Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A Milwaukee County Sheriff’s deputy, while on duty and driving his unmarked vehicle, caused a fatal collision after running a red light at a controlled intersection. The deputy failed to notice the light change because he was distracted—looking at either his cellphone or his dashboard computer—for over 15 seconds as he approached the intersection. He was traveling at or just below the speed limit at the time. The victim, Ceaser Stinson, was lawfully passing through the intersection when his vehicle was struck and he was killed. Investigations confirmed the deputy’s inattention as the cause of the accident.Following the crash, Stinson’s estate filed a lawsuit in state court against the deputy, Milwaukee County, and the county’s insurer, alleging, among other claims, a violation of Stinson’s substantive due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After removal to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin, the court dismissed some claims but permitted the estate’s § 1983 claim against the deputy to proceed. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the deputy’s conduct did not meet the threshold for a constitutional violation and that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The district judge denied the motion, concluding that a jury should decide whether the conduct was egregious enough to violate due process and deferred ruling on qualified immunity until after a jury verdict.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and held that the estate failed to show the deputy acted with deliberate indifference to a known and imminent harm, as required for a substantive due process violation. The court further held that it was not clearly established that distracted driving by a law enforcement officer violates due process. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court’s judgment and ordered entry of judgment in favor of the deputy, finding him entitled to qualified immunity. View "Estate of Stinson v. Streicher" on Justia Law

Cody Hatt, an employee of a demolition contractor, was fatally injured while working at the Hatfield’s Ferry Power Station in Pennsylvania, which was undergoing demolition after years of disuse. The plant was owned and operated by various FirstEnergy entities. Hatt was dismantling a catwalk on a smokestack when it collapsed, resulting in his death. His mother, Lisa DeBar, brought wrongful death and survival claims against the owner and operators of the plant, alleging negligence. The claims focused on whether the defendants retained control over the demolition work and whether they owed a duty to protect Hatt from the dangers present at the job site.The case was initially filed in Pennsylvania state court, but was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania based on diversity jurisdiction. After DeBar amended her complaint and voluntarily dismissed some defendants, the remaining defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court dismissed the claims against FirstEnergy Service and FirstEnergy Corp. with prejudice, and against Allegheny Energy Supply without prejudice. DeBar chose not to amend again and appealed the final judgment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the District Court’s dismissal de novo. The court held that, under Pennsylvania law, a property owner who hires an independent contractor does not owe a duty to the contractor’s employees unless the owner retains detailed control over the work, which was not sufficiently alleged here. Additionally, landowners owe no duty to protect invitees from dangers that are open and obvious, and the risks associated with demolishing the long-disused power station qualified as such. The court affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of all claims. View "Debar v. FirstEnergy Corp" on Justia Law

The case involves a patient who was admitted to a hospital for acute coronary syndrome. After initially declining surgery, he agreed to undergo bypass surgery and signed a consent form authorizing three specific procedures: coronary bypass graft surgery, endoscopic vein harvest, and placement of a left atrial appendage clip. The list of procedures was handwritten on a standard consent form. The patient later received surgery in which the left atrial appendage clip was placed.Subsequently, the patient filed a lawsuit in the Vermont Superior Court, Lamoille Unit, Civil Division, alleging medical battery against the physician and the hospital. He contended that the use of the singular term “procedure” on the consent form implied consent for only one procedure and not for the placement of the atrial appendage clip. He also claimed that the physician did not discuss the atrial clip with him or conduct appropriate follow-up. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the patient had consented to all procedures listed on the form. The trial court granted the motion, finding that the patient had expressly consented to the placement of the atrial appendage clip, and dismissed the medical battery claim.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the trial court’s dismissal, holding that medical battery requires the absence of consent or performance of a substantially different procedure than authorized. The Supreme Court found the patient expressly consented to the placement of the left atrial appendage clip, and did not allege that the procedure performed was substantially different from the one authorized. The Court emphasized that a lack of understanding or information about the procedure is a potential claim for lack of informed consent (medical malpractice), not medical battery. The dismissal was affirmed. View "Ford v. Polomsky" on Justia Law

