Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Alexander Rudnicki suffered permanent brain damage at birth due to Dr. Peter Bianco’s negligent use of a vacuum extractor, resulting in lifelong medical needs and disabilities. Nine years after the injury, Rudnicki’s parents filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Bianco on his behalf. Their individual claims were dismissed as time-barred, but the claim for Alexander proceeded. A jury found Bianco liable and awarded $4 million in damages. The trial court found good cause to exceed Colorado’s Health Care Availability Act ("HCAA") $1 million damages cap, citing the unfairness of limiting recovery given Rudnicki’s extensive care requirements. The court reduced the award by $391,000, excluding pre-majority medical expenses based on then-existing precedent. On appeal, this reduction was reversed by the Colorado Supreme Court, which reinstated the $391,000 in damages.After remand, the trial court reinstated the previously excluded damages and awarded prejudgment interest, including $319,120 in prefiling interest, resulting in a total judgment of about $1,357,000. The court maintained its finding of good cause and awarded the full amount, holding that the statutory cap did not limit the inclusion of prejudgment interest. Bianco appealed, arguing that prefiling interest could only be awarded up to $1 million, even if the good cause exception applied. The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed, interpreting the HCAA to treat prefiling interest as part of economic damages, subject to the cap and the good cause exception.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the statutory language and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. It held that prefiling interest accruing on economic damages is part of the economic damages award and thus falls within the good cause exception to the HCAA’s $1 million cap. The Court clarified that prefiling interest is not a separate category of damages and overruled conflicting precedent. View "Bianco v. Rudnicki" on Justia Law

Chance and Erin Gresser sued Banner Health on behalf of their minor daughter, C.G., alleging medical malpractice during labor, delivery, and postpartum care that resulted in severe, permanent injuries to C.G., including neurological damage and cerebral palsy. The jury found Banner Health negligent and awarded the Gressers over $27 million in economic damages, including past and future medical expenses and lost wages. Given Colorado’s Health Care Availability Act (HCAA) generally imposes a $1 million cap on such damages, the Gressers moved to exceed the cap based on good cause and unfairness, while Banner Health sought to reduce the award to the statutory limit.The Weld County District Court determined that imposing the statutory cap would be unfair under the circumstances and found good cause to exceed it. The court concluded its role was limited to a binary choice: either impose the cap or allow the full jury award, subject only to challenges for insufficient evidence or excessive damages. After finding the evidence supported the jury’s award and that the amount was not manifestly excessive or based on improper motives, the court entered judgment for the full amount, nearly $40 million with interest. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, though it reasoned the trial court retained some discretion in determining damages after finding good cause to exceed the cap.On certiorari review, the Supreme Court of Colorado affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. The court held that, once a trial court finds good cause and unfairness under section 13-64-302(1)(b) of the HCAA to exceed the damages cap, the amount of damages is governed by common law. The jury retains authority to determine the amount of damages, subject only to remittitur and sufficiency-of-evidence review by the court. The Supreme Court thus affirmed the full judgment awarded to the Gressers. View "Health v. Gresser" on Justia Law

A passenger was seriously injured after the driver of a remotely rented vehicle, accessed via a membership-based car-sharing service, crashed while under the influence of alcohol. The driver, a university student and approved member of the rental service, reserved the vehicle through a mobile app late at night after consuming alcohol at a party. The process for renting and accessing the car involved no face-to-face interaction with company staff, and the company had no prior knowledge of the driver’s intoxication or any history of impaired driving. Following the crash, the driver was convicted of felony DUI causing injury.The injured passenger sued the car-sharing company and its affiliated vehicle owner in the Superior Court of Yolo County, alleging negligent entrustment for providing the car to an unfit driver, negligent maintenance for failing to include technology to detect driver impairment, and vicarious liability based on vehicle ownership. Both sides moved for summary judgment. The trial court ruled for the defendants, holding that the company owed no duty to inquire about a renter’s impairment at the time of a remote rental, had no duty to install alcohol-detection devices, and was shielded from vicarious liability by federal law (the Graves Amendment).On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court held that remote rental car companies are exempt from statutory requirements to inspect for signs of impairment at the time of rental, per Civil Code section 1939.37, and that courts should not impose additional investigatory duties absent legislative action. The court also held that the Graves Amendment preempts state law claims of vicarious liability based solely on vehicle ownership. Judgment for the defendants was therefore affirmed. View "Tavares v. Zipcar, Inc." on Justia Law

