Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Maurice Voce, a self-taught investor, traded stock options with Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC for decades, amassing a substantial fortune. His children and nephew, as co-trustees of his trusts and personal representative of his estate, alleged that Morgan Stanley and advisor John Privitelli continued facilitating risky trading and collecting commissions even as Maurice’s cognitive health declined in his later years. They claimed this conduct constituted breach of fiduciary duty and financial elder abuse. The plaintiffs also asserted that Privitelli’s advice extended to tax and estate planning, resulting in costly insurance policies and tax penalties.Previously, the plaintiffs initiated arbitration with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which dismissed their claims without prejudice, permitting them to pursue litigation. They then filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The trial court found the claims timely under the discovery rule but imposed a damages cutoff based on a backward projection of the remaining statute of limitations period. The court also granted defendants’ motion for nonsuit, dismissing both causes of action. It ruled there was insufficient evidence of harm for elder abuse and concluded defendants’ fiduciary duty did not cover tax and estate planning advice, as they were not formally hired or paid for such services. Additionally, it determined plaintiffs failed to provide expert testimony on excessive trading for the breach of fiduciary duty claim.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court misapplied the statute of limitations by limiting damages to a narrow period, rather than considering the full course of wrongful conduct for timely claims. The appellate court found plaintiffs’ evidence sufficient to survive nonsuit on both the elder abuse claim and the breach of fiduciary duty claim, to the extent that the latter involved issues beyond excessive trading. However, it affirmed nonsuit regarding the excessive trading theory due to lack of expert evidence. The judgment was reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "DeVone v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC" on Justia Law

A car rental company leased a vehicle to an individual, who subsequently was involved in a collision with another driver. The injured party sued both the renter and the rental company, asserting two theories of liability against the company: vicarious liability under California Vehicle Code sections 17150 and 17151, and negligent entrustment, arguing the company should be liable for renting a vehicle without verifying the renter had automobile insurance.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of the rental company. The court found that the Graves Amendment, a federal statute, preempted California’s vicarious liability statute when applied to rental car companies, thereby shielding the company from liability based solely on ownership of the vehicle. The court also determined that there was no negligent entrustment because the renter had a valid driver’s license, matched the photo on the license, and showed no signs of incompetence or unfitness to drive. The court did not find a duty for the rental company to verify automobile insurance for the renter.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the Graves Amendment preempts California Vehicle Code section 17150 when used to impose vicarious liability on rental car companies, as section 17150 is not a financial responsibility law covered by the Amendment’s savings clause. The court further held that rental car companies do not have a duty to check whether renters possess automobile insurance and rejected the negligent entrustment claim, as there was no evidence the renter was incompetent or unfit. The judgment in favor of the rental company was affirmed. View "O'Brien v. Midway Rent-A-Car, Inc." on Justia Law

A Nevada resident, Virginia Pass, allegedly suffered injuries and ultimately died after a Care@Home C7000 in-home medical alert system failed to alert emergency services following her fall. The device was purchased from Medical Guardian, a Pennsylvania-based reseller authorized by Essence USA, Inc., a New Jersey corporation that distributes products manufactured by Essence SmartCare Ltd. Pass’s estate and her six children, some residing in Nevada and others in different states, filed suit against Essence USA and Medical Guardian in Nevada. The record did not establish where, how, or by whom the Care@Home device was acquired, only that it was used in Nevada.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, dismissed Essence USA for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding Essence USA had insufficient contacts with Nevada. Morgan, representing Pass’s estate, was permitted to amend the complaint and conduct limited jurisdictional discovery. The evidence showed that Essence USA attended the Consumer Electronic Show (CES) in Las Vegas to promote its products to resellers, and had entered into agreements with Medical Guardian authorizing resale in the United States and Canada. However, there was no evidence of direct sales or marketing to Nevada consumers, nor confirmation that more than one product ever reached Nevada. The district court denied reconsideration and certified its dismissal as final for appeal.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and affirmed the dismissal. The court held that, under Nevada’s adoption of the pure stream-of-commerce test for specific personal jurisdiction, a nonresident defendant must introduce products into the stream of commerce with the expectation of a regular flow to Nevada. The plaintiffs failed to show more than a single isolated instance of a product reaching Nevada or any meaningful connection between their claims and Essence USA’s in-state contacts at CES. Thus, Essence USA was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada. View "MORGAN VS. ESSENCE USA, INC." on Justia Law

