Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The case involved a personal injury claim filed by the plaintiff against the defendants in Los Angeles County Superior Court. The main issue was whether the action was "brought to trial" within the statutory period required by California law, which mandates dismissal if a civil case is not brought to trial within five years (plus a COVID-19 emergency extension). As the deadline approached, several panels of prospective jurors were assembled and sworn in by the trial court, and the court conducted hardship excusals. However, the parties did not begin their voir dire examination of the sworn juror panels before the deadline expired.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County dismissed the action with prejudice under Code of Civil Procedure section 583.360, concluding the matter was not "brought to trial" by the deadline. The trial court reasoned that jury selection had not sufficiently commenced because the parties had not yet started their voir dire examination of the juror panels. The plaintiff appealed this dismissal.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The appellate court held that, consistent with Stueve v. Nemer, a civil action is "brought to trial" when a panel of prospective jurors assembles in the courtroom for voir dire and is sworn in accordance with Code of Civil Procedure section 232, subdivision (a). The court determined that the action was timely "brought to trial" on the date the panels were sworn, regardless of whether the parties' examination of the jurors had begun. The court reversed the judgment of dismissal, finding it was error to dismiss the case since the statutory requirements were met when the jury panels were assembled and sworn before the deadline. The plaintiff was awarded costs on appeal. View "Wilson v. Johnson" on Justia Law

In December 2020, an individual was injured at a ski resort owned by a corporation when he collided with a snowmobile operated by an employee. After the incident, he filed several claims against both the corporation and the employee. While the litigation was ongoing, he purchased a ski pass for the 2022-23 season, during which he electronically signed an online waiver releasing any and all claims, including those arising from past events, against the corporation and its employees.The District Court for Summit County, Colorado, concluded that the online waiver signed during the purchase of the 2022-23 pass operated as a release of all existing claims, not merely as a pre-injury exculpatory agreement. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s remaining claims with prejudice, including his claims for willful and wanton conduct and his request for exemplary damages. On appeal, the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed that the waiver was a valid release, enforceable under general contract principles, and rejected arguments that it was unconscionable or lacked mutual assent. The appellate court also held that claims for willful and wanton conduct and exemplary damages were not independent, cognizable causes of action.The Supreme Court of Colorado, reviewing the case, affirmed the appellate court’s decision. It held that the 2022 online waiver was a post-injury release, not an exculpatory agreement, and was enforceable under traditional contract principles. The Court further held that claims for willful and wanton conduct and exemplary damages were properly dismissed, as they are not independent causes of action. Additionally, it found that its prior decision in Miller v. Crested Butte, LLC, which concerned pre-injury waivers, was not applicable to this post-injury release. View "Litterer v. Vail Summit Resorts, Inc." on Justia Law

On a cold, wet day, the plaintiff slipped and fell on black ice in the parking lot of a retail store, sustaining serious injuries. He brought a negligence action against the store, alleging that it failed to keep its premises reasonably safe for invitees. To prove that the store had notice of the dangerous condition, the plaintiff relied on evidence that a store employee had slipped on black ice approximately ten feet away, on a different side of a parking lot island, nearly an hour earlier. After the earlier fall, employees treated that area with salt or sand, but the plaintiff fell in a different spot. There was no evidence that the patch of ice that caused the plaintiff’s injury was present or reported before his fall, and several people walked over that area without incident between the two falls.A jury in the District Court of Oklahoma County found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding damages for pain and suffering and finding the store 95% negligent. The trial court admitted evidence of the earlier fall and denied the store’s motion for a directed verdict. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, finding that the circumstances of the falls were sufficiently similar and close in proximity for the earlier fall to be admissible to establish notice of the hazard, and concluded that the store owed a duty of care.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reversed. The court held that the earlier fall was not admissible under the governing standard, as it did not occur in the same place or under the same conditions as the plaintiff’s fall. Without admissible evidence that the store had notice of the specific hazard, the court concluded there was no duty owed to the plaintiff, and thus the negligence claim failed as a matter of law. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals, reversed the district court's judgment, and remanded with directions to enter judgment for the store. View "RAMIREZ v. WAL-MART STORES EAST, LP" on Justia Law

