Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A woman employed as an office support technician sought treatment from an orthopedic surgeon in 2016 for symptoms of carpal tunnel syndrome in her right hand. After conservative treatment failed, the surgeon performed carpal tunnel release surgery in January 2017. Following surgery, the patient continued to experience symptoms such as pain, grip weakness, and functional limitations. Her surgeon repeatedly reassured her that these symptoms were normal and that her healing was progressing as expected. Occupational therapy records indicated improvement, and at the time, both the patient and her doctor attributed any lingering issues to normal recovery or her repetitive work duties.Nearly four years later, in April 2021, the patient consulted a different physician due to worsening symptoms. Diagnostic imaging revealed the ligament that should have been severed during the 2017 surgery remained intact. The new physician explained the possibility of an incomplete release during the prior surgery, and a revision surgery was performed. The patient and her husband then filed a medical malpractice action against the original surgeon and his practice, alleging negligent surgery and delayed diagnosis. The Superior Court of San Diego County granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding the claims barred by the statute of limitations under California Code of Civil Procedure section 340.5, reasoning that the injury had manifested within months after the 2017 surgery.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. It held that there were triable issues of material fact regarding when the plaintiff’s injury became sufficiently appreciable to trigger the statute of limitations. The appellate court concluded that the record supported the plaintiffs’ contention that the injury was not manifest until 2021, and thus summary judgment was improper. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Godshall v. Peterson" on Justia Law

Several counties and municipalities in New York initiated lawsuits in state courts against two pharmacy benefit managers, Express Scripts, Inc. and OptumRx, Inc., alleging that these companies contributed to the opioid epidemic in their communities. The claims are based on state law and center on the defendants’ alleged practices in negotiating with opioid manufacturers and managing prescription formularies, which plaintiffs contend led to an oversupply of prescription opioids and caused substantial public harm and government expense.The defendants removed the cases to federal court—the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York—arguing removal was proper under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), because some of the challenged conduct was performed under contracts with federal agencies, such as the Department of Defense (TRICARE), the Office of Personnel Management (FEHBP), and the Veterans Health Administration. After removal, the plaintiffs amended their complaints to disclaim any claims based on the defendants’ work for federal clients, seeking to have the cases remanded to state court. The district courts accepted the disclaimers and remanded the cases.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district courts’ decisions. It concluded that the disclaimers were ineffective because the alleged wrongful conduct and resulting harms could not be separated between federal and non-federal clients; the conduct was indivisible. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, the Second Circuit held that the defendants satisfied all statutory requirements for federal officer removal: they acted under federal direction, were sued for acts relating to federal authority, and asserted colorable federal defenses. The Second Circuit therefore reversed the remand orders and returned the cases to the district courts for further proceedings. View "County of Westchester v. Express Scripts" on Justia Law

The plaintiff underwent a series of medical treatments at Presbyterian Hospital, including a gallbladder removal, after which she was discharged despite abnormal lab results by Dr. Kaur. She subsequently returned and was diagnosed with pneumonia and pulmonary emboli, then discharged again, only to return with abdominal pain and be diagnosed with a bile leak. She spent seven weeks hospitalized for treatment. In 2017, the plaintiff filed a medical negligence lawsuit against Presbyterian Healthcare Services and Dr. Kaur.The First Judicial District Court issued a scheduling order requiring expert disclosures by April 2019 and the completion of discovery by June 2019. The plaintiff initially disclosed Dr. Arnaout as an expert, but his deposition testimony was equivocal regarding the timing and diagnosability of the bile leak. After discovery closed and defendants moved for summary judgment for lack of causation evidence, the plaintiff submitted an amended expert disclosure and an affidavit from Dr. Arnaout asserting causation for the first time. Defendants moved to strike the affidavit, arguing it was untimely and contradictory. The district court granted the motions to strike and summary judgment, finding the affidavit untimely, unsupported by good cause, and prejudicial. The plaintiff appealed, and the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed both rulings, holding the district court did not abuse its discretion.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico reviewed the appeal and affirmed the Court of Appeals, but on different grounds. It held that the district court did not impose a sanction but properly exercised its inherent authority to enforce its scheduling order by striking the untimely and contradictory expert affidavit. The exclusion of the affidavit and subsequent grant of summary judgment were upheld, as the district court acted within its discretion and authority to manage its docket. View "Burns v. Presbyterian" on Justia Law

