Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The case involved a motor vehicle accident between Antonio Contreras and Aleshia Martinez. Contreras stipulated to negligence before trial, and the trial court granted Martinez’s motion for a directed verdict on causation. The matter proceeded to a jury trial on damages, which resulted in a verdict awarding Martinez $55,000 for various categories of loss, including past and future economic and noneconomic damages.After the verdict, Martinez moved for a new trial, arguing, among other grounds, that there was jury misconduct during deliberations. She supported her motion with declarations from two jurors indicating that the jury had openly discussed the defendant’s ability to pay, expressed sympathy for him, questioned why the suit was not against an insurance company or a corporation like Wal-Mart, and compared Martinez’s injuries to those suffered by military personnel. The Superior Court of Fresno County granted Martinez’s motion for a new trial solely on the ground of jury misconduct, finding that the jurors’ discussions violated specific jury instructions and that the misconduct was likely prejudicial. Contreras appealed the order.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed whether the trial court had abused its discretion in granting a new trial. The appellate court found the trial court’s statement of reasons sufficient under Code of Civil Procedure section 657. It held that the juror declarations were admissible because they described overt acts during deliberations, not jurors’ mental processes, and that Contreras had forfeited certain objections by not raising them in the trial court. The appellate court also held that the misconduct created a presumption of prejudice that Contreras did not rebut. The order granting a new trial was affirmed. View "Martinez v. Contreras" on Justia Law

A student with severe cognitive disabilities attended a public high school in Hawai‘i and was repeatedly sexually abused by male students, resulting in significant psychological harm, including a psychotic breakdown and persistent post-traumatic stress disorder. The student’s mother, acting for herself and her daughter, sued the State of Hawai‘i, the Department of Education, and school employees for negligence, alleging failure to protect her daughter despite the school’s awareness of her vulnerabilities and repeated warning signs. The evidence at trial showed that school staff recognized the student’s extraordinary vulnerability and received multiple reports of abuse but failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or address it.The Circuit Court of the First Circuit conducted a lengthy bench trial and found the State liable for negligently failing to protect the student, awarding over $14 million in damages to the plaintiffs. However, without a request from the State, the court sua sponte reduced the damages by 30%, attributing that portion of fault to the male students who committed the abuse, citing Hawai‘i Revised Statutes § 663-10.5. The State had not argued at trial that the male students should be apportioned fault; instead, its arguments for apportionment focused on the mother’s alleged negligence, which the court rejected. Plaintiffs moved to amend the judgment to reverse the apportionment, but the court denied the motion.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai‘i held that the circuit court’s sua sponte allocation of fault to the male students violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional due process rights because they lacked notice and an opportunity to be heard on the issue. The court further found insufficient evidence that the male students were “other tortfeasors” under the statute and held that apportionment under HRS § 663-10.5 is an affirmative defense, for which the State bears the burden of pleading and proof. The Supreme Court vacated the apportionment, affirmed the remainder of the circuit court’s judgment, and remanded for entry of an amended judgment awarding plaintiffs the full damages. The State’s cross-appeal regarding discovery and damages was rejected. View "R.H. v. Hayashi" on Justia Law

A maintenance technician was injured at a bottling plant in California when a robot and a depalletizer malfunctioned while he was performing repairs. The depalletizer, manufactured by Krones, Inc., released its gripper head and severely injured the technician. The robot involved in the incident was manufactured by a Japanese company. The technician sued Krones, the Japanese robot manufacturer, and the American subsidiary of the Japanese manufacturer. While the American subsidiary did not challenge the court’s jurisdiction, the Japanese parent company moved to quash service, arguing that California courts lacked personal jurisdiction over it.The Superior Court of San Bernardino County denied the Japanese company’s motion to quash, finding that it was subject to general jurisdiction in California based on an agency theory, relying on the relationship between the Japanese parent and its American subsidiary. The trial court also referenced its earlier finding, during a summary judgment motion, that there was evidence the parent and subsidiary operated as a single enterprise, or alter egos.On review, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, independently analyzed whether California courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over the Japanese company. The appellate court held that neither general nor specific jurisdiction applied. It determined that, under United States Supreme Court precedent, the connections between the Japanese company and California, even when considering the actions of its American subsidiary, were insufficient to render the parent company “at home” in California for general jurisdiction. The court also found that the plaintiff failed to show that his claims arose out of or related to the Japanese company’s contacts with California, as required for specific jurisdiction.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order and directed that the motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction be granted. View "Fanuc Corp. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Lucas Warner, a young man with a history of seizures and cerebrovascular disease, died after taking a single dose of Aimovig, a biologic drug manufactured by Amgen and approved by the FDA to prevent migraines. His mother, acting as representative of his estate, argued that the drug’s label was inadequate because it failed to disclose that the clinical trials excluded people with histories of seizures and neurological disorders, and did not warn of specific risks for such patients. She contended that this omission was especially relevant to Lucas’s medical circumstances.After Warner filed a wrongful death claim in Massachusetts state court, Amgen removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Amgen moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing federal law preempted Warner’s state law claims because Amgen was required to use the FDA-approved label and Warner had not shown Amgen could have unilaterally changed it. At the hearing, Warner sought leave to amend her complaint, alleging newly available studies could have permitted Amgen to update the label using FDA’s Changes Being Effected (CBE) procedure. The district court dismissed the complaint as preempted and denied leave to amend, finding the studies insufficient and the amendment futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the dismissal of Warner’s original complaint, holding that federal law preempted the claim because Amgen could not unilaterally alter the label during FDA approval, and the FDA would have rejected Warner’s proposed label changes. However, it reversed the denial of leave to amend, holding Warner plausibly alleged that certain studies constituted newly acquired information under the CBE process. The case was remanded for further proceedings limited to Warner’s claims based on this post-approval labeling theory. View "Warner v. Amgen Inc." on Justia Law

