Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

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In April 2018, Cavey filed a personal injury action for injuries sustained in a traffic accident involving a vehicle driven by a School District employee. Citing the six-month statute of limitations, Government Code 945.6,(a)(1), the trial court dismissed. The theory of untimeliness was based on the District’s July 19, 2017 notice rejecting a claim presented without Cavey’s authorization by a chiropractic firm that was treating her injuries, which, allegedly, started the statute of limitations.The court of appeal reversed. The claim submitted by the chiropractic firm was not presented “by a person acting on … her behalf” for purposes of section 910. The limitations period did not begin to run until the authorized claim submitted by Cavey’s lawyers was deemed rejected in November 2017. Using a November 2017 start date, the April 2018 complaint was timely under the six-month statute of limitations. In addition, the District’s notice of rejection was mailed to the wrong address, so the two-year statute of limitations in section 945.6(a)(2) applies. View "Cavey v. Tualla" on Justia Law

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Ben E. Keith Company, Inc. ("BEK"), appealed a circuit court order entering summary judgment in favor of Lyndon Southern Insurance Company ("Lyndon") on Lyndon's complaint for a declaratory judgment. On December 14, 2018, Felicia Edwards and Robert Allen Marak were involved in a motor-vehicle accident in Dadeville. Felicia was driving a 2009 Toyota Camry automobile that was owned by Annette Edwards and insured by Lyndon. Marak was driving a tractor-trailer that was owned by BEK. As a result of the accident, BEK incurred damage to its tractor-trailer. BEK sued Felicia and Annette claiming negligence and wantonness against both Felicia and Annette and a claim of negligent entrustment against Annette. BEK later amended the complaint to add a negligent-maintenance claim against Annette. Lyndon filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment against Felicia, Annette, and BEK, asserting the policy it issued to Annette excluded coverage for "[a]ny operator of a vehicle who is not listed as a driver on the Policy Applications, Declarations, and/or added by Endorsement who is under the age of twenty-five and is either a Family Member or resides in the same household as the Named Insured" and for "[a]n operator of a vehicle who is an unlicensed driver or whose driving privileges have been terminated or suspended." BEK argued the trial court erroneously granted Lyndon's motion for a summary judgment because Lyndon did not produce substantial admissible evidence to establish that Felicia was a noncovered person under the policy that insured Annette's vehicle at the time of the accident. Specifically, it contended Lyndon did not produce substantial admissible evidence to establish that Felicia did not have a valid driver's license at the time of the accident or to establish Felicia's age and residence at the time of the accident. After review, the Alabama Supreme Court concurred Lyndon did not produce substantial evidence to establish that Felicia did not have a valid driver's license at the time of the accident and did not produce substantial evidence to establish that Felicia was under the age of 25 and resided in Annette's household at the time of the accident. Therefore, Lyndon did not shift the burden of proof to BEK. Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting Lyndon's motion for a summary judgment. Judgment was therefore reversed. View "Ben E. Keith Company, Inc. v. Lyndon Southern Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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In each of two automobile personal injury actions, plaintiffs moved for entry of a qualified protective order (QPO) pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 110 Stat. 1936, and its implementing regulations (45 C.F.R. 160, 164) (Privacy Rule). Plaintiffs’ proposed QPOs would allow protected health information (PHI) to be released, subject to restrictions that nonlitigation use or disclosure of PHI is prohibited and PHI must be returned or destroyed at the conclusion of the litigation. State Farm, the liability insurer for the named defendants, intervened in each lawsuit and sought entry of its own protective order, which expressly allowed insurance companies to use, disclose, and maintain PHI for purposes beyond the litigation and expressly exempted insurers from the “return or destroy” requirement.In both cases the circuit court granted the plaintiffs’ motions. The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting State Farm’s argument that property and casualty insurers fall outside HIPAA. Rejecting arguments concerning the requirements of the Illinois Insurance Code, the court stated that no Illinois law requires State Farm to use or disclose plaintiffs’ PHI after the conclusion of the litigation. The Cook County standard protective order is preempted by the Privacy Rule and the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. 1011, does not apply to shield that order from traditional preemption. View "Haage v. Zavala" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants in this wrongful death suit, holding that the circuit court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' negligence claims but erred in dismissing Plaintiffs' strict liability claim.Chalan Hedman and Troy Hattum died after and explosion and fire at the Hattum Family Farms. Chalan's estate brought a wrongful death suit against Hattum Family Farms and individual members of the Hattum family, alleging claims for strict liability and negligence and seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Hattums on the Estate's claims. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the circuit court erred by granting summary judgment on the strict liability claim because genuine issues of material fact existed precluding dismissal. View "Sheard v. Hattum" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Defendants, the City of Pierre and the Pierre Volunteer Fire Department (PVFD), in this personal injury action, holding that the trial court correctly determined that the City and the PVFD were not vicariously liable under the circumstances of this case.Gerrit Tronvold, an on-call volunteer member of the PVFD, collided with Plaintiffs' motorcycle while his was traveling to a routine PVFD meeting. The trial court determined that the City and the PVFD were not vicariously liable for Tronvold's actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior and that the defendants were shielded from liability by governmental immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly determined that Tronvold was not acting within the scope of his employment or agency, precluding liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. View "Jurgens v. Tronvold" on Justia Law

