Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

After suffering catastrophic injuries during a surgery at a hospital, the plaintiff filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against the hospital and the lead surgeon. During its investigation, the hospital identified three nonparty doctors who had participated in the surgery and who might have contributed to the plaintiff's injuries. These doctors were no longer employed by the hospital, but the hospital remained contractually obligated to defend and indemnify them. Without the plaintiff's knowledge or consent, the hospital communicated with these doctors outside the formal discovery process. Additionally, a member of the hospital's quality improvement committee, also the chief medical officer, engaged in conversations regarding the case with one of these doctors.The case was first reviewed by the King County Superior Court, where the plaintiff sought sanctions, including default judgment, and moved to compel production of communications and quality improvement materials. The trial court found that the hospital had violated the rule against ex parte communications with the plaintiff's nonparty doctors but denied default judgment, citing insufficient information to determine substantial prejudice. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion to compel production of quality improvement materials, maintaining the statutory privilege. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, holding that the hospital's ex parte communications violated established rules, that the plaintiff bore the burden of demonstrating prejudice, and that the failure to screen the quality improvement committee member did not waive the statutory privilege.The Supreme Court of the State of Washington reviewed the case. It held that the hospital violated the rule prohibiting ex parte communications with the plaintiff's nonparty doctors and rejected the hospital's arguments for exceptions. The Court further held that prejudice is presumed when this rule is violated, and plaintiffs do not bear the burden to prove litigation prejudice to obtain relief. Regarding the quality improvement privilege, the Court concluded that by failing to screen a committee member involved in litigation, the hospital at least partially waived the statutory privilege. The Court vacated the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's motions and remanded for further proceedings, including in camera review of relevant materials. View "Snyder v. Virginia Mason Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

A pedestrian was severely injured when struck by a Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority bus while crossing an intersection in Philadelphia. The injuries required a partial left foot amputation and extensive ongoing medical care. The plaintiff retained counsel on the understanding that they would challenge the constitutionality of the statutory cap limiting damages recoverable from Commonwealth parties, set at $250,000 under Pennsylvania’s Sovereign Immunity Act. The complaint alleged negligence by SEPTA, which admitted liability; the parties then stipulated to a jury verdict with damages totaling $7 million, but SEPTA moved to reduce the award to the statutory cap.The Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County granted SEPTA’s motion to mold the verdict to $250,000 and denied delay damages, finding itself bound by prior Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent, specifically Zauflik v. Pennsbury School District, which had upheld similar caps. The plaintiff appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed the trial court in an unpublished opinion. The Commonwealth Court reasoned that the damages cap did not violate the right to a jury trial or the constitutional right to a remedy, holding that the cap affected only the ultimate recovery, not the ability to prosecute the claim or access a jury trial.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Eastern District, reviewed the case, focusing on whether the damages cap violates the Pennsylvania Constitution’s right to a jury trial or to a remedy. The court held that, as applied in this case, the statutory cap does not violate either constitutional right. The cap limits the remedy but does not restrict access to a jury trial or the process itself. The court affirmed the Commonwealth Court’s order, concluding that the legislature has authority to set such liability limits and that the cap is constitutional, even if it results in little or no recovery for the plaintiff. View "Freilich v. SEPTA" on Justia Law

A woman brought her daughter’s dog to a veterinary hospital for grooming. While preparing to bathe the dog in the grooming room, the animal escaped through a propped-open door into the hallway. The woman chased the dog and subsequently fell headfirst in the hallway, rendering her unresponsive. Emergency responders transported her to the hospital, where she died three days later due to blunt force injuries to her head and neck. The facility had a 1.25-inch unmarked elevation change at the threshold between the grooming room and hallway, and, after the incident, a gate was installed to prevent animal escapes.Her husband and son filed a wrongful death action in San Mateo County Superior Court against both the hospital owner and the building owner, alleging negligence and premises liability. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiffs could not prove causation. Plaintiffs provided expert declarations: two biomechanical engineers opined that the threshold likely caused the trip and fall, and a veterinarian asserted that failing to secure the dog and leaving the door open violated safety protocols and contributed to the accident. The trial court excluded key portions of the experts’ opinions as speculative and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, ruling there was no admissible evidence of causation.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It found the trial court erred by failing to properly analyze the expert testimony under the standards set forth in Sargon Enterprises, Inc. v. University of Southern California, and by not construing the evidence and inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. The appellate court held that the expert declarations provided a sufficient basis for a jury to infer causation and raised a triable issue of fact. The judgment was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Osaze v. Gee" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs purchased a residential lot from a developer and later alleged that defective grading and drainage in the subdivision caused water and erosion damage to their property. They claimed that the developer and seller deviated from an approved drainage plan, redirecting stormwater onto their lot. The plaintiffs discovered the source of the problem several years after purchasing the property, following a heavy rainstorm. Their claims included negligence, breach of contract, and breach of the implied warranty of workmanlike construction.The District Court of Oklahoma County conducted a bench trial. After the plaintiffs rested their case, the defendants moved for a directed verdict and argued that the tort and warranty claims were barred by Oklahoma’s ten-year statute of repose (12 O.S. § 109), and the contract claim was barred by the five-year statute of limitations (12 O.S. § 95). The trial court found that the improvement causing the harm was substantially completed more than ten years before suit, and that the contract claim accrued on the date the lot was conveyed. The trial court entered judgment for the defendants on all claims.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the appeal. It held that the statute of repose begins to run upon substantial completion of the specific improvement alleged to have caused harm, not the completion of the overall development. The only evidence of substantial completion was uncontroverted, showing completion more than ten years before suit, barring the tort claims. The implied warranty and contract claims were also time-barred by the statute of limitations, and Turner & Company was not a party to the contract. The judgment of the District Court was affirmed. View "ESCH v. TURNER & COMPANY, INC." on Justia Law