Several companies and associations connected to the Maine lobster industry brought a lawsuit against a California nonprofit organization, which operates a seafood rating program. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant’s public statements and industry reports—advising consumers to avoid American lobster due to risks posed to the endangered North Atlantic right whale—were defamatory and caused substantial financial harm. The statements described the risks in general terms about the American lobster fishery, without naming the plaintiffs individually.After the complaint was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maine, the defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the “group defamation rule” barred the claims because the statements targeted the industry as a whole and not specific members. The defendant also contended that the statements were protected opinion and sought dismissal under Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the statements, though directed at the industry, could reasonably be understood to refer to each plaintiff due to their membership and the statements’ factual nature. The court found that exceptions to the group defamation rule applied because the statements implicated every member of the group, included a call to action, and had directly influenced customer decisions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The First Circuit held that, under Maine law and the Second Restatement of Torts, the group defamation rule precludes claims by individual members of a large group unless a statement makes particular reference to them. The court concluded that the statements at issue, while they may affect every member, were not actionable because they lacked particular reference to any plaintiff. Accordingly, the First Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaint. View "Bean Maine Lobster, Inc. v. Monterey Bay Aquarium Foundation" on Justia Law

The defendant was involved in a vehicle pursuit by law enforcement in March 2021, during which he crashed the car he was driving, causing serious bodily injury to his passenger, Jane Doe. Evidence at trial established that the defendant had consumed drugs prior to the incident and that his actions during the pursuit resulted in Jane Doe suffering a fractured pelvis. He was charged with multiple offenses, including causing serious bodily injury while evading a police officer and causing serious bodily injury while driving under the influence of a drug.After a jury trial in the Riverside County Superior Court, the defendant was convicted of several charges, including evading a police officer resulting in serious bodily injury (count 2) and driving under the influence causing bodily injury (count 6). The jury found true special allegations regarding great bodily injury. The defendant was acquitted on kidnapping and false imprisonment charges. On appeal from the initial judgment, the Court of Appeal reversed the conviction for a sentencing enhancement due to instructional error, resulting in a remand. The trial court subsequently resentenced the defendant, imposing punishment for both count 2 and count 6.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred by imposing punishment on both count 2 and count 6 in violation of Penal Code section 654. The court found that both convictions arose from the same physical act of crashing the vehicle, which caused Jane Doe’s injury, and therefore the defendant could not be punished twice for the same act. The court reversed the sentence and remanded for full resentencing, directing the trial court to recalculate custody credits and correct any errors at resentencing. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Thornton" on Justia Law

