Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff underwent a surgical procedure involving multiple surgical staplers, one of which was used to create an anastomosis that subsequently leaked. In October 2021, the plaintiff filed a products liability suit against several manufacturers of surgical staplers. Over the course of pretrial proceedings, the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina issued multiple scheduling orders, ultimately extending the plaintiff’s expert disclosure deadline to March 15, 2024. The plaintiff failed to disclose any experts by this deadline. Twenty days later, the plaintiff moved to extend the expert disclosure deadline, citing delays in obtaining discovery and the model number of the stapler at issue.The district court denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend the scheduling order, finding that he had not shown “good cause” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4), and entered summary judgment for the defendants due to the absence of expert testimony needed to support the plaintiff’s claims. The court noted that the plaintiff had not acted diligently, as required by Rule 16(b)(4), and had not filed a motion to compel or otherwise timely challenged the adequacy of discovery responses. The district court also relied on the plaintiff’s own representations regarding when he learned the model number of the stapler.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the denial of the motion to amend for abuse of discretion and the grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the district court correctly applied Rule 16(b)(4)’s “good cause” standard to the request to extend the expert disclosure deadline and did not abuse its discretion in finding a lack of diligence. Because the plaintiff failed to offer expert evidence, the court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings in full. View "Eichin v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, LLC" on Justia Law

A developer purchased property in the Brookland neighborhood that included a historic mural and an adjacent parking lot providing clear sightlines to the mural. Another individual, who sought to preserve the mural, had previously contracted to buy the property but the deal fell through amid allegations of contract forgery by the seller. The developer, holding a promissory note secured by a deed of trust, initiated foreclosure and ultimately purchased the property at auction. The unsuccessful buyer accused the developer of fraud and publicly made statements labeling him as corrupt and claiming he had “problems with the DOJ” and had taken the property “by theft and fraud.” These statements were repeated online via a media outlet controlled by the unsuccessful buyer.The developer sued for defamation and false light in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. The defendant moved to dismiss under the District’s Anti-SLAPP Act, arguing that his statements were protected advocacy on matters of public interest and that the developer was a limited-purpose public figure, thus requiring proof of actual malice. The trial court found the developer to be a limited-purpose public figure and denied most of the motion, allowing the claims to proceed except those related to certain statements outside the statute of limitations.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. It held that the Anti-SLAPP Act applied because the statements addressed issues of public interest, such as urban development and historic preservation. The court concluded that the developer was a limited-purpose public figure and therefore must show actual malice by clear and convincing evidence. The court found that the developer failed to demonstrate that the statements were false or made with actual malice. As a result, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of the Anti-SLAPP motion and remanded for further proceedings. View "Capitol Intelligence Group, Inc. v. Waldman" on Justia Law

Monica Sparrow accompanied her daughter to a hospital appointment during the COVID-19 pandemic, when special entry and exit procedures were in place. After her daughter’s appointment, Sparrow was instructed by a nurse to exit the hospital through an employee parking garage to retrieve her car. While leaving through this route, which she was unfamiliar with, Sparrow slipped on a wet, partially concealed, and allegedly slick drainage grate that shifted under her weight. Sparrow sustained a serious knee injury requiring surgery. She claimed that the hospital required her to use an unreasonably dangerous route and failed to warn her of its dangers.The case was first heard in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court. Rush Health Systems, the hospital operator, moved for summary judgment, arguing that the drainage grate was an obvious, non-dangerous condition and that Sparrow was a licensee to whom limited duties were owed. The hospital contended that the grate's presence and condition were not unreasonably dangerous and that Sparrow was at fault for not watching where she was walking. Sparrow presented evidence, including her own and expert testimony, suggesting the grate was slick, poorly lit, shifted under weight, and that she was directed by hospital staff to use that exit. The trial court denied summary judgment, finding that genuine factual disputes remained as to whether the condition was dangerous and whether Sparrow was an invitee or licensee.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the denial of summary judgment de novo. The Court held that Sparrow had presented sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the drainage grate constituted a dangerous condition and her status as an invitee or licensee at the time of her fall. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Rush Health Systems, Inc. v. Sparrow" on Justia Law

