right to a jury trial under Article I, Section 5 of the Wisconsin Constitution, and concluded that the statute was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed only whether § 895.4801 facially violates the state constitutional right to a jury trial. The court held that because the legislature has the authority to abrogate or suspend common law causes of action under Article XIV, Section 13, and because the statute eliminated Wren’s causes of action during the specified period, her right to a jury trial did not attach. The court concluded that § 895.4801 does not implicate the constitutional jury trial right, reversed the court of appeals’ decision, and remanded for further proceedings on other unresolved issues. View "Wren v. Columbia St. Mary's Hospital Milwaukee, Inc." on Justia Law

A man suffered a serious injury to his right index finger in a bandsaw accident and was treated by a plastic surgeon who recommended amputation. The patient refused amputation, and the doctor attempted to salvage the finger through surgery and follow-up care. Another surgeon later treated the patient and ultimately performed a “ray amputation,” removing the entire finger and a portion of the hand. The patient sued the original doctor, alleging that negligent treatment led to an infection and necessitated the more extensive amputation. Medical experts for both sides testified that the initial injury left a very low chance of saving the finger.The case was tried to a jury in a Texas district court, which rendered an 11–1 defense verdict, finding neither the doctor nor the patient proximately caused the injury. The charge included a “loss of chance” instruction, requiring the jury to find the finger had more than a 50% chance of survival with proper care. The patient objected to this instruction before and after the verdict, arguing it was not appropriate under Texas law. After trial, the patient moved for a new trial, attaching a letter from the dissenting juror describing deliberations and alleged confusion about the charge. The district court granted a new trial, later amending its order to provide seven reasons, mainly contesting the “loss of chance” instruction. The doctor sought mandamus relief from the Texas Court of Appeals, which denied relief.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and conditionally granted mandamus relief. The Court held that the district court abused its discretion by ordering a new trial on legally incorrect grounds, including its misunderstanding of the “loss of chance” doctrine, which is recognized under Texas law in both death and injury cases. The Court directed the district court to vacate its new trial order and render judgment on the jury’s verdict. View "IN RE LAPUERTA" on Justia Law

A shopper at a grocery store slipped and fell in a puddle of clear liquid in the toy aisle. She noticed water around her and observed water dripping from a ceiling rafter above the puddle. Her companion, who was nearby, initially thought the water came from the ceiling but later stated he did not actually see a drip. The store manager, responding to the incident, saw water on the floor but no evidence of a leak, and attributed the source to rain, which had ended two hours earlier. The store had experienced multiple roof leaks in the past year due to renovations, but no leaks were reported in the toy aisle before or after the incident. Surveillance footage showed no employee had walked down the aisle in the two hours prior to the fall.The trial court excluded the plaintiff’s expert report and granted summary judgment for the grocery store, finding no evidence of the store’s actual or constructive knowledge of the puddle. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the store’s knowledge of previous leaks elsewhere in the building could raise a fact issue about its constructive knowledge regarding the puddle in the toy aisle. The appellate court also partially reinstated some expert testimony.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that to survive a no-evidence summary judgment in a premises liability slip-and-fall case, a plaintiff must present evidence of how long the dangerous condition existed. The Court concluded there was no evidence addressing the duration of the puddle’s presence. Prior leaks elsewhere in the store, the size of the puddle, or evidence about inspections were insufficient to show constructive knowledge of the puddle at the relevant time and place. The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the appellate court’s judgment and reinstated summary judgment for the grocery store. View "H-E-B, L.P. v. PETERSON" on Justia Law

An employee of a plumbing subcontractor was injured when a trench collapsed at a residential construction site, resulting in serious physical and emotional harm. The employee had been directed by his supervisor to enter a trench that did not comply with OSHA safety regulations. The general contractor for the project was not present at the site and only learned of the accident months later, after an OSHA investigation. The subcontractor, not the general contractor, was responsible for the trenching work and the day-to-day safety of its employees.After receiving workers’ compensation and settling gross negligence claims against his co-employees, the injured worker proceeded to trial solely on a negligence claim against the general contractor. The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied the general contractor’s motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, allowing the case to go to a jury, which found the general contractor liable and awarded substantial compensatory and punitive damages.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The court held that, as a general rule, a general contractor does not owe a duty of care to the employees of an independent contractor. The court found that neither the “retained control” nor “peculiar risk” exceptions to this rule applied. The general contractor did not retain operative control over the subcontractor’s work, either by contract or by conduct, and residential trenching work is not inherently or peculiarly dangerous as a matter of law under Iowa precedent. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that the general contractor was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict and reversed the lower court’s ruling. View "Kono v. D.R. Horton, Inc." on Justia Law

