Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries
Brown v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.
Several property owners in and around Merrimack, New Hampshire, brought an action alleging that a plastics manufacturing facility released airborne toxic chemicals, specifically perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA), which subsequently contaminated local drinking water sources, including both private wells and the municipal water supply. They claimed harm to their property interests due to this contamination and sought damages for diminution in property value, costs of remediation, and loss of use and enjoyment, among other injuries.After the case was removed from New Hampshire state court, it proceeded in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. Plaintiffs moved to certify a class of property owners in the affected geographic area. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, certifying a class under Rule 23(b)(3) for liability issues on trespass, negligence, and negligent failure to warn, but denied certification for nuisance and for damages issues, which it found to be individualized. The district court bifurcated proceedings, planning to address liability on a class-wide basis first, with damages to be determined in later, individualized proceedings. Saint-Gobain, the principal defendant, was granted permission to appeal the certification order.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s order. The appellate court reversed the class certification as to negligence and negligent failure to warn, finding that injury and causation on those claims would require individualized, property-by-property proof that predominated over common issues. However, the court affirmed class certification for liability on the trespass claim, concluding that, under New Hampshire law, plaintiffs need only prove the intentional physical invasion of their property by PFOA attributable to the facility, which could be established on a common basis. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these rulings. View "Brown v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp." on Justia Law
Birch v. Ross
A woman was injured in an automobile accident while riding as a passenger in a vehicle driven by her daughter. Her daughter and granddaughter died in the crash, while she and another granddaughter survived with significant injuries. The daughter had taken medication that could cause drowsiness, and the accident occurred after she fell asleep at the wheel, despite requests from passengers to let someone else drive. The injured woman filed suit against her daughter, the daughter’s estate, the daughter’s husband, and other unnamed parties, alleging negligent driving caused her injuries.After the defendants failed to respond, the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Payette County, entered default on liability and held an evidentiary hearing on damages. However, the court dismissed all claims with prejudice, reasoning that without a probate proceeding or appointment of a personal representative, claims could not proceed against the estate or the deceased daughter. It also found the husband was not a proper party, as no negligence was alleged against him. The court denied the plaintiff’s motions to reconsider or set aside the judgment, concluding she did not act with excusable neglect and failed to timely name the proper party.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the case. It held that the district court abused its discretion and violated the plaintiff’s procedural due process rights by dismissing the case with prejudice without providing meaningful notice or an opportunity to be heard regarding the dismissal’s severity. The Supreme Court also found the district court failed to articulate any legal or factual basis for dismissing with prejudice. The judgment was vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiff to seek leave to amend her complaint to name the personal representative and determining if the amended complaint relates back to the original filing. View "Birch v. Ross" on Justia Law
Thomas v. Sysco Foods
An employee suffered a significant workplace injury resulting in the amputation of his lower left leg while working as a forklift operator. The employer accepted liability and initially provided partial disability benefits, which were later increased following a stipulation that recognized the severity and psychiatric consequences of the injury. Subsequently, the employer filed a petition to terminate benefits for the adjustment disorder, relying on a psychiatric report from an independent medical examination (IME) conducted for third-party litigation. The employee’s workers’ compensation attorney was not notified of this IME, though the employee himself attended.A Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) allowed the employer to admit the IME report and proceed with the termination petition, granting the employee’s counsel additional time to prepare rebuttal evidence. Both parties presented expert testimony, with the WCJ ultimately crediting the employer’s expert and finding the employee fully recovered, thus granting the termination petition. The Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) affirmed, noting the employer’s lack of notice to counsel was not grounds for remand and that the employee had counsel’s advice for earlier IMEs. The Commonwealth Court also affirmed, reasoning that while special rules require notice to counsel, the lack of notice did not result in actual prejudice because the employee’s counsel had opportunities to challenge the IME report and expert testimony.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Commonwealth Court’s decision. The Court held that under the Special Rules governing workers’ compensation proceedings, an employer must provide notice of an IME to the employee’s counsel. Failure to do so is presumed prejudicial and bars the employer from using the improperly noticed IME to alter the employee’s benefits. The Court vacated the WCJ’s order granting termination and directed that proper notice and a new expert would be required for any future proceedings. View "Thomas v. Sysco Foods" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Personal Injury, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
State v. Conley
