Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A 20-year-old college student, while on spring break in Alabama, purchased alcohol from a Walmart store using a fake Georgia driver’s license that falsely indicated he was of legal age. A Walmart cashier checked the ID for a few seconds before approving the sale. The following day, after consuming several alcoholic beverages purchased from Walmart, the student drove under the influence and struck and killed an 80-year-old man, James Reed, who was riding a mobility scooter. Reed’s wife, Bonnie Estell, witnessed the accident. The student later admitted that his intoxication, caused by the alcohol bought at Walmart, played a role in the fatal incident.Reed’s widow, appointed by an Indiana court as special administrator of his estate for the purpose of pursuing wrongful death damages, brought a lawsuit against Walmart in the Baldwin Circuit Court. She asserted claims under Alabama’s Dram Shop Act, seeking damages for Reed’s death. Claims against the student driver were settled and dismissed, leaving Walmart as the sole defendant. The trial court denied Walmart’s motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, allowing the Dram Shop Act claim to proceed to a jury. The jury awarded $900,000 in compensatory damages against Walmart.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the Baldwin Circuit Court’s denial of Walmart’s postjudgment motion for judgment as a matter of law. The Court held that the Dram Shop Act allows for a claim for death, expressly overruling prior precedent to the contrary. The Court further found that Estell’s appointment as special administrator was sufficient to assert such a claim, and that a jury question existed as to whether Walmart violated the law in selling alcohol to a minor. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court’s judgment. View "Walmart, Inc. v. Estell" on Justia Law

Several school districts brought lawsuits against major social media companies, alleging that the companies’ platforms caused a mental health crisis among students. The districts claimed that these harms disrupted their educational missions, required additional spending on mental health and disciplinary services, and led to property vandalism, particularly through social media “challenges.” The complaints described features of the platforms as intentionally designed to maximize youth engagement and addictive use, which allegedly resulted in widespread student mental health issues and direct costs to the schools.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County consolidated the cases for demurrer briefing and ruled on complaints from school districts in California, Florida, Washington, and Rhode Island. The districts asserted claims for negligence and public nuisance under the laws of their respective states. In response, the social media defendants argued that the districts’ injuries were derivative of student harms, not cognizable under the legal theories pled, and that the claims were barred by doctrines such as the economic loss rule and federal immunity. The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer in its entirety, finding no legal basis for the claims and denying leave to amend, except for Vancouver School District’s challenge regarding leave to amend.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the trial court’s rulings de novo. The court affirmed the judgment, holding that the economic loss rule barred recovery for the school districts’ purely financial harms in negligence and that the alleged disruptions to educational missions and property were either not cognizable or shielded by federal immunity under Section 230. The court also found the public nuisance claims insufficiently pled under the respective state laws, especially lacking allegations that an entire community’s health was affected equally. Accordingly, the appellate court affirmed the dismissal of all claims. View "Social Media Cases" on Justia Law

Six men, including two law enforcement officers and four members of a towing crew, responded to a tractor-trailer accident in St. Francis County, Arkansas, in April 2018. The accident involved an Old Dominion Freight Line truck transporting a 565-pound barrel of formic acid, a hazardous material. Although federal law did not require placarding for this volume, Old Dominion’s driver failed to disclose the presence of hazardous material when asked by emergency responders. The responders were subsequently exposed to toxic fumes, resulting in permanent respiratory and related injuries. All six men sought emergency medical care and later brought negligence claims against Old Dominion and its driver, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.The St. Francis County Circuit Court held a jury trial, which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiffs, awarding them $75 million in compensatory damages and finding no liability for punitive damages. The defendants' post-trial motions for a new trial or remittitur were denied by operation of law. On appeal, the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and ordered a new trial, finding the compensatory damages unsupported by substantial evidence. The parties petitioned for review, which the Supreme Court of Arkansas granted, treating the case as if originally filed there.The Supreme Court of Arkansas affirmed the circuit court’s judgment and vacated the court of appeals’ opinion. It held that, given the immediate and acute toxic exposure, a heightened causation standard was not required, and that the evidence—including expert medical testimony—was sufficient to support the jury’s proximate cause finding. The court further held that the plaintiffs’ claims were not preempted by federal law, the professional-rescuer’s doctrine did not bar recovery, and the evidentiary and procedural rulings below were not abuses of discretion. Finally, the court found the damages award was supported by substantial evidence and was not so excessive as to shock the conscience. View "OLD DOMINION FREIGHT LINE, INC. v. MCMILLION" on Justia Law

