Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Rhonna Tindall slipped on a layer of ice in a parking lot owned by the County of Nevada and injured her knee. She sued the County, alleging that the icy parking lot was a dangerous condition of public property under Government Code sections 830 and 835. The County moved for summary judgment, claiming immunity under section 831, which provides that a public entity is not liable for injuries caused by weather conditions affecting the use of streets and highways.The trial court granted the County’s motion for summary judgment, ruling that the parking lot was a “street” or “highway” within the meaning of section 831, and that the County was entitled to “weather immunity.” The court also found that a reasonably careful person would have anticipated the potential existence of slippery ice in the parking lot. Tindall appealed, arguing that section 831 immunity does not apply to parking lots, that the dangerous condition resulted from a combination of weather and other factors, and that the County did not meet its burden to show that a reasonably careful person would have anticipated the ice.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the parking lot is a “street” within the meaning of section 831, largely based on the Vehicle Code’s definition of “street” as a publicly maintained place open to the public for vehicular travel. The court found Tindall’s arguments unpersuasive and determined that the County was not liable for her injury caused by the weather condition. The court also held that Tindall’s arguments regarding the combination of weather with other factors and the reasonably careful person standard were forfeited on appeal. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. View "Tindall v. County of Nevada" on Justia Law

Lauren Scottoline gave birth to J.S.S. at Christiana Care Hospital on July 28, 2015. After birth, J.S.S. could not breathe on his own, had low blood-oxygen levels, and suffered seizures. He was diagnosed with hypoxic-ischemic encephalopathy (HIE) and stayed in the newborn intensive care unit for three weeks. J.S.S. showed developmental delays and was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) in 2018, confirmed in 2021. Lauren and Stephen Scottoline filed a lawsuit against Christiana Care Health System, Inc. and Women First, LLC, claiming negligence during J.S.S.’s birth caused his condition.The Superior Court of Delaware excluded the expert causation opinion of Dr. Daniel Adler, a pediatric neurologist, who claimed that HIE caused J.S.S.’s ASD. The court found Dr. Adler’s opinion unreliable and inadmissible under Delaware Rule of Evidence 702, as it lacked a scientific basis and did not employ a reliable methodology. The court granted the defendants’ motion in limine to exclude Dr. Adler’s testimony and subsequently granted summary judgment for the defendants due to the lack of admissible causation testimony.The Supreme Court of Delaware reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court’s rulings. The court held that Dr. Adler’s causation opinion was inadmissible because it was not supported by scientific literature or a reliable differential etiology. The court also found that Dr. Adler’s third report did not materially differ from his previous reports and failed to provide a reliable basis for his causation opinion. The Supreme Court concluded that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Adler’s testimony and denying an evidentiary hearing. The court also upheld the exclusion of Jody Masterson’s derivative opinion and found no error in the Superior Court’s handling of procedural motions. View "Scottoline v. Women First LLC" on Justia Law

Rose, while 24 weeks pregnant with M.W., was traveling by Greyhound bus from Washington State to Las Vegas. During the journey, she boarded a bus in Redding, California, where another passenger, Asaandi Coleman, opened fire, injuring Rose. Rose was treated in California and later transferred to Las Vegas, where she suffered complications leading to an emergency C-section for M.W. M.W. has required constant medical care since birth. M.W.'s father filed a negligence lawsuit against Greyhound, alleging negligence and negligent hiring, training, retaining, supervising, and equipping.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County, Nevada, dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over Greyhound, applying the Calder effects test, which is used for intentional torts. The court found that Greyhound did not purposefully direct its conduct toward Nevada, the cause of action did not arise from Greyhound's contacts with Nevada, and exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in applying the Calder effects test, as it only applies to intentional torts, and the claims against Greyhound were based on negligence. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal, determining that even under the correct test for specific personal jurisdiction, the district court lacked jurisdiction. Greyhound's contacts with Nevada were not sufficiently related to the negligence claims, which arose from events in California. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's order dismissing the action. View "WHITLEY VS. GREYHOUND LINES, INC." on Justia Law

