Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

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Plaintiffs John and Jane Doe, on behalf of their minor children Janie Doe 1 and Janie Doe 2, alleged that Prosper Independent School District officials, Superintendent Holly Ferguson and former Transportation Director Annamarie Hamrick, failed to prevent school-bus-driver Frank Paniagua from sexually abusing their children. The abuse, which occurred during the 2021-22 school year, was captured on the bus’s video surveillance and reflected in GPS tracking data. Plaintiffs claimed that Ferguson and Hamrick had subjective knowledge of the abuse but failed to act.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas denied Ferguson and Hamrick's motions to dismiss based on qualified immunity, concluding that the complaint plausibly alleged that the defendants were aware of Paniagua’s inappropriate behavior and demonstrated deliberate indifference by failing to take necessary action to stop the abuse. The court allowed the claims under Title IX against Prosper ISD and claims under § 1983 against Paniagua’s estate to proceed, while dismissing the equal-protection and failure-to-train claims without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the interlocutory appeal concerning the denial of qualified immunity for the supervisory-liability claims under § 1983. The court held that the plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that Ferguson and Hamrick had subjective knowledge of the abuse. The court emphasized that mere access to information, such as surveillance footage and GPS data, does not equate to subjective knowledge. Consequently, the court vacated the district court's denial of qualified immunity and granted qualified immunity to Ferguson and Hamrick for the supervisory-liability claims under § 1983. View "Doe v. Ferguson" on Justia Law

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On January 13, 2020, Denise Likness ran a red light and collided with Breyanna Geerdes' car at an intersection in Watertown, South Dakota. Likness admitted fault for the accident. Geerdes claimed the accident caused her physical injuries, including neck pain, headaches, and back pain, as well as anxiety and anger outbursts. She received treatment from a chiropractor and a clinic, and attended physical therapy sessions. Sixteen months after the accident, she reported pain again and was diagnosed with upper cervical instability and neck curvature. Evidence showed Geerdes had similar symptoms before the accident.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit in Codington County, South Dakota, presided over the case. During the trial, Likness admitted fault but contested the extent of Geerdes' injuries and their connection to the accident. The jury found that Likness' negligence was not the legal cause of Geerdes' injuries. Geerdes filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the causation issue should not have been submitted to the jury. The circuit court did not rule on the motion, resulting in its automatic denial under SDCL 15-6-59(b).The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case. The court held that Likness' counsel's statements during the trial did not constitute judicial admissions of causation. The court concluded that the statements were made in the context of arguing the extent of damages and were not intended to relieve Geerdes of her burden to prove causation. The court affirmed the circuit court's decision, finding no abuse of discretion in denying the motion for a new trial. View "Geerdes v. Likness" on Justia Law

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Kristine Gail Walden and Shay Alan Walden were married in April 2016 and separated in June 2020. Kristine initiated divorce proceedings in September 2022. At the time of the trial in December 2023, Kristine was 54 and worked part-time, while Shay, 53, was self-employed. The district court heard testimony about their assets, debts, and the conduct leading to the breakdown of their marriage, including domestic violence by Shay that resulted in a permanent eye injury to Kristine. The court divided the marital property and debt, ordered Shay to pay spousal support of $1,000 per month for seven years, property payments totaling $43,587, and attorney’s fees of $8,350. Shay was also assigned a debt of $35,433.66 incurred after the divorce proceedings began.The district court awarded spousal support based on the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, considering the parties' ages, earning abilities, health, and financial circumstances. The court found Kristine had a monthly income of $2,400 and expenses of $6,400, while Shay had a gross monthly income of $12,500 and expenses of $5,017. The court concluded Kristine needed spousal support and Shay had the ability to pay without undue hardship. Shay’s argument that the court deviated from statutory limits for spousal support was dismissed as the applicable version of the statute was correctly applied.The court’s property and debt distribution was found to be equitable, considering the short-term nature of the marriage and the contributions of each party. Shay’s arguments against the distribution of the marital home’s equity and Kristine’s medical debt were rejected. The court’s decision to assign Shay the debt incurred after the divorce proceedings was also upheld.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that the court did not clearly err in its findings and that the award of attorney’s fees was justified based on Shay’s actions that increased the costs of the proceedings. View "Walden v. Walden" on Justia Law

