Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A man died from burn injuries after his clothing ignited while he was working near a portable propane tank top heater manufactured by Enerco Group, Inc. The decedent’s estate, represented by Jesse Near, filed a wrongful death suit alleging that the heater was defectively designed because it lacked an adequate guard or feasible alternative design to prevent clothing ignition when someone came close to the heater. The plaintiff did not assert a separate failure-to-warn claim. However, the sufficiency of the product warnings was central to the dispute, as Enerco maintained that adequate warnings rendered the product nondefective under South Carolina law.The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina addressed three key issues: it denied the plaintiff’s motion to certify to the Supreme Court of South Carolina the question of whether adequate warnings preclude a design defect claim; it excluded the plaintiff’s expert witness on the adequacy of warnings, finding her methodology unreliable; and, after treating the warnings as adequate as a matter of law (because there was no admissible evidence to the contrary), it granted summary judgment to Enerco, holding that under South Carolina law, adequate warnings preclude a design defect claim. The district court relied on the Fourth Circuit’s prior decision in Hickerson v. Yamaha Motor Corp., which interpreted South Carolina law to that effect.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert witness, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert’s opinions unreliable. However, the Fourth Circuit found that South Carolina law was unsettled on whether adequate warnings categorically preclude a design defect claim, especially in light of subsequent developments in South Carolina case law. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit certified this specific legal question to the Supreme Court of South Carolina and deferred ruling on the summary judgment issue until the Supreme Court responds. View "Near v. Enerco Group, Inc." on Justia Law

After enduring physical and sexual abuse while in the care of James and Susan McLaurie as a young child, the plaintiff obtained a $150 million judgment against both individuals in Missouri state court. Seeking to collect on this judgment, the plaintiff subsequently filed a new action in state court against the McLauries and their homeowner’s insurer, Liberty Mutual, asserting equitable garnishment claims against all three and additional claims, including bad faith and breach of contract, against Liberty Mutual.Liberty Mutual removed the action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri, invoking diversity jurisdiction. At the time of removal, James McLaurie had not yet been served but later entered an appearance. The plaintiff moved to remand, arguing a lack of complete diversity, and James McLaurie joined this motion, expressly refusing to consent to removal. The district court disagreed that diversity was lacking but found that the absence of consent from all defendants rendered removal procedurally defective under the requirement of unanimity in 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A). The court granted remand on this procedural ground.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit examined whether it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s remand order. The appellate court held that, under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), remand orders based on procedural defects—such as a lack of unanimity among defendants—are not reviewable, so long as the district court’s basis was at least “colorably” procedural. The court determined that the district court’s characterization of its order as resting on a procedural defect was colorable. Accordingly, the Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "G.T. v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Two individuals became involved in a public dispute relating to allegations of Russian interference and the passage of the Magnitsky Act. One party, a British citizen, made several statements in media interviews and social media posts from New York, characterizing the other party—a Russian-American lobbyist—as a “spy operator in Washington, D.C.” and linking him to a controversial meeting at Trump Tower in New York. The lobbyist claimed these statements were defamatory and brought suit in the District of Columbia, arguing that the statements caused harm to his reputation in D.C. and that the speaker’s comments established personal jurisdiction.The United States District Court for the District of Columbia reviewed the claim and dismissed the case, holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the British citizen. The district court also denied the speaker’s request for attorney’s fees under the D.C. Anti–SLAPP Act, finding that such fees were not warranted because the dismissal was based on lack of jurisdiction rather than on a motion under the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the British citizen did not “purposefully avail” himself of the benefits and protections of D.C. law, as required under the minimum-contacts test from International Shoe Co. v. Washington. The statements at issue did not focus on D.C. or create jurisdictionally significant contacts with the forum. The court also affirmed the denial of attorney’s fees, ruling that the D.C. Anti–SLAPP Act does not apply when the dismissal is for lack of personal jurisdiction rather than under the statute’s special motion to dismiss. The court denied the request for jurisdictional discovery. View "Akhmetshin v. Browder" on Justia Law