Charles Bunning was injured in a motor vehicle collision with Ernest Romero at an intersection in Cheyenne, Wyoming. At the time of the accident, Bunning was driving south on a through highway, exceeding the speed limit and weaving through heavy traffic. Romero, who had stopped at a stop sign on a cross street, waited for what he thought was a safe opportunity, then entered the intersection to turn left. Bunning, changing lanes and accelerating, collided with Romero’s truck as Romero crossed the highway. Both vehicles were damaged, and both drivers suffered injuries.After the incident, Bunning sued Romero for negligence. Romero counterclaimed, alleging Bunning’s negligence caused the crash, but Romero’s counterclaim was settled before trial. The District Court of Laramie County held a bench trial, concluded that both drivers breached their respective duties to operate their vehicles reasonably, and found that their negligence proximately caused Bunning’s injuries and damages. The district court found Bunning was more than fifty percent at fault, due to his speeding and unsafe driving, and under Wyoming’s comparative fault statute (Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-109(b)), barred him from recovering damages.On appeal, Bunning argued that as the preferred driver on a through highway, Romero’s failure to yield should make Romero strictly liable, and comparative fault principles should not apply. The Supreme Court of Wyoming rejected this argument, holding that the comparative fault statute applies to all negligence actions, including those involving violations of right-of-way statutes, unless the legislature has expressly provided otherwise. The Supreme Court found the district court’s application of the statute, its findings of fault, and the bar to recovery were not clearly erroneous and affirmed the judgment. View "Bunning v. Romero" on Justia Law

A man filed suit in 2017 against three individuals and a club, alleging that he was sexually abused as a child between 1993 and 2000. He claimed that the abuse caused him numerous injuries but asserted that he did not learn of the connection between the abuse and his injuries until 2014, after receiving psychotherapy. The defendants argued that his claims were barred by the statute of limitations, contending that he was aware of the connection between the abuse and his injuries before reaching adulthood, based on deposition testimony and documents such as statements the plaintiff made to police.The Circuit Court of Sussex County considered deposition transcripts and documentary evidence submitted by the parties, with no live testimony presented at the hearing. The circuit court found that the plaintiff knew of the causal relationship between the abuse and his injuries before he reached the age of majority in 2002. Thus, the court determined that his claims accrued when he became an adult, and were barred by the two-year statute of limitations that expired in 2004. The court granted the defendants’ pleas in bar, dismissing the claims.The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed this decision, holding that, since only documentary evidence had been presented, the circuit court’s factual findings were not entitled to deference. It reviewed the matter de novo, found disputed material facts, and concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate. On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard of review. The Supreme Court clarified that factual findings based on deposition evidence are entitled to substantial deference unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the circuit court’s judgment, holding that the claims were time-barred. View "Stevens v. Jurnigan" on Justia Law

Yerano Martinez was seriously injured in a car accident after he drove through a stop sign at an intersection. Martinez alleged that an overgrown bush, located on property owned by Jeffrey Smith, obscured the stop sign. The bush extended from Smith's property into the county's right-of-way, which is a strip of land adjacent to the roadway. Martinez argued that Smith failed in his duty to maintain his property so as not to obstruct the stop sign for passing motorists.The Marion Superior Court granted summary judgment to Smith, finding that, under the Indiana Supreme Court’s previous decision in Reece v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., Smith owed no duty to motorists unless a hazardous condition actually extended onto the paved portion of the roadway. The Indiana Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed, interpreting Reece to mean that a landowner’s duty to motorists is limited to conditions that extend onto the roadway itself, not merely into the public right-of-way or county easement.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case on transfer. The Court held that a landowner’s common-law duty under Reece to refrain from creating hazardous conditions for passing motorists on adjacent highways includes traffic-control devices, such as stop signs, located within the public right-of-way. The Court clarified that the duty is not confined to the paved part of the road but extends to conditions that obstruct traffic-control devices within the right-of-way. Because Smith admitted the bush encroached into the public right-of-way and created a visual obstruction, the hazardous condition was not wholly contained on his property. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to Smith and reversed the lower court’s decision. View "Martinez v. Smith" on Justia Law

A San Diego family suffered a significant mistake after the sudden death of their relative, Jose Gonzalez, Jr., in Texas. Due to a mix-up at the Tarrant County Medical Examiner’s Office, the body of Mr. Gonzalez was confused with another individual who died a day later. As a result, the family received the wrong body for burial, while Mr. Gonzalez’s remains were mistakenly cremated in Texas. The widow, Celina Gonzalez, contracted with a California mortuary to arrange for Mr. Gonzalez’s body to be transported and prepared for funeral services in California. However, due to the error, the family discovered the mistake only at the viewing and could not bury their loved one as intended.Following these events, two lawsuits were filed in the Superior Court of San Diego County: one by the extended family and one by Celina and her daughter Edna. The cases were consolidated. The operative complaint alleged breach of contract and negligence. At trial, the mortuary asserted the affirmative defense of impracticability of performance, which the trial judge submitted to the jury. The jury found for the mortuary on both negligence and breach of contract, concluding that performance was excused due to impracticability. The trial court also granted nonsuit to the mortuary, ruling that only Celina, as the contracting party, had standing to sue for breach of contract, and that the extended family were not intended third-party beneficiaries.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, held that the defense of impracticability of performance is equitable and must be decided by the judge, not a jury. The appellate court reversed the judgment on the breach of contract claim as to Celina, remanding for a bench trial on the impracticability defense and, if necessary, a trial on damages. The court affirmed the dismissal of the extended family’s contract claims, finding they lacked standing. View "Gonzalez v. Community Mortuary" on Justia Law