The plaintiff suffered severe injuries while working at a drilling site in New Mexico. Nearly two years and eight months after the incident, he filed his first lawsuit in Texas state court, alleging negligence and related claims against the defendants. Texas law provides a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions, and the Texas court dismissed his suit with prejudice as time-barred. The plaintiff did not appeal that dismissal. Four months later, the plaintiff brought a substantially similar lawsuit in New Mexico state court, seeking to take advantage of New Mexico’s three-year statute of limitations and its savings statute, which allows a plaintiff to refile within six months after certain dismissals.The New Mexico district court dismissed the second suit, agreeing with the defendants that the savings statute did not apply because the plaintiff failed to timely file his first action. The New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that pursuing the claim in Texas constituted a failure to prosecute with reasonable diligence, and that the savings statute’s exception for negligence in prosecution applied. The Court of Appeals relied on precedent that interpreted the exception broadly.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico granted certiorari to review whether the lower courts correctly applied the savings statute in light of its new decision in Zangara v. LSF9 Master Participation Trust. The Supreme Court clarified that the “negligence in prosecution” exception only applies when the first action is dismissed for failure to prosecute, and rejected the Court of Appeals’ broader analysis. However, the Supreme Court held that the New Mexico savings statute requires the first action to be timely commenced. Because the plaintiff’s Texas lawsuit was itself untimely, the New Mexico savings statute did not apply, and the second suit could not proceed. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. View "Moreno v. Ranger Energy Servs." on Justia Law

A certified nurse assistant in Idaho suffered significant injuries, including fractures and tendon tears, after slipping and falling in her employer’s parking lot while working. As a result of her injuries, she underwent three surgeries and experienced ongoing pain and physical limitations, which restricted her from returning to her prior position as a CNA. She was able to continue employment at the same facility in a less physically demanding role as an activities director. Multiple medical and vocational experts concluded that her injuries limited her to light-duty work and that she lost access to a significant portion of the labor market in which she previously participated.After filing a worker’s compensation claim, her case was heard by a referee for the Idaho Industrial Commission. The referee found a 4% permanent physical impairment, a figure not in dispute, but the parties disagreed on her permanent partial disability rating. The claimant sought a 34% rating based on vocational evidence showing a substantial loss in labor market access, while the employer argued for 17%. The Commission ultimately adopted the referee’s recommendation of a 20% rating, discounting the claimant’s evidence as overinflated and expressing skepticism about her future employment limitations, in part because her treating physician did not formally issue medical restrictions.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho set aside the Commission’s order. The Court held that the Commission erred by failing to accept unrefuted evidence supporting the 34% disability rating, by improperly requiring the claimant’s functional capacity assessment to be formally endorsed by her treating physician, and by incorrectly focusing on her retention of her current job rather than her overall access to the labor market. The Court found the record supported the claimant’s proposed 34% rating and concluded that the Commission’s order should be set aside. View "WHITELEY v. LIFE CARE CENTERS OF AMERICA" on Justia Law

A minor covered by MaineCare sustained an arm and elbow injury requiring medical treatment, for which MaineCare paid $34,078.70, though providers billed much more. The minor’s mother sued two third-party tortfeasors, seeking $375,000 in damages, including over $200,000 in medical bills. The claim was settled for $160,000, less than half the original claimed value. The Department of Health and Human Services asserted a lien for the full amount it paid. The mother filed suit against the Department, arguing that the Department’s recovery should be limited to the proportion of the settlement attributable to medical expenses, using a formula derived from Arkansas Department of Health and Human Services v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (2006).The Androscoggin County Superior Court entered summary judgment for the plaintiff, applying the percentage of total damages recovered (42.67%) to the amount the Department paid, thereby reducing the Department’s recovery to $14,540.25. The Department appealed, arguing that the calculation should be based on the entire amount billed for medical expenses, not the amount paid, and that the allocation formula was not appropriate without further factual findings.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case and vacated the judgment. The court held that, when a settlement does not allocate amounts between medical expenses and other damages and the parties do not stipulate to an allocation, the trial court must conduct an individualized, fact-intensive evidentiary hearing to determine what portion of the settlement is reasonably attributable to medical expenses. Only that portion is available for the Department’s recovery, limited to the amount it actually paid. The court rejected the use of a rigid formula or arbitrary reduction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Lynne v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

The appellant was injured in a car accident while driving a 2002 Ford Explorer in the U.S. Virgin Islands when the vehicle’s airbags allegedly deployed spontaneously, resulting in a loss of control and a collision with a hillside. She claimed that a defect in the vehicle’s airbag system caused the incident. The vehicle had a lengthy history, having changed ownership multiple times, and had been involved in several prior accidents and repairs. Central to her claim was the vehicle’s restraint control module (RCM), which did not record any crash or deployment event during the incident, though its data was available for inspection. The appellant’s experts suggested further testing of the RCM and its sensors, but this was not performed.The case was originally filed in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands and was removed to the District Court of the Virgin Islands. After various procedural steps, including a transfer to and from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, the District Court of the Virgin Islands granted summary judgment to Ford. The court found that, even assuming the applicability of Section 3 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts (“malfunction theory”), the appellant had not provided sufficient evidence to show a defect existed at the time of sale, that such a defect caused the airbag deployment, or that it was the proximate cause of her injuries.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that the malfunction theory’s relaxed evidentiary standard did not apply because the allegedly defective product was available for inspection. Even if the standard applied, the appellant’s evidence was too speculative to create a genuine dispute of material fact. The court affirmed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ford. View "Millentine Coates v. Ford Motor Co" on Justia Law

