Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

by
A group of plaintiffs, including the personal representative of a deceased resident’s estate and other similarly situated individuals, brought a class action against a nursing and rehabilitation facility. The complaint, filed in 2015, alleged chronic understaffing, breach of contract, violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, negligence, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment. The class was defined as all residents at the facility from June 2010 onward.After initial certification, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed some claims but reversed on negligence. The focus then shifted to whether the facility could compel arbitration under various resident agreements. The Pulaski County Circuit Court denied a 2017 motion to compel arbitration as to some residents, which the Supreme Court partly affirmed and partly reversed. Subsequent appeals and remands required the circuit court to make specific findings for each agreement. The latest orders reviewed involved 227 residents: the court granted arbitration as to 112 and denied it for 115, based on issues such as authority of signatories and ambiguities in the agreements.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reviewed whether the circuit court correctly denied arbitration for the 115 residents. The court held that, except for three residents (for whom the circuit court exceeded its mandate), the denials were correct because the arbitration agreements were procedurally unconscionable. This was due to the agreements being a condition of admission, unequal bargaining power, and the facility’s failure to disclose an ongoing class action. The court reversed the denials for the three residents and reinstated prior orders compelling arbitration for them. The cross-appeal regarding orders granting arbitration was dismissed because such orders are not immediately appealable. The direct appeal was therefore affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part, and the cross-appeal dismissed. View "ROBINSON NURSING AND REHABILITATION CENTER, LLC v. PHILLIPS" on Justia Law

by
In this case, the plaintiff was driving a 13-foot-6-inch tractor trailer in Newark, New Jersey, when he encountered a sign indicating a “truck route” at an intersection. Believing this to be a safe route for his vehicle, the plaintiff turned and, while looking down to avoid potholes, crashed into a 12-foot-2-inch railroad overpass. The bridge had no sign marking its clearance, nor was there a warning sign at the last safe exit before the bridge, as required by law. The accident caused injuries to the plaintiff, who, along with his wife, sued the City for damages.A jury in the Superior Court found that the City’s actions or inactions created a dangerous condition, that the City had actual or constructive notice of this condition, and that its conduct was palpably unreasonable. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $562,500 in damages. The City appealed, and the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the City had discretion in placing low-clearance-bridge signs and that the claim was barred by statutory immunity under N.J.S.A. 59:4-5, which protects public entities from liability for not providing ordinary traffic signs. The appellate court also found that the plaintiffs failed to present expert testimony showing the City had acted unreasonably.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed the case and reversed the Appellate Division’s decision. The Court held that the signs required by N.J.S.A. 27:5G-4, which mandates signage for low-clearance bridges, are not “ordinary” traffic signs within the meaning of the immunity provision, because municipalities have no discretion whether to post them. The Court further held that plaintiffs were not required to present expert testimony to prove palpable unreasonableness in this context. The jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiffs was reinstated. View "Wilson v. City of Newark" on Justia Law

by
A former elementary school student brought a lawsuit against a school district, alleging that she was sexually abused by her teacher during her time as a student. The complaint included claims of negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, asserting that the district was aware of prior allegations against the teacher, had settled an earlier lawsuit involving similar misconduct, and failed to take adequate action to protect students. The plaintiff claimed the abuse occurred both on and off school property, including during rides home with the teacher.The Superior Court of Fresno County granted summary judgment in favor of the school district, finding the district immune from liability under Education Code section 44808 because, based on the plaintiff’s deposition, the abuse occurred off school property and after school hours. The trial court also excluded certain evidence offered by the plaintiff, such as police reports and documents intended to show the district’s notice of the teacher’s dangerousness, on grounds of hearsay and lack of authentication, and found that the plaintiff’s efforts to cure these evidentiary defects were untimely.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reversed the summary judgment. The appellate court held that Education Code section 44808 does not provide immunity to a school district when it has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances, regardless of whether the resulting injury occurred on or off campus. The court concluded that the district’s motion only addressed the location and timing of the abuse, not whether the district exercised reasonable care or whether any failure of care caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Because the district did not meet its initial burden for summary judgment, the judgment was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "S.N. v. Fresno Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