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The plaintiffs sought to recover damages from the defendants for alleged violations of the Connecticut Product Liability Act (CPLA) after their minor child, L.L., was severely injured. The injury occurred when a Graco car seat, placed on a kitchen counter next to an electric range stove, caught fire. The plaintiffs claimed that the car seat and stove were defectively designed or manufactured. As a result of the fire, L.L. suffered severe burns and injuries. The plaintiffs, including L.L.'s parents, also sought damages for loss of filial consortium, alleging that they lost the society, care, and companionship of their daughter due to her injuries.The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut reviewed the case and certified a question to the Connecticut Supreme Court, asking whether Connecticut law recognizes a parent's claim for loss of filial consortium when a minor child suffers severe but nonfatal injuries due to a defendant's tortious conduct. The District Court had previously denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the loss of consortium claims without prejudice.The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that Connecticut law does not recognize a cause of action for loss of filial consortium. The court reasoned that the justifications for recognizing loss of spousal and parental consortium claims, which are based on mutual dependence and reliance, do not apply to the parent-child relationship in the same way. The court emphasized that the emotional distress experienced by a parent due to a child's severe injury is distinct from the relational loss addressed by loss of consortium claims. The court found the reasoning of jurisdictions that distinguish between parental and filial consortium more persuasive and declined to expand the scope of liability to include loss of filial consortium. View "L. L. v. Newell Brands, Inc." on Justia Law

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Felix Franco, a commercial truck driver, was asleep in his parked semi-trailer truck when it was hit by another truck driven by an employee of Richland Refrigerated Solutions, LLC. Franco claimed that the accident caused a back injury that necessitated surgery, while Richland acknowledged the accident but disputed the cause of Franco's injury. Franco had a history of degenerative back problems and had experienced back pain before the accident. The case went to trial, and a jury found in favor of Richland.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin handled the initial trial. Franco sought to admit medical illustrations as evidence, but the court only allowed two as demonstrative exhibits. The court provided jury instructions and a special verdict form, focusing on whether the accident caused Franco's injury. The jury ultimately ruled in favor of Richland, and Franco's post-trial motions were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's rulings, including the denial of Franco's motions for judgment as a matter of law and a new trial. The appellate court found that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the accident did not cause Franco's injury. The court also upheld the jury instructions and special verdict form, stating they accurately reflected Wisconsin law. Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to exclude two of Franco's medical illustrations. The judgment of the district court was affirmed in all respects. View "Franco v Richland Refrigerated Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

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Gerard A. Kirsch, a member of Calvary Temple Church of Evansville, Inc., was injured while building a storage barn on the church's property. Kirsch fell from a ladder and sustained a severe arm injury. He sued the church, alleging negligence for failing to provide safe equipment and proper supervision.The Vanderburgh Superior Court denied the church's motion for summary judgment, which argued that Indiana Code section 34-31-7-2 limited the church's liability. The court held that a jury must decide if the church breached any duty to Kirsch. The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, interpreting the statute narrowly to apply only to parts of the premises used primarily for worship services, thus allowing Kirsch's claim to proceed.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that the term "premises" in Indiana Code section 34-31-7-2 includes the entire parcel of land owned by the church, not just the areas used primarily for worship services. Since the church's entire property is used primarily for worship services, the statute applies, limiting the church's liability to warning of hidden dangers and refraining from intentional harm. Kirsch admitted the church breached neither duty, leading the court to grant summary judgment in favor of the church. View "Calvary Temple Church of Evansville, Inc. v. Kirsch" on Justia Law

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Great Plains Trucking Inc. and Lennis H. Beck (defendants) appealed a circuit court judgment in favor of Carrie S. Schultz and Robert C. Schultz, Sr. (plaintiffs), surviving parents of Robert C. Schultz, Jr., in a wrongful death action. Beck, a truck driver for Great Plains, collided with the plaintiffs' vehicle, resulting in the death of their son. The collision occurred in Wentzville, Missouri, under dark and rainy conditions. The plaintiffs' vehicle had fishtailed and was struck by another vehicle before Beck's truck collided with it.The Circuit Court of St. Charles County held a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict awarding the plaintiffs $10,000,000 in compensatory damages, $10,000,000 in aggravating circumstances damages against Great Plains, and $25,000 in aggravating circumstances damages against Beck. The circuit court entered judgment in accordance with the jury's verdicts and awarded post-judgment interest. The defendants filed a post-trial motion for a new trial or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the circuit court overruled. The defendants then appealed.The Supreme Court of Missouri reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The court found that the defendants did not preserve their claims of error for appellate review or that their preserved claims failed on the merits. Specifically, the court held that the defendants failed to preserve the issue of excluding expert testimony regarding the mother's impairment by THC because they did not object at trial. Additionally, the court found that the defendants did not preserve their objection to the participation of separate counsel for the plaintiffs throughout the trial.The court also held that there was substantial evidence to support the jury's finding that Beck failed to keep a careful lookout and that the jury's award of aggravating circumstances damages against both Beck and Great Plains was supported by sufficient evidence. The court concluded that Beck's multiple violations of the Missouri CDL manual and Great Plains' acceptance of Beck's conduct demonstrated complete indifference or conscious disregard for the safety of others. View "Schultz vs. Great Plains Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

