The date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the Government Claims Act's, Gov. Code, 810 et seq., statute of limitations is the date on which a plaintiff discovers or should reasonably have discovered that she had suffered a compensable injury. The trial court overruled the City's demurrer to a complaint, arguing that the real parties in interest failed to comply with the claim presentation requirement of the Act by not presenting their claim to the City within six months. The Court of Appeal held that the parties in interest presented their claim to the City more than 10 months after the date upon which the cause of action accrued and thus failed to comply with the claim presentation requirement. Accordingly, the court granted the City's petition for writ of mandate. View "City of Pasadena v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against S&N for negligence, product liability, breach of contract, and misrepresentation. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from his decision to get S&N's metal-on-metal hip replacement system and the injuries he says it caused him. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the negligence claim to the extent it relies on an improper training or failure to warn theory of liability; affirmed the dismissal of the breach of contract claim; and reversed the dismissal of the negligence claim and strict product liability claims premised on manufacturing defect, as well as his misrepresentation claim. The court explained that these surviving claims were cognizable Florida common law causes of action and were not preempted by federal law. View "Mink v. Smith & Nephew, Inc." on Justia Law

While walking past respondent Alexander Trujillo’s home on his way to the playground, petitioner N.M. became frightened when Trujillo’s two pit bulls rushed at the front-yard fence. Although the dogs did not get out of the yard or touch N.M., N.M. ran across the street and was struck by a passing van, which seriously injured him. N.M., by and through his parent and legal guardian, sued Trujillo for, as pertinent here, negligence. Trujillo moved to dismiss that claim, contending that N.M. had not sufficiently pleaded the requisite element of duty. The district court agreed and dismissed the case, and in a split, published decision, a division of the court of appeals affirmed. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari, and found given the circumstances presented here, concluded Trujillo did not owe N.M. a duty of care. Because N.M.’s claim against Trujillo was predicated on Trujillo’s alleged nonfeasance, or failure to act, and because this case was distinguishable from cases in which a dangerous or vicious animal attacks and directly injures someone, N.M. was required to plead a special relationship between himself and Trujillo in order to establish the duty of care necessary to support a negligence claim. View "N.M. v. Trujillo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Inter-State, seeking damages from injuries that he sustained when an Inter-State vehicle hit his pickup truck and trailer in Missouri. A jury awarded plaintiff $4.5 damages. The Eighth Circuit affirmed and held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction because the parties were completely diverse. The court upheld the award and denied remittitur because, with both economic and non-economic damages included in the general award, the total was not monstrous, shocking, or grossly excessive. View "Eckerberg v. Inter-State Studio, etc." on Justia Law

Smith was transported from the Rock Island County Jail to the federal courthouse for arraignment. U.S. marshals took Smith to an interview room to meet his lawyer. The Marshals Service inspects the interview rooms weekly. On the detainee’s side of the room, there is a metal stool attached to the wall by a swing-arm. According to Smith, when he sat on the stool it “broke,” causing him to fall and strike his head; he saw that bolts were missing. A nurse examined Smith and noted that his speech was slurred. She had him taken to the emergency room. He was treated for a stroke and continues to suffer adverse effects. Smith filed an administrative tort claim, which was denied. Smith then brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 2671, relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to impute negligence to the government. The district court rejected the theory, noting that Smith’s fall occurred at 11 a.m., so it was possible that others could have already damaged the seat or that Smith fell without the stool having malfunctioned. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The fact that a detainee is left alone to confer with his lawyer does not defeat the notion that the room and its contents remain within the control of the government. The sort of malfunction that Smith has described is the kind of hazard that the government may be expected to guard against. View "Smith v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claimed that the sale of property without their consent to an entity of which Defendants were principals, was fraudulent. Plaintiffs also named as a defendant the title insurance and escrow agent in connection with the sale of the property. The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment in part and vacated it in part, holding (1) the hearing justice erred in determining that there was no factual issue regarding damages, and summary judgment is vacated as to the individual defendants to the extent that Plaintiffs may show damages for lost profits sustained in their individual capacities only; (2) the superior court properly granted summary judgment for the individual defendants as to Plaintiffs’ tortious interference with a contractual relationship claims, intentional interference with prospective contractual relations claims, breach of contract claims, fraud claims, and civil conspiracy claims; and (3) the judgment is affirmed in favor of the title company in all respects. View "Fogarty v. Palumbo" on Justia Law

