Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

An employee at a food processing plant was severely injured during a scheduled inspection of a boiler used to heat cooking oil. The boiler, manufactured and periodically inspected by a third-party company, exploded while the employee and his supervisor were checking its safety devices. The explosion caused significant burns to both men. The boiler had been manufactured twenty-one years earlier, and had undergone both regular quarterly and annual inspections by the manufacturer, with no issues reported. An inspection of the accident scene took place within weeks, but the injured employee was not notified or present for that inspection.After the accident, the injured employee filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas, alleging that the manufacturer was liable under theories of strict products liability and negligence, claiming defects in design, manufacturing, and marketing, and inadequate inspections. During litigation, the plaintiff’s expert suggested that a leak in the boiler’s coils likely caused the explosion but admitted an inability to identify a specific defect or rule out numerous other possible causes. The district court granted summary judgment for the manufacturer, finding no evidence of a defect, breach of duty, or proximate causation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiff failed to present substantial evidence to show either that the boiler was defective or that the manufacturer’s inspections were negligent in a way that proximately caused the injuries. The court emphasized that conjecture and speculation were insufficient to survive summary judgment, and that the plaintiff’s evidence did not exclude other possible causes or establish the manufacturer’s liability. View "Rhodes v. Fulton Thermal Corp." on Justia Law

After Charlene Jorgensen underwent two breast reduction surgeries by Dr. Adam Smith, she and her husband filed suit in May 2020, alleging the second surgery in 2018 was negligently performed and left Charlene disfigured. Their claims included medical negligence and lack of informed consent against Dr. Smith, medical negligence and respondeat superior against Smith’s professional corporation, and negligent retention and respondeat superior against Tri-State Specialists, LLP. The plaintiffs timely served a certificate of merit affidavit from Dr. Mark Jewell, which addressed Dr. Smith’s surgical care, but did not specifically address negligent retention by Tri-State.The Iowa District Court for Woodbury County denied the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, which challenged the negligent retention claim based on Iowa Code section 147.140 and section 668.11, arguing the certificate of merit affidavit was insufficient. The defendants sought interlocutory review. In a prior appeal (Jorgensen I), the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding that section 147.140 did not apply to the negligent retention claim and distinguishing Struck v. Mercy Health Services-Iowa Corp. The Court also found section 668.11 did not bar the negligent retention claim since Tri-State was not a licensed professional under the statute.Following remand, the defendants filed two further summary judgment motions challenging the sufficiency and applicability of the certificate of merit affidavit. The district court again denied these motions, and the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court of Iowa, applying the law-of-the-case doctrine, concluded that issues or matters necessarily decided in the prior appeal could not be re-examined. The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the summary judgment motions and remanded the case for trial, holding that the law-of-the-case doctrine barred reconsideration of the certificate of merit issues and applicability of section 147.140 to the negligent retention claim. View "Jorgensen v. Smith" on Justia Law

A woman was severely injured while assisting a man who was operating a horse-drawn sickle mower on his property. After mowing, the man asked the woman to hold the horses by a lead rope while he raised the sickle bar. When the sickle bar suddenly dropped to the ground, the noise startled the horses, causing them to move, which led to the woman falling and being run over and dragged by the mower. She suffered catastrophic injuries, including paralysis, and incurred substantial medical expenses.The Iowa District Court for Madison County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, dismissing the plaintiff’s personal injury suit on the grounds that the defendant was immune from liability under the Iowa Domesticated Animal Activities Act. The plaintiff appealed, arguing that the defendant’s conduct was either not protected by the statute or, if it was, that it fell within the recklessness exception to immunity. The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the application of statutory immunity but reversed the district court’s decision on recklessness, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant’s conduct was reckless, thus allowing the suit to proceed.The Supreme Court of Iowa reviewed the case and held that the statutory immunity under the Domesticated Animal Activities Act applied, as the injury resulted from the inherent risks of driving a team of horses. The court found that the plaintiff’s expert evidence did not establish that the defendant acted with recklessness, as defined under Iowa law, but only suggested ordinary negligence. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Iowa vacated the decision of the court of appeals and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the action. View "Shafer v. Santana" on Justia Law