Four individuals alleged that they were sexually abused as children by James Nesmith, a pediatric doctor and church counselor, between 1995 and 2007. They claimed the abuse occurred during medical visits, at home, and at a church camp. Their lawsuit sought damages for sexual assault, sexual battery, and infliction of extreme emotional distress under Arkansas tort law and a statute granting crime victims a cause of action. However, the plaintiffs did not file their claims within the standard limitations periods applicable to such actions. Instead, they relied on the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sex Abuse Act, which revived and extended the statute of limitations for child sex abuse claims within a specific timeframe. The parties conceded that the plaintiffs’ complaint was filed within the revived window provided by the Act.James Nesmith moved for summary judgment in the Pulaski County Circuit Court, arguing that under the Arkansas Supreme Court’s existing vested-rights precedent, the General Assembly lacked the authority to revive claims that were already time-barred, rendering the Act invalid and the claims untimely. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the complaint on statute of limitations grounds. The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed, citing binding precedent that prohibited legislative revival of expired claims.The Supreme Court of Arkansas granted review and reversed the lower courts’ decisions. The court overruled its prior vested-rights precedent, finding no constitutional basis for categorically prohibiting the legislature from reviving time-barred claims through legislation. It upheld the Justice for Vulnerable Victims of Sex Abuse Act, concluding that the General Assembly has the authority to set or extend statutes of limitations, including for previously barred claims. The court reversed the circuit court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, and vacated the opinion of the court of appeals. View "H.C. v. NESMITH" on Justia Law

A wrongful death action was brought by the administratrix of a decedent’s estate against an employee of Adult Protective Services (APS) and the West Virginia Department of Human Services (DHS). The decedent, a vulnerable adult, lived with family members and required assistance with daily activities. A referral alleging abuse and neglect was made to APS, prompting multiple visits and interviews by the APS worker, who documented improvements made to the residence and ultimately closed the referral without removing the decedent from the home or contacting law enforcement. The complaint alleged that the APS worker’s decisions, including closing the referral and failing to remove the decedent or report to authorities, proximately caused the decedent’s death.The Circuit Court of Logan County denied motions to dismiss filed by the APS employee and DHS, concluding that whether the acts were ministerial, violated statutory duties, or constituted willful, wanton, or intentional misconduct presented questions of fact for a jury. The circuit court declined to apply the qualified immunity doctrine at the motion to dismiss stage, asserting issues regarding statutory violations and the nature of the conduct required jury determination.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the appeal, applying a de novo standard. The court held that the APS worker’s actions were discretionary and thus subject to qualified immunity, absent allegations of violation of a clearly established statutory or constitutional right, or conduct that was fraudulent, malicious, or oppressive. The court found that the complaint failed to plead sufficient facts to overcome qualified immunity and did not establish a causal link between the APS worker’s actions and the decedent’s death. Accordingly, the court reversed the circuit court’s denial of the motions to dismiss and remanded with instructions to grant the motions to dismiss. View "Secrist v. Watkins" on Justia Law

An employee of an electric car company was involved in a motor vehicle collision with a motorcyclist while driving a company-owned service truck. The employee had been authorized by his manager to take the truck home the previous evening for his convenience, rather than returning it to the service center after dropping off a company trailer. The following morning, while driving the truck back to work, the employee stopped for gas per an informal company policy recommending that vehicles be returned with at least a quarter tank of fuel. During this stop, the collision occurred, resulting in severe injuries to the motorcyclist.Following the accident, the injured party was found incompetent, and his guardian substituted as plaintiff. The plaintiff sued the employee and his employer, claiming the employer was vicariously liable under respondeat superior because the employee was acting within the scope of his employment. The Marion Superior Court granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiff and the employee, finding as a matter of law that the employer was liable since the employee was on a special errand for his employer. The trial proceeded in two phases: the jury allocated seventy percent fault to the employee and thirty percent to the motorcyclist, and awarded damages, which were then reduced according to comparative fault.On appeal, the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment on vicarious liability and the liability phase, but reversed for a new trial on damages due to improper ex parte communications between the judge and jury. The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer, vacating the appellate decision. The Indiana Supreme Court held that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the employee was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. Therefore, the trial court’s summary judgment on vicarious liability was reversed, and the case was remanded for a new trial on that issue and on damages, but the jury’s allocation of fault remains intact. View "Kaszuba v. Norris" on Justia Law

A woman, acting as administrator of her late husband’s estate and in her individual capacity, filed a medical malpractice action against multiple doctors and medical practices. The complaint alleged that after an MRI detected a lesion on her husband’s kidney in 2017, recommended follow-up care was not pursued by his medical providers. In 2020, he was diagnosed with kidney cancer and died within months. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ failure to act constituted a breach of the standard of care. Before trial, some defendants were dismissed, and the case proceeded to a jury trial against several remaining doctors and practices.During jury selection, the plaintiff’s counsel challenged four prospective jurors for cause, arguing that their responses during voir dire showed they could not be fair and impartial or would not follow the law as instructed by the court. The trial court denied these for-cause challenges, finding the prospective jurors’ answers did not establish actual bias or unwillingness to follow the law. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. The appellate court reviewed the trial court’s denial of the for-cause challenges under an abuse-of-discretion standard.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. It held that under R.C. 2313.17(B)(9), when a principal challenge is made to a prospective juror on grounds of bias or unwillingness to follow the law, the trial court must determine the validity of the challenge, and, if valid, the juror must be absolutely disqualified. The court overruled prior precedent to the extent it permitted discretion at this stage. However, it found that competent, credible evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the challenges were not valid. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals. View "Estate of Price v. Kidney Care Specialists, L.L.C." on Justia Law

