Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The case concerns an accident involving the Adalyn, a 38-foot commercial workboat owned by Michael Quain Neward Pittman and chartered by Hunter Marine Group, LLC. In November 2024, eight employees of Encore Dredging Partners, LLC were aboard the Adalyn during maintenance dredging operations on the Alabama River when the vessel ran aground and struck a steel pipe, resulting in injuries. The employees were performing work under a contract where Hunter Marine provided the vessel and received a daily flat fee from Encore, regardless of its use.Following the incident, the injured Encore employees filed personal injury claims in state court against Hunter Marine and Encore. In May 2025, Hunter Marine and Pittman sought to limit their liability under the federal Limitation of Liability Act of 1851 by filing a petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court stayed the state proceedings and ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment. It concluded that the Adalyn was a “covered small passenger vessel” excluded from the Act’s limitation of liability protections and granted summary judgment to the claimants.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo. The central issue was whether the Adalyn qualified as a “covered small passenger vessel” by carrying “passengers for hire,” given that consideration for carriage had been provided—albeit indirectly—by Encore on behalf of its employees. The Fifth Circuit held that the statute does not require personal payment by the passenger; indirect payment by an employer suffices. Consequently, the court affirmed that the Adalyn was a covered small passenger vessel, making the Limitation of Liability Act inapplicable and upholding the district court’s summary judgment for the claimants. View "Hunter Marine Group v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Irma Herrera alleged that her obstetricians committed medical malpractice during her childbirth at a federally funded community health clinic in Chicago, resulting in serious injuries. Because the clinic receives federal funding, her legal remedy was limited to an action against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act. After initially filing suit in state court, the Attorney General certified that the doctors were acting within the scope of their federal employment, leading to removal of the case to federal court.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Herrera’s case because she had failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). In an attempt to preserve her claim, Herrera complied with the saving provision in the Westfall Act and refiled her case in federal court. However, the district court again dismissed her suit, relying on the Seventh Circuit’s precedent in Evans v. United States, which had held that the Westfall Act’s saving provision does not apply to medical malpractice cases removed under 42 U.S.C. § 233(c).On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered whether to overturn its holding in Evans in light of Herrera’s arguments that Evans was wrongly decided. The court declined to do so, emphasizing the importance of stare decisis and finding no compelling reason to depart from its recent precedent. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the Westfall Act’s saving provision does not apply to medical malpractice cases removed under 42 U.S.C. § 233(c), thereby precluding Herrera’s claim. View "Herrera v USA" on Justia Law

A fatal car accident involving an eighteen-year-old driving a 2013 Toyota Scion led to a lawsuit by the driver’s estate against Toyota and Subaru, who had jointly developed the vehicle. The plaintiff alleged negligence, product liability, and violations of North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act, claiming that design defects caused the occupant compartment to collapse and a fire to spread, ultimately resulting in the driver’s death. During discovery, the plaintiff requested extensive documents and depositions, including English translations of Japanese-language materials. Toyota and Subaru objected to several document requests and deposition topics, and disputes arose regarding the timing and sufficiency of their responses.The Superior Court of Robeson County granted the plaintiff’s motions to compel, ordered the production of additional documents (including English translations), and mandated that Toyota and Subaru’s corporate representatives testify to all noticed deposition topics without further objection. When the defendants failed to comply as ordered, the trial court imposed sanctions, deeming certain facts established against them—including elements of duty and breach in the plaintiff’s product liability claim—and struck their regulatory compliance defense. Toyota and Subaru appealed, challenging the discovery and sanctions orders.The North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the sanctions order and reversed the requirement to translate documents but otherwise affirmed the discovery order, holding that most of the trial court’s actions were not an abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed only the remaining issues in the discovery order. It held that the trial court erred by enforcing a fourteen-day deadline for objections to document requests in deposition notices (rather than the seven days required by the rules), and by waiving defendants’ objections to deposition topics for not seeking a protective order. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the relevant portions of the Court of Appeals’ decision, instructed it to vacate the discovery order, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sessoms v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc" on Justia Law