A woman was seriously injured as a passenger in a car accident in Montgomery County, Alabama. She first received treatment at one hospital and was then transferred to another for further care. Both hospitals, which are affiliated with public entities, filed statutory hospital liens in probate courts to secure payment for her medical expenses from any settlement or recovery she might obtain related to her injuries. The total amount of the liens exceeded the amount available from the car owner’s insurance, which provided $75,000 in coverage. The woman settled with the insurance company and received a portion of the proceeds, with the rest held by her attorney pending resolution of the hospital liens.Afterward, she filed an action in the Montgomery Circuit Court, seeking interpleader and declaratory relief to determine the validity and amounts of the hospitals’ liens. One hospital, the University of South Alabama Health University Hospital, argued it was immune from suit under Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution because it is a state agency. The trial court agreed, found that the state hospital was a necessary party, and dismissed the claims against both hospitals with prejudice, concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the dismissal de novo. It held that an interpleader action brought under Rule 22 of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure to resolve the validity and amount of hospital liens does not implicate state immunity and does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction, even when a state entity is named as a defendant. The Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiff’s interpleader claim to go forward. View "Wood v. Health Care Authority for Baptist Health" on Justia Law

An employee of an industrial-construction company purchased a truck from his employer through paycheck deductions while residing at a rehabilitation center. The employee was terminated for suspected theft and, upon his firing, received a notarized title to the truck and his final paycheck, which completed the purchase. About a month later, while still driving the truck—which remained titled, licensed, and insured in the company’s name—he was involved in an accident that resulted in the death of another motorist. The deceased’s representative brought a wrongful death suit against both the former employee and the company, alleging the company was liable under theories of negligent entrustment and respondeat superior.The Circuit Court of Claiborne County granted summary judgment to the company on the respondeat superior claim, finding no employment relationship at the time of the accident. However, the court denied summary judgment on the negligent entrustment claim, finding issues of material fact regarding whether the company had control over the truck, whether title had properly transferred, and whether the company should have known about the employee’s alleged substance abuse.The Supreme Court of Mississippi granted interlocutory appeal and reviewed the denial of summary judgment on the negligent entrustment claim. The court held that for negligent entrustment, a plaintiff must show the supplier had control of the vehicle, knew or should have known of an unreasonable risk, and that this risk directly caused the harm. The court found insufficient evidence that the company knew or should have known of the employee’s substance abuse, that the company retained control over the truck after sale, or that substance abuse caused the accident. The Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the circuit court’s decision and remanded with instructions to grant summary judgment for the company on negligent entrustment. View "Rig Masters, Inc. v. Colenberg" on Justia Law

A customer was injured at a retail pharmacy when numerous beverage bottles fell from a cooler shelf, striking him and causing him to fall. The coolers in the store were stocked by both employees and independent beverage vendors, with vendors responsible for the majority of products and annual “resets” involving shelf removal and cleaning. Employees did not oversee these resets or move shelves due to their weight, and had limited interaction with the shelves apart from maintaining CVS products and general cleaning. On the day of the incident, the customer saw nothing unusual about the cooler shelf, but when he removed a bottle, many others fell, resulting in his injuries. Store staff responded promptly, but neither had ever seen such an incident or received reports of defective shelves.The customer filed a negligence claim in the Cook County Circuit Court, alleging the pharmacy was responsible for his injuries. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois based on diversity jurisdiction. Following discovery, including expert testimony limitations, the district court held a bench trial. The court found the plaintiff failed to prove negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because the evidence did not establish that the pharmacy had exclusive control over the cooler shelves, given the substantial involvement of third-party vendors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. The appellate court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that res ipsa loquitur did not apply since the plaintiff did not show that the defendant was more likely than not responsible for the injury. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s evidentiary rulings and limitations on expert testimony. View "Khouri v Highland Park CVS, L.L.C." on Justia Law

