Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The case centers on an incident where Joann Wright Haysbert, an academic administrator, slipped and fell while picking up an order at an Outback Steakhouse in Chesapeake, Virginia. She claimed to have suffered a traumatic brain injury and related cognitive impairments as a result of the fall, and brought a negligence lawsuit against Outback and its parent company. The litigation was marked by contentious proceedings, particularly involving her son, Attorney Nazareth Haysbert, who represented her pro hac vice.After Outback removed the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the first trial was declared a mistrial due to Attorney Haysbert’s repeated unprofessional conduct, including outbursts before the jury and violations of court instructions. Subsequently, his pro hac vice admission was revoked. The district court granted Dr. Haysbert's motion to dismiss the case without prejudice, but imposed strict limitations on discovery for any potential refiling. When Dr. Haysbert refiled the case, further disputes arose, including the late disclosure of a new expert report and challenges during jury selection.Upon retrial, the district court excluded Dr. Haysbert’s expert witness, Dr. Filler, as a sanction for untimely disclosure of his report, and denied her Batson challenge to Outback’s use of peremptory strikes against Black potential jurors. The jury found for Outback.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that Dr. Haysbert lacked standing to challenge the revocation of her attorney’s pro hac vice admission based on his due process rights. The court also found no abuse of discretion in excluding Dr. Filler’s testimony as a sanction or in denying the Batson challenge, concluding that the district court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous. The judgment in favor of Outback was affirmed. View "Haysbert v. Outback Steakhouse of Florida, LLC" on Justia Law

A large group of plaintiffs, including several states, individuals, school districts, and local governments, brought suit against Meta Platforms, Inc., and associated entities, alleging that Facebook and Instagram’s design features encourage addictive behavior and inadequately protect young users from harmful content. Additional defendants included TikTok-related entities, school districts, and others. The cases were consolidated in multidistrict litigation, where plaintiffs asserted various claims, including personal injury and state law violations.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California organized the litigation into several tracks based on the nature of the claims and plaintiffs. Meta moved to dismiss certain claims, arguing that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act provided them with immunity. The district court granted the dismissal in part, finding some claims barred by Section 230, but denied dismissal as to others, particularly where claims did not target Meta’s role as a publisher of third-party content. Meta sought interlocutory appeal on some orders, which the district court denied, and then appealed other orders as of right under the collateral order doctrine. TikTok entities joined in Meta’s arguments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether it had appellate jurisdiction to hear Meta’s and TikTok’s interlocutory appeals. The court held that Section 230 provides a defense to liability, not immunity from suit, and that the denial of such a defense is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. The court found none of the requirements for a collateral order were met, emphasizing that Section 230 does not constitute a statutory or constitutional guarantee against trial. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeals and cross-appeals for lack of jurisdiction. View "STATE OF COLORADO V. META PLATFORMS, INC." on Justia Law

In 2004, a fourteen-year-old girl was sexually assaulted in Anoka County, Minnesota. She provided evidence for a rape kit, which was submitted to the Anoka County Sheriff’s Office. Detective Johnson was assigned to her case and assured her mother that no DNA was obtained, though in reality the kit was never tested. The suspect was charged but not convicted. In 2015, it was discovered that the Sheriff’s Office had hundreds of untested rape kits, including hers. Sixteen years after the assault, her kit was finally tested, revealing DNA evidence implicating the original suspect, and criminal charges were pursued again.After these events, she brought suit against Anoka County, Sheriff Stuart, and Detective Johnson in the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. She asserted claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and the Minnesota Constitution for equal protection violations, a claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act, a “failure to train” claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state tort claims for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The district court dismissed her MHRA and negligence claims but allowed the other claims to proceed, finding she had standing in light of Eighth Circuit precedent.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring her federal constitutional claims for alleged failures to investigate or train, following Supreme Court and Eighth Circuit precedent holding that crime victims generally lack standing to challenge law enforcement or prosecutorial discretion in investigating crimes, even when alleging class-based discrimination. The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment on the federal claims and remanded with instructions to dismiss those claims for lack of standing. The court remanded the IIED claim for the district court to determine whether standing existed for that state-law claim. View "Doe v. Anoka County" on Justia Law