A married couple enrolled their children at a private school that, until the 2020–2021 academic year, offered a traditional curriculum. Following the events of summer 2020, the school shifted its curriculum to emphasize issues of race and gender identity. The parents became concerned after learning their sixth-grade child was exposed to controversial teachings and age-inappropriate materials. They joined a group of parents to express their concerns to the school’s leadership. After the parents met with school officials, the school abruptly expelled their children and accused the parents of making racist remarks, which the parents deny.The parents filed suit in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, alleging breach of contract, fraud, unfair and deceptive trade practices, defamation, and other claims. The trial court, Judge Lisa C. Bell presiding, dismissed all claims except for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The parents voluntarily dismissed that remaining claim to appeal. The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of all other claims.The Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the case to determine whether the parents’ complaint satisfied the state’s “notice pleading” standard for surviving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that the parents adequately alleged claims for breach of contract, fraud, unfair and deceptive trade practices based on their fraud allegations, and defamation. The court found that their breach of contract claim was viable because they alleged the school expelled their children under a false pretext, in violation of the contract. The fraud and defamation claims also survived due to sufficient factual allegations. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and remanded for further proceedings on these claims, but affirmed or declined to review the dismissal of other claims. View "Turpin v. Charlotte Latin Schools, Inc" on Justia Law

A former Fire Chief of the Cincinnati Fire Department, who had worked for the department since 1993 and was promoted to Fire Chief in 2021, was terminated by the City Manager in 2023 without being given a pre-termination hearing. The City Charter provided that, after serving six months as Fire Chief, the individual could only be removed for cause. When promoted, the Fire Chief signed a memorandum stating the position was “unclassified” and subject to dismissal without cause, but the Charter’s language provided for-cause protection after the first six months. The City Manager provided the Fire Chief with a termination letter listing reasons for the firing and publicized the termination, including to the media, citing the reasons as “for cause.” The Fire Chief did not receive a pre-termination or post-termination hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio denied summary judgment to the City Manager and the City, holding that the City Manager was not entitled to qualified immunity regarding pre-termination due process violations. The court found that, under the Charter, the Fire Chief had a property interest in continued employment after six months and that there were unresolved factual disputes regarding waiver of those rights. The district court also denied statutory immunity to the City Manager on the Fire Chief’s state law defamation claim, finding triable issues regarding whether her statements were knowingly false or made with malice.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Sixth Circuit held that the City Charter unambiguously gave the Fire Chief for-cause removal protection after six months, creating a property interest protected by procedural due process. It found that no “clear and unmistakable” waiver of those rights was effected by the memorandum. The court also held that sufficient evidence existed for a jury to decide whether the City Manager acted with malice or bad faith in making allegedly defamatory statements. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. City of Cincinnati" on Justia Law

The case involves a motor vehicle accident in which the plaintiff claimed to have sustained spinal injuries after being rear-ended by the defendant in 2019. The defendant admitted liability, leaving the extent and cause of the injuries, as well as the damages, for trial. During discovery, the defendant requested and received the plaintiff’s medical records from a prior, similar 2017 car accident, which the plaintiff produced. The defendant’s expert witnesses relied on these 2017 records to argue that the plaintiff’s injuries were not caused by the 2019 accident.At the Eighth Judicial District Court, the plaintiff moved to exclude the 2017 records on grounds of irrelevance and lack of proper authentication, also noting the defendant’s failure to list them in pretrial disclosures. The court agreed, excluding the records for not meeting Nevada’s statutory authentication requirements under NRS 52.325 and for incomplete disclosure, and also barred related expert testimony. The court further excluded evidence of the plaintiff’s medical liens, citing the collateral source rule, and ultimately a jury awarded the plaintiff approximately $3.8 million in damages. The district court denied the defendant’s motions for a new trial and for relief from judgment, and granted attorney fees and costs to the plaintiff.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for a new trial. It held that NRS 52.325 is not the exclusive method of authenticating medical records when those records are produced in discovery by a party, and that the general authentication standard under NRS 52.015 applies. The exclusion of the 2017 records and related expert testimony was error, as was the exclusion of medical lien evidence based on a misapplication of the collateral source rule. The court found the defendant’s disclosure error to be harmless and directed that a new trial be held. The awards of attorney fees and costs were vacated. View "GUTIERREZ-ZACATENCO VS. HERRERA" on Justia Law

On August 2, 2022, the plaintiff was riding her mule on an unpaved road when the defendant, operating a utility terrain vehicle (UTV), approached from behind. As the defendant attempted to avoid the riders, her UTV overturned, causing the plaintiff’s mule to bolt and resulting in the plaintiff’s fall and injury. The plaintiff filed a negligence suit against the defendant, alleging the defendant’s actions caused her injuries.The case was first heard in the Somerset County Superior Court. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that immunity applied under 7 M.R.S. § 4103-A because the plaintiff’s injuries arose from the inherent risks of equine activities and that the plaintiff failed to present a prima facie case of negligence. The Superior Court granted summary judgment for the defendant solely on the basis of statutory immunity, without reaching the merits of the negligence claim. The plaintiff appealed this decision.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the statutory language, legislative history, and structure of 7 M.R.S. § 4103-A. The Court held that the statute’s immunity applies only to equine activity sponsors, equine professionals, or persons engaged in equine activities—not to individuals like the defendant, who was not engaged in such activities at the time of the incident. The Court further concluded that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case of negligence, meaning the matter should proceed to trial. As a result, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Beem v. Temple" on Justia Law