After Paula Denison was declared dead at a hospital in Meridian, Mississippi, her family consented to organ donation. She was transferred to a transplant facility, where it was later discovered that she was actually alive. Denison was then returned to the original hospital, where her condition deteriorated and she was pronounced dead the following day. Denison’s estate, through her daughter Brooke Denison as administratrix, and Brooke individually, brought separate lawsuits against the Mississippi Organ Recovery Agency, Dr. Shirley Schlessinger, and Dr. Dustin Shea Allen, among others, alleging claims such as negligence and infliction of emotional distress.In the Lauderdale County Circuit Court, the defendants moved to dismiss both complaints. In the estate’s case, the court granted dismissal based on the immunity provisions of the Revised Mississippi Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, finding the defendants acted in good faith and in reliance on the family’s authorization. In Brooke’s individual case, the court granted dismissal because her complaint did not allege that she was present or witnessed any negligent acts, thus failing to establish bystander liability. Brooke and the estate appealed these decisions.The Supreme Court of Mississippi consolidated the appeals. The Court held that the trial court erred by considering material outside the pleadings in the estate’s case without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, and thus reversed and remanded that case for further proceedings. However, the Court found that Brooke’s individual allegations failed to meet the requirements for bystander liability under Mississippi law and affirmed the dismissal of her claims. The Court expressly declined to decide whether immunity under the Anatomical Gift Act applied, noting the need for further factual development. View "Denison v. Mississippi Organ Recovery Agency, Inc." on Justia Law

A woman with a complex medical history, including autoimmune hepatitis and cirrhosis, was admitted to a regional medical center with symptoms of weakness, nausea, and vomiting. After consultation and diagnostic imaging suggested gallstones and cholecystitis, a general surgeon evaluated her and determined she was not a surgical candidate due to end-stage liver disease. She was treated non-surgically, showed some improvement, and was discharged. Two days later, she was admitted to another hospital with sepsis and subsequently died from cardiopulmonary arrest due to urosepsis.Her daughter, on behalf of her wrongful-death beneficiaries, filed a medical malpractice suit against, among others, the general surgeon. The plaintiff sought to introduce a board-certified interventional radiologist as her medical expert, whose testimony suggested that the surgeon failed to meet the standard of care by not pursuing further diagnostic testing or recommending non-surgical interventions. The Washington County Circuit Court struck this expert’s testimony, holding that the radiologist was not qualified to testify about the standard of care for a general surgeon, and granted summary judgment for the surgeon.The Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the circuit court abused its discretion in excluding the expert. Upon further review, the Supreme Court of Mississippi found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702 in excluding the expert’s testimony, as the expert did not demonstrate sufficient familiarity with the field of general surgery or with the relevant procedures. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstated, and affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, thereby upholding the exclusion of the expert testimony and the grant of summary judgment. View "Lee v. Doolittle" on Justia Law

A mother and father, previously divorced, shared joint custody of their minor son. While visiting his father’s home, the child wandered into a neighbor’s property, accessed a swimming pool, and drowned. Following the child’s death, the mother—on behalf of her son—filed a wrongful death suit against both the father and the neighbor. The father cross-claimed against the neighbor for wrongful death as well. The neighbor settled with both parents, and the settlement funds were interpleaded with the Jefferson Circuit Court, Bessemer Division, which then dismissed all claims against the neighbor.After the neighbor’s dismissal, the mother received half of the settlement funds. The father’s portion was held by the court pending resolution of a related criminal case, in which the father later pleaded guilty to criminally negligent homicide. The mother then requested that the court award her the remainder of the funds, arguing that Alabama law and public policy prohibited the father from benefitting financially from his son’s death. The father argued that because his conviction did not involve a felonious and intentional killing, he was not barred from recovery. The trial court agreed with the father and ordered the remaining funds to be disbursed to him, while reserving all other issues for trial or further hearing.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. The Court held that it lacked jurisdiction because the order appealed from was not a final judgment. The trial court had expressly reserved remaining claims—specifically, the wrongful death claim against the father—so not all issues between all parties had been conclusively resolved. The Supreme Court of Alabama therefore dismissed the appeal. View "B.S.H. v. Humphryes" on Justia Law

A fatal collision occurred when a Volkswagen Jetta, driven by Raul Lopez with Emilio Martinez-Arroyo as a passenger, rear-ended a utility trailer owned by Ron J. Peterson Construction, Inc. (RJP) on a Utah highway. The trailer, which was transporting construction equipment and did not have underride protection, was traveling significantly below the speed limit with its emergency flashers on. Both occupants of the Jetta died instantly after their car slid under the trailer. Yesneiri Maldonado-Velasquez, the decedent’s wife, sued RJP alleging negligence both in operating the vehicle and in using a trailer that lacked safety features that could have mitigated the injuries.In the Third District Court, Summit County, RJP moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had no duty to upgrade the trailer beyond federal safety standards and that the crash was solely caused by Lopez. The district court found a general statutory duty to operate safe equipment but determined that there was no specific duty to alter the trailer, based on federal preemption and application of factors from B.R. ex rel. Jeffs v. West. As a result, the court excluded much of the plaintiff's expert testimony on enhanced injury and trailer design, allowing only claims related to negligent operation. The jury ultimately found RJP not at fault.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah held that the district court erred by applying the Jeffs factors to narrow an already established broad statutory duty to operate safe vehicles. The Supreme Court clarified that federal regulations set a minimum standard, not a ceiling, and that state law may impose greater obligations unless direct conflict preemption applies. The court also held that the exclusion of expert testimony premised on the erroneous duty ruling was an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Maldonado-Velasquez v. Ron J Peterson Construction" on Justia Law