A local man participated in a drag show at a public event in Coeur d’Alene City Park, performing on stage before an audience that included children. A member of the audience recorded the performance and sent the video to a local blogger, who did not attend the event. After reviewing the video, the blogger posted content on social media accusing the performer of exposing his genitalia to minors during the show. The blogger edited and posted a version of the video with a blurred area, claiming it covered fully exposed genitals, and invited public scrutiny and police investigation. These statements led to public backlash, an official investigation (which was closed for lack of evidence), harassment of the performer, job loss, and significant mental distress.The performer sued the blogger for defamation and defamation by implication in the District Court of the First Judicial District, Kootenai County. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment, which were denied. The court ruled that the performer was not a public figure or limited-purpose public figure, allowing him to seek punitive damages. At trial, the jury found in favor of the performer, awarding substantial compensatory and punitive damages, and found that the blogger acted with actual malice. The district court entered judgment accordingly. The blogger appealed, raising ten alleged errors related to jury instructions, verdict forms, damages, and legal standards.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the appeal. It declined to address most issues due to pervasive deficiencies in the appellant’s briefing, including lack of cogent argument, fabricated authority, and unpreserved issues. The Court held that even if the district court erred in determining the performer was not a limited-purpose public figure, the error was harmless because the jury found actual malice. The Court affirmed the district court’s judgment and awarded costs to the respondent. View "Posey v. Bushnell" on Justia Law

Several Central and South American banana plantation workers brought suit alleging that their health was harmed due to exposure to the pesticide dibromochloropropane (DBCP). One plaintiff, Fernando Jimenez Arias, worked as a quality fruit inspector for a Del Monte subsidiary in Costa Rica from 1971 to 1973. His duties included rotating among various farms, sometimes entering banana fields, and sleeping in warehouses where agricultural chemicals were stored, though he never directly handled or observed the application of DBCP. Arias and his wife experienced reproductive issues, including infertility and miscarriages, which they attributed to DBCP exposure.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit granted Dow Chemical Company’s motions for summary judgment and to exclude the plaintiffs’ expert, Michael J. DiBartolomeis, concluding there was no evidence Arias was exposed to DBCP or that such exposure caused his injuries. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., Inc. joined in these motions. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated these orders, holding that Arias’s testimony and other evidence raised genuine issues of material fact regarding exposure and causation.The Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i reviewed the case on certiorari. It affirmed the ICA’s decision, holding that Arias had presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of possible DBCP exposure and that the expert’s testimony was admissible. The court adopted a new approach for causation in toxic tort cases, following the Restatement (Third) of Torts: first, the plaintiff must show exposure to the agent; second, general causation; and third, specific causation. The court clarified that expert testimony is required and that no rigid dosage proof is necessary. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Patrickson v. DOW Chemical Company" on Justia Law

Morgan Fitch, a brakeman working for BNSF Railway Company, was injured in an emergency train stop in North Dakota, suffering a shoulder injury and claiming mild traumatic brain injury. Fitch asserted these injuries prevented her from returning to meaningful employment. BNSF admitted liability for the accident but contested the extent of Fitch’s injuries and her inability to work, offering alternatives to her conductor position. Fitch declined to pursue alternative employment, and the dispute proceeded to a jury trial focusing solely on damages.The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota presided over a six-day jury trial. Both parties presented expert testimony regarding Fitch’s injuries and her ability to work. Fitch requested substantial damages based on permanent disability, while BNSF argued her injuries had healed and she could return to work. The jury ultimately awarded Fitch significant compensation for past earnings and medical expenses but nothing for lost future earnings or benefits, along with reduced non-economic damages. Fitch moved for a new trial, asserting the jury’s finding of no lost future earnings was unsupported by the evidence. The district court denied her motion, finding sufficient evidence for the jury’s verdict and declining to substitute its judgment for the jury’s.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion, applying a doubly deferential standard. The appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Fitch’s motion for a new trial, as there was ample evidence to support the jury’s findings, including conflicting expert testimony. The court held that this case did not present an exceptional circumstance requiring intervention, and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion for a new trial. View "Fitch v. BNSF Railway Company" on Justia Law

A plaintiff, seeking to secure retirement funds, sold an apartment complex in 2017 and was introduced to Ronald Hill, who represented himself as a financial advisor but was only licensed as an insurance producer. Hill persuaded the plaintiff to invest the sale proceeds in a product offered by Future Income Payments, LLC (FIP), and also to purchase an Indexed Universal Life (IUL) insurance policy, initially from Minnesota Life and later from Pacific Life. Hill proposed that the proceeds from the FIP investment would fund the premiums for the Pacific Life IUL policy. FIP was subsequently exposed as a Ponzi scheme, resulting in the plaintiff’s loss of the investment and inability to pay the insurance premiums.The plaintiff and other parties filed suit in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho, asserting claims including negligence against Hill and Pacific Life. By trial, only Hill and Pacific Life remained as defendants, with the plaintiff as the sole remaining claimant. The trial proceeded on a common law negligence claim. The jury found both Hill and Pacific Life negligent, determined Hill was acting as Pacific Life’s agent, and apportioned 60% of fault to Pacific Life and 40% to Hill. The district court entered judgments against Pacific Life, including joint and several liability with Hill for a portion of damages. Pacific Life appealed, challenging the district court’s denial of motions for directed verdict.The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed the appeal and held that, under Idaho law, Pacific Life owed no duty to protect the plaintiff from pure economic loss absent an applicable exception to the economic loss rule. The Court further found insufficient evidence to establish Hill acted as Pacific Life’s agent when marketing the FIP investment. The Court vacated the judgments against Pacific Life and remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Pacific Life. View "Shelstad v. Pacific Life Insurance" on Justia Law

