Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A young man, Austin Ghaphery, began exhibiting signs of substance abuse in 2016 and admitted to his father, Dr. Nicholas Ghaphery, that he was using illicit drugs in 2017. Dr. Ghaphery arranged for his son to undergo an initial assessment at Wheeling Treatment Center (WTC), a medication-assisted treatment facility that treats opioid addiction. During the assessment, a counselor conducted a drug screen and determined that Austin was not a candidate for admission because he was not in opioid withdrawal and his drug screen was negative for opioids. However, concerns about possible suicidal ideation were raised during the assessment, prompting WTC’s medical director, Dr. Schultz, to evaluate Austin for suicide risk. After Austin agreed to follow up with his family physician, he was released. He was not admitted into the MAT program. Thirty-six days later, Austin died from a drug overdose.Dr. Ghaphery, as personal representative of Austin’s estate, sued WTC and Dr. Schultz for medical professional liability and wrongful death, alleging that they failed to properly evaluate Austin’s condition and arrange for his transportation to a psychiatric facility. The Circuit Court of Ohio County initially denied summary judgment but later granted it, concluding that no health care provider-patient relationship existed after WTC declined to admit Austin, and thus WTC and Dr. Schultz owed him no legal duty. The Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed, holding that any health care provided was merely incidental and did not give rise to such a relationship or duty.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and reversed. It held that a health care provider-patient relationship was established during the initial assessment, even though Austin was not ultimately admitted for ongoing treatment. Therefore, WTC and Dr. Schultz owed a duty of care to Austin during the assessment process. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ghaphery v. Wheeling Treatment Center" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was violently attacked by her ex-boyfriend, who was on federal supervised release at the time. Prior to the attack, the plaintiff informed the supervising probation officer of specific threats made against her and was assured that steps would be taken to protect her, including issuing an arrest warrant. Despite these promises, the officer failed to take urgent action or communicate the immediate danger to the court or law enforcement. Days later, the ex-boyfriend assaulted the plaintiff, causing severe injuries.In the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, the plaintiff brought claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging negligence and negligent undertaking by the United States. The government moved to dismiss, asserting the FTCA’s misrepresentation and discretionary function exceptions deprived the court of jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion, holding that the misrepresentation exception applied because the officer’s promises were central to the plaintiff’s claims. The court did not address the discretionary function exception.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff’s claims for negligent failure to protect were not barred by the misrepresentation exception, as the essence of the claims concerned operational negligence rather than faulty communication. The court also held that the discretionary function exception did not apply, finding that after the officer made the discretionary decision to seek an expedited warrant, subsequent failures to act were not susceptible to policy analysis and were not shielded by the exception.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the plaintiff’s claims for negligence and negligent undertaking to move forward. View "Morris v. USA" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was injured when he fell off a rented electric scooter after hitting an asphalt patch while attempting to move from a sidewalk to a bicycle lane in the City of Long Beach. He had consumed some alcohol earlier in the day. The plaintiff had registered for the scooter rental service by accepting a user agreement, which included exculpatory provisions releasing the rental company and municipalities, including the City, from liability for injuries. He brought a negligence action against the City and an adjacent property owner, alleging that they negligently created or maintained a dangerous sidewalk condition.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County considered the City’s motion for summary judgment, which asserted three grounds: improper use of the scooter, lack of notice of the condition, and the waiver and release in the user agreement. The trial court denied summary judgment on the first two grounds, reasoning that there were factual disputes regarding the plaintiff’s use of the scooter and whether the City had constructive notice of the condition. However, the court granted summary judgment based on the exculpatory provisions of the user agreement, finding them enforceable and not against public policy. Judgment was entered for the City, and the plaintiff appealed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, affirmed the judgment, but on a different ground. The appellate court held that the City lacked actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition. It found that the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of material fact regarding notice, as the evidence he submitted (a Google Street View screenshot) was inadmissible and not properly authenticated. The court also clarified that serving amended interrogatory responses does not itself create a triable issue. The court’s holding was that summary judgment for the City was proper because there was no admissible evidence that the City had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition. View "Sargenti v. City of Long Beach" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who sued several parties after negative posts about him appeared in a large Chicago-based Facebook group where women share experiences about local men. The posts, made in late 2023, included a woman he briefly dated recounting her unpleasant experiences, attaching a screenshot of a profane text message he sent her after their breakup. Other posts by unidentified users included supportive comments and, in one instance, a link to a news article about a criminal case involving someone with a different name and appearance. The plaintiff alleged these posts caused him reputational, economic, and emotional harm.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the defendants—including the former date, her parents (for allegedly allowing use of their internet connection), the group’s administrators, and Meta Platforms—moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motions, finding the claims legally insufficient and dismissing the case with prejudice. The plaintiff appealed and voluntarily dismissed claims against unidentified “Jane Doe” defendants to preserve diversity jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court affirmed, holding that the plaintiff failed to state plausible claims under the Illinois Right of Publicity Act because none of the defendants used his likeness for a commercial purpose. The court also found the “doxing” claim insufficient, as there were no plausible allegations of intent or recklessness regarding harm or stalking. Defamation and related claims failed because the allegedly defamatory material could be innocently interpreted or lacked special damages. The court also concluded that the appeal as to the woman and her parents was frivolous and ordered the plaintiff and his attorneys to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for bringing a meritless appeal and for submitting briefs containing fictitious quotations and misstatements of law. The court awarded costs to other appellees and referred attorney conduct to state disciplinary authorities. View "D'Ambrosio v Meta Platforms, Inc." on Justia Law

