Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff experienced serious medical complications after being misdiagnosed by his primary care provider, a physician assistant. Initially presenting with abdominal pain and urinary issues, the plaintiff was diagnosed with urinary retention and prescribed medication. His condition worsened, leading to emergency hospitalization where it was determined he had acute diverticulitis, resulting in a perforated bowel and septic shock. The plaintiff sued the physician assistant for negligence, alleging that the examination and treatment were deficient and caused significant injuries.The Iowa District Court for Dallas County reviewed the case. The plaintiff had submitted a certificate of merit affidavit, required under Iowa law for medical malpractice actions, signed by a physician board-certified in surgery. The defendant argued, and the district court agreed, that this expert was not qualified to opine on the standard of care for a physician assistant practicing family medicine, as the fields and certifications were deemed too distinct. The court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of a qualified expert.The Iowa Supreme Court considered whether a physician is qualified to serve as an expert in a malpractice case against a physician assistant under Iowa Code section 147.139. Applying a categorical approach established in Jones v. Lindell, the court held that “field” in the statute is defined by licensure rather than specialty or area of practice. It determined that physicians and physician assistants are licensed to practice in substantially similar fields because their scopes of practice, education, and statutory definitions overlap significantly. The court concluded the physician was a qualified expert and reversed the district court's dismissal, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Davenport v. Fuller" on Justia Law

A police officer employed by the Birmingham Police Department was patrolling late at night during a rainfall when his patrol car struck a pedestrian, resulting in the pedestrian’s death. The pedestrian was walking along a roadway, wearing dark clothing, and was found to be intoxicated. At the time of the accident, the officer was listening to a podcast on his personal cell phone, which was resting on the passenger seat; he stated he did not see the pedestrian before the collision. There was conflicting evidence as to whether the officer was exceeding the posted speed limit.The decedent’s estate brought a wrongful-death action against the officer in his official and individual capacities, as well as against the City of Birmingham based on vicarious liability. The officer and the city moved for summary judgment, arguing that both were entitled to immunity. The Jefferson Circuit Court granted summary judgment on the official-capacity claim based on State immunity but denied summary judgment on the individual-capacity and city claims, finding that there was substantial evidence the officer had acted beyond his authority by using his personal cell phone while driving, possibly violating department rules.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandamus, which is permissible when immunity is at issue. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded that patrolling is a discretionary function covered by State-agent immunity under the fourth category of Ex parte Cranman and § 6-5-338(a), Ala. Code 1975. The Court held that the officer did not exceed his authority by listening to a podcast, as this did not violate department rules, and found that even if the officer was speeding, such conduct would not remove his immunity in these circumstances. The Court therefore ordered summary judgment for both the officer and the city. View "In re: Cuin v. The City of Birmingham" on Justia Law

A tenant at an apartment complex sustained a knee injury while attempting to avoid a water puddle on a sidewalk between her apartment building and the parking lot during a rainstorm at night. The sidewalk had a longstanding issue with water, mud, and debris collecting in a depressed section due to a disconnected downspout and sidewalk deterioration. The tenant, who had a history of knee problems, stepped off the sidewalk to avoid the puddle and slipped on a concealed jagged edge, aggravating her knee. She later underwent surgery and filed suit against the apartment management, alleging negligent maintenance of the premises.The case was tried in the Circuit Court of Hinds County, Mississippi. The plaintiff presented expert testimony from Kenneth Goodrum, who was designated as a premises safety expert. Park Wind, the defendant, objected to Goodrum’s qualifications and methodology, arguing he lacked sufficient experience and that his approach was not reliable under the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. The trial court denied these objections, allowed Goodrum to testify as an expert, and the jury found in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant’s post-trial motion to exclude Goodrum’s testimony and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a new trial, or remittitur was denied without analysis.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi found that the trial court had abused its discretion by qualifying Goodrum as an expert. The court held that Goodrum did not possess the necessary knowledge, skill, experience, or education in premises safety and that his methodology was not sufficiently scientific or specialized to aid the jury. The Supreme Court determined that this error was prejudicial and not harmless. Accordingly, it reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Park Wind Apartments, LLC v. Mayze" on Justia Law

