Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, a lawyer, visited Suburban Hospital in Maryland in October 2015 with abdominal pain and other symptoms. He was diagnosed with gallbladder disease and underwent surgery performed by Dr. Daee, who was presented to him as a hospital agent or employee. Complications from that surgery led to a second operation at a different hospital a month later, where alleged medical malpractice was discovered. During subsequent litigation, the plaintiff learned in May 2022 that Dr. Daee was not a hospital employee but an independent contractor, and that the hospital may have misrepresented this relationship.The plaintiff first filed a medical malpractice action against the hospital and Dr. Daee in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in 2020. In 2022, after discovering new information, he tried to amend his complaint to add fraud and conspiracy claims, but the district court denied this request. He then filed a separate lawsuit in May 2023, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy to commit fraud regarding the hospital’s representations about Dr. Daee’s status. The hospital moved to dismiss, arguing the claims were barred by Maryland’s five-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice under the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that the district court applied the incorrect statute of limitations. It determined that the plaintiff’s fraud and conspiracy claims were not traditional malpractice claims and should be governed by Maryland’s general three-year statute of limitations for civil actions, not the five-year period for medical malpractice. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal order and remanded the case for further proceedings, without deciding whether the claims were timely under the correct statute. View "Brunenkant v. Suburban Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

Jeffrey Olson leased a Jeep Grand Cherokee from a car dealership under a lease agreement that included an arbitration provision and a delegation clause, which assigned questions about the scope of arbitration to an arbitrator. FCA US, LLC, the manufacturer of the Jeep, was not a signatory to the lease agreement. Olson later became the named plaintiff in a federal class-action lawsuit against FCA, alleging defects in the vehicle’s headrest system. FCA, not being a party to the lease, sought to compel Olson to arbitrate the dispute based on the arbitration agreement between Olson and the dealership.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied FCA’s motion to compel arbitration. The district court found that FCA, as a non-signatory to the lease agreement, could not enforce the arbitration provision or its delegation clause against Olson. The court concluded that the arbitration agreement applied only to Olson and the dealership (including its employees, agents, successors, or assigns), and FCA did not qualify under any of those categories. Additionally, the court rejected FCA’s argument that it could use equitable estoppel to compel arbitration, holding that none of Olson’s claims were sufficiently intertwined with the lease agreement to justify such an exception under California law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that FCA could not compel Olson to arbitrate because FCA was not a party to the arbitration agreement and no applicable exception—such as equitable estoppel—applied. The court clarified that, under both federal and California law, only parties to an arbitration agreement (or those qualifying under specific, limited exceptions) may enforce it. The court also rejected FCA’s reliance on Supreme Court precedent, finding it inapplicable to non-signatories in these circumstances. View "OLSON V. FCA US, LLC" on Justia Law

An individual regularly visited a commercial exercise facility as a guest of a member who held a special tier of membership, which allowed guests to accompany them. After several months of incident-free visits, the guest experienced two confrontational encounters with facility employees on consecutive days. On the first day, an employee refused the guest entry, questioned his status, and acted in a hostile manner. The following day, the same employee behaved in an intimidating way, and another employee threatened to bar the guest from the facility and called the police. The guest was not barred or arrested, and the police deemed it a non-police matter. Later, the guest was informed that no employees would be disciplined, and, months after the incident, he was accused by the business of making harassing phone calls, which he denied.The guest filed suit in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia against the facility and related entities, alleging assault, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, negligent hiring and supervision, and breach of contract. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, arguing that the facts alleged did not support any of the legal claims. The Superior Court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the dismissal de novo and affirmed the Superior Court’s decision. The appellate court held that the guest did not plausibly allege imminent apprehension of harmful contact necessary for assault, nor conduct sufficiently extreme or outrageous to support intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court also found that the facility’s marketing statements did not create a duty necessary for negligent infliction of emotional distress, and that the guest was not an intended third-party beneficiary of any contract between the member and the facility. The dismissal of all claims was affirmed. View "Blackwell v. Planet Fitness Franchising, LLC" on Justia Law

