Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A woman, acting as administrator of her late husband’s estate and in her individual capacity, filed a medical malpractice action against multiple doctors and medical practices. The complaint alleged that after an MRI detected a lesion on her husband’s kidney in 2017, recommended follow-up care was not pursued by his medical providers. In 2020, he was diagnosed with kidney cancer and died within months. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ failure to act constituted a breach of the standard of care. Before trial, some defendants were dismissed, and the case proceeded to a jury trial against several remaining doctors and practices.During jury selection, the plaintiff’s counsel challenged four prospective jurors for cause, arguing that their responses during voir dire showed they could not be fair and impartial or would not follow the law as instructed by the court. The trial court denied these for-cause challenges, finding the prospective jurors’ answers did not establish actual bias or unwillingness to follow the law. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. The appellate court reviewed the trial court’s denial of the for-cause challenges under an abuse-of-discretion standard.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. It held that under R.C. 2313.17(B)(9), when a principal challenge is made to a prospective juror on grounds of bias or unwillingness to follow the law, the trial court must determine the validity of the challenge, and, if valid, the juror must be absolutely disqualified. The court overruled prior precedent to the extent it permitted discretion at this stage. However, it found that competent, credible evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the challenges were not valid. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals. View "Estate of Price v. Kidney Care Specialists, L.L.C." on Justia Law

A fatal traffic collision occurred involving Erika Chavez and Jose Ortiz-Muñoz, an employee of O’Reilly Automotive Stores, Inc. Erika Chavez’s widower sought and obtained the appointment of Dennis P. Murphy as the personal representative (PR) for the wrongful death estate. After Murphy’s appointment, but before filing a wrongful death complaint, the plaintiffs conducted examinations under oath of various O’Reilly personnel using subpoenas issued under the appointment proceeding’s case number. O’Reilly was not a party to the appointment proceeding, and its employees were questioned, sometimes without counsel present. Subsequently, a wrongful death complaint was filed against O’Reilly and others, alleging negligent supervision and control related to the vehicle involved in the crash.O’Reilly, in the wrongful death action in the First Judicial District Court, moved to dismiss the case or alternatively sought exclusion of the pre-complaint discovery and disqualification of plaintiffs’ counsel. O’Reilly argued that a PR appointed under the Wrongful Death Act (WDA) does not have subpoena power in an appointment proceeding, as such actions are not pending civil cases under the New Mexico Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court denied the motion, finding O’Reilly’s proposed remedies too severe, but certified the issue for interlocutory appeal.The Supreme Court of the State of New Mexico granted certiorari to decide whether a concluded WDA appointment proceeding is a pending action permitting subpoena power. The Court held that issuance of an order appointing a PR under the WDA constitutes a final order, ending the appointment proceeding. Therefore, a PR does not have subpoena power after such appointment and before filing a wrongful death claim. The Court did not address remedies for misuse of subpoena power and remanded for application of its holding. View "Murphy v. O'Reilly Auto. Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Pamela Smith died after surgery at Lovelace Medical Center, operated by Lovelace Health System, LLC. Smith’s estate brought wrongful death claims against Lovelace, asserting both direct negligence and vicarious liability based on the conduct of Lovelace’s employed registered nurses. Lovelace was a “qualified health care provider” (QHP) under the New Mexico Medical Malpractice Act (MMA), but its employed registered nurses were not, nor could they be under the version of the Act in effect at the time.The Plaintiff sought summary judgment in the Second Judicial District Court, arguing that the MMA did not apply to claims based on the conduct of non-QHP registered nurses, and therefore Lovelace was not entitled to the MMA’s protections—including the damages cap—for vicarious liability claims arising from nurse conduct. The District Court agreed, granting summary judgment and concluding that Lovelace was not entitled to the Act’s benefits regarding its nurse employees’ actions. Lovelace sought interlocutory appeal; the New Mexico Court of Appeals denied review, but the Supreme Court of New Mexico granted certiorari.The Supreme Court of New Mexico reviewed the statutory construction de novo. It held that the plain language of the MMA covers vicarious liability claims against QHPs, regardless of whether the agent (here, a nurse) is a QHP, so long as the agent’s conduct constitutes medical treatment or a departure from accepted standards resulting in injury. The Court rejected the argument that only the conduct of a QHP can be the basis for a malpractice claim under the MMA, and affirmed that Lovelace is entitled to the Act’s protections—including the damages cap—for vicarious liability claims arising from nurse conduct. The summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff was reversed. View "Ferlic v. Lovelace Health Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