A truck driver was injured after slipping on a substance believed to be gasoline at a self-service fueling station owned by a truck stop operator. After his fall, the driver reported the spill to an employee, who then applied an absorbent to the area. The truck stop operator maintained a log for gasoline spills of one gallon or more. The driver sued the truck stop operator for negligence and later included the janitorial service provider as a defendant.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants, finding that the driver did not provide evidence that an employee caused the spill or that it had been present long enough to establish actual or constructive notice. The district court also found insufficient evidence to support a mode-of-operation theory, reasoning that the driver failed to show that self-service fueling was a new merchandising technique or that employees traditionally dispensed fuel in Nevada. The Nevada Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada clarified that it explicitly declines to adopt the mode-of-operation theory of premises liability. Instead, Nevada law requires consideration of whether the alleged hazardous condition was reasonably foreseeable, regardless of the business model. Constructive notice can be established by showing that the risk was reasonably foreseeable, either by the length of time the hazard existed or by evidence of general foreseeability. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the negligence claim and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this clarified standard. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment regarding the negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention claim, as the driver did not challenge that portion of the decision. View "MOORE VS. PRIMADONNA CO., LLC" on Justia Law

The appellant purchased and consumed a frozen “Oven Ready Breaded Cod Fillets” product sold by the appellee. While eating the fillet, a bone became lodged in her esophagus, causing her significant pain, medical treatment, and surgery. She claimed that the packaging’s “oven ready” and “breaded” descriptions led her to believe the product would be free of bones and thus safe to eat without risk of injury. As a result, she suffered physical and emotional harm, lost wages, ongoing impairment, and medical costs.After the incident, the appellant filed a complaint against the company in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging several causes of action including negligence for failure to warn, breach of warranty, strict products liability, and violation of consumer protection law. The company moved to dismiss all counts. The Superior Court initially dismissed all counts except negligence, finding enough factual allegations to suggest a failure to warn about bones. The company then filed a motion to reconsider, arguing that consumers should expect fish bones as a matter of law. The Superior Court agreed and dismissed the remaining negligence claim under Rule 12(b)(6), determining that the risk was obvious and no duty to warn existed.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that whether fish bones are an obvious risk in a breaded, oven-ready fish fillet is a question of fact for a jury, not a legal determination appropriate for dismissal at this stage. The court also found that the harm caused by ingesting a fish bone—especially one requiring hospitalization and surgery—was not obviously foreseeable to all consumers. Therefore, the court reversed the Superior Court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bahrampour v. Trader Joe's Company, Inc." on Justia Law

A Milwaukee County Sheriff’s deputy, while on duty and driving his unmarked vehicle, caused a fatal collision after running a red light at a controlled intersection. The deputy failed to notice the light change because he was distracted—looking at either his cellphone or his dashboard computer—for over 15 seconds as he approached the intersection. He was traveling at or just below the speed limit at the time. The victim, Ceaser Stinson, was lawfully passing through the intersection when his vehicle was struck and he was killed. Investigations confirmed the deputy’s inattention as the cause of the accident.Following the crash, Stinson’s estate filed a lawsuit in state court against the deputy, Milwaukee County, and the county’s insurer, alleging, among other claims, a violation of Stinson’s substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After removal to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, the court dismissed some claims but permitted the estate’s § 1983 claim against the deputy to proceed. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the deputy’s conduct did not meet the threshold for a constitutional violation and that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district judge denied the motion, concluding that a jury should decide whether the conduct was egregious enough to violate due process and deferred ruling on qualified immunity until after a jury verdict.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and held that the estate failed to show the deputy acted with deliberate indifference to a known and imminent harm, as required for a substantive due process violation. The court further held that it was not clearly established that distracted driving by a law enforcement officer violates due process. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s judgment and ordered entry of judgment in favor of the deputy, finding him entitled to qualified immunity. View "Estate of Stinson v. Streicher" on Justia Law

Cody Hatt, an employee of a demolition contractor, was fatally injured while working at the Hatfield’s Ferry Power Station in Pennsylvania, which was undergoing demolition after years of disuse. The plant was owned and operated by various FirstEnergy entities. Hatt was dismantling a catwalk on a smokestack when it collapsed, resulting in his death. His mother, Lisa DeBar, brought wrongful death and survival claims against the owner and operators of the plant, alleging negligence. The claims focused on whether the defendants retained control over the demolition work and whether they owed a duty to protect Hatt from the dangers present at the job site.The case was initially filed in Pennsylvania state court, but was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania based on diversity jurisdiction. After DeBar amended her complaint and voluntarily dismissed some defendants, the remaining defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court dismissed the claims against FirstEnergy Service and FirstEnergy Corp. with prejudice, and against Allegheny Energy Supply without prejudice. DeBar chose not to amend again and appealed the final judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s dismissal de novo. The court held that, under Pennsylvania law, a property owner who hires an independent contractor does not owe a duty to the contractor’s employees unless the owner retains detailed control over the work, which was not sufficiently alleged here. Additionally, landowners owe no duty to protect invitees from dangers that are open and obvious, and the risks associated with demolishing the long-disused power station qualified as such. The court affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of all claims. View "Debar v. FirstEnergy Corp" on Justia Law

