Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A wrongful death action was brought by the administratrix of a decedent’s estate against an employee of Adult Protective Services (APS) and the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS). The decedent, a vulnerable adult, lived with family members and required assistance with daily activities. A referral alleging abuse and neglect was made to APS, prompting multiple visits and interviews by the APS worker, who documented improvements made to the residence and ultimately closed the referral without removing the decedent from the home or contacting law enforcement. The complaint alleged that the APS worker’s decisions, including closing the referral and failing to remove the decedent or report to authorities, proximately caused the decedent’s death.The Circuit Court of Logan County denied motions to dismiss filed by the APS employee and DHS, concluding that whether the acts were ministerial, violated statutory duties, or constituted willful, wanton, or intentional misconduct presented questions of fact for a jury. The circuit court declined to apply the qualified immunity doctrine at the motion to dismiss stage, asserting issues regarding statutory violations and the nature of the conduct required jury determination.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the appeal, applying a de novo standard. The court held that the APS worker’s actions were discretionary and thus subject to qualified immunity, absent allegations of violation of a clearly established statutory or constitutional right, or conduct that was fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive. The court found that the complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to overcome qualified immunity and did not establish a causal link between the APS worker’s actions and the decedent’s death. Accordingly, the court reversed the circuit court’s denial of the motions to dismiss and remanded with instructions to grant the motions to dismiss. View "Secrist v. Watkins" on Justia Law

An employee of an electric car company was involved in a motor vehicle collision with a motorcyclist while driving a company-owned service truck. The employee had been authorized by his manager to take the truck home the previous evening for his convenience, rather than returning it to the service center after dropping off a company trailer. The following morning, while driving the truck back to work, the employee stopped for gas per an informal company policy recommending that vehicles be returned with at least a quarter tank of fuel. During this stop, the collision occurred, resulting in severe injuries to the motorcyclist.Following the accident, the injured party was found incompetent, and his guardian substituted as plaintiff. The plaintiff sued the employee and his employer, claiming the employer was vicariously liable under respondeat superior because the employee was acting within the scope of his employment. The Marion Superior Court granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiff and the employee, finding as a matter of law that the employer was liable since the employee was on a special errand for his employer. The trial proceeded in two phases: the jury allocated seventy percent fault to the employee and thirty percent to the motorcyclist, and awarded damages, which were then reduced according to comparative fault.On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment on vicarious liability and the liability phase, but reversed for a new trial on damages due to improper ex parte communications between the judge and jury. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacating the appellate decision. The Indiana Supreme Court held that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Therefore, the trial court’s summary judgment on vicarious liability was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial on that issue and on damages, but the jury’s allocation of fault remains intact. View "Kaszuba v. Norris" on Justia Law

A woman, acting as administrator of her late husband’s estate and in her individual capacity, filed a medical malpractice action against multiple doctors and medical practices. The complaint alleged that after an MRI detected a lesion on her husband’s kidney in 2017, recommended follow-up care was not pursued by his medical providers. In 2020, he was diagnosed with kidney cancer and died within months. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ failure to act constituted a breach of the standard of care. Before trial, some defendants were dismissed, and the case proceeded to a jury trial against several remaining doctors and practices.During jury selection, the plaintiff’s counsel challenged four prospective jurors for cause, arguing that their responses during voir dire showed they could not be fair and impartial or would not follow the law as instructed by the court. The trial court denied these for-cause challenges, finding the prospective jurors’ answers did not establish actual bias or unwillingness to follow the law. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. The appellate court reviewed the trial court’s denial of the for-cause challenges under an abuse-of-discretion standard.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. It held that under R.C. 2313.17(B)(9), when a principal challenge is made to a prospective juror on grounds of bias or unwillingness to follow the law, the trial court must determine the validity of the challenge, and, if valid, the juror must be absolutely disqualified. The court overruled prior precedent to the extent it permitted discretion at this stage. However, it found that competent, credible evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the challenges were not valid. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals. View "Estate of Price v. Kidney Care Specialists, L.L.C." on Justia Law