The employer under the circumstances of this case had no duty to control its employees. J.R.and Carlos worked as cashiers at a convenience store owned by Exxon Mobile Corporation. One evening, Carlos picked a fistfight with J.R. When Alfredo, J.R.’s father, entered to the store to pick up J.R., Carlos also started a fistfight with Alfredo. Alfredo was knocked down and complained he couldn’t breathe. Twenty-three days later he died from cardiac arrhythmia, respiratory failure, and renal failure. J.R. and his family (Plaintiffs) sued Exxon for wrongful death and survival damages. The jury found that Exxon’s negligent supervision of its employees, together with J.R. and Alfredo’s negligence, caused Alfredo’s death. The jury awarded Plaintiffs nearly $2 million in damages. The court of appeals remanded the case for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and rendered judgment for Exxon, holding that an employer in a situation like the one presented in this case owes no duty to supervise its employees, and therefore, as a matter of law, Exxon was not liable to Plaintiffs. View "Pagayon v. Exxon Mobil Corp." on Justia Law

Appellants, the parents and special administrators of the estate of Melissa Rodriguez, who was killed by Michael Loyd, brought this negligence and wrongful death action against numerous defendants. The defendants were treated as three groups - the Lasting Hope defendants, the UNMC defendants, and the City defendants. Appellants claimed that the defendants were negligent in failing to protect Melissa from Loyd. The district court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss the second amended complaint. On appeal, Appellants challenged the dismissal of the Lasting Hope and the UNMC defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court (1) erred when it dismissed Appellants’ second amended complaint for failure to state a claim with respect to the Lasting Hope defendants; and (2) erred when it denied Appellants’ motion to amend the second amended complaint to add allegations relative to the UNMC defendants and dismissed the UNMC defendants. View "Rodriguez v. Catholic Health Initiatives" on Justia Law

Between 2011 and 2013, a labor union held demonstrations at Walmart stores throughout Maryland, protesting Walmart’s employment conditions. Consequently, Walmart sued the union for trespass and nuisance and sought an injunction against the union. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Walmart and issued a permanent injunction against UFCW. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Walmart’s claims for trespass and nuisance were not preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, and therefore, the circuit court properly denied the union’s motion to dismiss; and (2) the circuit court properly ruled that this case did not involve a labor dispute within the meaning of Maryland’s Anti-Injunction Act. View "United Food & Commercial Workers International Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

The Barton doctrine is extended to a court-appointed accountant in the capacity of a special master, thus requiring an individual to seek leave of the appointing court prior to filing suit in a non-appointing court against a court-appointed special master for actions taken in the scope of his court-derived authority. Larry Bertsch and his accounting firm (collectively, Bertsch) were appointed as special master in a lawsuit between Vion Operations, LLC and Jay Bloom (the Lion litigation). The district court later discharged Bertsch from his duties as special master. When the Vion litigation was dismissed, Bloom filed the underlying complaint against Bertsch alleging, inter alia, gross negligence and fraudulent concealment based on Bertsch’s allegedly wrongful actions in the Vion litigation. Bertsch filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court denied. Bertsch petitioned for a writ of mandamus arguing, in part, that Bloom’s complaint was jurisdictionally improper because Bloom did not first seek leave of the appointing court before instituting the underlying action. The Supreme Court granted the motion, holding that Bloom must first have filed a motion with the appointing court in order to sue Bertsch personally. View "Bertsch v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law