Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Several patients suffered harm after undergoing surgeries performed by Abubakar Atiq Durrani, M.D., whose conduct involved unnecessary procedures and fraudulent misrepresentations about the need for surgery. Following Durrani’s indictment and flight from the United States, hundreds of injured patients pursued civil suits in Ohio state court, obtaining judgments against Durrani for negligence, fraud, and, in some cases, battery or lack of informed consent. After prevailing at trial but unable to collect damages directly from Durrani, the plaintiffs sought to enforce their judgments against his insurer, the Medical Protective Company (MedPro), under the terms of Durrani’s malpractice insurance policy.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, the plaintiffs filed enforcement actions to compel MedPro to pay their verdicts and initiated a direct action against MedPro and its vice president, alleging bad faith and other torts related to MedPro’s handling of the litigation and denial of payment. The district court dismissed all claims, finding that the policy’s exclusion for damages “in consequence of” intentional torts (including fraud) barred coverage where the damages were inseparable from Durrani’s fraudulent acts, and that Ohio law permits only the insured—not third-party claimants—to assert bad faith claims against insurers.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The court held that MedPro’s policy exclusion applies when the plaintiffs’ damages directly arise from and cannot be separated from Durrani’s fraud. Where jury verdicts did not allocate damages between negligence and fraud, or where all remaining damages were tied to fraudulent acts, the plaintiffs could not plausibly claim coverage. The court further held that, under Ohio law, third-party claimants may not bring bad faith claims against insurers, and the plaintiffs failed to state any viable independent tort claims. The district court’s dismissals were therefore affirmed in all respects. View "Adams v. Med. Protective Co." on Justia Law

A bus passenger, Vasken Ohanian, sued the bus driver Tamisha Davis and her employer MV Transportation, Inc. after being struck by a bus and allegedly suffering both physical and psychological injuries. Davis and MV retained an expert psychologist, Dr. Thomas Kinsora, to conduct a neuropsychological evaluation of Ohanian. Dr. Kinsora’s report criticized the evaluation by Ohanian’s own expert, Dr. Michael A. Elliott, and concluded that Ohanian’s symptoms were inconsistent with true traumatic injury. Ohanian requested disclosure of the raw psychological test data, including exam questions used by Dr. Kinsora, claiming this was necessary for effective cross-examination.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County ordered Davis and MV to disclose the raw test data to Ohanian’s counsel, subject to a protective order. Davis and MV partially complied but refused to disclose the exam questions, arguing that a newly-enacted regulation, NAC 641.234(3), prohibited such disclosure absent a specific state or federal law. The district court found that Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure (NRCP) 16.1 and NRS 50.305 constituted specific state laws requiring disclosure and repeatedly ordered compliance. Davis and MV continued to resist full disclosure and petitioned for a writ of mandamus to the Supreme Court of Nevada.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed whether NAC 641.234(3) superseded the district court’s discovery order. The Court held that the Board of Psychological Examiners’ authority under NRS 641.100(2) extends only to regulating the practice of psychology, not court-ordered discovery. The Court found that district courts have broad discretion to control discovery under NRCP 16.1 and NRCP 35, including ordering disclosure of raw test data. It concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion and denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "DAVIS VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

An employee of an independent contractor was injured after falling through a skylight while working on equipment located on the roof of a warehouse. The warehouse owner had leased roof space and related access to a tenant (Verizon) expressly for the installation and maintenance of communications equipment. The tenant, in turn, hired a general contractor to perform work at the site, who then sent the injured employee to perform the task. The area where the accident occurred was not part of the leased roof section, but the employee accessed it while attempting to complete his assignment. It was undisputed that the general contractor, not the warehouse owner, was responsible for the means, methods, and safety of the work.After the accident, the injured worker brought a lawsuit against both the tenant and the warehouse owner in the Superior Court of Alameda County, asserting claims of negligence and premises liability. The warehouse owner moved for summary judgment, arguing that under the Privette doctrine, which generally shields those who hire independent contractors from liability for workplace injuries, it was not liable. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that because the warehouse owner was a landlord and not the entity that directly hired the independent contractor, the Privette doctrine did not apply. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the tenant on Privette grounds, and the plaintiff did not appeal that ruling.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the Privette doctrine protects not only the party that directly hires an independent contractor but also applies to others in the “chain of delegation,” such as non-hiring landlords whose lease agreements contemplate the use of independent contractors for contracted work. The court directed the trial court to vacate its denial of summary judgment and to enter judgment for the warehouse owner, holding that the Privette doctrine barred the plaintiff’s claims. View "Schurman Family Company TIC v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