A fatal traffic collision occurred involving Erika Chavez and Jose Ortiz-Muñoz, an employee of O’Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc. Erika Chavez’s widower sought and obtained the appointment of Dennis P. Murphy as the personal representative (PR) for the wrongful death estate. After Murphy’s appointment, but before filing a wrongful death complaint, the plaintiffs conducted examinations under oath of various O’Reilly personnel using subpoenas issued under the appointment proceeding’s case number. O’Reilly was not a party to the appointment proceeding, and its employees were questioned, sometimes without counsel present. Subsequently, a wrongful death complaint was filed against O’Reilly and others, alleging negligent supervision and control related to the vehicle involved in the crash.O’Reilly, in the wrongful death action in the First Judicial District Court, moved to dismiss the case or alternatively sought exclusion of the pre-complaint discovery and disqualification of plaintiffs’ counsel. O’Reilly argued that a PR appointed under the Wrongful Death Act (WDA) does not have subpoena power in an appointment proceeding, as such actions are not pending civil cases under the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court denied the motion, finding O’Reilly’s proposed remedies too severe, but certified the issue for interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico granted certiorari to decide whether a concluded WDA appointment proceeding is a pending action permitting subpoena power. The Court held that issuance of an order appointing a PR under the WDA constitutes a final order, ending the appointment proceeding. Therefore, a PR does not have subpoena power after such appointment and before filing a wrongful death claim. The Court did not address remedies for misuse of subpoena power and remanded for application of its holding. View "Murphy v. O'Reilly Auto. Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Pamela Smith died after surgery at Lovelace Medical Center, operated by Lovelace Health System, LLC. Smith’s estate brought wrongful death claims against Lovelace, asserting both direct negligence and vicarious liability based on the conduct of Lovelace’s employed registered nurses. Lovelace was a “qualified health care provider” (QHP) under the New Mexico Medical Malpractice Act (MMA), but its employed registered nurses were not, nor could they be under the version of the Act in effect at the time.The Plaintiff sought summary judgment in the Second Judicial District Court, arguing that the MMA did not apply to claims based on the conduct of non-QHP registered nurses, and therefore Lovelace was not entitled to the MMA’s protections—including the damages cap—for vicarious liability claims arising from nurse conduct. The District Court agreed, granting summary judgment and concluding that Lovelace was not entitled to the Act’s benefits regarding its nurse employees’ actions. Lovelace sought interlocutory appeal; the New Mexico Court of Appeals denied review, but the Supreme Court of New Mexico granted certiorari.The Supreme Court of New Mexico reviewed the statutory construction de novo. It held that the plain language of the MMA covers vicarious liability claims against QHPs, regardless of whether the agent (here, a nurse) is a QHP, so long as the agent’s conduct constitutes medical treatment or a departure from accepted standards resulting in injury. The Court rejected the argument that only the conduct of a QHP can be the basis for a malpractice claim under the MMA, and affirmed that Lovelace is entitled to the Act’s protections—including the damages cap—for vicarious liability claims arising from nurse conduct. The summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff was reversed. View "Ferlic v. Lovelace Health Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

Maurice Voce, a self-taught investor, traded stock options with Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC for decades, amassing a substantial fortune. His children and nephew, as co-trustees of his trusts and personal representative of his estate, alleged that Morgan Stanley and advisor John Privitelli continued facilitating risky trading and collecting commissions even as Maurice’s cognitive health declined in his later years. They claimed this conduct constituted breach of fiduciary duty and financial elder abuse. The plaintiffs also asserted that Privitelli’s advice extended to tax and estate planning, resulting in costly insurance policies and tax penalties.Previously, the plaintiffs initiated arbitration with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which dismissed their claims without prejudice, permitting them to pursue litigation. They then filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The trial court found the claims timely under the discovery rule but imposed a damages cutoff based on a backward projection of the remaining statute of limitations period. The court also granted defendants’ motion for nonsuit, dismissing both causes of action. It ruled there was insufficient evidence of harm for elder abuse and concluded defendants’ fiduciary duty did not cover tax and estate planning advice, as they were not formally hired or paid for such services. Additionally, it determined plaintiffs failed to provide expert testimony on excessive trading for the breach of fiduciary duty claim.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court misapplied the statute of limitations by limiting damages to a narrow period, rather than considering the full course of wrongful conduct for timely claims. The appellate court found plaintiffs’ evidence sufficient to survive nonsuit on both the elder abuse claim and the breach of fiduciary duty claim, to the extent that the latter involved issues beyond excessive trading. However, it affirmed nonsuit regarding the excessive trading theory due to lack of expert evidence. The judgment was reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "DeVone v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC" on Justia Law

A car rental company leased a vehicle to an individual, who subsequently was involved in a collision with another driver. The injured party sued both the renter and the rental company, asserting two theories of liability against the company: vicarious liability under California Vehicle Code sections 17150 and 17151, and negligent entrustment, arguing the company should be liable for renting a vehicle without verifying the renter had automobile insurance.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of the rental company. The court found that the Graves Amendment, a federal statute, preempted California’s vicarious liability statute when applied to rental car companies, thereby shielding the company from liability based solely on ownership of the vehicle. The court also determined that there was no negligent entrustment because the renter had a valid driver’s license, matched the photo on the license, and showed no signs of incompetence or unfitness to drive. The court did not find a duty for the rental company to verify automobile insurance for the renter.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the Graves Amendment preempts California Vehicle Code section 17150 when used to impose vicarious liability on rental car companies, as section 17150 is not a financial responsibility law covered by the Amendment’s savings clause. The court further held that rental car companies do not have a duty to check whether renters possess automobile insurance and rejected the negligent entrustment claim, as there was no evidence the renter was incompetent or unfit. The judgment in favor of the rental company was affirmed. View "O'Brien v. Midway Rent-A-Car, Inc." on Justia Law