Frank Costa was being transported to a medical facility by Northwest Ambulance, staffed by EMTs Jack Wilson, Henry Shaw, and EMT trainee Katelyn Averill. The EMTs secured Mr. Costa to a gurney using guardrails and lap belts but omitted shoulder restraints, violating company policy. During transport, Mr. Shaw, driving the ambulance under emergency code, swerved to avoid a garbage truck and crashed into a highway divider. As a result, Mr. Costa was ejected from the stretcher and sustained fatal injuries. Northwest Ambulance admitted that both the failure to secure Mr. Costa with shoulder restraints and the negligent driving were breaches of ordinary care.The Estate of Frank Costa brought wrongful death and survival actions against Northwest Ambulance in Snohomish County Superior Court. Both sides filed cross motions for summary judgment on whether RCW 18.71.210(1) provided qualified immunity for the negligent acts. The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment for the Estate, ruling that driving an ambulance is not an emergency medical service subject to immunity. Northwest Ambulance conceded negligence but maintained it was immune under the statute. The jury returned a general verdict for the Estate, and Northwest Ambulance appealed. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that qualified immunity did not apply to the negligent driving.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed whether Northwest Ambulance was entitled to qualified immunity for negligent ambulance transportation. The court held that RCW 18.71.210 provides immunity only for acts or omissions within the EMT’s field of medical expertise, such as emergency medical procedures, and does not extend to negligent driving. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals, concluding that Northwest Ambulance was not entitled to qualified immunity for negligent ambulance driving. View "Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

A woman with an enlarged lymph node was initially diagnosed by a pathologist as having metastatic breast cancer. However, subsequent imaging and tests did not confirm a breast origin and suggested lymphoma as a possible diagnosis. Her treating oncologist, despite access to these conflicting findings, did not consult further with pathology or pursue additional investigation, and instead proceeded to treat her for breast cancer with chemotherapy and radiation. After about a year, her cancer had advanced, and a later biopsy revealed she actually had ALK positive large B-cell lymphoma, a rare and aggressive cancer. She then received appropriate treatment but did not respond positively and died. The plaintiffs, her husband and her estate, alleged that the oncologist breached the standard of care by failing to properly diagnose and consult, resulting in delayed proper treatment and increased harm.The case was first tried in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, resulting in a mistrial. At retrial, after the plaintiffs presented their evidence, the defendants moved for compulsory nonsuit, which the trial court granted, finding insufficient evidence of causation. The plaintiffs’ post-trial motions were denied, and judgment was entered for the defendants. On appeal, the Superior Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for a new trial, concluding there was sufficient expert evidence under Pennsylvania’s “increased risk of harm” standard to permit the case to go to the jury.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Middle District, reviewed whether the Superior Court correctly applied the “increased risk of harm” standard from Hamil v. Bashline. The Court held that the Superior Court properly applied this relaxed causation standard, finding the plaintiffs’ expert testimony sufficient to establish a prima facie case that the oncologist’s conduct increased the risk of harm. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision, requiring the case be submitted to the jury. View "Estate of Smith v. Kannarkatt" on Justia Law

The plaintiff worked as a cleanup worker in Pascagoula, Mississippi, following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, allegedly exposed to crude oil and chemical dispersants through inhalation and direct contact. He claimed this exposure caused a chronic worsening of his preexisting asthma. The plaintiff sued BP Exploration & Production, Inc. and BP America Production Company under the Back-End Litigation Option (BELO) of the Medical Settlement Agreement related to the Deepwater Horizon class-action litigation. The parties stipulated to venue in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.The litigation required the plaintiff to prove that his injuries were legally caused by exposure to oil spill-related substances. He proffered two experts, Dr. Michael Freeman and Dr. Shawn French, to establish causation. BP moved to exclude their testimony and for summary judgment. The district court denied the plaintiff’s request for an evidentiary hearing, excluded the expert testimony, and granted summary judgment in favor of BP, finding that the expert evidence was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to causation. The plaintiff timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that toxic tort causation standards, requiring expert testimony to establish both general and specific causation, apply under maritime law for BELO claims involving non-readily observable injuries with multiple possible etiologies. The Fifth Circuit found the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the plaintiff’s experts, both for lack of reliability and relevance under Rule 702 and Daubert, and for deficiencies in qualifications and methodology. The district court’s grant of summary judgment was affirmed. View "Dufour v. BP Exploration & Production" on Justia Law

K.S., the plaintiff, was placed in a group home by the County of Alameda when he was a minor in foster care. Between 2006 and 2007, while he was twelve to thirteen years old, he was sexually abused by an adult staff member at the facility. K.S. reported the abuse to a supervisor, an agent of the County, but no investigation or protective action was taken. Instead, K.S. alleges he was penalized, and the abuse continued. He contends that, beyond the failure to respond to his report, the County and its employees failed to implement adequate policies, procedures, and supervision to prevent foreseeable abuse of children in their care, and that systemic deficiencies contributed to his injuries.After K.S. filed a negligence action against the County in the Alameda County Superior Court, the County moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that it was immune from liability under California Government Code section 820.2, which grants immunity for discretionary acts by public employees. The trial court granted the County’s motion, concluding the complaint’s allegations demonstrated that the relevant acts or omissions were discretionary decisions entitled to immunity.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that at the pleading stage, it could not be determined that all of the acts or omissions alleged by K.S. were necessarily discretionary within the meaning of section 820.2, nor that they resulted from a conscious, considered exercise of discretion by County employees. The court explained that some alleged conduct, such as failure to notice abuse or take reasonable protective measures, might be ministerial rather than discretionary, and that immunity under section 820.2 could not be resolved solely on the pleadings. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "K.S. v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law