A woman was struck and injured by a bus in Bangor, Maine. The bus was operated as part of a public transit system known as the Community Connector, which serves several municipalities and the University of Maine. The City of Bangor oversees daily operations of the Community Connector, but the precise extent of involvement by the neighboring towns and cities is disputed. It is also unclear whether the bus that struck the plaintiff was running on a Community Connector route or a Bangor-only route; the buses for both services look the same.The plaintiff filed a complaint in the Penobscot County Superior Court against the City of Bangor, the Community Connector, and several neighboring towns and cities, alleging negligence and asserting that the Community Connector operated as a joint venture among the defendants. The municipalities moved for summary judgment, arguing they were immune from suit under the Maine Tort Claims Act. The Superior Court denied summary judgment, holding that the municipalities had not established that there were no material disputes of fact regarding their involvement or possible joint venture status. The court also denied a motion for reconsideration.On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court considered whether the municipalities were entitled to immunity as a matter of law. The Court found that key factual questions remained unresolved, including whether the municipalities exercised direct control over the bus or its driver and the nature of their participation in the Community Connector. Because these factual disputes must be resolved by the trial court before determining the applicability of immunity, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the appeal as interlocutory, leaving the issue of immunity to be addressed after further factual development in the trial court. View "Fisher v. Town of Hampden" on Justia Law

Gerald Lorbiecki, a steamfitter, was diagnosed with and later died from mesothelioma, a disease caused by asbestos exposure. He alleged that part of his exposure occurred while working at Pabst Brewing Company’s brewery in the mid-1970s, where he was employed by an independent contractor. The facility contained extensive asbestos-insulated piping, and Lorbiecki and other workers removed and replaced this insulation using methods that generated airborne asbestos dust. Evidence showed that Pabst was aware of the presence and dangers of asbestos during this period but did not undertake abatement or enforce protective measures.The Milwaukee County Circuit Court, after dismissing Lorbiecki’s common-law negligence claim, allowed his claim under Wisconsin’s safe-place statute to proceed. At trial, a jury found Pabst liable under the statute for failing to provide a safe workplace, awarded compensatory and punitive damages, and apportioned liability among Pabst and several non-party companies. The court entered judgment for Lorbiecki against Pabst, applying statutory caps to certain damages and including a portion of liability attributed to another company based on the non-delegable duty under the safe-place statute.On appeal, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals largely affirmed the trial court’s rulings. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the case and held that Pabst could be liable under the safe-place statute to an employee of an independent contractor, as the statute imposes a heightened, non-delegable duty of care that supersedes common-law limitations. The Court also found sufficient evidence to allow the jury to consider punitive damages. However, it ruled that the statutory cap on punitive damages applies only to the compensatory damages recoverable from the sole remaining defendant, Pabst, and not to the total compensatory damages found by the jury. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals. View "Estate of Lorbiecki v. Pabst Brewing Company" on Justia Law

Wayne and Kristin Betts brought a products liability lawsuit against Toyota after Wayne Betts was injured and paralyzed in a single-vehicle rollover accident while driving a 2002 Toyota Sequoia. The accident occurred in Oklahoma while Wayne was traveling for work, but both he and his wife were Texas residents. The vehicle had been designed in Japan, manufactured in Indiana, sold new in Georgia, resold to Wayne’s grandmother in Texas in 2015, and then retitled in Wayne’s name in Texas in 2016. At the time of the accident, the Sequoia was registered, titled, tagged, and garaged in Texas, and Wayne primarily lived and worked in Texas, though he traveled to Oklahoma for short-term work assignments.Toyota moved for summary judgment in the District Court, arguing that Texas’s 15-year statute of repose barred the Betts’ claims, as the vehicle had been originally sold more than 15 years before the accident. The Betts contended that Oklahoma law should apply because the accident and injury occurred there and Wayne had significant work contacts with Oklahoma. The District Court, using the “most significant relationship” test from Brickner v. Gooden, granted summary judgment to Toyota, holding that Texas law applied and barred the claim. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed, concluding that Oklahoma law should govern and the claim was not barred.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and held that Texas had the most significant relationship to the parties and the occurrence for purposes of applying the statute of repose. The Court concluded that Texas’s statute of repose barred the Betts’ products liability claim. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the District Court. View "BETTS V. TOYOTA" on Justia Law