Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that neoprene production from the Pontchartrain Works Facility (PWF) exposed residents of St. John the Baptist Parish, Louisiana, to unsafe levels of chloroprene. Plaintiff filed suit against Denka and DuPont—the current and former owners of the facility—as well as the DOH and DEQ in state court. After removal to federal court, the district court denied plaintiff's motion to remand, granted each defendants' motion to dismiss, and dismissed the amended petition for failure to state a claim.After determining that removal was proper under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) and that the state agencies have consented to federal jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the equitable doctrine of contra non velentem tolls prescription of plaintiff's claims against DuPont and DOH. Consistent with Louisiana's contra non valentem analysis as to what plaintiff reasonably knew or should have known at the time, the court disagreed that, on the record before it, plaintiff had constructive knowledge sufficient to trigger the running of prescription over a year before she filed suit in June 2018. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's holding that plaintiff's claims were prescribed.The court concluded that plaintiff's custodial liability claims against DuPont fail for the same reason as her claims against Denka: a failure to state a plausible duty and corresponding breach. The court agreed with the district court's grant of Denka's motion to dismiss for failure to state a plausible claim of negligence and strict custodial liability arising from Denka's past and current neoprene manufacturing at the PWF. In this case, plaintiff fails to adequately allege a duty owed by Denka, and consequently whether Denka breached such a duty. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's declaratory relief claims against DEQ. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Butler v. Denka Performance Elastomer, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Kevin McGrath challenged a superior court’s decision granting summary judgment to appellee Progressive Northern Insurance Company. Specifically, he argued the court erred in concluding that he was not “occupying” a vehicle, as that term is defined in the insurance policy at issue, when he was struck and injured by an underinsured motorist. Plaintiff was driving the vehicle’s owner in the owner’s vehicle to the airport. Plaintiff stopped at a gas station/convenience store on the way; he got out to pump gas and paid for it at the pump. The owner went inside the store for coffee. As the two returned to the car, but before they got inside, a pickup truck struck both plaintiff and the owner. Plaintiff filed for underinsured motorist benefits with the owner’s insurance company, Progressive, asserting he qualified for coverage under the terms of the policy. Progressive denied the claim, contending Plaintiff was not operating or occupying the car at the time of the accident. Plaintiff sued for a declaratory judgment on stipulated facts and no discovery. Summary judgment was entered in favor of the insurer. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed, finding that while Plaintiff intended to enter the car, he did not, thus he did not occupy it under the terms of the policy at issue. View "Progressive Northern Insurance Company v. McGrath" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered in the negative a question certified to it by the Fourth District Court of Appeal, holding that it is not a departure from the essential requirements of law to permit discovery regarding the financial relationship between a defendant's nonparty insurer and an expert witness retained by the defense.This case involved a discovery dispute in an automobile negligence action. Plaintiff sought to discover from Defendant the financial relationship between Defendant's nonparty insurer and his expert witness. Defendant was ordered to provide the discovery. Defendant then filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The Fourth District denied the writ but certified a question to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, thus approving the result reached by the Fourth District, and declined to readdress its holding or analysis adopted in Worley v. Central Florida Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 228 So. 3d 18 (Fla. 2017). View "Dodgen v. Grijalva" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court answered in the negative a question certified to it by the Fourth District Court of Appeal, holding that it is not a departure from the essential requirements of law to permit discovery regarding the financial relationship between a defendant's nonparty insurer and an expert witness retained by the defense.In this automobile negligence case, the district court passed upon a question that it certified to be of great public importance regarding whether the Supreme Court's decision in Worley v. Central Florida Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 228 S. 3d 18 (Fla. 2017), forecloses discovery of the financial relationship between a personal injury defendant's nonparty law firm and the defendant's expert witnesses. The Supreme Court answered the question in the negative, thus approving the result reached by the Fourth District, and declined to readdress its holding or analysis adopted in Worley v. Central Florida Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 228 So. 3d 18 (Fla. 2017). View "Younkin v. Blackwelder" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court dismissing Petitioners' amended complaint against iTech AG, LLC and Robbins Law Group, PLLC (collectively, Appellees) alleging malicious abuse of process, slander of title, tortious interference with contractual relations, and civil conspiracy arising out of the filing of a lis pendens, holding that the circuit court erred in sustaining Appellees' demurrers.In their demurrers to Petitioners' complaint, Appellees argued that the filing of a lis pendens is entitle to absolute privilege and that the complaint dd not plead valid claims for slander of title, tortious interference with contractual relations, or civil conspiracy. The circuit court sustained the demurrers on the basis that the information contained in a memorandum of lis pendens is subject to absolute privilege. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the information contained in the lis pendens was not sufficiently "relevant and pertinent to the matter under inquiry" for absolute privilege to apply in this case. View "Givago Growth, LLC v. iTech AG, LLC" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court judge denying the Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff's complaint alleging wrongful termination under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 149, 185, the Massachusetts whistleblower act, holding that there was no error.In 2014, Governor Deval Patrick dismissed Plaintiff from her position as chair of the Sex Offender Registry Board (SORB), stating to the media that Plaintiff had improperly interfered in a sex offender classification proceeding and had attempted inappropriately to influence the hearing examiner. Plaintiff brought this complaint against Patrick for defamation and against the Commonwealth for wrongful termination. The claims against Patrick were dismissed, but the superior court denied the Commonwealth's motion for summary judgment on the remaining whistleblower claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that genuine issues of material fact remained in dispute, precluding summary judgment in favor of the Commonwealth. View "Edwards v. Commonwealth" on Justia Law