A professional track and field athlete received a bottle of Gatorade Recovery Gummies at an award ceremony hosted by Gatorade, which were labeled as “NSF Certified for Sport,” indicating independent testing for banned substances. After consuming the gummies, the athlete submitted a routine drug test that later returned positive for cardarine, a banned performance-enhancing drug, resulting in immediate suspension from elite competition. Subsequent investigation revealed that the gummies lot the athlete received had never been NSF certified, and Gatorade was aware of the mislabeling before distributing the product. The athlete suffered significant consequences, including loss of eligibility to compete, loss of a scholarship, and forfeiture of endorsement opportunities.The athlete initiated legal action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging strict products liability, negligence, negligent misrepresentation, violation of Texas’s Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, tortious interference with contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court dismissed all claims. It found no “cognizable injury outside of purely economic damages” for the strict liability, negligence, and misrepresentation claims, applying New York’s economic loss doctrine. Additional claims were dismissed based on statutory definitions and insufficient allegations of extreme conduct or distress.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. It affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the tortious interference, consumer protection, and emotional distress claims. However, the court recognized uncertainty in New York law regarding tort recovery for nonconsensual bodily changes detectable only by laboratory testing and the boundaries of the economic loss doctrine. Accordingly, the Second Circuit deferred decision and certified two questions to the New York Court of Appeals concerning the scope of the economic loss doctrine and whether the athlete’s injury is cognizable in tort under New York law. View "Asinga v. Gatorade Co." on Justia Law

Parents, guardians, and children brought state law claims against manufacturers, pharmacies, and retailers of acetaminophen products, alleging that prenatal exposure to acetaminophen caused ADHD and/or autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The plaintiffs contended that the defendants failed to warn about these risks. Acetaminophen is commonly used during pregnancy, but the FDA only requires a general warning for pregnant women and does not mandate warnings about ADHD or ASD. Scientific debate exists regarding any causal relationship between prenatal acetaminophen exposure and neurodevelopmental disorders, with studies and expert opinions both supporting and questioning such links.After these cases were consolidated in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, the court excluded all general causation expert testimony offered by plaintiffs in Rutledge (Drs. Baccarelli, Hollander, Pearson, Cabrera, Louie) and Phippen (Dr. Ness), determining their opinions were unreliable and not based on sufficient scientific methodology under Rule 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. The district court then granted summary judgment for the defendants. It also rejected defendants’ arguments that federal law preempted the plaintiffs’ failure-to-warn claims, holding that federal drug labeling regulations did not prohibit supplemental warnings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s decisions. It held that the district court erred in excluding the testimony of Drs. Baccarelli, Hollander, and Pearson, as their methodologies and interpretations were consistent with accepted scientific practices and the ongoing debate in the field. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of Drs. Cabrera and Louie. The Second Circuit also held that reconsideration of Dr. Ness’s testimony in Phippen was warranted. The court affirmed the district court’s rejection of the federal preemption defense. The judgments in both cases were vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rutledge v. Walgreen Co." on Justia Law

A husband and wife brought a lawsuit against a physician and his employer after the husband, working as a surgical technologist, was exposed to HIV-positive blood during a cardiac procedure. The exposure occurred when the physician discharged blood onto a sterile drape rather than into a splash bin, causing blood to splash into the husband’s eye. Following this incident, the husband underwent antiviral treatment with significant side effects and endured months of anxiety and medical testing, which also affected his marriage.The plaintiffs filed five claims, including negligence, assault, battery, unfair business practices, and loss of consortium (the latter on behalf of the wife only), in the Riverside County Superior Court. The defendants demurred to four of the claims and moved to strike several forms of relief. The trial court overruled the demurrer as to negligence but sustained it with leave to amend for the other challenged claims, and struck certain relief such as punitive damages. Before the amendment period expired, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all their claims with prejudice, expressly to expedite an appeal of the trial court’s orders. After the clerk entered the dismissal, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. The Fourth Appellate District, Division One, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that a voluntary dismissal is not an appealable judgment.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the matter and held that when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an action before the court has issued a final resolution as to any pleaded claim, the dismissal terminates the action and forfeits the right to appeal. The Court clarified that such a dismissal is a ministerial act, not a judgment that confers appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants' Medical Group" on Justia Law