Whittaker, Clark & Daniels, Inc. and three affiliates, with a history of manufacturing, storing, and distributing asbestos-containing talc, faced thousands of personal injury and environmental claims. After a $29 million verdict against Whittaker in South Carolina, a state court there appointed a receiver to administer Whittaker’s assets. Whittaker’s board, without consulting the receiver, authorized and filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey. The Debtors’ estates were largely depleted by a 2004 asset sale to Brenntag, which expressly excluded liability for pre-sale asbestos and environmental claims. The Debtors, now essentially shells, sought to settle successor liability claims against Brenntag for $535 million, but some talc claimants had already asserted such claims against Brenntag in state courts.The South Carolina receiver and the Official Committee of Talc Claimants challenged the bankruptcy filing’s validity, arguing that only the receiver could authorize such a filing under the South Carolina court's order. The receiver’s motion to dismiss the bankruptcy petition as unauthorized was denied by the Bankruptcy Court, which found the South Carolina order did not divest Whittaker’s board of its authority. The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed. In parallel, the Committee contested whether certain “product-line” successor liability claims belonged to the Debtors’ estates or to individual creditors. The Bankruptcy Court, referencing Third Circuit precedent, held that such claims were property of the bankruptcy estates.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed both lower court decisions. It held that Whittaker’s Chapter 11 filing was valid, as the South Carolina court’s receivership order did not displace the board’s authority under New Jersey law, which governs corporate internal affairs. The court further held that successor liability claims based on product-line theory, even if nominally assertable by creditors outside bankruptcy, are property of the bankruptcy estate when they address a general injury to the debtor that results in secondary harm to all creditors. Accordingly, the judgments below were affirmed. View "In re Whittaker, Clark & Daniels Inc" on Justia Law

A young man, Austin Ghaphery, began exhibiting signs of substance abuse in 2016 and admitted to his father, Dr. Nicholas Ghaphery, that he was using illicit drugs in 2017. Dr. Ghaphery arranged for his son to undergo an initial assessment at Wheeling Treatment Center (WTC), a medication-assisted treatment facility that treats opioid addiction. During the assessment, a counselor conducted a drug screen and determined that Austin was not a candidate for admission because he was not in opioid withdrawal and his drug screen was negative for opioids. However, concerns about possible suicidal ideation were raised during the assessment, prompting WTC’s medical director, Dr. Schultz, to evaluate Austin for suicide risk. After Austin agreed to follow up with his family physician, he was released. He was not admitted into the MAT program. Thirty-six days later, Austin died from a drug overdose.Dr. Ghaphery, as personal representative of Austin’s estate, sued WTC and Dr. Schultz for medical professional liability and wrongful death, alleging that they failed to properly evaluate Austin’s condition and arrange for his transportation to a psychiatric facility. The Circuit Court of Ohio County initially denied summary judgment but later granted it, concluding that no health care provider-patient relationship existed after WTC declined to admit Austin, and thus WTC and Dr. Schultz owed him no legal duty. The Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed, holding that any health care provided was merely incidental and did not give rise to such a relationship or duty.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and reversed. It held that a health care provider-patient relationship was established during the initial assessment, even though Austin was not ultimately admitted for ongoing treatment. Therefore, WTC and Dr. Schultz owed a duty of care to Austin during the assessment process. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ghaphery v. Wheeling Treatment Center" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was violently attacked by her ex-boyfriend, who was on federal supervised release at the time. Prior to the attack, the plaintiff informed the supervising probation officer of specific threats made against her and was assured that steps would be taken to protect her, including issuing an arrest warrant. Despite these promises, the officer failed to take urgent action or communicate the immediate danger to the court or law enforcement. Days later, the ex-boyfriend assaulted the plaintiff, causing severe injuries.In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, the plaintiff brought claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging negligence and negligent undertaking by the United States. The government moved to dismiss, asserting the FTCA’s misrepresentation and discretionary function exceptions deprived the court of jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion, holding that the misrepresentation exception applied because the officer’s promises were central to the plaintiff’s claims. The court did not address the discretionary function exception.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s claims for negligent failure to protect were not barred by the misrepresentation exception, as the essence of the claims concerned operational negligence rather than faulty communication. The court also held that the discretionary function exception did not apply, finding that after the officer made the discretionary decision to seek an expedited warrant, subsequent failures to act were not susceptible to policy analysis and were not shielded by the exception.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiff’s claims for negligence and negligent undertaking to move forward. View "Morris v. USA" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was injured when he fell off a rented electric scooter after hitting an asphalt patch while attempting to move from a sidewalk to a bicycle lane in the City of Long Beach. He had consumed some alcohol earlier in the day. The plaintiff had registered for the scooter rental service by accepting a user agreement, which included exculpatory provisions releasing the rental company and municipalities, including the City, from liability for injuries. He brought a negligence action against the City and an adjacent property owner, alleging that they negligently created or maintained a dangerous sidewalk condition.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County considered the City’s motion for summary judgment, which asserted three grounds: improper use of the scooter, lack of notice of the condition, and the waiver and release in the user agreement. The trial court denied summary judgment on the first two grounds, reasoning that there were factual disputes regarding the plaintiff’s use of the scooter and whether the City had constructive notice of the condition. However, the court granted summary judgment based on the exculpatory provisions of the user agreement, finding them enforceable and not against public policy. Judgment was entered for the City, and the plaintiff appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, affirmed the judgment, but on a different ground. The appellate court held that the City lacked actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition. It found that the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of material fact regarding notice, as the evidence he submitted (a Google Street View screenshot) was inadmissible and not properly authenticated. The court also clarified that serving amended interrogatory responses does not itself create a triable issue. The court’s holding was that summary judgment for the City was proper because there was no admissible evidence that the City had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition. View "Sargenti v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who sued several parties after negative posts about him appeared in a large Chicago-based Facebook group where women share experiences about local men. The posts, made in late 2023, included a woman he briefly dated recounting her unpleasant experiences, attaching a screenshot of a profane text message he sent her after their breakup. Other posts by unidentified users included supportive comments and, in one instance, a link to a news article about a criminal case involving someone with a different name and appearance. The plaintiff alleged these posts caused him reputational, economic, and emotional harm.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the defendants—including the former date, her parents (for allegedly allowing use of their internet connection), the group’s administrators, and Meta Platforms—moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motions, finding the claims legally insufficient and dismissing the case with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed and voluntarily dismissed claims against unidentified “Jane Doe” defendants to preserve diversity jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the plaintiff failed to state plausible claims under the Illinois Right of Publicity Act because none of the defendants used his likeness for a commercial purpose. The court also found the “doxing” claim insufficient, as there were no plausible allegations of intent or recklessness regarding harm or stalking. Defamation and related claims failed because the allegedly defamatory material could be innocently interpreted or lacked special damages. The court also concluded that the appeal as to the woman and her parents was frivolous and ordered the plaintiff and his attorneys to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for bringing a meritless appeal and for submitting briefs containing fictitious quotations and misstatements of law. The court awarded costs to other appellees and referred attorney conduct to state disciplinary authorities. View "D'Ambrosio v Meta Platforms, Inc." on Justia Law

