Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Two separate cases were filed in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County by administrators of the estates of deceased individuals who died while incarcerated in West Virginia regional jails. The plaintiffs alleged that jail staff and medical providers failed to respond to the decedents’ serious medical needs, resulting in death or injury. Both complaints included claims against the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DCR) for negligence, negligent training, and “deliberate indifference in violation of clearly established West Virginia law,” but explicitly disclaimed reliance on federal law or constitutional claims, instead seeking damages under state common law.DCR moved to dismiss the deliberate indifference counts, arguing that West Virginia common law does not recognize a standalone cause of action for “deliberate indifference to clearly established law.” The Circuit Court denied the motions, concluding that such a claim was recognized by prior West Virginia Supreme Court decisions and supported by decisions from the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA). DCR then filed petitions in the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia seeking writs of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the circuit court orders denying dismissal.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the matter and granted the writs of prohibition. The Court held that a claim for damages for “deliberate indifference to clearly established law” is not cognizable under the common law of West Virginia. The Court determined that prior decisions, including Nobles v. Duncil, did not establish such a cause of action, but rather recognized deliberate indifference as a legal standard in constitutional claims, most often under federal law. The orders by the Circuit Court were found to be clearly erroneous as a matter of law and thus were prohibited from enforcement. View "State ex rel. Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation v. Salango" on Justia Law

After being injured in a motorcycle accident, the plaintiff was transported to a designated trauma center and diagnosed with a thoracic vertebra fracture. Initially, a non-surgical treatment was recommended, but the defendant physician offered surgery as an alternative, which the plaintiff chose. Following surgery, the plaintiff suffered permanent paraplegia. He later experienced a stroke, and his life care plan was updated to reflect increased needs after this event. The plaintiff sued the physician for medical negligence, alleging failures in preoperative and intraoperative care, and sought compensatory damages. At trial, issues arose regarding the timeliness and scope of expert witness disclosures, as well as the connection between the surgery and later stroke.In the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, a jury found for the plaintiff, awarding substantial damages and finding the physician not only negligent but reckless. The court denied the defendant’s motions for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law, including arguments that West Virginia’s Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA) “Trauma Cap” should limit damages. The defendant appealed, challenging the court’s rulings on the Trauma Cap and procedural matters. The West Virginia Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in part, but reversed on one issue: it found the trial court abused its discretion by striking a late-disclosed expert opinion on life expectancy, and remanded for a new trial solely on damages.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It held that the physician bore the burden to invoke and prove the factual predicates for the Trauma Cap’s application, which he failed to do. The court affirmed that the MPLA Trauma Cap did not apply and upheld most trial court rulings. However, it reversed the appellate court’s order for a new trial on damages, finding no abuse of discretion in striking the late life expectancy expert opinion. The September 12, 2022, judgment was reinstated. View "Orphanos v. Rodgers" on Justia Law

A dispute arose following a 2016 chlorine gas leak at a chemical plant in West Virginia, where IPI, Inc. employees, including its president, Matthew Joseph Taylor, were injured and IPI’s equipment was damaged while performing power washing and industrial painting services for Westlake Chlor-Vinyls Corporation and Westlake Natrium LLC (collectively Westlake). The parties operated under two interrelated service agreements containing indemnity provisions. After the incident, IPI and Taylor sued Westlake for personal injury and property damage. Westlake counterclaimed, arguing that IPI breached the indemnity agreements by bringing suit and owed Westlake indemnification for Taylor’s claims.The Circuit Court of Marshall County applied Pennsylvania law, granted summary judgment to Westlake, and found the indemnity agreements clearly required IPI to indemnify Westlake, even for claims arising from Westlake’s own negligence, except in cases of Westlake’s sole negligence or willful misconduct. The court ruled that IPI’s claims fell within the scope of the agreements, including damages from the chlorine gas release, and certified its order as final under Rule 54(b). On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the application of Pennsylvania law but concluded that the circuit court erred by not analyzing the possible conflict between the two indemnity provisions and by insufficiently explaining why the claims fell within their scope. The ICA remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the ICA’s decision de novo, holding that the two indemnity provisions should be read together, not in conflict, and that both unequivocally require IPI to indemnify Westlake for its own negligence. However, the court found ambiguities regarding the scope of indemnity and the application of exceptions, necessitating factual development through parol evidence. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case with directions to the circuit court. View "Westlake Chlor-Vinyls Corp. v. IPI, Inc." on Justia Law