Richard Hicks and his wife, Jocelyn Hicks, filed a lawsuit seeking monetary damages after Richard was injured by a vehicle driven by Gregory Middleton, an employee of Marine Terminals Corporation - East, d.b.a. Ports America. The incident occurred at the Port of Savannah, where both Hicks and Middleton worked as longshoremen. Middleton struck Hicks with his personal vehicle while allegedly on his way to retrieve work-related documents called "game plans."The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia granted summary judgment in favor of Ports America. The court ruled that Ports America could not be held vicariously liable for Middleton's actions because Middleton was not acting within the scope of his employment when the incident occurred. The court determined that Middleton was engaged in a personal activity, specifically commuting, and had not yet begun his work duties for Ports America.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment. The appellate court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Middleton was acting in furtherance of Ports America's business and within the scope of his employment when the incident occurred. The court noted that a jury could reasonably infer that Middleton's actions, including driving to retrieve the game plans, were part of his job responsibilities and thus within the scope of his employment. The case was remanded for further proceedings to allow a jury to determine these factual issues. View "Hicks v. Middleton" on Justia Law

Eric Coomer, Ph.D., the former Director of Product Strategy and Safety at Dominion Voting Systems, Inc., filed a defamation lawsuit against several defendants, including Make Your Life Epic, LLC, Reopen America, LLC, and Clayton Thomas Clark. Joseph Oltmann, a nonparty to the lawsuit, was subpoenaed to testify and produce documents. Oltmann initially appeared for his deposition but left without authorization and later boasted about his actions on his podcast, disparaging the magistrate judge and suggesting violence.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado held Oltmann in civil contempt for failing to comply with the subpoena and court orders. The court imposed a $1,000 per day fine until Oltmann complied and ordered him to pay attorney’s fees and costs. Oltmann appealed the Contempt Order, arguing that he properly invoked the newsperson’s privilege and that his due process rights were violated because the district court did not hold a hearing before issuing the Contempt Order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s Contempt Order. The appellate court held that Oltmann waived his arguments by not raising them specifically in his objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendations. The court also found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the Contempt Order without a second hearing, as the material facts were undisputed. The appellate court further imposed sanctions on Oltmann, ordering him to pay Coomer’s reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees and costs associated with the appeal, and remanded the case to the district court to determine the amount. View "Coomer v. Make Your Life Epic" on Justia Law

In 2016, a plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit in Hawai‘i against his uncle, alleging sexual abuse that occurred in 1975 and 1976 when the plaintiff was a minor. The plaintiff sought damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and assault and battery, among other claims. The case was subject to Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 657-1.8, which sets specific time limitations for civil actions arising from the sexual abuse of a minor.The Circuit Court instructed the jury based on criminal statutes in effect at the time the complaint was filed, rather than those in effect when the alleged abuse occurred. The jury awarded the plaintiff $50,000 in general damages and $200,000 in punitive damages. The defendant appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), arguing that the instructions should have been based on the criminal statutes in effect during the time of the alleged abuse. The ICA affirmed the Circuit Court's judgment, holding that the defendant failed to show that HRS § 657-1.8 violated the ex post facto clause.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case and held that HRS § 657-1.8(a) establishes a statute of limitations for civil actions based on the sexual abuse of a minor and does not create an independent cause of action. The court concluded that the applicable criminal statutes are those in effect when the alleged conduct occurred. Although the Circuit Court erred in instructing the jury on the criminal statutes in effect when the complaint was filed, the Supreme Court found this error to be harmless. The record showed that the defendant admitted to conduct that would have constituted a criminal offense under the statutes in effect at the time of the alleged abuse. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the ICA’s judgment, which upheld the Circuit Court’s final judgment. View "Foresman v. Foresman" on Justia Law

A minor, J.F., was sexually assaulted by three fellow passengers in a stateroom on a Carnival cruise ship. J.F. alleged that Carnival could have foreseen the crime and failed to take preventative action. She sued Carnival for negligence, claiming the cruise line did not warn her of the danger or prevent the assault.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of Carnival, concluding that the assault was not foreseeable. J.F. appealed the decision, arguing that Carnival had constructive notice of the risk due to previous incidents of sexual misconduct on its ships and the company's security policies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Carnival did not owe J.F. a relevant duty because the cruise line did not have actual or constructive notice of the specific risk that led to the assault. The court found that the general statistics on sexual assaults and the alcohol-smuggling incident involving one of the assailants were insufficient to establish foreseeability. Additionally, the court determined that the hypothetical presence of more security personnel would not have prevented the assault, as the attack occurred in a private stateroom.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that Carnival neither owed J.F. a duty to prevent the assault nor proximately caused her injuries. View "J.F. v. Carnival Corporation" on Justia Law