by
Paris Moffett, a young man who was paralyzed after being shot, was admitted to a skilled nursing facility owned by Lake Merritt Healthcare Center, LLC. In March 2023, Paris signed an arbitration agreement with the facility, which stated it would bind not only Paris but also his representatives and family members. Days later, Paris was fatally shot by intruders who entered the facility through an unlocked door. Paris D’Marco Moffett, Paris’s father, filed suit against the facility and its owner, asserting four causes of action: negligence, negligent abuse of a dependent adult, a claim for extreme pain suffered by Paris before death, and wrongful death. Paris’s father did not sign the arbitration agreement.The Alameda County Superior Court reviewed a motion by the defendants to compel arbitration of all claims. The court denied the motion, mainly because Paris’s father had not signed the arbitration agreement. The defendants appealed, arguing that all claims should be arbitrated based on the agreement signed by Paris.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, considered the appeal. It held that the wrongful death claim could not be compelled to arbitration because it was brought in Paris’s father’s personal capacity, and he did not agree to arbitrate. The court clarified that, under California law, wrongful death claims are independent statutory actions, not derivative of the decedent’s claims, and an exception that allows binding heirs to arbitration applies only in cases of medical malpractice, not elder or dependent adult abuse. However, the court found that the three survivor claims—negligence, negligent abuse of a dependent adult, and pain and suffering—were subject to arbitration, as they belonged to Paris and survived his death. The court affirmed denial of arbitration for the wrongful death claim but reversed as to the survivor claims. View "Moffett v. Lake Merritt Healthcare Center" on Justia Law

by
Several property owners in and around Merrimack, New Hampshire, brought an action alleging that a plastics manufacturing facility released airborne toxic chemicals, specifically perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), which subsequently contaminated local drinking water sources, including both private wells and the municipal water supply. They claimed harm to their property interests due to this contamination and sought damages for diminution in property value, costs of remediation, and loss of use and enjoyment, among other injuries.After the case was removed from New Hampshire state court, it proceeded in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Plaintiffs moved to certify a class of property owners in the affected geographic area. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(3) for liability issues on trespass, negligence, and negligent failure to warn, but denied certification for nuisance and for damages issues, which it found to be individualized. The district court bifurcated proceedings, planning to address liability on a class-wide basis first, with damages to be determined in later, individualized proceedings. Saint-Gobain, the principal defendant, was granted permission to appeal the certification order.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The appellate court reversed the class certification as to negligence and negligent failure to warn, finding that injury and causation on those claims would require individualized, property-by-property proof that predominated over common issues. However, the court affirmed class certification for liability on the trespass claim, concluding that, under New Hampshire law, plaintiffs need only prove the intentional physical invasion of their property by PFOA attributable to the facility, which could be established on a common basis. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "Brown v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp." on Justia Law

by
A woman was injured in an automobile accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by her daughter. Her daughter and granddaughter died in the crash, while she and another granddaughter survived with significant injuries. The daughter had taken medication that could cause drowsiness, and the accident occurred after she fell asleep at the wheel, despite requests from passengers to let someone else drive. The injured woman filed suit against her daughter, the daughter’s estate, the daughter’s husband, and other unnamed parties, alleging negligent driving caused her injuries.After the defendants failed to respond, the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Payette County, entered default on liability and held an evidentiary hearing on damages. However, the court dismissed all claims with prejudice, reasoning that without a probate proceeding or appointment of a personal representative, claims could not proceed against the estate or the deceased daughter. It also found the husband was not a proper party, as no negligence was alleged against him. The court denied the plaintiff’s motions to reconsider or set aside the judgment, concluding she did not act with excusable neglect and failed to timely name the proper party.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It held that the district court abused its discretion and violated the plaintiff’s procedural due process rights by dismissing the case with prejudice without providing meaningful notice or an opportunity to be heard regarding the dismissal’s severity. The Supreme Court also found the district court failed to articulate any legal or factual basis for dismissing with prejudice. The judgment was vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiff to seek leave to amend her complaint to name the personal representative and determining if the amended complaint relates back to the original filing. View "Birch v. Ross" on Justia Law

by
An employee suffered a significant workplace injury resulting in the amputation of his lower left leg while working as a forklift operator. The employer accepted liability and initially provided partial disability benefits, which were later increased following a stipulation that recognized the severity and psychiatric consequences of the injury. Subsequently, the employer filed a petition to terminate benefits for the adjustment disorder, relying on a psychiatric report from an independent medical examination (IME) conducted for third-party litigation. The employee’s workers’ compensation attorney was not notified of this IME, though the employee himself attended.A Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) allowed the employer to admit the IME report and proceed with the termination petition, granting the employee’s counsel additional time to prepare rebuttal evidence. Both parties presented expert testimony, with the WCJ ultimately crediting the employer’s expert and finding the employee fully recovered, thus granting the termination petition. The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) affirmed, noting the employer’s lack of notice to counsel was not grounds for remand and that the employee had counsel’s advice for earlier IMEs. The Commonwealth Court also affirmed, reasoning that while special rules require notice to counsel, the lack of notice did not result in actual prejudice because the employee’s counsel had opportunities to challenge the IME report and expert testimony.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court’s decision. The Court held that under the Special Rules governing workers’ compensation proceedings, an employer must provide notice of an IME to the employee’s counsel. Failure to do so is presumed prejudicial and bars the employer from using the improperly noticed IME to alter the employee’s benefits. The Court vacated the WCJ’s order granting termination and directed that proper notice and a new expert would be required for any future proceedings. View "Thomas v. Sysco Foods" on Justia Law