A pharmacy, operated by a licensed pharmacist, improperly compounded a prescription medication for a patient after a technician mistakenly entered a formula with the wrong dosage. The patient consumed the medication, suffered severe poisoning, required intensive medical treatment, and subsequently filed suit against the pharmacy and the pharmacist. She alleged negligence, wantonness, product liability, breach of the Alabama Extended Manufacturer’s Liability Doctrine, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and failure to warn. The pharmacy’s liability insurer, Nationwide, declined coverage, citing a professional-services exclusion in its policy. The pharmacy had previously been covered by a different insurer, Zurich, whose policy did not exclude such claims.After the patient obtained a substantial judgment against the pharmacy, a separate action was brought to determine whether the Nationwide policy covered the claim and whether the insurance agents who procured the policy for the pharmacy had been negligent or wanton in failing to secure proper coverage. The Tuscaloosa Circuit Court entered summary judgment for Nationwide, finding the professional-services exclusion applied, and for the insurance agents, concluding the pharmacy was contributorily negligent for not reading its policy.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It held that the professional-services exclusion in the Nationwide policy unambiguously barred coverage for all claims, including product-liability claims, arising from the compounding of medication, which is a professional service under Alabama law. The Supreme Court also held that the pharmacy was contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failing to read its insurance policy, which expressly excluded the type of coverage in question, thereby precluding any claim for negligent failure to procure insurance. The summary judgments in favor of Nationwide and the agency defendants were affirmed. View "OMS Pharmacy, Inc. v. Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs brought suit against a prominent music record label and several executives, alleging sexual battery, harassment, assault, and unpaid wages. One plaintiff claimed that while performing services for the label, she was sexually battered and harassed by executives and not paid for her work. The other plaintiff alleged assault and harassment by an employee while residing in a label-owned home to support an artist. The lawsuit was initially filed under pseudonyms, but the plaintiffs did not seek court approval to proceed anonymously.After the lawsuit was filed, plaintiffs’ counsel issued a press release using the pseudonyms to publicize the allegations. The defendants then issued their own press release, which publicly disclosed the plaintiffs’ real names. Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a claim for doxing under Civil Code section 1708.89, asserting that the disclosure of their names constituted doxing. Defendants responded with a special motion to strike this cause of action under California's anti-SLAPP statute, arguing the press release was protected activity. Plaintiffs conceded the activity was protected but argued they could show a probability of prevailing. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied the anti-SLAPP motion, reasoning that the disclosure was not necessary and referencing the Rules of Professional Conduct to find potential prejudice to judicial proceedings.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Two reviewed the denial. The court held that the defendants' press release was protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute and that the disclosure of plaintiffs’ names was protected by the fair report privilege, since plaintiffs had not sought court authorization to proceed anonymously. The court reversed the trial court’s order, directed it to grant the anti-SLAPP motion, and strike the doxing cause of action. Defendants were awarded costs on appeal. View "Luna v. Top Dawg Entertainment" on Justia Law

Federal agents executed a pre-dawn raid targeting a gang member in Atlanta, but mistakenly entered the plaintiffs’ residence, three houses away from the intended address and on a different street. The FBI SWAT team forcibly entered, detonated a flash-bang grenade, and detained the plaintiffs, including a minor, before realizing their error and departing. The raid’s leader, Agent Guerra, later attributed the mistake to his personal GPS device, which he discarded shortly after the incident. Plaintiffs disputed the adequacy of pre-raid preparations and alleged multiple torts and constitutional violations.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, asserting claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) for false arrest, assault and battery, trespass, emotional distress, and negligence, as well as a Bivens claim against Agent Guerra and others for Fourth Amendment violations. The district court granted summary judgment to the United States on most FTCA claims under the discretionary-function exception, and to Agent Guerra on the Bivens claim based on qualified immunity. After an intervening Eleventh Circuit decision, the district court granted judgment to the government on the remaining FTCA claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was instructed by the Supreme Court (following Martin v. United States, 605 U.S. 395 (2025)) to re-examine whether the FTCA’s discretionary-function exception barred the plaintiffs’ claims. The Eleventh Circuit held that the discretionary-function exception shielded the United States from all FTCA claims arising from the raid and affirmed their dismissal. However, the court reversed the grant of qualified immunity to Agent Guerra, finding that, when viewing the evidence most favorably to the plaintiffs, his actions violated clearly established Fourth Amendment law. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these holdings. View "Martin v. USA" on Justia Law

A juvenile dropped a sandbag from an overpass bridge undergoing reconstruction in Toledo, Ohio, resulting in the death of Marquise Shawndell Byrd, a vehicle passenger traveling on Interstate 75. At the time of the incident, the bridge's north side was closed for reconstruction, including removal of the existing vandal-protective fencing, while the south side remained open to pedestrian traffic with its fencing intact. The Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT) managed the reconstruction, and the project contractor used sandbags to secure traffic barricades and signage. Prior to the incident, there had been no reported vandalism or safety concerns at the site.The estate of Byrd, represented by Patricia Wilkes, brought a wrongful death action against ODOT in the Ohio Court of Claims, alleging negligence in failing to mitigate dangerous conditions by allowing sandbags to remain accessible and not erecting temporary protective fencing. The Court of Claims denied ODOT’s motion for summary judgment on immunity grounds but ultimately found that the estate had not proven ODOT’s liability after trial. On appeal, the Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed, holding that ODOT was not immune and liable for Byrd’s death, remanding for a determination of damages.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and held that ODOT’s decision not to install temporary vandal-protective fencing on the bridge’s north side during reconstruction was a basic policy decision involving a high degree of discretion, granting ODOT discretionary immunity from the negligence suit under R.C. 2743.02. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the appellate court’s judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Claims with instructions to dismiss the action. View "Wilkes v. Ohio Dept. of Transp." on Justia Law