Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The defendant was convicted of five counts of sexual assault in the first degree and two counts of risk of injury to a child, based on multiple incidents of sexual abuse against two minor victims who attended a day care operated by the defendant’s wife in their home. The abuse occurred over several years, when the victims were between three and eight years old. The state’s case relied on evidence that the defendant committed a variety of sexual acts against each child on separate occasions. Each count of sexual assault was based on multiple, distinct incidents involving a specific sexual act.The Superior Court for the judicial district of New Haven conducted a jury trial. At the conclusion of evidence, the trial court provided the jury with specific unanimity instructions for each count, stating that to find the defendant guilty, all jurors must unanimously agree that the defendant committed at least one specific alleged act described in the count. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts, and the court sentenced the defendant to a total effective term of twenty-five years’ imprisonment, execution suspended after twenty-one years, followed by ten years of probation. The defendant appealed directly to the Connecticut Supreme Court, arguing his right to a unanimous jury verdict was violated because the trial court did not require the jury to answer special interrogatories identifying which incident formed the basis for each conviction.The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the federal constitution does not require special interrogatories on unanimity in addition to a specific unanimity instruction when a single count is based on multiple, separate acts. The Court found the trial court’s unanimity instructions sufficient to protect the defendant’s constitutional rights and affirmed the judgments. View "State v. Carlos G." on Justia Law

A fire at a call center in Davao City, Philippines, resulted in the deaths of twenty-nine individuals who were employees of a Philippine company providing services for a Connecticut-based company. The estates of the deceased and other plaintiffs, most of whom were Philippine citizens or residents, brought a wrongful death and loss of consortium action in Connecticut against the Connecticut company and two of its officers, who were also involved with the Philippine employer.The Superior Court, Complex Litigation Docket, granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens, finding the Philippines to be an adequate alternative forum. The court considered conflicting affidavits from expert witnesses regarding whether Philippine courts would accept the case, given concerns about the statute of limitations. The dismissal was conditioned on allowing the plaintiffs to reinstate the Connecticut action if the Philippine courts declined jurisdiction. The Appellate Court affirmed this decision, concluding that the trial court applied the proper legal standard and meaningfully assessed the adequacy of the Philippine forum.On further appeal, the Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment. It held that the trial court correctly applied the legal standard from Picketts v. International Playtex, Inc., and undertook a meaningful assessment of the adequacy of the Philippines as an alternative forum. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did not rely solely on the defendants’ consent to jurisdiction but weighed competing affidavits and evidence regarding Philippine law and procedure. The conditional nature of the dismissal, allowing reinstatement in Connecticut if the Philippine courts declined jurisdiction, was also deemed appropriate. Thus, the disposition by the Connecticut Supreme Court was to affirm the Appellate Court’s decision. View "DeCicco v. Dynata, LLC" on Justia Law

A garbage truck driver was injured when his vehicle was struck by a train at a railroad crossing in Baldwin, Louisiana. The collision occurred after the left front tire of the garbage truck became stuck in a hole next to the wooden planks of the railroad crossing, which was maintained by the railroad company. The driver was delayed in maneuvering his truck out of the hole and, as he attempted to cross, was hit by an oncoming train. Evidence showed that the crossing was narrower than the adjacent roadway and did not meet industry or the railroad company's own safety standards.A jury in the 16th Judicial District Court found the railroad company negligent and a proximate cause of the accident, and also found the driver negligent but determined his negligence was not a proximate cause, yet assigned him 15% of the fault and the railroad 85%. The trial court entered judgment on this verdict. On appeal, the Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit, found the jury's verdict inconsistent and ordered a new trial. The Louisiana Supreme Court vacated that order, holding that the driver’s acceptance of partial fault resolved the inconsistency, and remanded for review of other issues. On remand, the appellate court found the evidence supported the jury’s findings and damages award.The Supreme Court of Louisiana subsequently granted review to consider the allocation of fault. The court found manifest error in the jury’s allocation of 85% fault to the railroad and 15% to the driver. It held that the lowest reasonable allocation of fault to the driver was 75%, with 25% to the railroad, and amended the judgment accordingly. The amended judgment was affirmed. View "THOMAS VS. BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY" on Justia Law