An elderly patient, after contracting COVID-19, received remote medical treatment from an out-of-state physician who prescribed multiple medications, including prednisone. Prednisone is known to carry a risk of peptic ulcer disease, especially in older individuals, and the physician did not prescribe mitigating medication to counteract these side effects. The patient subsequently developed a perforated ulcer and died from organ failure. The estate brought suit against the physician for negligence, lack of informed consent, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA).The estate initially filed the action in Connecticut Superior Court, and the physician removed it to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The physician moved to dismiss, arguing immunity under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) and contending the CUTPA claim was not viable. The District Court dismissed the CUTPA claim but denied the motion to dismiss the negligence and informed consent claims, concluding PREP Act immunity did not apply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the physician qualified for PREP Act immunity because he was a licensed health professional who prescribed a covered countermeasure (prednisone) for COVID-19, and the prescription had a causal relationship with the patient’s death. The court also held that the CUTPA claim was impermissible because it was based on alleged professional negligence rather than business or entrepreneurial conduct. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the CUTPA claim, reversed the District Court’s denial of PREP Act immunity, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Waters v. Kory" on Justia Law

A passenger aboard a cruise ship alleged that, after becoming inebriated, she was separated from her friends and ended up in a maintenance closet with a crewmember. She stated that she was held against her will and sexually assaulted. Both she and the crewmember gave differing accounts of the incident to FBI agents: she could not recall if she consented to sexual conduct, while the crewmember claimed it was consensual and that he did not know she was intoxicated. The FBI investigator ultimately concluded the encounter was consensual, and prosecutors declined to bring criminal charges.The passenger brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida asserting claims including false imprisonment and sexual assault. In pretrial proceedings, the district court granted her motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of false imprisonment liability, finding that the cruise line had not produced admissible evidence to create a dispute of material fact. The district court excluded the FBI reports as hearsay. At trial, the district court instructed the jury that the cruise line was already liable for false imprisonment and limited the ability of the defendant to challenge the factual basis for that claim. The jury found the cruise line liable for sexual assault but rejected the negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, awarding over $10 million in damages.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment on false imprisonment and in excluding the FBI investigator’s conclusions, which were admissible under the public records exception to the hearsay rule. The appellate court reversed the partial summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim, vacated the judgment as to the false imprisonment and sexual assault claims, and remanded for a new trial on those claims. The negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims remain resolved in favor of the cruise line. View "Doe v. Carnival Corporation" on Justia Law

During an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting in Sikeston, Missouri, George Holland experienced a severe mental health crisis, displaying incoherent speech and ultimately brandishing a small pistol, which he placed in his mouth. The other attendees exited safely, leaving Holland alone and armed inside. Police responded and engaged with Holland from a concealed position outside an open door, repeatedly commanding him to drop his weapon. For most of the encounter, Holland neither pointed the firearm at officers nor threatened them directly. After about fifteen minutes, Holland moved into clear view, holding the gun to his temple. In a sudden motion, he lowered the firearm and shifted his left arm toward it, prompting Officer Martin Simmerman to fire. Holland retreated, and Simmerman, followed by other officers, pursued him into the corridor, firing additional shots. Simmerman discharged fifteen rounds in total, striking Holland at least six times, resulting in Holland’s death.The Holland family brought suit against Simmerman and the City of Sikeston in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wrongful death, battery, and Monell claims. The defendants moved to dismiss, providing body camera footage. The district court found that the video evidence contradicted key allegations in the complaint, concluded that Simmerman was entitled to qualified and official immunity, and dismissed all claims with prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that while the video evidence contradicted the allegation that Holland took no menacing action before the first volley of shots, it did not conclusively show the events during the subsequent volleys. The court held that Simmerman was entitled to qualified immunity for the initial shots but not for the later volleys, as the complaint plausibly alleged excessive force as to those shots. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the excessive force claim, remanded for reconsideration of the related state-law and Monell claims, and affirmed in all other respects. View "Holland v. Simmerman" on Justia Law

The plaintiff suffered harm as a result of an incident at a Trader Joe’s store. Following a trial in the Superior Court of Stanislaus County, a jury found Trader Joe’s negligent and determined that its negligence was a substantial factor in causing injury to the plaintiff. The jury awarded damages of $23,509,165. After a post-trial motion, the court conditionally granted a new trial unless the plaintiff accepted a reduced award. The plaintiff accepted the remittitur, and an amended judgment was entered for $10,809,165.Trader Joe’s sought to appeal the amended judgment. The deadline to file the notice of appeal was January 20, 2026. On that date, Trader Joe’s submitted its notice of appeal electronically, receiving confirmation of receipt. However, the Superior Court clerk later rejected the filing, citing a local rule and a court website provision that classified notices of appeal as documents that could not be filed electronically. After further attempts, the notice of appeal was eventually accepted and filed on February 17, 2026. The plaintiff then moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. It held that the local rule and related court website provisions barring e-filing of notices of appeal were inconsistent with state law, particularly California Rules of Court, rule 2.253. As such, the rule was invalid. The court further held that since Trader Joe’s had delivered the notice of appeal to the clerk electronically on the jurisdictional deadline, the notice was timely. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss the appeal. View "Gharraee v. Trader Joe's Co." on Justia Law