The case involves a patient who was admitted to a hospital for acute coronary syndrome. After initially declining surgery, he agreed to undergo bypass surgery and signed a consent form authorizing three specific procedures: coronary bypass graft surgery, endoscopic vein harvest, and placement of a left atrial appendage clip. The list of procedures was handwritten on a standard consent form. The patient later received surgery in which the left atrial appendage clip was placed.Subsequently, the patient filed a lawsuit in the Vermont Superior Court, Lamoille Unit, Civil Division, alleging medical battery against the physician and the hospital. He contended that the use of the singular term “procedure” on the consent form implied consent for only one procedure and not for the placement of the atrial appendage clip. He also claimed that the physician did not discuss the atrial clip with him or conduct appropriate follow-up. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the patient had consented to all procedures listed on the form. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the patient had expressly consented to the placement of the atrial appendage clip, and dismissed the medical battery claim.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, holding that medical battery requires the absence of consent or performance of a substantially different procedure than authorized. The Supreme Court found the patient expressly consented to the placement of the left atrial appendage clip, and did not allege that the procedure performed was substantially different from the one authorized. The Court emphasized that a lack of understanding or information about the procedure is a potential claim for lack of informed consent (medical malpractice), not medical battery. The dismissal was affirmed. View "Ford v. Polomsky" on Justia Law

A motorist was injured after colliding with a cow on Interstate 84 in Elmore County, Idaho. The cow belonged to a local rancher, and the land adjacent to the collision site was managed by a grazing association. The Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) maintained fencing and cattle guards along the highway, and there was a livestock culvert nearby which had been gated for years. On the day of the incident, livestock were herded through this culvert, and the following day, a hole was discovered in the fencing near the site.The injured motorist filed suit in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Elmore County, asserting negligence against the rancher, the grazing association, and ITD. He argued that the defendants failed to warn motorists and breached duties related to fencing and livestock management. The rancher and association sought summary judgment based on immunity under Idaho’s open range law, while ITD sought summary judgment on the grounds that it owed no duty to prohibit livestock from entering the highway or to warn motorists, and claimed immunity under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The district court granted summary judgment, dismissing all claims, and subsequently denied the plaintiff’s motions to reconsider for procedural noncompliance and, alternatively, on the merits.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho conducted de novo review. The Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that the rancher and grazing association were immune under Idaho Code section 25-2118 because the collision occurred on open range, rejecting arguments that the presence of fencing precluded immunity or that federal law preempted Idaho’s statutes. The Court also held that ITD owed no tort duty to the plaintiff to maintain fencing or warn of livestock, and that no special relationship or assumption of duty existed. The summary judgment rulings for all defendants were affirmed. View "Ludwig v. Howard, ITD" on Justia Law

The case involved a motor vehicle accident between Antonio Contreras and Aleshia Martinez. Contreras stipulated to negligence before trial, and the trial court granted Martinez’s motion for a directed verdict on causation. The matter proceeded to a jury trial on damages, which resulted in a verdict awarding Martinez $55,000 for various categories of loss, including past and future economic and noneconomic damages.After the verdict, Martinez moved for a new trial, arguing, among other grounds, that there was jury misconduct during deliberations. She supported her motion with declarations from two jurors indicating that the jury had openly discussed the defendant’s ability to pay, expressed sympathy for him, questioned why the suit was not against an insurance company or a corporation like Wal-Mart, and compared Martinez’s injuries to those suffered by military personnel. The Superior Court of Fresno County granted Martinez’s motion for a new trial solely on the ground of jury misconduct, finding that the jurors’ discussions violated specific jury instructions and that the misconduct was likely prejudicial. Contreras appealed the order.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed whether the trial court had abused its discretion in granting a new trial. The appellate court found the trial court’s statement of reasons sufficient under Code of Civil Procedure section 657. It held that the juror declarations were admissible because they described overt acts during deliberations, not jurors’ mental processes, and that Contreras had forfeited certain objections by not raising them in the trial court. The appellate court also held that the misconduct created a presumption of prejudice that Contreras did not rebut. The order granting a new trial was affirmed. View "Martinez v. Contreras" on Justia Law