A dispute arose among residents of a Palm Beach community after Harold Peerenboom sued Isaac and Laura Perlmutter for defamation, alleging they orchestrated a hate mail campaign. The Perlmutters counterclaimed for various torts, including defamation and invasion of privacy, and later sought to amend their counterclaims to add punitive damages against Peerenboom, his attorney William Douberley, and Douberley’s employer, Federal Insurance Company. The Perlmutters alleged that Peerenboom and Douberley improperly collected their DNA and manipulated evidence to falsely implicate them, while Federal Insurance was accused of inadequate oversight.After reviewing the Perlmutters’ evidentiary submission and hearing arguments, the Circuit Court granted their motion to amend and add punitive damages claims. Peerenboom, Douberley, and Federal Insurance appealed. The Fourth District Court of Appeal, sitting en banc, reversed the trial court, holding that the trial court should have denied the motion because the evidence could not support a finding of intentional misconduct or gross negligence by clear and convincing evidence. The Fourth District required that, at the pleading stage, the court must determine whether a reasonable jury could find punitive damages warranted by clear and convincing evidence, considering all evidence from both sides.On review, the Supreme Court of Florida held that, under section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, the trial court at the pleading stage should only consider the evidence proffered by the claimant and not opposing evidence. The Court further held that the clear and convincing evidence standard does not apply at this stage; instead, the trial court must determine only whether a reasonable person could conclude, based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant’s conduct could meet the statutory standard for punitive damages. The court quashed the Fourth District’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding. View "Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Thomas Keathley and his wife filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in December 2019. During the bankruptcy proceedings, they were required to disclose all assets, including any claims against third parties. In August 2021, while the bankruptcy case was still open, Keathley was involved in a car accident with an employee of Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc. He hired a personal injury attorney and told his bankruptcy counsel that he intended to file a lawsuit, but neither he nor his counsel disclosed this potential claim to the Bankruptcy Court. Later, Keathley filed a negligence lawsuit in federal district court without updating his bankruptcy disclosures.Buddy Ayers Construction moved for summary judgment in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi based on judicial estoppel, arguing Keathley was barred from bringing the lawsuit because he had not disclosed the claim to the Bankruptcy Court. When faced with the motion, Keathley amended his bankruptcy filings to include the claim and submitted affidavits asserting the omission was inadvertent. The District Court, following Fifth Circuit precedent, granted summary judgment for Buddy Ayers Construction, finding the omission was not inadvertent because Keathley knew of the facts and had a potential motive to conceal the claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, though a concurring judge questioned whether this approach furthered the goals of judicial estoppel.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case and held that courts must examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a debtor’s omission in bankruptcy was inadvertent or mistaken for purposes of judicial estoppel. The Court found that the Fifth Circuit’s rule—which considered only whether the debtor knew of the claim and had a motive to conceal—was too rigid and overly broad for an equitable doctrine. The Supreme Court vacated the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Keathley v. Buddy Ayers Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Jewel Sanitary Napkins, a Georgia-based company, sells feminine hygiene products that it claims provide health benefits, including products containing graphene. The company developed a market among the Amish community and advertised its products through Busy Beaver Publications, which circulates regional advertising papers to that community. In August 2022, Busy Beaver published an ad submitted by a reader, Betty Lantz, that questioned the safety of Jewel's products, suggesting that graphene could attract electrical waves or radiation and pose health risks. The ad was published anonymously at Lantz’s request. Jewel asserted that the ad contained false statements and damaged its reputation.After the ad’s publication, Jewel contacted Busy Beaver to request a retraction, but Busy Beaver instead offered free advertising, consistent with its policy of not issuing retractions. Jewel declined and sued in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin for libel and trade libel. During discovery, Jewel sought the original ad submission. Busy Beaver initially believed the form had been destroyed per company practice, but later obtained it from Lantz and provided it to Jewel. Jewel withdrew a related spoliation motion but then sought sanctions over the delay. The district court denied Jewel’s motions, including a request to reopen summary judgment briefing, and granted summary judgment to Busy Beaver.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that, under Wisconsin law and the First Amendment standard for public figures, Jewel failed to present evidence that Busy Beaver acted with actual malice when publishing the ad. The appellate court also found no abuse of discretion in denying sanctions against Busy Beaver. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of Busy Beaver. View "Jewel Sanitary Napkins, LLC v Busy Beaver Publications, LLC" on Justia Law

An employee of a Charleston convenience store fatally shot a customer after a heated confrontation that escalated from a dispute over a cell phone charger. The employee, Suhib Yousef, was previously a victim of armed robbery and displayed signs of trauma. During the incident, after the customer, David Wilson, engaged in aggressive behavior and attempted to disarm Yousef, Yousef shot Wilson, who died from his injuries. Yousef’s uncle, Mahmoud Yousef, owned the store and had hired and armed Suhib after his earlier trauma.Criminal charges for murder were brought against Yousef, but the Circuit Court (Judge R. Markley Dennis) granted him immunity under the South Carolina Protection of Persons and Property Act, finding that Yousef acted lawfully in self-defense and was justified in using deadly force. The State did not appeal this ruling. Wilson’s estate then brought civil claims against the store and its owner for negligence, wrongful death, negligent supervision, and negligent entrustment. The Circuit Court (Judge George M. McFaddin, Jr.) dismissed these claims, ruling that the immunity finding in the criminal case precluded civil liability for Yousef and, by extension, for the store and its owner. The court also found no actionable damages since Yousef’s actions were deemed reasonable.On appeal, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the dismissal, holding that when an employee is granted statutory immunity for justified use of deadly force, that immunity extends to the employer for claims based on vicarious liability and also bars negligent supervision and negligent entrustment claims, as there was no underlying wrongful act. The court concluded this extension of immunity aligns with legislative intent and public policy. View "Moore v. Green's Grocery" on Justia Law