Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

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A former elementary school student brought a lawsuit against a school district, alleging that she was sexually abused by her teacher during her time as a student. The complaint included claims of negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, asserting that the district was aware of prior allegations against the teacher, had settled an earlier lawsuit involving similar misconduct, and failed to take adequate action to protect students. The plaintiff claimed the abuse occurred both on and off school property, including during rides home with the teacher.The Superior Court of Fresno County granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, finding the district immune from liability under Education Code section 44808 because, based on the plaintiff’s deposition, the abuse occurred off school property and after school hours. The trial court also excluded certain evidence offered by the plaintiff, such as police reports and documents intended to show the district’s notice of the teacher’s dangerousness, on grounds of hearsay and lack of authentication, and found that the plaintiff’s efforts to cure these evidentiary defects were untimely.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reversed the summary judgment. The appellate court held that Education Code section 44808 does not provide immunity to a school district when it has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances, regardless of whether the resulting injury occurred on or off campus. The court concluded that the district’s motion only addressed the location and timing of the abuse, not whether the district exercised reasonable care or whether any failure of care caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Because the district did not meet its initial burden for summary judgment, the judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "S.N. v. Fresno Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

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Paris Moffett, a young man who was paralyzed after being shot, was admitted to a skilled nursing facility owned by Lake Merritt Healthcare Center, LLC. In March 2023, Paris signed an arbitration agreement with the facility, which stated it would bind not only Paris but also his representatives and family members. Days later, Paris was fatally shot by intruders who entered the facility through an unlocked door. Paris D’Marco Moffett, Paris’s father, filed suit against the facility and its owner, asserting four causes of action: negligence, negligent abuse of a dependent adult, a claim for extreme pain suffered by Paris before death, and wrongful death. Paris’s father did not sign the arbitration agreement.The Alameda County Superior Court reviewed a motion by the defendants to compel arbitration of all claims. The court denied the motion, mainly because Paris’s father had not signed the arbitration agreement. The defendants appealed, arguing that all claims should be arbitrated based on the agreement signed by Paris.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, considered the appeal. It held that the wrongful death claim could not be compelled to arbitration because it was brought in Paris’s father’s personal capacity, and he did not agree to arbitrate. The court clarified that, under California law, wrongful death claims are independent statutory actions, not derivative of the decedent’s claims, and an exception that allows binding heirs to arbitration applies only in cases of medical malpractice, not elder or dependent adult abuse. However, the court found that the three survivor claims—negligence, negligent abuse of a dependent adult, and pain and suffering—were subject to arbitration, as they belonged to Paris and survived his death. The court affirmed denial of arbitration for the wrongful death claim but reversed as to the survivor claims. View "Moffett v. Lake Merritt Healthcare Center" on Justia Law

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Several property owners in and around Merrimack, New Hampshire, brought an action alleging that a plastics manufacturing facility released airborne toxic chemicals, specifically perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), which subsequently contaminated local drinking water sources, including both private wells and the municipal water supply. They claimed harm to their property interests due to this contamination and sought damages for diminution in property value, costs of remediation, and loss of use and enjoyment, among other injuries.After the case was removed from New Hampshire state court, it proceeded in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Plaintiffs moved to certify a class of property owners in the affected geographic area. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(3) for liability issues on trespass, negligence, and negligent failure to warn, but denied certification for nuisance and for damages issues, which it found to be individualized. The district court bifurcated proceedings, planning to address liability on a class-wide basis first, with damages to be determined in later, individualized proceedings. Saint-Gobain, the principal defendant, was granted permission to appeal the certification order.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The appellate court reversed the class certification as to negligence and negligent failure to warn, finding that injury and causation on those claims would require individualized, property-by-property proof that predominated over common issues. However, the court affirmed class certification for liability on the trespass claim, concluding that, under New Hampshire law, plaintiffs need only prove the intentional physical invasion of their property by PFOA attributable to the facility, which could be established on a common basis. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "Brown v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp." on Justia Law

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A woman was injured in an automobile accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by her daughter. Her daughter and granddaughter died in the crash, while she and another granddaughter survived with significant injuries. The daughter had taken medication that could cause drowsiness, and the accident occurred after she fell asleep at the wheel, despite requests from passengers to let someone else drive. The injured woman filed suit against her daughter, the daughter’s estate, the daughter’s husband, and other unnamed parties, alleging negligent driving caused her injuries.After the defendants failed to respond, the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Payette County, entered default on liability and held an evidentiary hearing on damages. However, the court dismissed all claims with prejudice, reasoning that without a probate proceeding or appointment of a personal representative, claims could not proceed against the estate or the deceased daughter. It also found the husband was not a proper party, as no negligence was alleged against him. The court denied the plaintiff’s motions to reconsider or set aside the judgment, concluding she did not act with excusable neglect and failed to timely name the proper party.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It held that the district court abused its discretion and violated the plaintiff’s procedural due process rights by dismissing the case with prejudice without providing meaningful notice or an opportunity to be heard regarding the dismissal’s severity. The Supreme Court also found the district court failed to articulate any legal or factual basis for dismissing with prejudice. The judgment was vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiff to seek leave to amend her complaint to name the personal representative and determining if the amended complaint relates back to the original filing. View "Birch v. Ross" on Justia Law