A fatal traffic collision occurred involving Erika Chavez and Jose Ortiz-Muñoz, an employee of O’Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc. Erika Chavez’s widower sought and obtained the appointment of Dennis P. Murphy as the personal representative (PR) for the wrongful death estate. After Murphy’s appointment, but before filing a wrongful death complaint, the plaintiffs conducted examinations under oath of various O’Reilly personnel using subpoenas issued under the appointment proceeding’s case number. O’Reilly was not a party to the appointment proceeding, and its employees were questioned, sometimes without counsel present. Subsequently, a wrongful death complaint was filed against O’Reilly and others, alleging negligent supervision and control related to the vehicle involved in the crash.O’Reilly, in the wrongful death action in the First Judicial District Court, moved to dismiss the case or alternatively sought exclusion of the pre-complaint discovery and disqualification of plaintiffs’ counsel. O’Reilly argued that a PR appointed under the Wrongful Death Act (WDA) does not have subpoena power in an appointment proceeding, as such actions are not pending civil cases under the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court denied the motion, finding O’Reilly’s proposed remedies too severe, but certified the issue for interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico granted certiorari to decide whether a concluded WDA appointment proceeding is a pending action permitting subpoena power. The Court held that issuance of an order appointing a PR under the WDA constitutes a final order, ending the appointment proceeding. Therefore, a PR does not have subpoena power after such appointment and before filing a wrongful death claim. The Court did not address remedies for misuse of subpoena power and remanded for application of its holding. View "Murphy v. O'Reilly Auto. Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Pamela Smith died after surgery at Lovelace Medical Center, operated by Lovelace Health System, LLC. Smith’s estate brought wrongful death claims against Lovelace, asserting both direct negligence and vicarious liability based on the conduct of Lovelace’s employed registered nurses. Lovelace was a “qualified health care provider” (QHP) under the New Mexico Medical Malpractice Act (MMA), but its employed registered nurses were not, nor could they be under the version of the Act in effect at the time.The Plaintiff sought summary judgment in the Second Judicial District Court, arguing that the MMA did not apply to claims based on the conduct of non-QHP registered nurses, and therefore Lovelace was not entitled to the MMA’s protections—including the damages cap—for vicarious liability claims arising from nurse conduct. The District Court agreed, granting summary judgment and concluding that Lovelace was not entitled to the Act’s benefits regarding its nurse employees’ actions. Lovelace sought interlocutory appeal; the New Mexico Court of Appeals denied review, but the Supreme Court of New Mexico granted certiorari.The Supreme Court of New Mexico reviewed the statutory construction de novo. It held that the plain language of the MMA covers vicarious liability claims against QHPs, regardless of whether the agent (here, a nurse) is a QHP, so long as the agent’s conduct constitutes medical treatment or a departure from accepted standards resulting in injury. The Court rejected the argument that only the conduct of a QHP can be the basis for a malpractice claim under the MMA, and affirmed that Lovelace is entitled to the Act’s protections—including the damages cap—for vicarious liability claims arising from nurse conduct. The summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff was reversed. View "Ferlic v. Lovelace Health Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

Maurice Voce, a self-taught investor, traded stock options with Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC for decades, amassing a substantial fortune. His children and nephew, as co-trustees of his trusts and personal representative of his estate, alleged that Morgan Stanley and advisor John Privitelli continued facilitating risky trading and collecting commissions even as Maurice’s cognitive health declined in his later years. They claimed this conduct constituted breach of fiduciary duty and financial elder abuse. The plaintiffs also asserted that Privitelli’s advice extended to tax and estate planning, resulting in costly insurance policies and tax penalties.Previously, the plaintiffs initiated arbitration with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which dismissed their claims without prejudice, permitting them to pursue litigation. They then filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The trial court found the claims timely under the discovery rule but imposed a damages cutoff based on a backward projection of the remaining statute of limitations period. The court also granted defendants’ motion for nonsuit, dismissing both causes of action. It ruled there was insufficient evidence of harm for elder abuse and concluded defendants’ fiduciary duty did not cover tax and estate planning advice, as they were not formally hired or paid for such services. Additionally, it determined plaintiffs failed to provide expert testimony on excessive trading for the breach of fiduciary duty claim.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court misapplied the statute of limitations by limiting damages to a narrow period, rather than considering the full course of wrongful conduct for timely claims. The appellate court found plaintiffs’ evidence sufficient to survive nonsuit on both the elder abuse claim and the breach of fiduciary duty claim, to the extent that the latter involved issues beyond excessive trading. However, it affirmed nonsuit regarding the excessive trading theory due to lack of expert evidence. The judgment was reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "DeVone v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC" on Justia Law