An employee suffered an industrial injury in December 2013 while working for a sanitation district. The employee filed a workers’ compensation claim, and a workers’ compensation judge awarded him total and permanent disability. The employer, Ross Valley Sanitation District, filed a timely petition for reconsideration of this award. However, for reasons not clear in the record, the workers’ compensation judge did not act on the petition, and the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board did not act on the petition within the 60-day statutory deadline. The Appeals Board eventually granted the petition for reconsideration 144 days after it was filed, stating that it had not received notice of the petition within the 60-day period due to an administrative irregularity.The employee then sought a writ of mandate from the California Court of Appeal, arguing that the Appeals Board’s action was untimely and void under former Labor Code section 5909, which at the time provided that a petition for reconsideration is deemed denied unless acted upon within 60 days of filing. The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that the 60-day deadline in section 5909 is mandatory and that the Appeals Board exceeded its jurisdiction when it acted outside that period.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case. It held that the deadline in former section 5909 is mandatory, but not jurisdictional in the fundamental sense, meaning the Appeals Board acts in excess of its authority, rather than lacking power, if it acts late. The Supreme Court further held that the Appeals Board may not equitably toll its own statutory deadline to act on a petition for reconsideration, rejecting the argument that tolling was appropriate when the Board itself did not receive notice of the petition in time. The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, granting the writ of mandate and directing the Appeals Board to rescind its untimely order. View "Mayor v. Workers' Comp. App. Bd." on Justia Law

In 2018, a patient named Crystal Allen suffered a stroke and was admitted to a skilled nursing facility. During her stay, Dr. Oyesiji Arojojoye evaluated and performed a debridement procedure on a pressure ulcer on her hip. Afterward, Crystal developed an infection that progressed to sepsis, resulting in her death. Vickie Allen, Crystal’s mother and the statutory beneficiary, brought a lawsuit against Dr. Arojojoye and others, alleging that they failed to prevent sepsis and abscesses, did not timely assess or refer Crystal for immediate treatment, and did not provide adequate medical care. Vickie Allen retained Dr. Andrew Meillier, an internist, as her medical expert.Dr. Arojojoye moved for summary judgment in the Superior Court in Maricopa County, arguing that he was a board-certified wound care specialist and, under Arizona law (A.R.S. § 12-2604), only an expert with the same board certification could testify about the standard of care. The trial court found that while Dr. Arojojoye was board-certified in wound care, the relevant treatment fell within internal medicine, so Dr. Meillier was qualified to testify. The Arizona Court of Appeals, Division One, disagreed, concluding the treatment was wound care and that a wound care specialist was required as an expert. It reversed the trial court and directed entry of judgment for Dr. Arojojoye.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed whether the lower courts properly applied § 12-2604 and its own precedent in Baker v. University Physicians Healthcare. The Supreme Court found that the court of appeals failed to properly identify the care or treatment at issue and did not conduct the necessary analysis regarding Dr. Arojojoye’s claimed specialty. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the decisions of both lower courts and remanded the case for further consideration consistent with its opinion. The main holding is that lower courts must correctly identify the care at issue and conduct a thorough analysis of any claimed specialty under § 12-2604 before determining expert witness qualifications. View "AROJOJOYE v. ALLEN" on Justia Law

Kevin Welch underwent emergency surgery for an ascending aortic dissection and was subsequently treated in the intensive care unit of a hospital. After the operation, he exhibited confusion and, later, weakness in his lower extremities. Neurological consultation and imaging were recommended, but an MRI was delayed for safety and stability reasons. When eventually performed, the MRI indicated that Welch had suffered a stroke. He later reported ongoing cognitive and physical impairments, while the hospital maintained that his physical function had largely recovered and that any permanent disability was cognitive rather than physical.Following these events, Welch’s power of attorney, Shana Hargrove, filed a medical malpractice suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the hospital and several physicians, alleging that delays and omissions in post-surgical care worsened Welch’s outcome. After discovery, the hospital moved to exclude the causation testimony of Welch’s experts, Dr. Elakil and Dr. Schulman, and for summary judgment. The District Court excluded Dr. Elakil’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 due to insufficient basis for his causation opinions and excluded Dr. Schulman’s testimony because he was not properly disclosed as a causation expert under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 37. With no admissible expert testimony on causation, the court granted summary judgment for the hospital.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the exclusions for abuse of discretion and the summary judgment de novo. The appellate court affirmed the District Court’s rulings, holding that both expert testimonies were properly excluded and summary judgment was warranted, as expert testimony on causation is required under District of Columbia law for medical malpractice claims of this nature. View "Hargrove v. MedStar Washington Hospital Center" on Justia Law