A woman who had resided at an apartment complex in 2021 was injured when a bullet, fired from outside her apartment, struck her. She filed a pro se complaint with the Montgomery Circuit Court before the expiration of the statute of limitations, seeking to hold the apartment management responsible for her injuries on the basis that tenants were supposed to have 24-hour security due to increasing crime. The complaint, in the form of a letter, did not explicitly name a defendant or assert specific legal claims, but accompanying documents identified Hubbard Properties as the defendant and provided an address for service. However, she did not include summonses or provide instructions regarding service of process.No action was taken in the case until a status conference was held nearly two years later. Several months after that, and after the limitations period had expired, the plaintiff amended her complaint with the assistance of counsel, formally naming both Stonebridge and Hubbard Properties as defendants and asserting claims of negligence, wantonness, and failure to provide safe premises. At that time, she also included summonses and requested service by certified mail, and both defendants were served after the limitations period expired. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations because the plaintiff had not made a bona fide attempt to have the original complaint immediately served. The Montgomery Circuit Court denied the motions to dismiss without explanation.The Supreme Court of Alabama granted the defendants' petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that, although the complaint was filed before the statute of limitations expired, the plaintiff did not have the bona fide intent to have it immediately served, as objectively required for timely commencement of an action under Alabama law. Because of this, and because service occurred after the limitations period, the court directed the circuit court to dismiss the complaint with prejudice. View "Ex parte Stonebridge, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves the family of a deceased inmate who alleged that certain medical professionals and a health services foundation, after performing an autopsy at the request of correctional authorities, removed and retained the decedent’s organs without family consent. The family contended they were not informed or asked for permission regarding the autopsy or retention of organs, and only learned the organs were missing when preparing the funeral. They claimed to have relied on statements from hospital staff that such practices were standard, and only discovered in December 2023, through media reports, that retention of organs without next-of-kin consent was allegedly unlawful.The Montgomery Circuit Court reviewed and denied the defendants’ consolidated motion to dismiss, finding that statutory limitations could be tolled due to alleged fraudulent concealment. The court determined that the amended complaint sufficiently alleged facts that, if proven, could justify equitable tolling under Alabama law, and that the family’s claims were not time-barred because they filed suit within two years of learning the alleged conduct was illegal.On review, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered a petition for writ of mandamus by the University of Alabama Health Services Foundation and Dr. Stephanie Reilly. The Court held that mandamus relief was appropriate because, from the face of the complaint, the claims were barred by applicable statutes of limitations. The Court reasoned the causes of action accrued by November 6, 2021, when the family learned the organs were missing, and rejected arguments for tolling or for treating the alleged conduct as a continuous tort. The Court distinguished between statutes of limitations governing different claims, and found that all claims against the petitioners except the AUAGA claim were time-barred. It therefore granted the petition and directed dismissal of all claims against the petitioners except for the AUAGA claim. View "Ex parte University of Alabama Health Services Foundation" on Justia Law