Katharine Blackwell, a regular customer at a car dealership, slipped and fell on a wet floor that had just been mopped by a dealership employee. The employee did not place a wet-floor sign before or during mopping and left the area unattended while retrieving a sign, which was stored about a minute away. While the employee was gone, another employee called Ms. Blackwell to the service desk, leading her to walk across the freshly mopped, unmarked area and fall. She had not seen the mopping take place and received no warning about the hazard.Ms. Blackwell filed suit in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, asserting negligence under premises liability and negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision. After discovery, the dealership moved for summary judgment, arguing it had insufficient time to warn Ms. Blackwell before she fell, relying on precedent from Rehn v. Westfield America. The circuit court granted summary judgment on both claims, finding that although the dealership had notice of the wet floor, there was no genuine dispute that it lacked time to post a warning sign.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed summary judgment on the negligent hiring and supervision claim but reversed with respect to premises liability, concluding that a jury could find the dealership failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or warn of the hazard. The dealership sought review by the Supreme Court of Maryland.The Supreme Court of Maryland held that, under Maryland law, the knowledge element for an invitee’s premises liability claim is satisfied when an owner’s employee knowingly creates a dangerous condition. Where creating the hazard is a foreseeable consequence of an assigned task, whether the owner acted reasonably to prevent or warn of the danger is a jury question unless only one reasonable conclusion is possible. The Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s judgment, allowing the premises liability claim to proceed. View "DARCARS Toyota of Silver Spring v. Blackwell" on Justia Law

The dispute centers on statements made by an attorney during a media interview concerning the fallout from a business partnership between two individuals, one of whom was accused of embezzlement and criminal wrongdoing. The attorney commented publicly about the circumstances that led to the criminal charges against his client and the civil dispute with his client’s business partner. After criminal charges against the client were dismissed, the business partner sued the attorney and his former law firm for defamation and defamation per se, specifically challenging statements in the interview that allegedly impugned his reputation and business fitness.Prior to trial, the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, Bannock County, granted summary judgment on ordinary defamation claims due to a lack of pleaded special damages and dismissed one defendant by stipulation. The case proceeded to a jury trial solely on defamation per se claims. The plaintiff requested a jury instruction defining defamation per se to include statements imputing conduct incompatible with the plaintiff’s lawful business, trade, or profession. The district court declined, instructing the jury that defamation per se was limited to statements imputing criminal conduct punishable by imprisonment or involving moral turpitude. The jury found for the defendants, and the district court denied the plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho reviewed whether the district court erred in its jury instructions on defamation per se. The Court held that Idaho law does recognize statements imputing unfitness in the conduct of a person’s business, trade, or profession as a category of defamation per se. The district court’s failure to instruct the jury on this category constituted prejudicial error. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, denying attorney fees to the respondents. View "Taylor v. Davis" on Justia Law

A newborn, Layla, was admitted to Druid City Hospital in July 2019, where her condition deteriorated, prompting a transfer to Children's Hospital's neonatal intensive care unit. Despite medical intervention, Layla passed away shortly after her transfer. Nearly two years later, her parents filed a wrongful-death lawsuit against the hospital, a physician, and several fictitiously named defendants, alleging failures in timely transfer and communication. The complaint specifically described one fictitious defendant as the physician responsible for Layla's care during the events in question.After the statute of limitations had expired, the parents amended their complaint to substitute Dr. Sam Gentle for one of the fictitiously named defendants, alleging he had delayed Layla's transfer. Dr. Gentle moved for summary judgment in the Circuit Court of Tuscaloosa County, arguing that the claims against him were barred by the statute of limitations and did not relate back to the original filing because the plaintiffs knew or should have known his identity earlier. The circuit court granted summary judgment, finding that the original allegations lacked specificity required by the Alabama Medical Liability Act and that the parents failed to exercise due diligence in identifying Dr. Gentle before the limitations period ended.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the summary judgment under the same standard as the lower court. The Supreme Court held that for a substitution of a fictitiously named defendant to relate back, plaintiffs must exercise due diligence to ascertain the party’s identity. Because the parents had information in medical records indicating Dr. Gentle’s involvement but did not investigate further before the statute expired, the Court concluded that due diligence was not shown. As a result, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Gentle. View "Bauman v. Gentle" on Justia Law