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An employee suffered a significant workplace injury resulting in the amputation of his lower left leg while working as a forklift operator. The employer accepted liability and initially provided partial disability benefits, which were later increased following a stipulation that recognized the severity and psychiatric consequences of the injury. Subsequently, the employer filed a petition to terminate benefits for the adjustment disorder, relying on a psychiatric report from an independent medical examination (IME) conducted for third-party litigation. The employee’s workers’ compensation attorney was not notified of this IME, though the employee himself attended.A Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) allowed the employer to admit the IME report and proceed with the termination petition, granting the employee’s counsel additional time to prepare rebuttal evidence. Both parties presented expert testimony, with the WCJ ultimately crediting the employer’s expert and finding the employee fully recovered, thus granting the termination petition. The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) affirmed, noting the employer’s lack of notice to counsel was not grounds for remand and that the employee had counsel’s advice for earlier IMEs. The Commonwealth Court also affirmed, reasoning that while special rules require notice to counsel, the lack of notice did not result in actual prejudice because the employee’s counsel had opportunities to challenge the IME report and expert testimony.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court’s decision. The Court held that under the Special Rules governing workers’ compensation proceedings, an employer must provide notice of an IME to the employee’s counsel. Failure to do so is presumed prejudicial and bars the employer from using the improperly noticed IME to alter the employee’s benefits. The Court vacated the WCJ’s order granting termination and directed that proper notice and a new expert would be required for any future proceedings. View "Thomas v. Sysco Foods" on Justia Law

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On September 12, 2019, the defendant drove his truck across the center line on a Logan County road, colliding head-on with another vehicle driven by Brittany Duty. The crash resulted in both vehicles catching fire, causing severe injuries to Brittany Duty and the death of her passenger, Beverly Duty. First responders noted the defendant exhibited signs of intoxication, including slurred speech, combative behavior, and the smell of alcohol. Blood samples were taken at two hospitals: one within two hours of the collision, showing a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .263 percent, and another six to seven hours later, showing a BAC of .131 percent. The defendant was indicted for causing death and serious bodily injury while driving in an impaired state.The Circuit Court of Logan County denied the defendant’s pre-trial motions to exclude the BAC test results, finding the first sample was drawn within two hours of the collision and would be admissible if analyzed according to state health standards. The court also ruled the second sample, taken pursuant to a warrant and outside the statutory two-hour window, would be admissible, with its timing affecting its weight, not its admissibility. The defendant entered conditional guilty pleas, reserving the right to appeal these evidentiary rulings.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the circuit court’s decisions de novo for legal conclusions and under a clearly erroneous standard for factual findings. The Court held that the blood test taken within two hours of the collision was admissible as presumptive evidence of impairment, and the second test, though not qualifying for statutory presumptions, was admissible under the Rules of Evidence. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motions in limine and upheld the defendant’s convictions. View "State v. Conley" on Justia Law

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After being rear-ended in 2018, the plaintiff claimed various injuries including concussion, neck pain, cognitive deficits, psychological issues, and TMJ dysfunction. She settled with the at-fault driver’s insurer for $45,000 but believed her damages exceeded that amount. She sought $25,000—the full underinsured motorist (UIM) policy—from her own insurer, Safeco. Safeco evaluated her claim, excluded certain medical expenses such as TMJ treatment, and initially offered $4,000, inviting further negotiation. The plaintiff rejected this and filed suit for breach of contract, enhanced damages (Hayseeds), and violations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act (WVUTPA).The case originated in West Virginia state court but was removed by Safeco to the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia. During discovery, the plaintiff produced new expert reports estimating much higher damages. Safeco then offered the full UIM policy limit of $25,000, which was memorialized in a joint motion signed by both parties, explicitly resolving the claim for policy proceeds and leaving only extracontractual and bad faith claims. The district court found the contractual claim settled, denied the plaintiff’s attempt to later seek reformation for higher policy limits, and granted summary judgment to Safeco on all claims. It found Safeco’s conduct reasonable and no evidence of a pattern of unfair trade practices.Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held the breach of contract claim was resolved for $25,000 based on undisputed settlement evidence, rejected the plaintiff’s reformation argument, found Safeco’s conduct did not necessitate litigation for Hayseeds damages, and concluded there was no evidence of a general business practice violating WVUTPA. The judgment and orders of the district court were affirmed. View "Kreitzer v. Safeco Insurance Company of America" on Justia Law