On September 12, 2019, the defendant drove his truck across the center line on a Logan County road, colliding head-on with another vehicle driven by Brittany Duty. The crash resulted in both vehicles catching fire, causing severe injuries to Brittany Duty and the death of her passenger, Beverly Duty. First responders noted the defendant exhibited signs of intoxication, including slurred speech, combative behavior, and the smell of alcohol. Blood samples were taken at two hospitals: one within two hours of the collision, showing a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of .263 percent, and another six to seven hours later, showing a BAC of .131 percent. The defendant was indicted for causing death and serious bodily injury while driving in an impaired state.The Circuit Court of Logan County denied the defendant’s pre-trial motions to exclude the BAC test results, finding the first sample was drawn within two hours of the collision and would be admissible if analyzed according to state health standards. The court also ruled the second sample, taken pursuant to a warrant and outside the statutory two-hour window, would be admissible, with its timing affecting its weight, not its admissibility. The defendant entered conditional guilty pleas, reserving the right to appeal these evidentiary rulings.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the circuit court’s decisions de novo for legal conclusions and under a clearly erroneous standard for factual findings. The Court held that the blood test taken within two hours of the collision was admissible as presumptive evidence of impairment, and the second test, though not qualifying for statutory presumptions, was admissible under the Rules of Evidence. The Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of the motions in limine and upheld the defendant’s convictions. View "State v. Conley" on Justia Law
Kreitzer v. Safeco Insurance Company of America
After being rear-ended in 2018, the plaintiff claimed various injuries including concussion, neck pain, cognitive deficits, psychological issues, and TMJ dysfunction. She settled with the at-fault driver’s insurer for $45,000 but believed her damages exceeded that amount. She sought $25,000—the full underinsured motorist (UIM) policy—from her own insurer, Safeco. Safeco evaluated her claim, excluded certain medical expenses such as TMJ treatment, and initially offered $4,000, inviting further negotiation. The plaintiff rejected this and filed suit for breach of contract, enhanced damages (Hayseeds), and violations of the West Virginia Unfair Trade Practices Act (WVUTPA).The case originated in West Virginia state court but was removed by Safeco to the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia. During discovery, the plaintiff produced new expert reports estimating much higher damages. Safeco then offered the full UIM policy limit of $25,000, which was memorialized in a joint motion signed by both parties, explicitly resolving the claim for policy proceeds and leaving only extracontractual and bad faith claims. The district court found the contractual claim settled, denied the plaintiff’s attempt to later seek reformation for higher policy limits, and granted summary judgment to Safeco on all claims. It found Safeco’s conduct reasonable and no evidence of a pattern of unfair trade practices.Reviewing the appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held the breach of contract claim was resolved for $25,000 based on undisputed settlement evidence, rejected the plaintiff’s reformation argument, found Safeco’s conduct did not necessitate litigation for Hayseeds damages, and concluded there was no evidence of a general business practice violating WVUTPA. The judgment and orders of the district court were affirmed. View "Kreitzer v. Safeco Insurance Company of America" on Justia Law
Marsh v. U.S.A. Healthcare Management, LLC
A woman, acting as personal representative of her late husband's estate, brought a medical negligence action after her husband died following treatment at the University of South Alabama Hospital. She alleged that various doctors and U.S.A. Healthcare Management, LLC (HCM) failed to provide adequate care, leading to his death. HCM employed the hospital staff involved and was created by the University of South Alabama (USA) to manage its healthcare system. The plaintiff claimed HCM was vicariously liable for the doctors’ alleged negligence.HCM moved for dismissal or summary judgment in the Mobile Circuit Court, arguing it was entitled to State immunity based on its relationship to USA, a State institution. HCM presented affidavits and documentation showing USA was its sole member and manager, and that HCM’s finances were intertwined with USA. The plaintiff opposed, arguing HCM was a separately created LLC under Alabama law, formed to shield USA from certain liabilities, and operated as an independent entity. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of HCM, finding it was entitled to immunity, and later certified the judgment as final for appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. It examined whether HCM, as an LLC created by a State agency, qualified as a State agency for purposes of immunity under Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution. Applying the factors from Armory Commission of Alabama v. Staudt, the court determined HCM’s powers and functions were typical of private entities, not unique to government, and its relationship with USA did not override its separate legal status as an LLC. The court held HCM was not entitled to State immunity and reversed the circuit court’s summary judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Marsh v. U.S.A. Healthcare Management, LLC" on Justia Law
Knight v. Glover
Linda Fay Campbell underwent kidney surgery at St. Dominic-Jackson Memorial Hospital, during which her colon was unintentionally perforated. Campbell subsequently required additional surgery by Dr. Jeffery Glover to address the perforation. Later, a surgical sponge was discovered in Campbell’s abdomen from the prior surgery, requiring yet another operation by Dr. Glover. Campbell initially filed a medical-negligence personal injury suit against Dr. Tanaka, Dr. Glover, and St. Dominic. She passed away while the suit was pending, and her estate and wrongful death beneficiaries sought to pursue claims related to her death and pre-death injuries.After Campbell’s death, her attorneys filed a suggestion of death and indicated an amended complaint would be filed on behalf of her estate and wrongful death beneficiaries. However, the motion to substitute parties was not timely under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 25. The parties agreed to dismiss Dr. Tanaka with prejudice and later dismissed the original suit without prejudice, preserving claims for wrongful death. Torrie Campbell Knight, as administratrix, then filed a new complaint alleging wrongful death against Dr. Glover and others. As discovery progressed, St. Dominic and Dr. Tanaka were dismissed, leaving Dr. Glover as the sole defendant. Dr. Glover moved for summary judgment, arguing that no act or omission by him proximately caused Campbell’s death and that any personal injury claims were barred.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed whether the wrongful death complaint adequately pled a separate personal-injury-survival claim. The Court held that the complaint only asserted a wrongful death claim under the wrongful death statute and did not include a distinct personal-injury-survival claim. Therefore, the Court found summary judgment for Dr. Glover was proper, reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, reinstated, and affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County. View "Knight v. Glover" on Justia Law
