Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The appellant was injured in a car accident while driving a 2002 Ford Explorer in the U.S. Virgin Islands when the vehicle’s airbags allegedly deployed spontaneously, resulting in a loss of control and a collision with a hillside. She claimed that a defect in the vehicle’s airbag system caused the incident. The vehicle had a lengthy history, having changed ownership multiple times, and had been involved in several prior accidents and repairs. Central to her claim was the vehicle’s restraint control module (RCM), which did not record any crash or deployment event during the incident, though its data was available for inspection. The appellant’s experts suggested further testing of the RCM and its sensors, but this was not performed.The case was originally filed in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands and was removed to the District Court of the Virgin Islands. After various procedural steps, including a transfer to and from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, the District Court of the Virgin Islands granted summary judgment to Ford. The court found that, even assuming the applicability of Section 3 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts (“malfunction theory”), the appellant had not provided sufficient evidence to show a defect existed at the time of sale, that such a defect caused the airbag deployment, or that it was the proximate cause of her injuries.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the malfunction theory’s relaxed evidentiary standard did not apply because the allegedly defective product was available for inspection. Even if the standard applied, the appellant’s evidence was too speculative to create a genuine dispute of material fact. The court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ford. View "Millentine Coates v. Ford Motor Co" on Justia Law

A homeowner in Massachusetts experienced a fire in his residence, which originated in the ceiling above a bathroom exhaust fan. Both the homeowner and a Verizon technician were present at the time; the technician had earlier tripped a fuse while working in the basement. The local fire department determined the fire started with the bathroom vent fan and found no connection to the technician’s work. The homeowner’s insurer, having paid out the claim for the fire damage, brought a subrogation action against the manufacturers of the fan and its motor, alleging that a defect in the fan or its components caused the fire.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts reviewed the case after the insurer presented claims for negligence and breach of implied warranty of merchantability against the fan and motor manufacturers. The insurer designated two experts, one of whom opined that the fire originated within the fan but could not specify the precise failure mode. During discovery, the expert could not identify which of several known defects in a thermal cutoff device caused the failure, nor could he provide details on the cost or feasibility of proposed alternative designs. The District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the insurer had not provided sufficient admissible expert evidence to show a specific manufacturing or design defect, and excluded some of the expert’s deposition testimony as a sanction for violating expert disclosure rules.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Court held that, even considering the malfunction theory, the insurer failed to provide sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer a manufacturing defect or a feasible alternative design. The appellate court concluded that summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate, as the insurer did not meet its burden under Massachusetts law to establish liability for breach of implied warranty or negligence. View "Citation Insurance Company v. Broan-NuTone LLC" on Justia Law

Cheryl Walker used her Uber account to order a guest ride for her husband, Carroll Walker. Carroll had never downloaded the Uber app or created an account, and he consistently stated that he does not read or reply to text messages. On the relevant occasion, Cheryl ordered a ride for Carroll, and Uber sent Carroll a text message with ride details and a hyperlink to its Terms of Use, which included an arbitration provision. Carroll did not see the message. During the ride, an accident occurred, allegedly due to the driver’s distraction by Uber’s app, resulting in severe injuries to Carroll.In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Cheryl Walker sued Uber on Carroll’s behalf, asserting negligence and products liability claims. Uber moved to compel arbitration, arguing Carroll was bound to arbitrate either because he had notice of the Terms via Uber’s text message or as a third-party beneficiary of Cheryl’s contract with Uber. The district court denied Uber’s motion, finding Uber failed to establish that Carroll was on inquiry notice of the Terms and concluding that Carroll was not bound as a third-party beneficiary or estopped from refusing arbitration.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of Uber’s motion to compel arbitration de novo, applying D.C. contract law. The Court held that Uber had not shown Carroll agreed to be bound by its Terms of Use, as Carroll lacked actual or inquiry notice of the Terms. The Court further determined that Carroll was not bound by Cheryl’s contract as a third-party beneficiary or by equitable estoppel, since Carroll was not seeking to enforce Cheryl’s contract and his claims were independent of it. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Walker v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