A resident of Anderson, South Carolina alleged he suffered burns when a lithium-ion battery in his vape pen exploded in Charleston. He claimed that a South Korean corporation manufactured the battery, which he purchased from a local retailer. The complaint asserted that the manufacturer had significant contacts with South Carolina, including the distribution and sale of lithium-ion batteries and knowledge that such batteries were being sold individually for use in vape pens without adequate safety protections. The plaintiff also referenced other similar lawsuits in South Carolina and alleged that the manufacturer knew its batteries were reaching consumers in the state.The manufacturer moved to dismiss the claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction, arguing that it only sold batteries in packs to commercial customers, not individual consumers, and therefore the plaintiff’s injury did not arise out of its contacts with South Carolina. The Circuit Court granted the motion to dismiss, finding no personal jurisdiction. The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, over a dissent.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case on certiorari and reversed the lower courts’ rulings. It held that South Carolina courts may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over the manufacturer. The court reasoned that the manufacturer had purposefully availed itself of the South Carolina market for lithium-ion batteries, including the type at issue, and that the plaintiff’s claims arose out of or related to the manufacturer’s contacts with the state. The court found that due process permits jurisdiction under these circumstances, as it does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The Supreme Court concluded that the manufacturer must defend itself in South Carolina for conduct related to its activities in the state. View "Fleming v. LG Chem Ltd." on Justia Law

A child was injured during a gymnastics class at a facility known as The Little Gym of West Boylston. Her grandmother enrolled her in classes, and her father signed a liability waiver during both the initial and subsequent enrollments. The injury occurred while the child attempted to sit on a piece of equipment and fell, with a coach present at the time. The child, through her mother, brought a negligence claim against the facility, alleging a failure to properly supervise.The Worcester Superior Court reviewed the case on a motion for summary judgment. The facility argued that the liability waiver signed by the child's father barred the negligence claim. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the facility, determining that the waiver was not part of a "contract for health club services" under the relevant Massachusetts statute (G. L. c. 93, § 80). The child appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts transferred the case from the Appeals Court on its own initiative.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the facility qualifies as a "health club" under the statute and that the liability waiver, together with the enrollment paperwork and payment, constituted a "contract for health club services." The Court further found that the negligence claim arose from the child's activities at the facility. As a result, the waiver is prohibited by the statute and is void and unenforceable. The Court vacated the summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the waiver does not bar the negligence claim. View "Cross v. BeFree Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

A train carrying hazardous chemicals derailed in East Palestine, Ohio, resulting in a release of dangerous substances into the environment. This incident led to a class-action lawsuit involving nearly half a million residents. After extensive environmental testing and expert analysis, both sides reached a settlement to avoid prolonged litigation. The settlement established a $600 million fund, allowing residents to receive direct payments and, if desired, additional compensation for waiving personal injury claims. Those with extraordinary losses or injuries could submit claims for further individualized consideration.Prior to this appeal, some objectors challenged the settlement, asserting that class counsel should have reviewed and disclosed more expert evidence regarding long-term risks. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, after a fairness hearing, approved the settlement and rejected these objections. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed that approval, citing the adequacy and fairness of the settlement process and the sufficiency of the evidence considered.A small group of residents who had waived personal injury claims subsequently sought relief from the settlement, alleging fraud and misconduct by class counsel and Norfolk Southern. The Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of relief under Rule 60 for abuse of discretion. The court held that the movants failed to demonstrate fraud on the court, fraud by an opposing party, or extraordinary circumstances warranting relief under Rule 60(b)(3), 60(d)(3), or 60(b)(6). The court further concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing. The main holding is that the settlement approval stands and the movants are not entitled to relief from judgment. The disposition by the Sixth Circuit is affirmed. View "In re: E. Palestine Train Derailment" on Justia Law

The appellants, a family involved in the ballet community, brought a lawsuit against a former student who had publicly accused the family patriarch, her former ballet teacher, of sexual abuse committed in the 1970s and 1980s. The accusations were aired on a podcast, where the defendant discussed her own experiences and those of other named victims, alleging recurring abuse and a coverup at the dance studio. She also made disparaging remarks about the teacher’s wife and son, who had also been active in the studio. The teacher had previously been criminally charged with abuse of another student in the 1980s but was acquitted after trial.The Superior Court of Orange County reviewed the defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion, which argued that the plaintiffs’ slander claims arose from protected activity—statements made in a public forum on matters of public interest—and lacked merit. The trial court found that, while some statements attributed to the defendant were not accurately alleged, those that did accuse the teacher of criminal conduct were privileged under section 47.1 of the California Civil Code, which provides a qualified privilege for sexual assault survivors speaking out without malice. The trial court also found that statements about the wife and son did not accuse them of crimes and therefore did not constitute slander per se.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court’s order granting the anti-SLAPP motion. The appellate court held that the defendant’s statements were protected as they were made in connection with an issue of public interest, and plaintiffs did not establish a probability of prevailing. The court interpreted section 47.1 broadly to cover statements about other alleged victims and clarified that malice requires wrongful intent beyond emotional response. The order striking the complaint was affirmed, and the matter remanded for determination of attorney fees. View "Sellars v. Rose" on Justia Law