State ex rel. Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation v. Salango
Two separate cases were filed in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County by administrators of the estates of deceased individuals who died while incarcerated in West Virginia regional jails. The plaintiffs alleged that jail staff and medical providers failed to respond to the decedents’ serious medical needs, resulting in death or injury. Both complaints included claims against the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DCR) for negligence, negligent training, and “deliberate indifference in violation of clearly established West Virginia law,” but explicitly disclaimed reliance on federal law or constitutional claims, instead seeking damages under state common law.DCR moved to dismiss the deliberate indifference counts, arguing that West Virginia common law does not recognize a standalone cause of action for “deliberate indifference to clearly established law.” The Circuit Court denied the motions, concluding that such a claim was recognized by prior West Virginia Supreme Court decisions and supported by decisions from the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA). DCR then filed petitions in the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia seeking writs of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the circuit court orders denying dismissal.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the matter and granted the writs of prohibition. The Court held that a claim for damages for “deliberate indifference to clearly established law” is not cognizable under the common law of West Virginia. The Court determined that prior decisions, including Nobles v. Duncil, did not establish such a cause of action, but rather recognized deliberate indifference as a legal standard in constitutional claims, most often under federal law. The orders by the Circuit Court were found to be clearly erroneous as a matter of law and thus were prohibited from enforcement. View "State ex rel. Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation v. Salango" on Justia Law
Orphanos v. Rodgers
After being injured in a motorcycle accident, the plaintiff was transported to a designated trauma center and diagnosed with a thoracic vertebra fracture. Initially, a non-surgical treatment was recommended, but the defendant physician offered surgery as an alternative, which the plaintiff chose. Following surgery, the plaintiff suffered permanent paraplegia. He later experienced a stroke, and his life care plan was updated to reflect increased needs after this event. The plaintiff sued the physician for medical negligence, alleging failures in preoperative and intraoperative care, and sought compensatory damages. At trial, issues arose regarding the timeliness and scope of expert witness disclosures, as well as the connection between the surgery and later stroke.In the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, a jury found for the plaintiff, awarding substantial damages and finding the physician not only negligent but reckless. The court denied the defendant’s motions for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law, including arguments that West Virginia’s Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA) “Trauma Cap” should limit damages. The defendant appealed, challenging the court’s rulings on the Trauma Cap and procedural matters. The West Virginia Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in part, but reversed on one issue: it found the trial court abused its discretion by striking a late-disclosed expert opinion on life expectancy, and remanded for a new trial solely on damages.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It held that the physician bore the burden to invoke and prove the factual predicates for the Trauma Cap’s application, which he failed to do. The court affirmed that the MPLA Trauma Cap did not apply and upheld most trial court rulings. However, it reversed the appellate court’s order for a new trial on damages, finding no abuse of discretion in striking the late life expectancy expert opinion. The September 12, 2022, judgment was reinstated. View "Orphanos v. Rodgers" on Justia Law
Westlake Chlor-Vinyls Corp. v. IPI, Inc.
A dispute arose following a 2016 chlorine gas leak at a chemical plant in West Virginia, where IPI, Inc. employees, including its president, Matthew Joseph Taylor, were injured and IPI’s equipment was damaged while performing power washing and industrial painting services for Westlake Chlor-Vinyls Corporation and Westlake Natrium LLC (collectively Westlake). The parties operated under two interrelated service agreements containing indemnity provisions. After the incident, IPI and Taylor sued Westlake for personal injury and property damage. Westlake counterclaimed, arguing that IPI breached the indemnity agreements by bringing suit and owed Westlake indemnification for Taylor’s claims.The Circuit Court of Marshall County applied Pennsylvania law, granted summary judgment to Westlake, and found the indemnity agreements clearly required IPI to indemnify Westlake, even for claims arising from Westlake’s own negligence, except in cases of Westlake’s sole negligence or willful misconduct. The court ruled that IPI’s claims fell within the scope of the agreements, including damages from the chlorine gas release, and certified its order as final under Rule 54(b). On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed the application of Pennsylvania law but concluded that the circuit court erred by not analyzing the possible conflict between the two indemnity provisions and by insufficiently explaining why the claims fell within their scope. The ICA remanded for further proceedings.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the ICA’s decision de novo, holding that the two indemnity provisions should be read together, not in conflict, and that both unequivocally require IPI to indemnify Westlake for its own negligence. However, the court found ambiguities regarding the scope of indemnity and the application of exceptions, necessitating factual development through parol evidence. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case with directions to the circuit court. View "Westlake Chlor-Vinyls Corp. v. IPI, Inc." on Justia Law