A woman named Lewis sought medical care at Marion General Hospital for abdominal pain and constipation. She was evaluated by multiple physicians, including Dr. Armstead, Dr. Verucchi, and Dr. Jensen, and was diagnosed with sepsis and severe abdominal issues. After various tests and a transfer to the intensive care unit, her condition worsened, leading to her eventual transfer to another hospital where she was diagnosed with abdominal compartment syndrome and underwent emergency surgery. Lewis continued to suffer complications and ultimately died several months later. Her wrongful death beneficiaries brought suit against the hospital and the physicians, alleging medical negligence for failure to diagnose and treat her condition, failure to timely transfer her to a facility with higher-level care, and failure to consult appropriate specialists.The Marion County Circuit Court initially denied summary judgment to the defendants and allowed limited discovery. After further proceedings, the defendants again sought summary judgment, arguing that Mississippi Code Section 11-71-7 granted them legal immunity due to resource limitations caused by the COVID-19 state of emergency. The trial court agreed, finding the defendants immune and dismissing all claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the trial court’s summary judgment de novo. The Court held that Section 11-71-7 did not apply to all of the plaintiffs’ claims, as there was no evidence that several alleged acts of negligence—such as failure to diagnose, treat, or consult—were attributable to the COVID-19 state of emergency. The Court found genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the defendants’ failure to timely transfer Lewis was related to COVID-19 resource limitations. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bush v. Marion General Hospital" on Justia Law

Several patients suffered harm after undergoing surgeries performed by Abubakar Atiq Durrani, M.D., whose conduct involved unnecessary procedures and fraudulent misrepresentations about the need for surgery. Following Durrani’s indictment and flight from the United States, hundreds of injured patients pursued civil suits in Ohio state court, obtaining judgments against Durrani for negligence, fraud, and, in some cases, battery or lack of informed consent. After prevailing at trial but unable to collect damages directly from Durrani, the plaintiffs sought to enforce their judgments against his insurer, the Medical Protective Company (MedPro), under the terms of Durrani’s malpractice insurance policy.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, the plaintiffs filed enforcement actions to compel MedPro to pay their verdicts and initiated a direct action against MedPro and its vice president, alleging bad faith and other torts related to MedPro’s handling of the litigation and denial of payment. The district court dismissed all claims, finding that the policy’s exclusion for damages “in consequence of” intentional torts (including fraud) barred coverage where the damages were inseparable from Durrani’s fraudulent acts, and that Ohio law permits only the insured—not third-party claimants—to assert bad faith claims against insurers.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decisions. The court held that MedPro’s policy exclusion applies when the plaintiffs’ damages directly arise from and cannot be separated from Durrani’s fraud. Where jury verdicts did not allocate damages between negligence and fraud, or where all remaining damages were tied to fraudulent acts, the plaintiffs could not plausibly claim coverage. The court further held that, under Ohio law, third-party claimants may not bring bad faith claims against insurers, and the plaintiffs failed to state any viable independent tort claims. The district court’s dismissals were therefore affirmed in all respects. View "Adams v. Med. Protective Co." on Justia Law

A bus passenger, Vasken Ohanian, sued the bus driver Tamisha Davis and her employer MV Transportation, Inc. after being struck by a bus and allegedly suffering both physical and psychological injuries. Davis and MV retained an expert psychologist, Dr. Thomas Kinsora, to conduct a neuropsychological evaluation of Ohanian. Dr. Kinsora’s report criticized the evaluation by Ohanian’s own expert, Dr. Michael A. Elliott, and concluded that Ohanian’s symptoms were inconsistent with true traumatic injury. Ohanian requested disclosure of the raw psychological test data, including exam questions used by Dr. Kinsora, claiming this was necessary for effective cross-examination.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County ordered Davis and MV to disclose the raw test data to Ohanian’s counsel, subject to a protective order. Davis and MV partially complied but refused to disclose the exam questions, arguing that a newly-enacted regulation, NAC 641.234(3), prohibited such disclosure absent a specific state or federal law. The district court found that Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure (NRCP) 16.1 and NRS 50.305 constituted specific state laws requiring disclosure and repeatedly ordered compliance. Davis and MV continued to resist full disclosure and petitioned for a writ of mandamus to the Supreme Court of Nevada.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed whether NAC 641.234(3) superseded the district court’s discovery order. The Court held that the Board of Psychological Examiners’ authority under NRS 641.100(2) extends only to regulating the practice of psychology, not court-ordered discovery. The Court found that district courts have broad discretion to control discovery under NRCP 16.1 and NRCP 35, including ordering disclosure of raw test data. It concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion and denied the petition for a writ of mandamus. View "DAVIS VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

An employee of an independent contractor was injured after falling through a skylight while working on equipment located on the roof of a warehouse. The warehouse owner had leased roof space and related access to a tenant (Verizon) expressly for the installation and maintenance of communications equipment. The tenant, in turn, hired a general contractor to perform work at the site, who then sent the injured employee to perform the task. The area where the accident occurred was not part of the leased roof section, but the employee accessed it while attempting to complete his assignment. It was undisputed that the general contractor, not the warehouse owner, was responsible for the means, methods, and safety of the work.After the accident, the injured worker brought a lawsuit against both the tenant and the warehouse owner in the Superior Court of Alameda County, asserting claims of negligence and premises liability. The warehouse owner moved for summary judgment, arguing that under the Privette doctrine, which generally shields those who hire independent contractors from liability for workplace injuries, it was not liable. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that because the warehouse owner was a landlord and not the entity that directly hired the independent contractor, the Privette doctrine did not apply. Summary judgment was granted in favor of the tenant on Privette grounds, and the plaintiff did not appeal that ruling.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the Privette doctrine protects not only the party that directly hires an independent contractor but also applies to others in the “chain of delegation,” such as non-hiring landlords whose lease agreements contemplate the use of independent contractors for contracted work. The court directed the trial court to vacate its denial of summary judgment and to enter judgment for the warehouse owner, holding that the Privette doctrine barred the plaintiff’s claims. View "Schurman Family Company TIC v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