Nathan O’Bannon worked for a coal company for four years, primarily performing strenuous labor in confined spaces, which required repetitive heavy lifting and awkward physical positions. He claimed that this work resulted in cumulative trauma injuries to his neck, back, shoulders, and knees. After his employment ended, O’Bannon filed a workers’ compensation claim, testifying about his pain, physical limitations, and inability to return to mining work. Medical evaluations offered conflicting opinions: one doctor, Dr. Gilbert, diagnosed significant permanent impairment attributable to O’Bannon’s coal mining work and assigned a 40% whole person impairment rating, while two other doctors, retained by the employer, disputed the work-relatedness of his injuries and offered lower or no impairment ratings.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found O’Bannon’s injuries were caused by his employment and awarded him permanent partial disability and medical benefits, relying mainly on Dr. Gilbert’s assessment. The Workers’ Compensation Board affirmed the ALJ’s decision. The Kentucky Court of Appeals, however, partially reversed, finding that Dr. Gilbert’s 10% impairment rating for the cervical spine did not strictly adhere to the AMA Guides and that separate impairment ratings were needed for each shoulder and wrist. The appellate court remanded those claims for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and held that strict adherence to the AMA Guides is not required so long as the medical opinion is grounded in them. The Court found Dr. Gilbert’s ratings were sufficiently supported by the evidence and not meaningfully contested by other experts. It also concluded that, since the evidence did not differentiate between the severity of injuries in each shoulder or wrist, separate ratings were unnecessary. The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals in part and reversed in part, reinstating the ALJ’s full award to O’Bannon. View "O'BANNON V. MUHLENBERG COUNTY COAL CO." on Justia Law

Charles L. Hinkel, III experienced chest pain at home and, after his son called 911, emergency responders Kristian Brock (an EMT) and Christopher Stone (a paramedic) were dispatched to assist. They used a phone app called “Active 911” for navigation, but due to darkness, rain, and poor lighting, they initially missed the house, arriving about sixteen minutes after dispatch. After bringing Hinkel to the ambulance, he suffered cardiac arrest, and the defibrillator malfunctioned. The responders stopped at another paramedic’s home to get a working defibrillator and continued resuscitation, but Hinkel was pronounced dead at the hospital. Hinkel’s estate sued Brock and Stone in their individual capacities, alleging negligence related to their navigation choices and equipment checks.The Henry Circuit Court dismissed claims against Henry County EMS and the defendants in their official capacities but denied summary judgment for Brock and Stone in their individual capacities, finding their actions involved ministerial duties not protected by qualified official immunity. Rather than immediately appealing, Brock and Stone proceeded to trial, which ended in a mistrial. Afterward, they filed an interlocutory appeal regarding the denial of immunity. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that Brock and Stone forfeited their right to an interlocutory appeal by proceeding to trial rather than appealing the immunity denial before trial. The Court clarified that once trial begins, the summary judgment record is superseded and further appellate review of immunity must occur on the trial record, not the pretrial record. The Court also found it lacked appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine in these circumstances. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case to the Henry Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "BROCK V. HINKEL" on Justia Law

During the 1978–1979 school year, a public high school student alleged that he was sexually abused on multiple occasions by his science teacher, who had recently been hired by the district. The student, then 16 years old, reported that the teacher “groomed” him, leading to sexual conduct that occurred off campus. The student did not disclose the abuse until it was revealed during a parent-teacher conference at his home, after which his mother called law enforcement. He subsequently ceased attending the high school and finished the semester through independent study.Years later, the student filed suit against the school district, alleging negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of the teacher, as well as negligent supervision of him as a minor. He claimed that the district’s administrators and supervisory employees knew or should have known about the teacher’s dangerous propensities or had received complaints regarding her conduct. The Superior Court of Riverside County granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, finding there was no evidence that its supervisory personnel had actual or constructive knowledge of the teacher’s dangerous tendencies before or during the abuse. The student appealed, arguing that the lack of district records or evidence of its policies from 1978 precluded summary judgment and that the district failed to prove it properly vetted or supervised the teacher.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that the district met its initial burden by showing there was no evidence of actual or constructive knowledge of the teacher’s dangerous propensities among supervisory personnel. The plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of material fact, as he provided no admissible evidence that the district knew or should have known of the risk prior to the abuse. The absence of historical records regarding hiring or supervision did not create a triable issue. The judgment for the district was affirmed. View "N.K. v. Palm Springs Unified School District" on Justia Law