A Nevada resident, Virginia Pass, allegedly suffered injuries and ultimately died after a Care@Home C7000 in-home medical alert system failed to alert emergency services following her fall. The device was purchased from Medical Guardian, a Pennsylvania-based reseller authorized by Essence USA, Inc., a New Jersey corporation that distributes products manufactured by Essence SmartCare Ltd. Pass’s estate and her six children, some residing in Nevada and others in different states, filed suit against Essence USA and Medical Guardian in Nevada. The record did not establish where, how, or by whom the Care@Home device was acquired, only that it was used in Nevada.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, dismissed Essence USA for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding Essence USA had insufficient contacts with Nevada. Morgan, representing Pass’s estate, was permitted to amend the complaint and conduct limited jurisdictional discovery. The evidence showed that Essence USA attended the Consumer Electronic Show (CES) in Las Vegas to promote its products to resellers, and had entered into agreements with Medical Guardian authorizing resale in the United States and Canada. However, there was no evidence of direct sales or marketing to Nevada consumers, nor confirmation that more than one product ever reached Nevada. The district court denied reconsideration and certified its dismissal as final for appeal.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and affirmed the dismissal. The court held that, under Nevada’s adoption of the pure stream-of-commerce test for specific personal jurisdiction, a nonresident defendant must introduce products into the stream of commerce with the expectation of a regular flow to Nevada. The plaintiffs failed to show more than a single isolated instance of a product reaching Nevada or any meaningful connection between their claims and Essence USA’s in-state contacts at CES. Thus, Essence USA was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada. View "MORGAN VS. ESSENCE USA, INC." on Justia Law

Frank Costa was being transported to a medical facility by Northwest Ambulance, staffed by EMTs Jack Wilson, Henry Shaw, and EMT trainee Katelyn Averill. The EMTs secured Mr. Costa to a gurney using guardrails and lap belts but omitted shoulder restraints, violating company policy. During transport, Mr. Shaw, driving the ambulance under emergency code, swerved to avoid a garbage truck and crashed into a highway divider. As a result, Mr. Costa was ejected from the stretcher and sustained fatal injuries. Northwest Ambulance admitted that both the failure to secure Mr. Costa with shoulder restraints and the negligent driving were breaches of ordinary care.The Estate of Frank Costa brought wrongful death and survival actions against Northwest Ambulance in Snohomish County Superior Court. Both sides filed cross motions for summary judgment on whether RCW 18.71.210(1) provided qualified immunity for the negligent acts. The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment for the Estate, ruling that driving an ambulance is not an emergency medical service subject to immunity. Northwest Ambulance conceded negligence but maintained it was immune under the statute. The jury returned a general verdict for the Estate, and Northwest Ambulance appealed. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that qualified immunity did not apply to the negligent driving.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed whether Northwest Ambulance was entitled to qualified immunity for negligent ambulance transportation. The court held that RCW 18.71.210 provides immunity only for acts or omissions within the EMT’s field of medical expertise, such as emergency medical procedures, and does not extend to negligent driving. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals, concluding that Northwest Ambulance was not entitled to qualified immunity for negligent ambulance driving. View "Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

A woman with an enlarged lymph node was initially diagnosed by a pathologist as having metastatic breast cancer. However, subsequent imaging and tests did not confirm a breast origin and suggested lymphoma as a possible diagnosis. Her treating oncologist, despite access to these conflicting findings, did not consult further with pathology or pursue additional investigation, and instead proceeded to treat her for breast cancer with chemotherapy and radiation. After about a year, her cancer had advanced, and a later biopsy revealed she actually had ALK positive large B-cell lymphoma, a rare and aggressive cancer. She then received appropriate treatment but did not respond positively and died. The plaintiffs, her husband and her estate, alleged that the oncologist breached the standard of care by failing to properly diagnose and consult, resulting in delayed proper treatment and increased harm.The case was first tried in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, resulting in a mistrial. At retrial, after the plaintiffs presented their evidence, the defendants moved for compulsory nonsuit, which the trial court granted, finding insufficient evidence of causation. The plaintiffs’ post-trial motions were denied, and judgment was entered for the defendants. On appeal, the Superior Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for a new trial, concluding there was sufficient expert evidence under Pennsylvania’s “increased risk of harm” standard to permit the case to go to the jury.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Middle District, reviewed whether the Superior Court correctly applied the “increased risk of harm” standard from Hamil v. Bashline. The Court held that the Superior Court properly applied this relaxed causation standard, finding the plaintiffs’ expert testimony sufficient to establish a prima facie case that the oncologist’s conduct increased the risk of harm. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision, requiring the case be submitted to the jury. View "Estate of Smith v. Kannarkatt" on Justia Law