A large group of cities, towns, and counties in West Virginia sued a pharmacy benefit manager, alleging that it contributed to the oversupply of opioids in their communities, thus creating a public nuisance. The local governments sought an injunction requiring the defendant to fund the abatement of the ongoing public nuisance and to compensate them for the costs of rectifying it. This proposed “abatement fund” was described as covering not just eliminating the oversupply itself, but also providing addiction treatment, education, and community rehabilitation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia denied the defendant’s demand for a jury trial, determining that the Seventh Amendment did not confer a right to a jury trial because this was a governmental public nuisance action seeking only abatement, which the court characterized as an equitable remedy. The district court also ordered a bifurcated bench trial on the public-nuisance claim, with a potential statewide abatement phase, and denied the defendant’s motions for reconsideration or for interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case on a petition for a writ of mandamus. The Fourth Circuit held that the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial because the relief sought by the local governments included a classic legal remedy—compensation for downstream harms resulting from the alleged public nuisance, such as addiction treatment and community rehabilitation. The court explained that, at the time of the Founding, only courts of law—not equity—could award such monetary relief for the consequences of a public nuisance. Therefore, the defendant was entitled to a jury trial on the public-nuisance claim, and the petition for mandamus was granted in part. View "In re: Express Scripts, Inc." on Justia Law

A young man died after his motorcycle collided with a tractor-trailer owned and operated by a nationwide commercial motor carrier. The victim’s parents and his estate brought a wrongful-death and survival action against the trucking company, its driver, and a customer whose goods were being transported at the time of the accident. The plaintiffs alleged that the customer was negligent for hiring the trucking company, claiming it should have known the carrier employed reckless drivers due to a history of safety violations. However, the pleadings did not allege that the customer owned, operated, or controlled the truck, employed the driver, influenced how the shipment was conducted, or that the shipment itself involved any unusual risk or hazard.The trucking company and driver were sued for negligence and gross negligence. The plaintiffs later amended their petition to name the customer (a national retailer) as a defendant on the same theories. The customer moved to dismiss the claims under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, arguing it owed no duty of care to the public as a mere shipper of goods transported by an independent, federally regulated carrier. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, and the Fourteenth Court of Appeals summarily denied mandamus relief.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case on petition for writ of mandamus. It held that Texas law does not impose a duty of care on a passive shipper in these circumstances. The court concluded that because the customer neither created nor controlled the risk, and the allegations did not show any exception to the general rule against liability for acts of independent contractors, the claims against the customer had no basis in law. The Supreme Court of Texas conditionally granted mandamus relief, directing the trial court to vacate its denial and dismiss the claims against the customer. View "IN RE HOME DEPOT U.S.A., INC." on Justia Law