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A woman, acting as personal representative of her late husband's estate, brought a medical negligence action after her husband died following treatment at the University of South Alabama Hospital. She alleged that various doctors and U.S.A. Healthcare Management, LLC (HCM) failed to provide adequate care, leading to his death. HCM employed the hospital staff involved and was created by the University of South Alabama (USA) to manage its healthcare system. The plaintiff claimed HCM was vicariously liable for the doctors’ alleged negligence.HCM moved for dismissal or summary judgment in the Mobile Circuit Court, arguing it was entitled to State immunity based on its relationship to USA, a State institution. HCM presented affidavits and documentation showing USA was its sole member and manager, and that HCM’s finances were intertwined with USA. The plaintiff opposed, arguing HCM was a separately created LLC under Alabama law, formed to shield USA from certain liabilities, and operated as an independent entity. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of HCM, finding it was entitled to immunity, and later certified the judgment as final for appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. It examined whether HCM, as an LLC created by a State agency, qualified as a State agency for purposes of immunity under Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution. Applying the factors from Armory Commission of Alabama v. Staudt, the court determined HCM’s powers and functions were typical of private entities, not unique to government, and its relationship with USA did not override its separate legal status as an LLC. The court held HCM was not entitled to State immunity and reversed the circuit court’s summary judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Marsh v. U.S.A. Healthcare Management, LLC" on Justia Law

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Linda Fay Campbell underwent kidney surgery at St. Dominic-Jackson Memorial Hospital, during which her colon was unintentionally perforated. Campbell subsequently required additional surgery by Dr. Jeffery Glover to address the perforation. Later, a surgical sponge was discovered in Campbell’s abdomen from the prior surgery, requiring yet another operation by Dr. Glover. Campbell initially filed a medical-negligence personal injury suit against Dr. Tanaka, Dr. Glover, and St. Dominic. She passed away while the suit was pending, and her estate and wrongful death beneficiaries sought to pursue claims related to her death and pre-death injuries.After Campbell’s death, her attorneys filed a suggestion of death and indicated an amended complaint would be filed on behalf of her estate and wrongful death beneficiaries. However, the motion to substitute parties was not timely under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 25. The parties agreed to dismiss Dr. Tanaka with prejudice and later dismissed the original suit without prejudice, preserving claims for wrongful death. Torrie Campbell Knight, as administratrix, then filed a new complaint alleging wrongful death against Dr. Glover and others. As discovery progressed, St. Dominic and Dr. Tanaka were dismissed, leaving Dr. Glover as the sole defendant. Dr. Glover moved for summary judgment, arguing that no act or omission by him proximately caused Campbell’s death and that any personal injury claims were barred.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed whether the wrongful death complaint adequately pled a separate personal-injury-survival claim. The Court held that the complaint only asserted a wrongful death claim under the wrongful death statute and did not include a distinct personal-injury-survival claim. Therefore, the Court found summary judgment for Dr. Glover was proper, reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, reinstated, and affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County. View "Knight v. Glover" on Justia Law

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Two separate cases were filed in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County by administrators of the estates of deceased individuals who died while incarcerated in West Virginia regional jails. The plaintiffs alleged that jail staff and medical providers failed to respond to the decedents’ serious medical needs, resulting in death or injury. Both complaints included claims against the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DCR) for negligence, negligent training, and “deliberate indifference in violation of clearly established West Virginia law,” but explicitly disclaimed reliance on federal law or constitutional claims, instead seeking damages under state common law.DCR moved to dismiss the deliberate indifference counts, arguing that West Virginia common law does not recognize a standalone cause of action for “deliberate indifference to clearly established law.” The Circuit Court denied the motions, concluding that such a claim was recognized by prior West Virginia Supreme Court decisions and supported by decisions from the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA). DCR then filed petitions in the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia seeking writs of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the circuit court orders denying dismissal.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the matter and granted the writs of prohibition. The Court held that a claim for damages for “deliberate indifference to clearly established law” is not cognizable under the common law of West Virginia. The Court determined that prior decisions, including Nobles v. Duncil, did not establish such a cause of action, but rather recognized deliberate indifference as a legal standard in constitutional claims, most often under federal law. The orders by the Circuit Court were found to be clearly erroneous as a matter of law and thus were prohibited from enforcement. View "State ex rel. Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation v. Salango" on Justia Law