Maurice Voce, a self-taught investor, traded stock options with Morgan Stanley & Co., LLC for decades, amassing a substantial fortune. His children and nephew, as co-trustees of his trusts and personal representative of his estate, alleged that Morgan Stanley and advisor John Privitelli continued facilitating risky trading and collecting commissions even as Maurice’s cognitive health declined in his later years. They claimed this conduct constituted breach of fiduciary duty and financial elder abuse. The plaintiffs also asserted that Privitelli’s advice extended to tax and estate planning, resulting in costly insurance policies and tax penalties.Previously, the plaintiffs initiated arbitration with the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), which dismissed their claims without prejudice, permitting them to pursue litigation. They then filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The trial court found the claims timely under the discovery rule but imposed a damages cutoff based on a backward projection of the remaining statute of limitations period. The court also granted defendants’ motion for nonsuit, dismissing both causes of action. It ruled there was insufficient evidence of harm for elder abuse and concluded defendants’ fiduciary duty did not cover tax and estate planning advice, as they were not formally hired or paid for such services. Additionally, it determined plaintiffs failed to provide expert testimony on excessive trading for the breach of fiduciary duty claim.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court misapplied the statute of limitations by limiting damages to a narrow period, rather than considering the full course of wrongful conduct for timely claims. The appellate court found plaintiffs’ evidence sufficient to survive nonsuit on both the elder abuse claim and the breach of fiduciary duty claim, to the extent that the latter involved issues beyond excessive trading. However, it affirmed nonsuit regarding the excessive trading theory due to lack of expert evidence. The judgment was reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "DeVone v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC" on Justia Law

A car rental company leased a vehicle to an individual, who subsequently was involved in a collision with another driver. The injured party sued both the renter and the rental company, asserting two theories of liability against the company: vicarious liability under California Vehicle Code sections 17150 and 17151, and negligent entrustment, arguing the company should be liable for renting a vehicle without verifying the renter had automobile insurance.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of the rental company. The court found that the Graves Amendment, a federal statute, preempted California’s vicarious liability statute when applied to rental car companies, thereby shielding the company from liability based solely on ownership of the vehicle. The court also determined that there was no negligent entrustment because the renter had a valid driver’s license, matched the photo on the license, and showed no signs of incompetence or unfitness to drive. The court did not find a duty for the rental company to verify automobile insurance for the renter.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the grant of summary judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the Graves Amendment preempts California Vehicle Code section 17150 when used to impose vicarious liability on rental car companies, as section 17150 is not a financial responsibility law covered by the Amendment’s savings clause. The court further held that rental car companies do not have a duty to check whether renters possess automobile insurance and rejected the negligent entrustment claim, as there was no evidence the renter was incompetent or unfit. The judgment in favor of the rental company was affirmed. View "O'Brien v. Midway Rent-A-Car, Inc." on Justia Law

A Nevada resident, Virginia Pass, allegedly suffered injuries and ultimately died after a Care@Home C7000 in-home medical alert system failed to alert emergency services following her fall. The device was purchased from Medical Guardian, a Pennsylvania-based reseller authorized by Essence USA, Inc., a New Jersey corporation that distributes products manufactured by Essence SmartCare Ltd. Pass’s estate and her six children, some residing in Nevada and others in different states, filed suit against Essence USA and Medical Guardian in Nevada. The record did not establish where, how, or by whom the Care@Home device was acquired, only that it was used in Nevada.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, dismissed Essence USA for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding Essence USA had insufficient contacts with Nevada. Morgan, representing Pass’s estate, was permitted to amend the complaint and conduct limited jurisdictional discovery. The evidence showed that Essence USA attended the Consumer Electronic Show (CES) in Las Vegas to promote its products to resellers, and had entered into agreements with Medical Guardian authorizing resale in the United States and Canada. However, there was no evidence of direct sales or marketing to Nevada consumers, nor confirmation that more than one product ever reached Nevada. The district court denied reconsideration and certified its dismissal as final for appeal.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and affirmed the dismissal. The court held that, under Nevada’s adoption of the pure stream-of-commerce test for specific personal jurisdiction, a nonresident defendant must introduce products into the stream of commerce with the expectation of a regular flow to Nevada. The plaintiffs failed to show more than a single isolated instance of a product reaching Nevada or any meaningful connection between their claims and Essence USA’s in-state contacts at CES. Thus, Essence USA was not subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada. View "MORGAN VS. ESSENCE USA, INC." on Justia Law

Frank Costa was being transported to a medical facility by Northwest Ambulance, staffed by EMTs Jack Wilson, Henry Shaw, and EMT trainee Katelyn Averill. The EMTs secured Mr. Costa to a gurney using guardrails and lap belts but omitted shoulder restraints, violating company policy. During transport, Mr. Shaw, driving the ambulance under emergency code, swerved to avoid a garbage truck and crashed into a highway divider. As a result, Mr. Costa was ejected from the stretcher and sustained fatal injuries. Northwest Ambulance admitted that both the failure to secure Mr. Costa with shoulder restraints and the negligent driving were breaches of ordinary care.The Estate of Frank Costa brought wrongful death and survival actions against Northwest Ambulance in Snohomish County Superior Court. Both sides filed cross motions for summary judgment on whether RCW 18.71.210(1) provided qualified immunity for the negligent acts. The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment for the Estate, ruling that driving an ambulance is not an emergency medical service subject to immunity. Northwest Ambulance conceded negligence but maintained it was immune under the statute. The jury returned a general verdict for the Estate, and Northwest Ambulance appealed. The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that qualified immunity did not apply to the negligent driving.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed whether Northwest Ambulance was entitled to qualified immunity for negligent ambulance transportation. The court held that RCW 18.71.210 provides immunity only for acts or omissions within the EMT’s field of medical expertise, such as emergency medical procedures, and does not extend to negligent driving. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals, concluding that Northwest Ambulance was not entitled to qualified immunity for negligent ambulance driving. View "Lang v. Platinum Nine Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