An elderly patient, after contracting COVID-19, received remote medical treatment from an out-of-state physician who prescribed multiple medications, including prednisone. Prednisone is known to carry a risk of peptic ulcer disease, especially in older individuals, and the physician did not prescribe mitigating medication to counteract these side effects. The patient subsequently developed a perforated ulcer and died from organ failure. The estate brought suit against the physician for negligence, lack of informed consent, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA).The estate initially filed the action in Connecticut Superior Court, and the physician removed it to the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The physician moved to dismiss, arguing immunity under the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) and contending the CUTPA claim was not viable. The District Court dismissed the CUTPA claim but denied the motion to dismiss the negligence and informed consent claims, concluding PREP Act immunity did not apply.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the physician qualified for PREP Act immunity because he was a licensed health professional who prescribed a covered countermeasure (prednisone) for COVID-19, and the prescription had a causal relationship with the patient’s death. The court also held that the CUTPA claim was impermissible because it was based on alleged professional negligence rather than business or entrepreneurial conduct. The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the CUTPA claim, reversed the District Court’s denial of PREP Act immunity, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Waters v. Kory" on Justia Law

A passenger aboard a cruise ship alleged that, after becoming inebriated, she was separated from her friends and ended up in a maintenance closet with a crewmember. She stated that she was held against her will and sexually assaulted. Both she and the crewmember gave differing accounts of the incident to FBI agents: she could not recall if she consented to sexual conduct, while the crewmember claimed it was consensual and that he did not know she was intoxicated. The FBI investigator ultimately concluded the encounter was consensual, and prosecutors declined to bring criminal charges.The passenger brought suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida asserting claims including false imprisonment and sexual assault. In pretrial proceedings, the district court granted her motion for partial summary judgment on the issue of false imprisonment liability, finding that the cruise line had not produced admissible evidence to create a dispute of material fact. The district court excluded the FBI reports as hearsay. At trial, the district court instructed the jury that the cruise line was already liable for false imprisonment and limited the ability of the defendant to challenge the factual basis for that claim. The jury found the cruise line liable for sexual assault but rejected the negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, awarding over $10 million in damages.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment on false imprisonment and in excluding the FBI investigator’s conclusions, which were admissible under the public records exception to the hearsay rule. The appellate court reversed the partial summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim, vacated the judgment as to the false imprisonment and sexual assault claims, and remanded for a new trial on those claims. The negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims remain resolved in favor of the cruise line. View "Doe v. Carnival Corporation" on Justia Law

During an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting in Sikeston, Missouri, George Holland experienced a severe mental health crisis, displaying incoherent speech and ultimately brandishing a small pistol, which he placed in his mouth. The other attendees exited safely, leaving Holland alone and armed inside. Police responded and engaged with Holland from a concealed position outside an open door, repeatedly commanding him to drop his weapon. For most of the encounter, Holland neither pointed the firearm at officers nor threatened them directly. After about fifteen minutes, Holland moved into clear view, holding the gun to his temple. In a sudden motion, he lowered the firearm and shifted his left arm toward it, prompting Officer Martin Simmerman to fire. Holland retreated, and Simmerman, followed by other officers, pursued him into the corridor, firing additional shots. Simmerman discharged fifteen rounds in total, striking Holland at least six times, resulting in Holland’s death.The Holland family brought suit against Simmerman and the City of Sikeston in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, alleging excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wrongful death, battery, and Monell claims. The defendants moved to dismiss, providing body camera footage. The district court found that the video evidence contradicted key allegations in the complaint, concluded that Simmerman was entitled to qualified and official immunity, and dismissed all claims with prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that while the video evidence contradicted the allegation that Holland took no menacing action before the first volley of shots, it did not conclusively show the events during the subsequent volleys. The court held that Simmerman was entitled to qualified immunity for the initial shots but not for the later volleys, as the complaint plausibly alleged excessive force as to those shots. The appellate court reversed the dismissal of the excessive force claim, remanded for reconsideration of the related state-law and Monell claims, and affirmed in all other respects. View "Holland v. Simmerman" on Justia Law