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Trina Cunningham, an employee of the Baltimore Department of Public Works, was responsible for monitoring water flow at the Patapsco Wastewater Treatment Plant. On June 3, 2019, while inspecting the plant's Grit Facility, Cunningham fell through a metal, grated catwalk that collapsed under her feet, causing her to drown in the wastewater chamber below. Her estate and family members filed a lawsuit against multiple defendants, including the City of Baltimore, various city officials, and several crane servicing companies, alleging negligence and other claims related to her death.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland granted motions to dismiss filed by most of the defendants, including Freeland Hoist & Crane, Inc., but did not address the claims against Crane 1 Services, Inc., and Overhead Crane Service, Inc., who had not filed motions to dismiss. The district court dismissed the entire complaint, despite the unresolved claims against these two defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and determined that the district court's order was not a final decision because it did not resolve all claims against all parties. The appellate court noted that the district court failed to address the claims against Crane 1 Services and Overhead Crane Services, and thus, the order was not appealable. Consequently, the Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the case to the district court to adjudicate the remaining claims. View "Estate of Cunningham v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law

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In September 2016, a high school student, almost 16 years old, was involved in a fistfight during an art class. The teacher, who weighed 375 pounds and had a back condition, intervened to stop the fight. While pulling the larger boy away, the teacher lost his balance and fell onto the plaintiff, breaking the plaintiff’s leg. The plaintiff sued the teacher and the school district for negligence, arguing that the teacher should not have intervened due to his physical condition and that the school district failed to train teachers on safely handling physical altercations.The case was tried in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. After a 15-day trial, the jury viewed a video of the incident multiple times and concluded that neither the teacher nor the school district was negligent. The jury found that the plaintiff and the other boy were each 50 percent responsible for the harm. The plaintiff filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and a motion for a new trial, both of which were denied by the trial court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s judgment, finding no error in the trial court’s decisions. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict that neither the teacher nor the school district was negligent. The court also found no error in the trial court’s exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert witness and the refusal to give several special jury instructions requested by the plaintiff. The appellate court concluded that the standard instructions given were sufficient and that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the trial court’s rulings. View "I.C. v. Compton Unified School Dist. et al." on Justia Law

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Lonnie Two Eagle, Sr. was injured when Chad Sully, who was driving and suffered a seizure, collided with him while he was operating a lawn mower. Two Eagle sued Dr. Matthew Smith and the entities Avel eCare, LLC and Moonlighting Solutions, LLC, which contracted with Dr. Smith to provide medical services to Rosebud Indian Health Services Hospital. Two Eagle alleged medical malpractice and ordinary negligence, claiming Dr. Smith was negligent in treating Sully and authorizing him to drive despite his seizure history.The Circuit Court of the Sixth Judicial Circuit, Todd County, South Dakota, granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that Dr. Smith owed no duty of care to Two Eagle. The court found that there was no relationship between Dr. Smith and Two Eagle that would give rise to a duty, and that imposing such a duty would contravene public policy.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that Dr. Smith did not owe a duty to Two Eagle under either a medical malpractice or ordinary negligence theory. The court reasoned that there was no special relationship between Dr. Smith and Sully that would create a duty to Two Eagle, and that the risk of harm to Two Eagle was not foreseeable. Additionally, the court emphasized public policy considerations, noting that imposing a duty on physicians to protect third parties could negatively impact the physician-patient relationship and lead to overly restrictive recommendations by physicians. View "Two Eagle V. Avel Ecare" on Justia Law