A fatal accident occurred in 2016 when a bicyclist, Jonathan Tansavatdi, collided with a turning truck at an intersection in the City of Rancho Palos Verdes. The bicycle lane on Hawthorne Boulevard ended before the intersection, forcing cyclists to share the roadway. Jonathan’s mother, Betty Tansavatdi, sued the City, alleging that the intersection constituted a dangerous condition of public property and that the City failed to adequately warn of this danger.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County initially granted summary judgment for the City based on the affirmative defense of design immunity under Government Code section 830.6. The trial court found the City had established all elements of design immunity regarding the absence of a bicycle lane. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal affirmed the finding of design immunity but remanded the case for consideration of the failure to warn claim. The California Supreme Court, in Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 639, held that design immunity does not categorically preclude failure to warn claims and remanded the matter, leaving open whether design immunity applies if warnings were part of an approved design.Upon remand, the City renewed its motion for summary judgment, arguing that all warning signs and markings at the intersection were part of the 2009 approved design plans. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, held that when a public entity has provided some warning of a dangerous condition as part of an approved and reasonable design, complaints about the adequacy of that warning fall within the scope of design immunity. The court affirmed summary judgment for the City and upheld the award of expert fees, finding the City’s section 998 settlement offer valid. View "Tansavatdi v. City of Rancho Palos Verdes" on Justia Law

A bystander was injured in June 2023 when a police dog owned by a municipality mistakenly attacked him during a pursuit. The injured party, seeking damages for his injuries, timely submitted a statutory notice of claim to the municipality. In the notice, he offered to settle his personal injury claim for “one hundred thousand dollars ($250,000),” creating an internal inconsistency between the written and numerical amounts. The municipality did not accept the offer within the 60-day statutory period.After the offer was not accepted, the injured party filed a complaint in the Superior Court in Gila County. The municipality moved to dismiss, asserting that the notice failed to comply with Arizona Revised Statutes § 12-821.01(A)’s requirement to state a specific amount for which the claim can be settled. The Superior Court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and granted it, finding the notice insufficient. On appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals, Division Two, reversed, holding that contract law principles should be used to resolve the inconsistency, and concluding that the written amount controlled, thus satisfying the statute.The Supreme Court of the State of Arizona reviewed the case. It held that strict compliance with the statutory requirement is necessary: a notice of claim must state a single, specific settlement amount that leaves no room for doubt. The court rejected the use of contract interpretation principles or extrinsic evidence to resolve conflicting figures in the notice, emphasizing that the municipality has no obligation to investigate or seek clarification. Because the notice contained two different amounts, it did not comply with § 12-821.01(A). The Supreme Court vacated the appellate decision and affirmed summary judgment for the municipality. View "TERBORG v TOWN OF PAYSON" on Justia Law

A family rented military housing located within the Naval Amphibious Base Coronado in California, managed by San Diego Family Housing (SDFH) and Lincoln Military Property Management. During their tenancy, the family experienced repeated water intrusion and mold contamination, which allegedly caused health issues and property damage. After reporting these problems, remediation was attempted, but the family was dissatisfied with the response and subsequent actions. They ultimately vacated the property and brought claims in California state court for negligence and other state law issues against SDFH, Lincoln, and InDepth, a mold remediation company.SDFH and Lincoln removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, asserting federal enclave, federal agency, and federal officer jurisdiction. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on derivative sovereign immunity and later, after supplemental briefing and a Statement of Interest from the United States, rejected all grounds for federal jurisdiction. The district court found no evidence that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over the property, no sufficient nexus for federal officer removal, and insufficient grounds for federal agency status. The court remanded the case to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s remand order after the Supreme Court remanded for consideration in light of Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that no basis for federal jurisdiction existed: (1) federal enclave jurisdiction was not established due to lack of evidence of federal government assent to exclusive jurisdiction; (2) federal officer removal requirements were not satisfied, as defendants were not “acting under” a federal officer; and (3) SDFH did not qualify as a federal agency. The district court’s remand to state court was affirmed. View "CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC" on Justia Law