by
On September 12, 2019, the defendant drove his truck across the center line on a Logan County road, colliding head-on with another vehicle driven by Brittany Duty. The crash resulted in both vehicles catching fire, causing severe injuries to Brittany Duty and the death of her passenger, Beverly Duty. First responders noted the defendant exhibited signs of intoxication, including slurred speech, combative behavior, and the smell of alcohol. Blood samples were taken at two hospitals: one within two hours of the collision, showing a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .263 percent, and another six to seven hours later, showing a BAC of .131 percent. The defendant was indicted for causing death and serious bodily injury while driving in an impaired state.The Circuit Court of Logan County denied the defendant’s pre-trial motions to exclude the BAC test results, finding the first sample was drawn within two hours of the collision and would be admissible if analyzed according to state health standards. The court also ruled the second sample, taken pursuant to a warrant and outside the statutory two-hour window, would be admissible, with its timing affecting its weight, not its admissibility. The defendant entered conditional guilty pleas, reserving the right to appeal these evidentiary rulings.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the circuit court’s decisions de novo for legal conclusions and under a clearly erroneous standard for factual findings. The Court held that the blood test taken within two hours of the collision was admissible as presumptive evidence of impairment, and the second test, though not qualifying for statutory presumptions, was admissible under the Rules of Evidence. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motions in limine and upheld the defendant’s convictions. View "State v. Conley" on Justia Law

by
After being rear-ended in 2018, the plaintiff claimed various injuries including concussion, neck pain, cognitive deficits, psychological issues, and TMJ dysfunction. She settled with the at-fault driver’s insurer for $45,000 but believed her damages exceeded that amount. She sought $25,000—the full underinsured motorist (UIM) policy—from her own insurer, Safeco. Safeco evaluated her claim, excluded certain medical expenses such as TMJ treatment, and initially offered $4,000, inviting further negotiation. The plaintiff rejected this and filed suit for breach of contract, enhanced damages (Hayseeds), and violations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act (WVUTPA).The case originated in West Virginia state court but was removed by Safeco to the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia. During discovery, the plaintiff produced new expert reports estimating much higher damages. Safeco then offered the full UIM policy limit of $25,000, which was memorialized in a joint motion signed by both parties, explicitly resolving the claim for policy proceeds and leaving only extracontractual and bad faith claims. The district court found the contractual claim settled, denied the plaintiff’s attempt to later seek reformation for higher policy limits, and granted summary judgment to Safeco on all claims. It found Safeco’s conduct reasonable and no evidence of a pattern of unfair trade practices.Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held the breach of contract claim was resolved for $25,000 based on undisputed settlement evidence, rejected the plaintiff’s reformation argument, found Safeco’s conduct did not necessitate litigation for Hayseeds damages, and concluded there was no evidence of a general business practice violating WVUTPA. The judgment and orders of the district court were affirmed. View "Kreitzer v. Safeco Insurance Company of America" on Justia Law

by
A woman, acting as personal representative of her late husband's estate, brought a medical negligence action after her husband died following treatment at the University of South Alabama Hospital. She alleged that various doctors and U.S.A. Healthcare Management, LLC (HCM) failed to provide adequate care, leading to his death. HCM employed the hospital staff involved and was created by the University of South Alabama (USA) to manage its healthcare system. The plaintiff claimed HCM was vicariously liable for the doctors’ alleged negligence.HCM moved for dismissal or summary judgment in the Mobile Circuit Court, arguing it was entitled to State immunity based on its relationship to USA, a State institution. HCM presented affidavits and documentation showing USA was its sole member and manager, and that HCM’s finances were intertwined with USA. The plaintiff opposed, arguing HCM was a separately created LLC under Alabama law, formed to shield USA from certain liabilities, and operated as an independent entity. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of HCM, finding it was entitled to immunity, and later certified the judgment as final for appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. It examined whether HCM, as an LLC created by a State agency, qualified as a State agency for purposes of immunity under Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution. Applying the factors from Armory Commission of Alabama v. Staudt, the court determined HCM’s powers and functions were typical of private entities, not unique to government, and its relationship with USA did not override its separate legal status as an LLC. The court held HCM was not entitled to State immunity and reversed the circuit court’s summary judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Marsh v. U.S.A. Healthcare Management, LLC" on Justia Law