A large group of cities, towns, and counties in West Virginia sued a pharmacy benefit manager, alleging that it contributed to the oversupply of opioids in their communities, thus creating a public nuisance. The local governments sought an injunction requiring the defendant to fund the abatement of the ongoing public nuisance and to compensate them for the costs of rectifying it. This proposed “abatement fund” was described as covering not just eliminating the oversupply itself, but also providing addiction treatment, education, and community rehabilitation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia denied the defendant’s demand for a jury trial, determining that the Seventh Amendment did not confer a right to a jury trial because this was a governmental public nuisance action seeking only abatement, which the court characterized as an equitable remedy. The district court also ordered a bifurcated bench trial on the public-nuisance claim, with a potential statewide abatement phase, and denied the defendant’s motions for reconsideration or for interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case on a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Fourth Circuit held that the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial because the relief sought by the local governments included a classic legal remedy—compensation for downstream harms resulting from the alleged public nuisance, such as addiction treatment and community rehabilitation. The court explained that, at the time of the Founding, only courts of law—not equity—could award such monetary relief for the consequences of a public nuisance. Therefore, the defendant was entitled to a jury trial on the public-nuisance claim, and the petition for mandamus was granted in part. View "In re: Express Scripts, Inc." on Justia Law

A young man died after his motorcycle collided with a tractor-trailer owned and operated by a nationwide commercial motor carrier. The victim’s parents and his estate brought a wrongful-death and survival action against the trucking company, its driver, and a customer whose goods were being transported at the time of the accident. The plaintiffs alleged that the customer was negligent for hiring the trucking company, claiming it should have known the carrier employed reckless drivers due to a history of safety violations. However, the pleadings did not allege that the customer owned, operated, or controlled the truck, employed the driver, influenced how the shipment was conducted, or that the shipment itself involved any unusual risk or hazard.The trucking company and driver were sued for negligence and gross negligence. The plaintiffs later amended their petition to name the customer (a national retailer) as a defendant on the same theories. The customer moved to dismiss the claims under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, arguing it owed no duty of care to the public as a mere shipper of goods transported by an independent, federally regulated carrier. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals summarily denied mandamus relief.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case on petition for writ of mandamus. It held that Texas law does not impose a duty of care on a passive shipper in these circumstances. The court concluded that because the customer neither created nor controlled the risk, and the allegations did not show any exception to the general rule against liability for acts of independent contractors, the claims against the customer had no basis in law. The Supreme Court of Texas conditionally granted mandamus relief, directing the trial court to vacate its denial and dismiss the claims against the customer. View "IN RE HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC." on Justia Law