A motorist was injured after colliding with a cow on Interstate 84 in Elmore County, Idaho. The cow belonged to a local rancher, and the land adjacent to the collision site was managed by a grazing association. The Idaho Transportation Department (ITD) maintained fencing and cattle guards along the highway, and there was a livestock culvert nearby which had been gated for years. On the day of the incident, livestock were herded through this culvert, and the following day, a hole was discovered in the fencing near the site.The injured motorist filed suit in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Elmore County, asserting negligence against the rancher, the grazing association, and ITD. He argued that the defendants failed to warn motorists and breached duties related to fencing and livestock management. The rancher and association sought summary judgment based on immunity under Idaho’s open range law, while ITD sought summary judgment on the grounds that it owed no duty to prohibit livestock from entering the highway or to warn motorists, and claimed immunity under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. The district court granted summary judgment, dismissing all claims, and subsequently denied the plaintiff’s motions to reconsider for procedural noncompliance and, alternatively, on the merits.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho conducted de novo review. The Court affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that the rancher and grazing association were immune under Idaho Code section 25-2118 because the collision occurred on open range, rejecting arguments that the presence of fencing precluded immunity or that federal law preempted Idaho’s statutes. The Court also held that ITD owed no tort duty to the plaintiff to maintain fencing or warn of livestock, and that no special relationship or assumption of duty existed. The summary judgment rulings for all defendants were affirmed. View "Ludwig v. Howard, ITD" on Justia Law

The case involved a motor vehicle accident between Antonio Contreras and Aleshia Martinez. Contreras stipulated to negligence before trial, and the trial court granted Martinez’s motion for a directed verdict on causation. The matter proceeded to a jury trial on damages, which resulted in a verdict awarding Martinez $55,000 for various categories of loss, including past and future economic and noneconomic damages.After the verdict, Martinez moved for a new trial, arguing, among other grounds, that there was jury misconduct during deliberations. She supported her motion with declarations from two jurors indicating that the jury had openly discussed the defendant’s ability to pay, expressed sympathy for him, questioned why the suit was not against an insurance company or a corporation like Wal-Mart, and compared Martinez’s injuries to those suffered by military personnel. The Superior Court of Fresno County granted Martinez’s motion for a new trial solely on the ground of jury misconduct, finding that the jurors’ discussions violated specific jury instructions and that the misconduct was likely prejudicial. Contreras appealed the order.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed whether the trial court had abused its discretion in granting a new trial. The appellate court found the trial court’s statement of reasons sufficient under Code of Civil Procedure section 657. It held that the juror declarations were admissible because they described overt acts during deliberations, not jurors’ mental processes, and that Contreras had forfeited certain objections by not raising them in the trial court. The appellate court also held that the misconduct created a presumption of prejudice that Contreras did not rebut. The order granting a new trial was affirmed. View "Martinez v. Contreras" on Justia Law

A student with severe cognitive disabilities attended a public high school in Hawai‘i and was repeatedly sexually abused by male students, resulting in significant psychological harm, including a psychotic breakdown and persistent post-traumatic stress disorder. The student’s mother, acting for herself and her daughter, sued the State of Hawai‘i, the Department of Education, and school employees for negligence, alleging failure to protect her daughter despite the school’s awareness of her vulnerabilities and repeated warning signs. The evidence at trial showed that school staff recognized the student’s extraordinary vulnerability and received multiple reports of abuse but failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or address it.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit conducted a lengthy bench trial and found the State liable for negligently failing to protect the student, awarding over $14 million in damages to the plaintiffs. However, without a request from the State, the court sua sponte reduced the damages by 30%, attributing that portion of fault to the male students who committed the abuse, citing Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 663-10.5. The State had not argued at trial that the male students should be apportioned fault; instead, its arguments for apportionment focused on the mother’s alleged negligence, which the court rejected. Plaintiffs moved to amend the judgment to reverse the apportionment, but the court denied the motion.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the circuit court’s sua sponte allocation of fault to the male students violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional due process rights because they lacked notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue. The court further found insufficient evidence that the male students were “other tortfeasors” under the statute and held that apportionment under HRS § 663-10.5 is an affirmative defense, for which the State bears the burden of pleading and proof. The Supreme Court vacated the apportionment, affirmed the remainder of the circuit court’s judgment, and remanded for entry of an amended judgment awarding plaintiffs the full damages. The State’s cross-appeal regarding discovery and damages was rejected. View "R.H. v. Hayashi" on Justia Law