A blind student attending a university sustained injuries after falling from a balcony on campus. He mistook a guardrail for a bench and climbed over it, leading to a fall of at least ten feet. The student had previously followed set, familiar routes on campus, and although a university representative had shown him some areas, he was not informed about the balcony or its guardrail. The accident occurred during a pandemic-related closure when the student was unfamiliar with the route he took to access the building.The student filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Fourth Judicial District, against the university and its Board of Regents, alleging negligence, recklessness, and negligence per se. He claimed that the university owed a duty to maintain a safe environment for all students, including those with disabilities. The university moved for summary judgment, arguing it owed no duty to protect the student from risks created by his own conduct. The superior court granted summary judgment, finding neither statutory nor common law imposed a duty on the university to prevent harm resulting from the student’s own actions. The court determined that neither the Alaska Human Rights Act nor the Americans with Disabilities Act established a relevant duty of care, and Alaska precedent precluded finding a duty under these circumstances.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed the case de novo. It affirmed the superior court’s decision, holding that the university had no duty to protect the student from the obvious risks created by his own conduct, specifically his voluntary act of climbing over the guardrail. The court reasoned that statutory protections against discrimination did not translate into a tort duty to prevent physical injury in this context, and existing precedent controlled the outcome. The grant of summary judgment was affirmed. View "Carey-Thomann v. University of Alaska" on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute between two drivers following a car accident in a parking lot. The plaintiff sought to recover medical expenses for injuries allegedly sustained in the collision. To establish the reasonableness and necessity of her medical costs, the plaintiff submitted affidavits from her medical providers under Section 18.001 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The defendant responded by serving counteraffidavits from qualified experts, challenging only portions of the claimed medical expenses—not the entirety of each provider’s charges. In response, the plaintiff designated the defense experts as her own, intending to rely on their affidavits regarding uncontested medical charges.The trial court, sitting in Collin County, sustained the defendant’s objections and excluded all affidavits from the two contested providers, reasoning that any counteraffidavit required all costs from that provider to be supported by expert testimony at trial. The plaintiff’s attempt to admit the counteraffidavits themselves was also denied on hearsay grounds. The jury awarded only the uncontested medical costs from the third provider. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth District of Texas affirmed, holding that a compliant counteraffidavit rendered the plaintiff’s Section 18.001 affidavits insufficient, thereby requiring expert testimony for all costs from providers whose affidavits were challenged, even in part.The Supreme Court of Texas reversed the court of appeals’ judgment. It held that when a counteraffidavit challenges only part of a medical-cost affidavit, the uncontested portions of the affidavit remain competent evidence under Section 18.001 and may be submitted to the jury. Furthermore, the court held that counteraffidavits can also be admissible for the uncontested claims they affirm. The court remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "ORTIZ v. NELAPATLA" on Justia Law

A worker at the Cherry Point oil refinery in Washington was regularly exposed to asbestos-containing insulation during his employment, which began in 1971. The insulation at issue was chosen, supplied, and installed by a subcontractor as part of the refinery’s original construction in the early 1970s. Decades after his exposure, the worker developed mesothelioma and died from the disease. His estate brought claims against numerous defendants, including the subcontractor, based on alleged asbestos exposure at the refinery.The Whatcom County Superior Court first granted summary judgment for the subcontractor, relying on Maxwell v. Atlantic Richfield Co., which held that Washington’s six-year construction statute of repose barred such claims. However, the court reconsidered and denied summary judgment after the Washington Court of Appeals issued Welch v. Brand Insulations, Inc., which found there were factual questions about whether the subcontractor’s activities were covered by the statute of repose. Due to conflicting appellate decisions, the Supreme Court of Washington granted direct review.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington held that claims against the subcontractor arising from its construction activities—specifically, its installation of asbestos insulation as part of constructing an improvement on real property—are barred by the construction statute of repose. However, the court held that claims based on the subcontractor’s independent role as a product seller or supplier, separate from its construction activities, are not barred by the statute of repose. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine which claims, if any, survive under theories of product seller or supplier liability. The court declined to address the constitutionality of the statute of repose, as that issue was not timely raised. View "Polinder v. Aecom Energy & Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

A motorcyclist was injured when his motorcycle collided with a vehicle that was pulling out of a parking lot onto a public roadway. The driver of the vehicle was attempting to make a left turn but her view was obstructed by a line of stopped cars waiting to enter the lot. The motorcyclist, traveling northbound, collided with the vehicle in the northbound lane and suffered serious injuries. He had no memory of the crash. The motorcyclist sued the driver for negligence, alleging that she failed to yield as required by state law. The driver denied liability and argued that the motorcyclist was also negligent.The case was tried in the Montana Eighteenth Judicial District Court. The motorcyclist sought partial summary judgment, arguing that the driver was negligent per se for violating a statute requiring vehicles entering from a driveway to yield. The District Court denied summary judgment, finding disputes of material fact about the parties' respective conduct. At trial, the jury found both parties negligent, attributing 65% of the fault to the motorcyclist and 35% to the driver, resulting in a defense verdict. The court entered judgment for the driver. The motorcyclist moved for a new trial, arguing errors in evidentiary rulings, jury instructions, and the exclusion of demonstrative videos. The District Court denied the motion.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's rulings. The Supreme Court held that summary judgment was properly denied due to disputed factual issues about both parties’ actions at the time of the collision. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decisions to admit expert testimony from the crash investigator, exclude videos taken after the accident, allow certain cross-examination of an expert, and give jury instructions reflecting the statutory law. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Murray v. Steinmetz" on Justia Law