An employee filed a workers’ compensation claim with the Utah Labor Commission, alleging significant injuries, including complex regional pain syndrome, sustained while working for her employer. As part of the claim process, she was ordered by an administrative law judge (ALJ) to attend independent medical examinations (IMEs) with three different physicians selected by her employer. Each exam failed to be completed due to disputes or complications involving her cooperation, including refusal to sign paperwork, attempts to record the exam, and disagreements over exam conditions.The employer moved for sanctions after repeated failed IMEs. The ALJ found that the employee and her attorneys had hindered the employer’s right to conduct a medical exam and dismissed her claim, also ordering her attorneys to pay the resulting costs. On appeal, the Labor Commission Appeals Board initially reversed the dismissal, ruling that the statutory sanction for obstructing an IME is suspension of the claim, not dismissal. However, after a third failed exam, the Board changed its position, concluding that the employee’s pattern of obstruction warranted dismissal under rule 37 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and imposed monetary sanctions on her attorneys.The Supreme Court of the State of Utah reviewed the case on certification from the Court of Appeals. The court held that dismissal is not an available sanction for obstructing a medical examination under Utah Code section 34A-2-602(2); instead, the only permissible sanction is suspension of the claim during the period of obstruction. The court also found that the employee herself did not have standing to challenge the monetary sanctions imposed on her attorneys. The court reversed the Board’s order dismissing the claim but left the monetary sanctions undisturbed, to be challenged by the proper party. View "Hooker v. Labor Commission" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, represented by the same counsel as earlier litigants, alleged injuries caused by cellphone radiation exposure. Their complaints were nearly identical to those in a previous set of cases involving similar claims. The plaintiffs agreed, through joint stipulations filed in their cases, that the outcome of expert admissibility litigation in the earlier cases would apply to their own. This agreement included being bound by both the substantive ruling on whether expert testimony about general causation was admissible and all procedural rulings leading up to that determination. The stipulations were signed by counsel for both sides, and subsequent court orders stayed the plaintiffs’ cases pending the resolution of expert admissibility in the earlier litigation.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia managed the earlier cases by first resolving whether the plaintiffs had admissible expert testimony on general causation, limiting discovery to that issue. After several hearings and rulings, the court ultimately excluded the plaintiffs’ expert testimony under the Daubert/Rule 702 standard, and granted summary judgment to the defendants because the plaintiffs lacked the necessary expert evidence to support their claims. The Brooks plaintiffs later moved to lift the stays in their cases, arguing for broader discovery and the opportunity to present new expert witnesses, but the court denied this motion.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed whether the Brooks plaintiffs were bound by their agreements and the trial court’s rulings. The court held that the plaintiffs had agreed—expressly or implicitly—to be bound by both the outcome of the expert admissibility litigation and the procedural rulings in the earlier cases. The court affirmed the Superior Court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the plaintiffs lacked admissible expert testimony required to prove their claims. View "Brooks v. Mitsubishi Electric & Electronics US, Inc." on Justia Law

Two hotel guests drowned while swimming in the ocean in front of a beachfront hotel in Carolina, Puerto Rico. Their family members, the plaintiffs, alleged that neither the hotel nor its contractor, Iguana Sport Services, Corp. (“Iguana”), provided warnings or safety measures regarding dangerous ocean conditions, despite rip current warnings being in effect at the time. Iguana had been contracted to provide towel and beach attendants for the hotel and held certain government permits to operate in the hotel’s beach area.The family members filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, naming the hotel, Iguana, and other related entities as defendants. After settling with all other defendants, the plaintiffs proceeded against Iguana. Iguana moved for summary judgment, arguing it had no duty—by contract, permit, or law—to warn or protect guests from ocean dangers. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Iguana, finding it did not owe a duty of care to the deceased guests under any contractual, regulatory, or statutory basis, including the heightened duty of care sometimes imposed on innkeepers by Puerto Rico law.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The plaintiffs argued Iguana owed a duty under its agreements, its government permit, and Puerto Rico’s heightened standard for innkeepers or similar entities. The First Circuit held that unresolved and outcome-determinative questions of Puerto Rico law existed regarding the scope and applicability of any heightened duty of care for entities like Iguana. The court therefore certified two dispositive legal questions to the Puerto Rico Supreme Court and retained jurisdiction pending that court’s response, rather than issuing a ruling on the merits at this time. View "Wilson v. Iguana Sport Services, Corp." on Justia Law

On August 12, 2014, Eva Pena was injured while attempting to board a Rhode Island Public Transit Authority (RIPTA) bus in Providence. She alleged that the bus driver closed the doors on her, causing her to fall and sustain serious injuries. After her death in 2019, her estate continued the suit, claiming negligence by RIPTA. At trial, testimony was presented from multiple witnesses, including Pena’s deposition, the bus driver, a RIPTA supervisor, and Pena’s son. Central to the dispute was the supervisor’s account of a conversation with Pena, which had been facilitated by an unidentified Spanish interpreter at the scene.The Providence County Superior Court admitted the supervisor’s testimony and report about what Pena allegedly said through the interpreter, overruling objections that this constituted inadmissible hearsay. The jury returned a verdict for RIPTA, finding that the plaintiff had not proven negligence. The plaintiff moved for a new trial, arguing that the trial justice erred in allowing hearsay testimony via the unidentified interpreter. The trial court denied the motion, finding the issue unsettled under Rhode Island law and suitable for appellate clarification.The Supreme Court of Rhode Island reviewed the case and reversed the Superior Court’s denial of a new trial. The Supreme Court held that admitting the supervisor’s testimony and report regarding Pena’s statements, relayed through the unidentified interpreter, was an abuse of discretion because it constituted inadmissible hearsay lacking reliability and trustworthiness. The Court found that this evidence was not cumulative and its admission affected the substantial rights of the parties. The case was remanded for a new trial consistent with the Supreme Court’s opinion. View "Fernandez v. Rhode Island Public Transit Authority" on Justia Law