Mitchell sued Twin Galaxies for defamation and false light after Twin Galaxies issued a statement asserting Mitchell’s world record scores in the Donkey Kong arcade game were not achieved on original unmodified hardware as required under its rules. Twin Galaxies removed all of Mitchell’s world record scores and banned him from participating in its leaderboards. The trial court denied Twin Galaxies’ special motion to strike under the strategic lawsuits against public participation statute (anti-SLAPP motion). (Code Civ. Procedure 425.16.) The court of appeal affirmed. Mitchell showed a probability of prevailing on his claims; the trial court properly denied the anti-SLAPP motion. Mitchell made a prima facie showing of falsity by providing his own declaration and others’ declarations attesting to the equipment used and made a prima facie showing of actual malice. Twin Galaxies failed to take any steps to inquire into the truth of Mitchell’s statements even after he was provided the names of witnesses and having confirmation of the procedures under which the disputed scores were achieved. View "Mitchell v. Twin Galaxies, LLC" on Justia Law

The personal representative of an estate brought a medical malpractice claim against a company that provided the decedent emergency room medical care shortly before his death. The superior court granted summary judgment dismissing the estate’s claim against the company, reasoning that the estate’s board-certified expert was not qualified to testify about the relevant standard of care. The Alaska Supreme Court reversed, finding the physician, licensed under AS 09.20.185(a)(1), met the requirement of AS 09.20.185(a)(3) because a variety of fields of medicine, directly related to the matter at issue. View "Titus v. Alaska, Department of Corrections, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Maria Carachure suffered serious injuries when she was struck by a vehicle driven by defendant Celia Acosta Scott. Plaintiff filed suit, and a jury found the action was barred because of a “‘binding and enforceable settlement.’” On appeal, plaintiff contended the trial court erred in granting partial nonsuit on the issue of plaintiff’s consent to settle and acted in excess of its power by approving the settlement on her behalf. She further contended the trial court erred in striking the allegations and prayer for punitive damages. After review, the Court of Appeal rejected plaintiff’s contentions and affirmed. View "Carachure v. Scott" on Justia Law

The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court entering summary judgment in favor of Karen and Ronald White on Cecelia Boles's complaint alleging premises liability, holding that there was no error in the proceedings below.Boles was a guest of tenants who rented a two-story house owned by the Whites. Boles was injured when she descended the staircase between the first and second floor and fell at the landing at the bottom of the staircase. Boles brought suit against the Whites on the theory of premises liability for injuries she sustained in the fall. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Whites, concluding that the tenants were in exclusive control of the premises, that the Whites did not expressly agree to maintain the premises in good repair, and that there was no alternative basis for finding the Whites liable. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Boles's claims on appeal were unavailing. View "Boles v. White" on Justia Law