The case involves claims brought by the parents and step-parents of a minor, S.A., against a medical professional, Regina Bias, and her employer, Logan Regional Medical Center. The plaintiffs allege that Ms. Bias, a certified pediatric sexual assault nurse examiner, deviated from appropriate medical standards during an evaluation for sexual abuse and falsely reported positive findings, including a sexually transmitted disease, to the Department of Human Services. These alleged false reports resulted in the extended removal of S.A. and a half-sibling from their homes and perpetuated ongoing abuse and neglect proceedings. Plaintiffs claim the defendants financially benefited from repeat examinations and that Ms. Bias ultimately recanted her findings when testifying under oath. The underlying abuse and neglect proceedings were later dismissed after a judicial finding that S.A. was not sexually abused.In the Circuit Court of Mingo County, the defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaints, arguing that they were entitled to statutory “good faith” immunity under West Virginia Code § 49-2-810 for actions taken pursuant to the Child Welfare Act. They asserted that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged bad faith or knowledge to overcome this immunity. The circuit court denied the motions to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged false reporting and that the issue of good faith was a factual question requiring discovery. The court invited the defendants to raise the immunity issue again after discovery.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the interlocutory appeal and dismissed it for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court held that statutory immunity from liability under West Virginia Code § 49-2-810 does not meet the requirements for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine, as it does not constitute immunity from suit or a right not to be tried, nor does it implicate a substantial public interest requiring immediate review. The appeal was therefore dismissed as interlocutory. View "Logan Regional Medical Center v. A.J." on Justia Law

A 20-year-old college student, while on spring break in Alabama, purchased alcohol from a Walmart store using a fake Georgia driver’s license that falsely indicated he was of legal age. A Walmart cashier checked the ID for a few seconds before approving the sale. The following day, after consuming several alcoholic beverages purchased from Walmart, the student drove under the influence and struck and killed an 80-year-old man, James Reed, who was riding a mobility scooter. Reed’s wife, Bonnie Estell, witnessed the accident. The student later admitted that his intoxication, caused by the alcohol bought at Walmart, played a role in the fatal incident.Reed’s widow, appointed by an Indiana court as special administrator of his estate for the purpose of pursuing wrongful death damages, brought a lawsuit against Walmart in the Baldwin Circuit Court. She asserted claims under Alabama’s Dram Shop Act, seeking damages for Reed’s death. Claims against the student driver were settled and dismissed, leaving Walmart as the sole defendant. The trial court denied Walmart’s motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, allowing the Dram Shop Act claim to proceed to a jury. The jury awarded $900,000 in compensatory damages against Walmart.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the Baldwin Circuit Court’s denial of Walmart’s postjudgment motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Court held that the Dram Shop Act allows for a claim for death, expressly overruling prior precedent to the contrary. The Court further found that Estell’s appointment as special administrator was sufficient to assert such a claim, and that a jury question existed as to whether Walmart violated the law in selling alcohol to a minor. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Walmart, Inc. v. Estell" on Justia Law

Several school districts brought lawsuits against major social media companies, alleging that the companies’ platforms caused a mental health crisis among students. The districts claimed that these harms disrupted their educational missions, required additional spending on mental health and disciplinary services, and led to property vandalism, particularly through social media “challenges.” The complaints described features of the platforms as intentionally designed to maximize youth engagement and addictive use, which allegedly resulted in widespread student mental health issues and direct costs to the schools.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County consolidated the cases for demurrer briefing and ruled on complaints from school districts in California, Florida, Washington, and Rhode Island. The districts asserted claims for negligence and public nuisance under the laws of their respective states. In response, the social media defendants argued that the districts’ injuries were derivative of student harms, not cognizable under the legal theories pled, and that the claims were barred by doctrines such as the economic loss rule and federal immunity. The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer in its entirety, finding no legal basis for the claims and denying leave to amend, except for Vancouver School District’s challenge regarding leave to amend.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the trial court’s rulings de novo. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the economic loss rule barred recovery for the school districts’ purely financial harms in negligence and that the alleged disruptions to educational missions and property were either not cognizable or shielded by federal immunity under Section 230. The court also found the public nuisance claims insufficiently pled under the respective state laws, especially lacking allegations that an entire community’s health was affected equally. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of all claims. View "Social Media Cases" on Justia Law