In March 2020, Jose Gonzalez visited a Walgreens store in Austin, Texas. An unidentified customer had clogged the toilet in the men's restroom and was given a plunger by a Walgreens employee to fix it. While the customer was attempting to unclog the toilet, Gonzalez entered the restroom and slipped on water that had accumulated on the floor. Gonzalez sued Walgreens for his injuries.The case was initially filed in Texas state court but was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas based on diversity jurisdiction. Gonzalez asserted a theory of vicarious liability and a claim for premises liability against Walgreens. The district court dismissed the vicarious liability theory and denied Walgreens's motion for summary judgment on the premises liability claim. After Gonzalez presented his case at trial, Walgreens moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), which the district court granted, finding that Walgreens had no actual or constructive knowledge of the wet floor. Gonzalez's motion for a new trial was also denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's JMOL, holding that no reasonable jury could find that Walgreens had actual or constructive knowledge of the wet floor. The court found that Gonzalez failed to provide sufficient evidence that Walgreens knew or should have known about the hazardous condition. The court also affirmed the dismissal of Gonzalez's vicarious liability theory, stating that the allegations constituted a premises liability claim, not a basis for vicarious liability. The court concluded that Walgreens did not have a policy or practice that it knew routinely created an unreasonable risk of harm, distinguishing this case from others where such knowledge was established. View "Gonzalez v. Walgreen" on Justia Law

A student, E.I., attended El Segundo Middle School during the 2017-2018 school year and experienced bullying from classmates, particularly Skylar. Despite E.I. and her parents repeatedly reporting the bullying to school officials, including the principal and counselor, the school failed to take effective action. The bullying included verbal harassment, social media abuse, and physical aggression, which led E.I. to self-harm and develop PTSD and depression. The school’s anti-bullying policies were not adequately followed by the staff.The case was initially reviewed by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, where a jury found the El Segundo Unified School District negligent and awarded E.I. $1 million in damages. The District moved for a new trial and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, both of which were denied by the court.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The District argued several points on appeal, including errors in allowing reliance on certain Education Code provisions, claims of immunity under Government Code section 820.2, insufficient evidence of causation, improper consideration of a negligent training and supervision theory, admission of expert testimony, and attorney misconduct during closing arguments. The appellate court found that many of the District’s arguments were either waived or lacked merit. The court held that the District was not immune from liability under Government Code section 820.2, as the actions in question were operational rather than policy decisions. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the jury’s causation finding and determined that any potential errors were not prejudicial. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of E.I. View "E.I. v. El Segundo Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

Rita Oteka, a faculty member at The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, attended a commencement ceremony voluntarily. While walking to her car after the event, she was struck and injured by a vehicle driven by a University police officer. The University, a self-insured employer for workers' compensation, reported the injury to its third-party claims administrator. The administrator denied benefits, stating that Oteka was using her personal insurance, no medical evidence was presented, and the injury was not work-related. Oteka did not contest this denial or file a compensation claim.Oteka later sued the police officer for negligence, and the University substituted in as the defendant. The University claimed that workers' compensation benefits were the exclusive remedy for Oteka's injury, asserting for the first time that the injury was work-related. The district court denied the University's plea to the jurisdiction, and the University appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth District of Texas affirmed, holding that the Division of Workers' Compensation did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the course-and-scope issue in this context.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and held that the Division does not have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an injury was work-related when the issue is raised by an employer's exclusive-remedy defense and the employee's lawsuit does not depend on entitlement to workers' compensation benefits. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, emphasizing that the Workers' Compensation Act does not provide a procedural mechanism for obtaining a course-and-scope finding from the Division without the employee first filing a compensation claim. View "THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS RIO GRANDE VALLEY v. OTEKA" on Justia Law