A worker was severely injured while operating a piece of agricultural machinery at his place of employment. The machine’s power take-off (PTO) shaft, which should have been equipped with safety guards, lacked those guards at the time of the accident. The worker alleged that the absence of these safety guards was due to his employer’s deliberate removal, and that this action directly caused his injuries. He sued his employer for an intentional tort under Ohio law, specifically invoking a statutory provision that creates a rebuttable presumption of intent to injure when an employer deliberately removes an equipment safety guard and an injury results.The Madison County Court of Common Pleas denied the employer’s motion for summary judgment, finding a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the employer had deliberately removed the safety guard. The case proceeded to trial, where the jury heard evidence about the condition of the machinery, the employer’s repair practices, and the employer’s responses to safety concerns. The jury found in favor of the worker, awarding significant compensatory damages for his injuries. On appeal, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence did not support a finding of deliberate removal as a matter of law, and that the statutory presumption did not apply unless the employer both removed the guard and made a conscious decision not to replace it.The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the court of appeals. It held that when reviewing the denial of summary judgment after a trial, appellate courts must consider the full trial record, not just the pretrial record. The court further held that the statutory presumption applies when there is evidence of deliberate removal of a safety guard, and that courts may not require proof of a separate, additional decision not to replace the guard. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "Camara v. Gill Dairy, L.L.C." on Justia Law

A woman employed as an office support technician with the FBI underwent carpal tunnel surgery on her right hand in January 2017, performed by an orthopedic surgeon. After the surgery, she continued to experience symptoms such as numbness, pain, and decreased grip strength. Her physician reassured her that these ongoing symptoms were normal and that she was healing well. She continued therapy and work with certain restrictions but did not realize the surgery might have been unsuccessful until 2021, when another physician diagnosed her with an incomplete release of her transverse carpal ligament during the original surgery. She subsequently underwent a corrective surgery.The Superior Court of San Diego County granted summary judgment in favor of the surgeon and his medical group, finding the plaintiff’s claims barred by the statute of limitations under California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5. The court reasoned that her postoperative symptoms in 2017 were sufficient to trigger the three-year limitations period, which had expired before she filed suit in July 2022. The plaintiff appealed, arguing there were triable issues of fact regarding when she knew or should have known of the alleged injury and its negligent cause.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reversed the summary judgment. The Court of Appeal held that triable issues of material fact remained as to when the plaintiff’s injury became sufficiently appreciable to trigger the statute of limitations and when she knew or, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known the cause of her injury was the 2017 surgery. The court concluded that summary judgment was improper because reasonable minds could differ on when the statute began to run. The judgment was reversed, and costs on appeal were awarded to the appellants. View "Godshall v. Peterson" on Justia Law

A physician who operated an addiction clinic was indicted on multiple counts of unlawfully prescribing controlled substances to five undercover law enforcement officers and four actual patients, as well as several counts of obstruction of justice for altering patient records after being indicted. At trial, four former patients testified that the physician prescribed drugs to them following minimal or inadequate medical evaluation, with several testifying to sexual misconduct or exploitation by the physician in connection with their prescriptions. Five undercover officers also testified to receiving prescriptions with little or no medical assessment, and video evidence corroborated their accounts. The prosecution further showed that after his indictment, the physician added false or misleading entries to the medical records of the undercover officers to make it appear that he had conducted more thorough evaluations than he actually had.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted the physician’s motion for acquittal only as to the conspiracy count but let the case proceed on the remaining charges. A jury convicted the defendant on all remaining counts. At sentencing, the district court adopted a guidelines range of 30 to 37 months but imposed a sentence of 144 months, an upward variance, citing the physician’s sexual misconduct against patients as a significant aggravating factor. The district court explained that the guidelines did not adequately capture the seriousness of the sexual abuse committed in connection with the unlawful prescriptions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that sufficient evidence supported all convictions for unlawful prescription and obstruction of justice. The court also found that the upward variance in sentencing was reasonable, given the aggravating circumstances, and that the district court did not commit procedural or substantive error. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the defendant’s convictions and sentence. View "USA v. Hollington" on Justia Law