A maintenance technician was injured at a bottling plant in California when a robot and a depalletizer malfunctioned while he was performing repairs. The depalletizer, manufactured by Krones, Inc., released its gripper head and severely injured the technician. The robot involved in the incident was manufactured by a Japanese company. The technician sued Krones, the Japanese robot manufacturer, and the American subsidiary of the Japanese manufacturer. While the American subsidiary did not challenge the court’s jurisdiction, the Japanese parent company moved to quash service, arguing that California courts lacked personal jurisdiction over it.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County denied the Japanese company’s motion to quash, finding that it was subject to general jurisdiction in California based on an agency theory, relying on the relationship between the Japanese parent and its American subsidiary. The trial court also referenced its earlier finding, during a summary judgment motion, that there was evidence the parent and subsidiary operated as a single enterprise, or alter egos.On review, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, independently analyzed whether California courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over the Japanese company. The appellate court held that neither general nor specific jurisdiction applied. It determined that, under United States Supreme Court precedent, the connections between the Japanese company and California, even when considering the actions of its American subsidiary, were insufficient to render the parent company “at home” in California for general jurisdiction. The court also found that the plaintiff failed to show that his claims arose out of or related to the Japanese company’s contacts with California, as required for specific jurisdiction.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and directed that the motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction be granted. View "Fanuc Corp. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Lucas Warner, a young man with a history of seizures and cerebrovascular disease, died after taking a single dose of Aimovig, a biologic drug manufactured by Amgen and approved by the FDA to prevent migraines. His mother, acting as representative of his estate, argued that the drug’s label was inadequate because it failed to disclose that the clinical trials excluded people with histories of seizures and neurological disorders, and did not warn of specific risks for such patients. She contended that this omission was especially relevant to Lucas’s medical circumstances.After Warner filed a wrongful death claim in Massachusetts state court, Amgen removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Amgen moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing federal law preempted Warner’s state law claims because Amgen was required to use the FDA-approved label and Warner had not shown Amgen could have unilaterally changed it. At the hearing, Warner sought leave to amend her complaint, alleging newly available studies could have permitted Amgen to update the label using FDA’s Changes Being Effected (CBE) procedure. The district court dismissed the complaint as preempted and denied leave to amend, finding the studies insufficient and the amendment futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of Warner’s original complaint, holding that federal law preempted the claim because Amgen could not unilaterally alter the label during FDA approval, and the FDA would have rejected Warner’s proposed label changes. However, it reversed the denial of leave to amend, holding Warner plausibly alleged that certain studies constituted newly acquired information under the CBE process. The case was remanded for further proceedings limited to Warner’s claims based on this post-approval labeling theory. View "Warner v. Amgen Inc." on Justia Law

Several companies and associations connected to the Maine lobster industry brought a lawsuit against a California nonprofit organization, which operates a seafood rating program. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s public statements and industry reports—advising consumers to avoid American lobster due to risks posed to the endangered North Atlantic right whale—were defamatory and caused substantial financial harm. The statements described the risks in general terms about the American lobster fishery, without naming the plaintiffs individually.After the complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, the defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the “group defamation rule” barred the claims because the statements targeted the industry as a whole and not specific members. The defendant also contended that the statements were protected opinion and sought dismissal under Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the statements, though directed at the industry, could reasonably be understood to refer to each plaintiff due to their membership and the statements’ factual nature. The court found that exceptions to the group defamation rule applied because the statements implicated every member of the group, included a call to action, and had directly influenced customer decisions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The First Circuit held that, under Maine law and the Second Restatement of Torts, the group defamation rule precludes claims by individual members of a large group unless a statement makes particular reference to them. The court concluded that the statements at issue, while they may affect every member, were not actionable because they lacked particular reference to any plaintiff. Accordingly, the First Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. View "Bean Maine Lobster, Inc. v. Monterey Bay Aquarium Foundation" on Justia Law

The defendant was involved in a vehicle pursuit by law enforcement in March 2021, during which he crashed the car he was driving, causing serious bodily injury to his passenger, Jane Doe. Evidence at trial established that the defendant had consumed drugs prior to the incident and that his actions during the pursuit resulted in Jane Doe suffering a fractured pelvis. He was charged with multiple offenses, including causing serious bodily injury while evading a police officer and causing serious bodily injury while driving under the influence of a drug.After a jury trial in the Riverside County Superior Court, the defendant was convicted of several charges, including evading a police officer resulting in serious bodily injury (count 2) and driving under the influence causing bodily injury (count 6). The jury found true special allegations regarding great bodily injury. The defendant was acquitted on kidnapping and false imprisonment charges. On appeal from the initial judgment, the Court of Appeal reversed the conviction for a sentencing enhancement due to instructional error, resulting in a remand. The trial court subsequently resentenced the defendant, imposing punishment for both count 2 and count 6.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred by imposing punishment on both count 2 and count 6 in violation of Penal Code section 654. The court found that both convictions arose from the same physical act of crashing the vehicle, which caused Jane Doe’s injury, and therefore the defendant could not be punished twice for the same act. The court reversed the sentence and remanded for full resentencing, directing the trial court to recalculate custody credits and correct any errors at resentencing. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Thornton" on Justia Law