A homeowner in Massachusetts experienced a fire in his residence, which originated in the ceiling above a bathroom exhaust fan. Both the homeowner and a Verizon technician were present at the time; the technician had earlier tripped a fuse while working in the basement. The local fire department determined the fire started with the bathroom vent fan and found no connection to the technician’s work. The homeowner’s insurer, having paid out the claim for the fire damage, brought a subrogation action against the manufacturers of the fan and its motor, alleging that a defect in the fan or its components caused the fire.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts reviewed the case after the insurer presented claims for negligence and breach of implied warranty of merchantability against the fan and motor manufacturers. The insurer designated two experts, one of whom opined that the fire originated within the fan but could not specify the precise failure mode. During discovery, the expert could not identify which of several known defects in a thermal cutoff device caused the failure, nor could he provide details on the cost or feasibility of proposed alternative designs. The District Court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that the insurer had not provided sufficient admissible expert evidence to show a specific manufacturing or design defect, and excluded some of the expert’s deposition testimony as a sanction for violating expert disclosure rules.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision. The Court held that, even considering the malfunction theory, the insurer failed to provide sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer a manufacturing defect or a feasible alternative design. The appellate court concluded that summary judgment for the defendants was appropriate, as the insurer did not meet its burden under Massachusetts law to establish liability for breach of implied warranty or negligence. View "Citation Insurance Company v. Broan-NuTone LLC" on Justia Law

Cheryl Walker used her Uber account to order a guest ride for her husband, Carroll Walker. Carroll had never downloaded the Uber app or created an account, and he consistently stated that he does not read or reply to text messages. On the relevant occasion, Cheryl ordered a ride for Carroll, and Uber sent Carroll a text message with ride details and a hyperlink to its Terms of Use, which included an arbitration provision. Carroll did not see the message. During the ride, an accident occurred, allegedly due to the driver’s distraction by Uber’s app, resulting in severe injuries to Carroll.In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Cheryl Walker sued Uber on Carroll’s behalf, asserting negligence and products liability claims. Uber moved to compel arbitration, arguing Carroll was bound to arbitrate either because he had notice of the Terms via Uber’s text message or as a third-party beneficiary of Cheryl’s contract with Uber. The district court denied Uber’s motion, finding Uber failed to establish that Carroll was on inquiry notice of the Terms and concluding that Carroll was not bound as a third-party beneficiary or estopped from refusing arbitration.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of Uber’s motion to compel arbitration de novo, applying D.C. contract law. The Court held that Uber had not shown Carroll agreed to be bound by its Terms of Use, as Carroll lacked actual or inquiry notice of the Terms. The Court further determined that Carroll was not bound by Cheryl’s contract as a third-party beneficiary or by equitable estoppel, since Carroll was not seeking to enforce Cheryl’s contract and his claims were independent of it. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Walker v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law

A woman named Lewis sought medical care at Marion General Hospital for abdominal pain and constipation. She was evaluated by multiple physicians, including Dr. Armstead, Dr. Verucchi, and Dr. Jensen, and was diagnosed with sepsis and severe abdominal issues. After various tests and a transfer to the intensive care unit, her condition worsened, leading to her eventual transfer to another hospital where she was diagnosed with abdominal compartment syndrome and underwent emergency surgery. Lewis continued to suffer complications and ultimately died several months later. Her wrongful death beneficiaries brought suit against the hospital and the physicians, alleging medical negligence for failure to diagnose and treat her condition, failure to timely transfer her to a facility with higher-level care, and failure to consult appropriate specialists.The Marion County Circuit Court initially denied summary judgment to the defendants and allowed limited discovery. After further proceedings, the defendants again sought summary judgment, arguing that Mississippi Code Section 11-71-7 granted them legal immunity due to resource limitations caused by the COVID-19 state of emergency. The trial court agreed, finding the defendants immune and dismissing all claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the trial court’s summary judgment de novo. The Court held that Section 11-71-7 did not apply to all of the plaintiffs’ claims, as there was no evidence that several alleged acts of negligence—such as failure to diagnose, treat, or consult—were attributable to the COVID-19 state of emergency. The Court found genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the defendants’ failure to timely transfer Lewis was related to COVID-19 resource limitations. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Bush v. Marion General Hospital" on Justia Law