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The Appellee in this case, K.N.B., was a freshman at Clarion University in 2015. K.N.B. claimed that a fellow Clarion student, M.D., sexually assaulted her in September 2015. K.N.B. initially did not report the assault to the police. Only after seeing M.D. at a Walmart in early 2018 did K.N.B. report the assault to the Clarion University Police Department. By this time, K.N.B. was no longer a student at the University. The main question this appeal presented for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's review was whether a petition seeking a protective order under the Protection of Victims of Sexual Violence or Intimidation Act (“PVSVIA”) was subject to the two-year statute of limitations governing certain enumerated civil actions, or the six-year catch-all statute of limitations that applies to non-enumerated actions. Because the Supreme Court concluded that the six-year limitations period applied, affirming the superior court. View "K.N.B. v. M.D." on Justia Law

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Strobel, diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma in 2019, died at age 68 in 2020. Strobel had sued for product liability, negligence, and fraud, alleging that continuous exposure to asbestos in J&J’s Baby Powder (JBP), a product he used regularly for 60 years, was a substantial contributing cause of his mesothelioma. J&J’s expert swore that JBP was at all relevant times asbestos-free. The Strobels filed declarations from five experts, all contradicting J&J’s experts. The court sustained J&J’s hearsay objections to much of the Strobels’ proffered expert testimony and concluded that, after the exclusion of this testimony, the Strobels could not bear their burden of proof on legal causation because what remained—opinions from Drs. Fitzgerald and Compton—only confirmed the presence of asbestos in the talcum ore J&J used to manufacture JBP, not in JBP offered for sale as a finished product during the years Strobel used it.The court of appeal reversed a judgment in favor of J&J. The Strobels presented sufficient admissible evidence on legal causation to create a triable issue. The court noted the evidence of long-term usage in this case and concluded that Fitzgerald fairly drew the inference that JBP dating from within the exposure period contained asbestos. View "Strobel v. Johnson & Johnson" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's negligence claim based on a determination that no duty was owed in this case, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff's husband suffered catastrophic injuries when the motorcycle he was operating was hit by a car in an intersection. Plaintiff brought this action against Defendant, alleging negligence for allowing the property it owed to grow grass so high that it blocked the view of the roadway. The trial court granted summary judgment for Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant did not owe a duty to nearby motorists. View "Reece v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc." on Justia Law

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After Sally Madison Roberts was involved in a car accident with a vehicle owned by Unison Behavioral Health (a Georgia community service board), she filed suit against Unison. As required by the Georgia Tort Claims Act (“GTCA”), Roberts provided an ante litem notice listing, among other things, the nature of her loss. Unison moved to dismiss Roberts’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the description of her loss was insufficient. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, but after Unison was granted an interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Roberts’s petition for certiorari to decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that Roberts’s ante litem notice failed to meet the requirements of OCGA 50-21-26 (a) (5) (D). Because the Supreme Court concluded Roberts’s notice was sufficient, it reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision. View "Roberts v. Unison Behavioral Health" on Justia Law

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Consolidated cases presented a certified question from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The Oregon Supreme Court was asked to determine whether Oregon law precluded an insurer from limiting its liability for uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) benefits on the basis that another policy also covered the insured’s losses. Each plaintiff suffered injuries caused by an uninsured or underinsured motorist, and each plaintiff incurred resulting damages that qualify as covered losses under multiple motor vehicle insurance policies issued by defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (State Farm). Each plaintiff alleged a loss that exceeded the declared liability limits of any single applicable policy and sought to recover the excess under additional applicable policies, up to the combined total of the limits of liability. In each case, however, State Farm refused to cover the excess loss, citing a term in the policies that allowed State Farm to limit its liability to the amount that it agreed to pay under the single policy with the highest applicable limit of liability. The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that that term made State Farm’s uninsured motorist coverage less favorable to its insureds than the model coverage that the legislature has required and, thus, was unenforceable. View "Batten v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co." on Justia Law