Paul Johnson sustained severe injuries while using a drain-cleaning machine manufactured by Ridge Tool Manufacturing Company, Inc. The machine, designed to minimize user risks, included a warning label, an instruction manual, and specially designed gloves. Johnson did not read the manual or use the provided gloves, instead choosing an oversized pair from his employer. While operating the machine, his glove became entangled in the rotating cable, resulting in significant injury. Johnson brought suit against Ridge Tool, alleging strict liability, negligence, and failure to warn. He relied on two expert witnesses: Chad Jones, who opined that a safer alternative design was feasible, and Cynthia Rando, who criticized the manual and glove warnings.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois excluded both expert reports under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, finding Jones’s alternative design opinion unreliable due to lack of testing, analysis, and supporting industry data, and Rando’s report deficient for not proposing an alternative warning and for focusing on the manual Johnson never read. The district court then granted summary judgment to Ridge Tool, concluding that Johnson’s claims lacked evidentiary support after the exclusion of his experts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions for abuse of discretion regarding the exclusion of expert testimony and de novo for summary judgment. The appellate court affirmed both rulings, holding that the district court properly excluded Johnson’s experts for unreliable methodologies and unsupported conclusions, and that, absent those expert opinions, Johnson’s legal theories could not survive summary judgment. The court emphasized the necessity of reliable expert evidence and alternative warnings to establish causation in failure-to-warn claims under Illinois law. The judgment was affirmed. View "Johnson v Ridge Tool Manufacturing Co." on Justia Law

The case involves a car accident in which the plaintiff was seriously injured after colliding with a municipal bus operated by an employee of the New York City Transit Authority. The plaintiff filed a state law tort action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging negligence by both the Transit Authority and the bus driver. Both parties requested a jury trial, and a Magistrate Judge was assigned to preside over jury selection.During jury selection, defense counsel used all peremptory strikes on three Black prospective jurors. The plaintiff’s counsel raised a Batson v. Kentucky challenge, arguing that the strikes were racially motivated. The Magistrate Judge requested race-neutral explanations from defense counsel, who provided reasons related to the jurors’ perceived education, employment, and demeanor. The plaintiff contended these explanations were pretextual. The Magistrate Judge overruled the Batson objection, finding the explanations race-neutral without explicitly assessing their credibility as required by Batson's third step. The trial then proceeded before a District Judge, who, after an eight-day trial, received a jury verdict in favor of the defendants, resulting in dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the plaintiff’s claims that he was denied a fair trial and that his Batson rights were violated during jury selection. The court rejected the fair-trial claim, finding no prejudicial conduct by the trial judge. However, the Second Circuit held that the Magistrate Judge erred by not making an explicit credibility determination regarding the race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strikes. The court remanded the case to the District Court to conduct a Batson reconstruction hearing or, if such a hearing is no longer feasible, to order a new trial. View "Salters v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth." on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought medical treatment for vision issues and was referred to a board-certified ophthalmologist, who performed cataract surgery on both eyes in March and April 2018. After follow-up appointments and an additional procedure on one eye, the plaintiff’s vision improved compared to before surgery. However, nearly a year later, he experienced retinal detachments in both eyes, which required surgical repairs by another physician. Following these procedures, the plaintiff suffered diminished vision in both eyes.The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice complaint in the District Court for Douglas County, asserting that the physician failed to obtain informed consent prior to the cataract surgeries, particularly by not discussing specific risks associated with prior radial keratotomy (RK) procedures. The physician answered that he met the applicable standard of care and denied any negligence or causation. The district court initially granted summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, but the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding the limitations defense had not been properly raised. On remand, after the plaintiff failed to designate any expert witnesses by the deadline, the physician again moved for summary judgment, offering his own affidavit and evidence that the plaintiff had no expert to testify at trial. The plaintiff responded with depositions and affidavits asserting he was not informed of relevant risks and would have declined surgery if properly informed.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and held that, although there was a factual dispute regarding whether the physician breached the standard of care in obtaining informed consent, the plaintiff failed to present competent evidence on proximate causation, an essential element of his claim. The Court found expert testimony was required to establish causation and rejected arguments based on the common knowledge exception and “self-evident damages.” The judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for the physician was affirmed. View "Schuemann v. Timperley" on Justia Law

A woman experienced a difficult third pregnancy, complicated by multiple medical issues that warranted an early, medically induced labor. Before delivery, she signed a consent form authorizing her obstetrician to perform a vaginal delivery with possible laceration/episiotomy repairs and possible cesarean section. During labor, as the infant was crowning, she pleaded with her doctor not to perform an episiotomy, but the procedure was carried out. She later required reconstructive surgery due to complications from the episiotomy.She initiated legal action in the Hinds County Circuit Court against her obstetrician, the medical group, and other entities, alleging lack of informed consent and battery related to the episiotomy, along with other claims against additional defendants. Over time, the trial court issued a series of orders dismissing various claims and defendants, culminating in summary judgment for the obstetrician on the informed consent and battery claims, primarily due to the plaintiff’s failure to provide expert medical testimony. The plaintiff argued that expert testimony was unnecessary because she had withdrawn consent during labor, but the court disagreed.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. It held that while a medical procedure performed without consent may constitute battery and not require expert testimony, this scenario involved consent given prior to delivery and alleged withdrawal during labor. In such cases, it is necessary to prove that stopping the procedure was medically feasible and would not cause harm, which requires expert testimony. The Court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff’s lack of expert evidence prevented her claims from proceeding, and upheld the trial court’s denial of reconsideration. View "Brown v. Davey-Sullivan" on Justia Law