A woman with an enlarged lymph node was initially diagnosed by a pathologist as having metastatic breast cancer. However, subsequent imaging and tests did not confirm a breast origin and suggested lymphoma as a possible diagnosis. Her treating oncologist, despite access to these conflicting findings, did not consult further with pathology or pursue additional investigation, and instead proceeded to treat her for breast cancer with chemotherapy and radiation. After about a year, her cancer had advanced, and a later biopsy revealed she actually had ALK positive large B-cell lymphoma, a rare and aggressive cancer. She then received appropriate treatment but did not respond positively and died. The plaintiffs, her husband and her estate, alleged that the oncologist breached the standard of care by failing to properly diagnose and consult, resulting in delayed proper treatment and increased harm.The case was first tried in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, resulting in a mistrial. At retrial, after the plaintiffs presented their evidence, the defendants moved for compulsory nonsuit, which the trial court granted, finding insufficient evidence of causation. The plaintiffs’ post-trial motions were denied, and judgment was entered for the defendants. On appeal, the Superior Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for a new trial, concluding there was sufficient expert evidence under Pennsylvania’s “increased risk of harm” standard to permit the case to go to the jury.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Middle District, reviewed whether the Superior Court correctly applied the “increased risk of harm” standard from Hamil v. Bashline. The Court held that the Superior Court properly applied this relaxed causation standard, finding the plaintiffs’ expert testimony sufficient to establish a prima facie case that the oncologist’s conduct increased the risk of harm. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision, requiring the case be submitted to the jury. View "Estate of Smith v. Kannarkatt" on Justia Law

The plaintiff worked as a cleanup worker in Pascagoula, Mississippi, following the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, allegedly exposed to crude oil and chemical dispersants through inhalation and direct contact. He claimed this exposure caused a chronic worsening of his preexisting asthma. The plaintiff sued BP Exploration & Production, Inc. and BP America Production Company under the Back-End Litigation Option (BELO) of the Medical Settlement Agreement related to the Deepwater Horizon class-action litigation. The parties stipulated to venue in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.The litigation required the plaintiff to prove that his injuries were legally caused by exposure to oil spill-related substances. He proffered two experts, Dr. Michael Freeman and Dr. Shawn French, to establish causation. BP moved to exclude their testimony and for summary judgment. The district court denied the plaintiff’s request for an evidentiary hearing, excluded the expert testimony, and granted summary judgment in favor of BP, finding that the expert evidence was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to causation. The plaintiff timely appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that toxic tort causation standards, requiring expert testimony to establish both general and specific causation, apply under maritime law for BELO claims involving non-readily observable injuries with multiple possible etiologies. The Fifth Circuit found the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the plaintiff’s experts, both for lack of reliability and relevance under Rule 702 and Daubert, and for deficiencies in qualifications and methodology. The district court’s grant of summary judgment was affirmed. View "Dufour v. BP Exploration & Production" on Justia Law

K.S., the plaintiff, was placed in a group home by the County of Alameda when he was a minor in foster care. Between 2006 and 2007, while he was twelve to thirteen years old, he was sexually abused by an adult staff member at the facility. K.S. reported the abuse to a supervisor, an agent of the County, but no investigation or protective action was taken. Instead, K.S. alleges he was penalized, and the abuse continued. He contends that, beyond the failure to respond to his report, the County and its employees failed to implement adequate policies, procedures, and supervision to prevent foreseeable abuse of children in their care, and that systemic deficiencies contributed to his injuries.After K.S. filed a negligence action against the County in the Alameda County Superior Court, the County moved for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that it was immune from liability under California Government Code section 820.2, which grants immunity for discretionary acts by public employees. The trial court granted the County’s motion, concluding the complaint’s allegations demonstrated that the relevant acts or omissions were discretionary decisions entitled to immunity.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The appellate court reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that at the pleading stage, it could not be determined that all of the acts or omissions alleged by K.S. were necessarily discretionary within the meaning of section 820.2, nor that they resulted from a conscious, considered exercise of discretion by County employees. The court explained that some alleged conduct, such as failure to notice abuse or take reasonable protective measures, might be ministerial rather than discretionary, and that immunity under section 820.2 could not be resolved solely on the pleadings. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "K.S. v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law