Todd Mueller was shopping at a Walmart in Duluth, Georgia, when store employee Brandon Burston suspected him of shoplifting and surveilled him. After Mueller checked out, Burston and another associate approached him, resulting in a disputed encounter that led Mueller to exit through a rear entrance. Police pursued and arrested Mueller for obstruction of justice, and Burston later applied for a shoplifting warrant. Mueller also filed assault claims with police, but an additional warrant was issued against him for filing a false report. Ultimately, Mueller faced charges for obstruction, shoplifting, and filing a false police report. The district attorney declined to prosecute the false-report charge, negotiated a plea for obstruction resulting in probation, and dropped the shoplifting charge, with the parties disputing whether the latter was connected to the plea deal.Mueller initially sued Walmart and Burston in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, asserting federal civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982, as well as various state-law claims including false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, assault, and battery. Mueller abandoned the federal claims, which the district court dismissed. The court exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and malicious-prosecution claims, granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants, but declined jurisdiction over the assault and battery claims, dismissing them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. It held that district courts have broad discretion under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over some, but not all, state-law claims after federal claims are dismissed. The court affirmed the district court’s jurisdictional decisions but reversed the summary judgment on Mueller’s malicious-prosecution claim, concluding that a reasonable jury could find in Mueller’s favor regarding favorable termination of the shoplifting charge. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Mueller v. Walmart Corporation" on Justia Law

A bicyclist was involved in a collision with a semi-trailer operated by a truck driver and owned by the driver’s employer. She sued for personal injuries, including a traumatic brain injury, alleging motor vehicle negligence. During litigation, she made four settlement offers under California Code of Civil Procedure section 998—three offers for $1,000,000 and a final offer for $2,000,000, all of which expired without acceptance. After a six-week bench trial, the Los Angeles County Superior Court found both parties negligent, apportioning 85 percent of fault to the defendants and 15 percent to the plaintiff. The plaintiff was awarded $1,062,500 after reduction for comparative negligence.Following trial, the plaintiff sought nearly $1 million in costs, including prejudgment interest and expert witness fees, arguing entitlement under section 998 and Civil Code section 3291. The defendants moved to tax costs, claiming the plaintiff’s recovery did not exceed her final $2,000,000 offer. The Superior Court agreed, ruling that only the last unaccepted section 998 offer controls when determining eligibility for cost-shifting and prejudgment interest, and since the judgment plus allowable costs did not exceed the final offer, the plaintiff was not entitled to expert fees or interest. The court also reduced certain requested costs for lack of substantiation regarding their necessity or reasonableness.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the order. It held that under the “last offer rule,” a plaintiff’s entitlement to section 998 benefits and prejudgment interest must be measured against the final unaccepted offer. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of expert witness fees and prejudgment interest, as well as its reductions of costs for insufficient documentation, finding no abuse of discretion. Respondents were awarded their costs on appeal. View "Meehan v. Aguirre" on Justia Law

Insurance companies paid claims to policyholders whose Hyundai or Kia vehicles were stolen or damaged due to a vulnerability stemming from the lack of an engine immobilizer in certain models from 2011 to 2022. These companies, as subrogees, filed a nationwide class action alleging that the Korean manufacturers, Hyundai Motor Company and Kia Corporation, defectively designed these vehicles, making them prone to theft. The complaint also asserted claims for breach of warranties, violations of consumer protection statutes, fraud, unjust enrichment, and negligent failure to warn.Multiple lawsuits arising from this issue were consolidated into multidistrict litigation before the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court dismissed the claims against the Korean entities for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that the evidence did not establish intentional targeting of California by the manufacturers and that the claims did not arise from California-related conduct. The district court also denied leave to amend and jurisdictional discovery, entering final judgment under Rule 54(b) dismissing the Korean entities from the subrogation track.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the Korean manufacturers were subject to specific personal jurisdiction in California. The panel found that the manufacturers purposefully directed their activities toward California by sending thousands of shipments of vehicles through California ports and designing vehicles specifically for the U.S. market. The court further held that the claims arose out of these California contacts, as the injuries were caused by vehicles shipped to California. The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, leaving the question of reasonableness of jurisdiction for the district court to resolve. View "IN RE: KIA HYUNDAI VEHICLE THEFT MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION" on Justia Law