A bicyclist was injured in a collision with a vehicle driven by a physician employed by a medical group. The accident occurred on a Monday morning while the physician was driving her personal vehicle from home to her office at the medical center, stopping briefly at a dry cleaner for a personal errand. The physician’s employment permitted her to work from home part of the week, but on Mondays, she worked exclusively at the office. The injured bicyclist sued the physician and her employer, alleging the employer was vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, concluding that the “going and coming rule” applied. This rule generally exempts employers from liability for torts committed by employees while commuting to and from work. The court found no evidence that the physician was acting within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident, and no exception to the rule applied. The court also overruled evidentiary objections raised by the plaintiff, including objections to call and text logs showing no work-related communications at the time of the accident.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the judgment. The appellate court held that the employer met its burden on summary judgment by providing uncontradicted evidence that the physician was commuting to work and not performing job duties at the time of the accident. The plaintiff failed to offer admissible evidence creating a triable issue of fact. The court also rejected the argument that the physician’s ability to sometimes work remotely converted her home into a second worksite for all purposes. Thus, the going and coming rule barred employer liability, and summary judgment was properly granted. View "Chang v. So. Cal. Permanente Medical Group" on Justia Law

Elizabeth and Cale Putnam, residents of Massachusetts, traveled to the Hotel Valcartier in Québec, Canada, with their five-year-old son, Anthony. While staying at the hotel, an unsecured Murphy bed fell on Anthony, causing fatal injuries. The Putnams had booked their stay at the hotel and its associated Ice Hotel through the hotel’s website, received receipts and marketing communications at their Massachusetts address, and noticed other Massachusetts vehicles at the hotel during their visit.Following Anthony’s death, the Putnams filed a wrongful death lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts against Premier Parks, LLC, which they believed operated the hotel, and EPR Properties, which they believed owned it. Both Premier and EPR moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, submitting affidavits asserting they neither owned nor operated the hotel, nor marketed or contracted with Massachusetts residents regarding the hotel. The Putnams submitted documentary evidence suggesting connections between Premier, EPR, and the hotel, but the district court dismissed the case with prejudice and denied their request for jurisdictional discovery.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court found that, as to Premier Parks, the Putnams presented enough documentary evidence to create a genuine dispute regarding Premier’s involvement in the hotel’s operations, marketing, and staffing. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by denying jurisdictional discovery with respect to Premier and reversed the dismissal as to Premier, remanding for discovery. Regarding EPR, the court concluded that the Putnams failed to contradict EPR’s affidavit that it did not own or operate the hotel or market it to Massachusetts residents. The court affirmed the dismissal as to EPR but modified the judgment to be without prejudice. View "Putnam v. EPR Properties" on Justia Law

A patient who had recently undergone heart surgery was transported to a hospital after experiencing chest pain. Upon arrival, hospital staff inserted a second intravenous line in her left hand for a CT scan with contrast. During the procedure, contrast agent leaked into the tissue of her hand, and hospital staff followed their protocol to address the infiltration, including administering an antidote and later performing a surgical procedure to drain a hematoma. The patient subsequently alleged that she suffered permanent injury, including Chronic Regional Pain Syndrome, as a result of the infiltration.The patient filed a medical malpractice suit against the hospital, relying on a registered nurse as her expert witness to opine on the standard of care and causation. The District Court of Tulsa County granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital, finding that the nurse was not qualified to testify as to the physician’s standard of care, and that there was insufficient evidence to establish causation. The patient appealed, and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reversed, holding that a factual dispute remained regarding whether non-physician hospital employees were negligent and caused the patient’s injuries.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and concluded that the patient failed to produce a qualified expert to testify regarding the standard of care for physicians, and that the nurse’s opinions could not establish hospital physician negligence. The Court further held that hospital nurses cannot be liable for following physician orders absent evidence that the orders were obviously negligent, and that the patient failed to present proper expert testimony to establish causation between any alleged breach and her injury. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirmed the judgment of the District Court, effectively ruling in favor of the hospital. View "BEAN v. ST. FRANCIS HOSPITAL" on Justia Law