A patient sought treatment at a state medical center for vision issues and was diagnosed with idiopathic intracranial hypertension. She initially chose medication over surgery but later agreed to undergo an optic-nerve sheath fenestration. Following continued vision decline, she received a shunt placement. Shortly after this procedure, she and her mother discussed concerns about her treatment, expressing suspicions that something had gone wrong and that she should seek care elsewhere. The patient continued follow-up visits at the center, but months later obtained a second medical opinion, which suggested prior care had been incorrect and provided an alternative diagnosis.The patient filed a notice of claim against the medical center more than a year after her suspicions of negligence but within a year of receiving the second opinion. She then filed suit for medical negligence. The University of Mississippi Medical Center moved for summary judgment in the Hinds County Circuit Court, arguing the claim was time barred under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act’s one-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, finding a genuine issue as to when the patient discovered the alleged negligence.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the denial of summary judgment de novo. It held that the statute of limitations began running when the patient first suspected negligent care, as shown by her own statements and those of her mother shortly after the shunt procedure, not when she received the second opinion. The court found no genuine issue of material fact that her suspicions triggered the limitations period, making her claim time barred. The court reversed the trial court’s decision and rendered summary judgment in favor of the medical center. View "University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Carter" on Justia Law

Mary Margaret Upchurch, who suffered from chronic back pain, underwent multiple surgeries involving spinal cord stimulators and pain pumps. In 2016, after moving to Mississippi, she had a pain pump replaced by Dr. Adam Lewis, a neurosurgeon at Jackson Neurosurgery Clinic. During surgery, Dr. Lewis attempted to replace the battery of her spinal cord stimulator with one from a different manufacturer, but encountered issues with the compatibility of the leads. This led to additional procedures, including a laminectomy and the eventual replacement of the stimulator, after which Mary experienced severe neurological complications, including paralysis. The Upchurches alleged that Dr. Lewis failed to properly prepare for surgery, did not obtain informed consent, and failed to communicate adequately with hospital staff.The case was tried in the Rankin County Circuit Court, where the jury found in favor of Dr. Lewis and Jackson Neurosurgery Clinic, concluding there was no negligence in Dr. Lewis’s care. The circuit court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict and denied the Upchurches’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. The Upchurches appealed, and the Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s judgment, finding insufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict and remanding the case for a new trial.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the Upchurches’ failure to object to Dr. Lewis’s testimony at trial constituted waiver, and that his unobjected-to testimony should have been considered as evidence. The Court found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, and reinstated and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in favor of Dr. Lewis and Jackson Neurosurgery Clinic. Additionally, the Court affirmed the circuit court’s order assessing appellate record costs against Dr. Lewis and the Clinic. View "Upchurch v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Ramona Ricapor-Hall began smoking at age twelve and continued for sixty-six years, relying on assurances from cigarette manufacturers that downplayed the dangers of smoking. Despite repeated efforts to quit, her addiction persisted. In 2019, she was diagnosed with lung cancer and later developed a second primary lung cancer. In 2021, she filed suit against cigarette manufacturers and vendors for her lung cancer, ultimately settling with all defendants except Philip Morris USA Inc.The case was tried before the Circuit Court of the First Circuit in Hawaii. The jury found Philip Morris liable for negligence, strict products liability, and intentional torts related to conspiracy to commit fraudulent concealment and misrepresentation, awarding Ricapor-Hall $6 million in general damages and $8 million in punitive damages. The jury attributed 54% fault to Philip Morris and 46% to Ricapor-Hall. The circuit court reduced her general damages by her share of fault, citing comparative negligence, and entered final judgment totaling $11,095,000 after settlement credits.On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Hawaii, Philip Morris challenged the verdict on several grounds, including juror substitutions, juror bias inquiry, jury instructions, and the availability of punitive damages. Ricapor-Hall cross-appealed, arguing that her negligence should not reduce damages for intentional torts. The Supreme Court held that comparative negligence does not reduce damages for intentional torts, vacated the portion of the judgment reducing Ricapor-Hall’s award, and remanded for entry of an amended judgment for the full $6 million in general damages. All other aspects of the circuit court’s judgment were affirmed. View "Ricapor-Hall v. Philip Morris USA Inc." on Justia Law