A 14-year-old passenger, Kevin Greenidge, died from cardiac arrest aboard an American Airlines international flight from Honduras to Florida. Kevin, who suffered from multiple health conditions, began experiencing breathing difficulties soon after takeoff. Despite the crew’s efforts and the assistance of two medical professionals on board, Kevin did not survive. During the resuscitation attempt, there was a dispute about whether the aircraft’s automated external defibrillator (AED) functioned properly, as several witnesses reported it failed to deliver a shock, despite internal device data indicating otherwise.Following Kevin’s death, his aunt, Melissa Arzu, acting individually and as administrator of his estate, filed suit against American Airlines in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. She alleged liability and loss of consortium under the Montreal Convention and breach of contract under Texas law. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of American Airlines on all claims, finding that the alleged deviations from airline policy and medical response did not constitute an “accident” under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed summary judgment on the claims based on the crew’s allegedly ineffective medical response, holding that such a response does not amount to an “accident” under Article 17 without unusual circumstances or willful inaction. However, the court reversed summary judgment on the claims premised on the AED malfunction, finding that a genuine dispute remained as to whether the AED’s failure, in violation of FAA regulations, could be considered an “unexpected or unusual event.” The court also held that the Montreal Convention expressly preempts Arzu’s breach of contract claim. View "Arzu v. American Airlines" on Justia Law

A man suffered severe injuries, including the loss of his leg, when his stopped tractor-trailer was struck by a truck driven by an employee of a motor carrier. The shipment had been coordinated by a broker, and the injured man alleged the broker was liable for negligently hiring the motor carrier and its driver, pointing to the carrier’s poor safety rating and regulatory violations. The claim asserted that the broker knew, or should have known, that hiring this carrier posed a reasonable risk of causing harm.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, the broker moved to dismiss the negligent-hiring claim, arguing that it was preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA). That court, following precedent from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, agreed and dismissed the claim, reasoning that it was expressly preempted by the FAAAA and did not fall within the safety exception. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, maintaining that the safety exception did not apply to the broker in this context.The Supreme Court of the United States reviewed the case to resolve a division among the circuits. The Court held that the FAAAA’s safety exception does encompass negligent-hiring claims against brokers when those claims concern the use of motor vehicles in transportation. Specifically, the Court determined that state common-law negligent-hiring standards, as applied to brokers who select motor carriers, constitute the exercise of “safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles” and are thus not preempted by the FAAAA. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Seventh Circuit and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC" on Justia Law

A law enforcement officer conducted a traffic stop of an individual suspected of participating in a series of armed robberies. During the stop, the suspect, D’Juantez Mitchell, did not comply with police orders and drove his vehicle into the officer and toward another officer. In response, the officer shot and killed Mitchell. Mitchell’s estate and children challenged the officer’s use of deadly force, alleging violations of constitutional rights and Kentucky law.The United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky granted the officer qualified immunity on federal claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, concluding there was no violation of clearly established federal law. However, the district court denied the officer’s motion for summary judgment on the state-law claims, finding a genuine dispute as to whether the officer acted in subjective good faith, and thus denied Kentucky qualified official immunity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified official immunity under Kentucky law de novo. The appellate court held that the officer’s use of deadly force constituted a discretionary act under Kentucky law and that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption that the officer acted in good faith. The court found that neither purported inconsistencies in the officer’s testimony nor affidavits concerning his general racial animus created a genuine issue of material fact regarding his subjective intent during the incident. The court emphasized that the video evidence showed the officer and another were in imminent danger when the vehicle moved, supporting the officer’s stated belief that deadly force was necessary.The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified official immunity, holding that the officer was entitled to immunity from the state-law claims. View "Mitchell v. Conrad" on Justia Law

Two individuals were involved in a car accident, after which one party sued for damages, alleging a traumatic brain injury and seeking nearly $2 million. The parties agreed that the plaintiff would undergo a neuropsychological examination, but they disagreed on the terms governing the examination. The defendant argued that Nevada’s Rule of Civil Procedure 35 (NRCP 35) should control the process, while the plaintiff asserted that a new statute, NRS 629.620, provided additional rights and should apply.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada ruled that NRCP 35 governed the examination but imposed several conditions, including disclosure of raw test data to the plaintiff’s counsel (with restrictions), permitting non-neuropsychologist experts to review the data, allowing the exam to be audio recorded, and permitting the presence of a court-certified interpreter. The defendant sought reconsideration, which was denied, and then petitioned for extraordinary relief from the Nevada Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Nevada held that NRS 629.620 is unconstitutional to the extent it governs discovery in civil litigation and conflicts with NRCP 35. The court found that NRCP 35 is a procedural rule within the judiciary’s domain, and legislative attempts to alter its operation via NRS 629.620 violate the separation of powers. Regarding the specific exam conditions, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing disclosure of raw data to counsel with a protective order. However, it found the district court abused its discretion by permitting audio recording and the presence of an interpreter without a showing of good cause. The court granted the writ in part, directing the district court to modify those conditions, and denied relief as to the other challenged conditions. View "POWERS VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law