Two sisters, aged twelve and nine, were sexually abused by their tutor during sessions at public libraries owned by two Alabama municipalities in 2017. The abuse was witnessed by library employees who allegedly failed to intervene or report the misconduct. The sisters disclosed the abuse to their mother later that year, prompting a police report. In 2023, the tutor was convicted of sexual abuse. In 2024, the sisters and their mother sued the municipalities, asserting negligence in failing to respond to the abuse.The initial complaint named nonprofit corporations associated with the libraries as defendants but was amended to substitute the municipalities themselves. Prior to filing the amended complaint, the plaintiffs served notices of claim to each municipality, but these were submitted more than six years after the alleged tortious conduct. Both the City of Irondale and the City of Birmingham moved to dismiss, arguing noncompliance with Alabama Code § 11-47-23, which requires notice of claim against a municipality within six months of claim accrual. The Jefferson Circuit Court granted their motions, dismissing the claims.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Alabama considered whether minors are exempt from the six-month notice requirement under § 11-47-23. The plaintiffs argued that minority status should toll the notice period, referencing statutory provisions that extend the time for filing suit by minors. The Supreme Court of Alabama held that § 11-47-23 contains no exception for minors and that the statutory tolling provision applies only to statutes of limitations, not notice-of-claim statutes. The court affirmed the Jefferson Circuit Court's dismissal of the claims against both municipalities, holding that minors are subject to the same notice requirements as adults under Alabama law. View "A.G.R. v. The City of Irondale" on Justia Law

Several residents of Estherville, Iowa, sued a former police officer, the police chief, the City of Estherville, and its insurance company, alleging that the officer repeatedly accessed and disseminated their confidential criminal history and intelligence data for improper purposes between 2015 and his resignation on May 3, 2019. The officer used this data for personal gain, including assisting with vehicle repossessions and harassing certain plaintiffs. Complaints about his conduct were made to the police chief, who ultimately placed the officer on administrative leave and accepted his resignation. Criminal charges were later brought against the officer in 2022 for his actions.After learning of the wrongful data access between 2021 and 2022, the plaintiffs filed suit on July 7, 2023, in the Iowa District Court for Emmet County, asserting statutory and common law claims, including invasion of privacy and conspiracy, and seeking damages under Iowa Code section 692.6. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the two-year statute of limitations under the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA) barred the claims, since all alleged misconduct ended by May 3, 2019. The district court denied dismissal, holding that the statutory claim under section 692.6 was subject to a five-year limitation with a discovery rule, and that the remaining claims accrued when plaintiffs discovered the wrongdoing.On appeal, the Iowa Court of Appeals reversed the district court and ordered dismissal, concluding that all claims were governed by the IMTCA’s two-year statute of limitations and that the date of injury was when the data was accessed or disseminated, not when plaintiffs learned of it. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court, holding that the IMTCA’s statute of limitations applied to all claims and began at the time of the wrongful acts, regardless of later discovery or emotional harm. The case was remanded for dismissal. View "Abrahamson v. Scheevel" on Justia Law

A patient in his mid-thirties, with a history of neurological complaints but no similar recent issues, was hospitalized twice in early April 2018 for severe testicular pain at a regional medical center. During the second admission, he received high doses of opioid medications, with documented warnings about their risks and instructions for monitoring his respiratory function. On the last day of his hospitalization, he exhibited abnormal drowsiness and a low respiratory rate. Shortly after discharge, his wife observed sudden, profound cognitive and behavioral changes, including confusion, speech difficulties, and memory problems. Over the following months, he underwent multiple neurological and psychiatric evaluations, many of which failed to show physiological brain abnormalities. Several providers ultimately diagnosed him with functional neurological (conversion) disorder, while a brain injury rehabilitation center noted a history of hypoxia based on family accounts.The patient and his wife filed a medical malpractice suit against the hospital and a treating physician in the Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Beadle County, South Dakota. They alleged negligent overprescription of opioids and inadequate monitoring, resulting in a hypoxic brain injury. The defendants moved to exclude the plaintiffs’ causation expert, arguing that his methods were unreliable under Daubert and state law. The circuit court excluded the expert’s testimony and granted summary judgment for the defendants, reasoning that without expert causation testimony, the plaintiffs could not establish a genuine issue of material fact.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed whether the exclusion of the expert’s testimony and the grant of summary judgment were proper. The court held that the circuit court erred by failing to assess the reliability of the expert’s overall differential diagnosis methodology and by excluding all his opinions based solely on certain quantitative tests. The Supreme Court reversed the exclusion of most of the expert’s testimony (except regarding two specific tests) and reversed summary judgment, allowing the case to proceed. View "Walton V. Huron Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

Unity McGill was murdered on the dance floor of The Red Carpet Nightclub in St. Cloud, Minnesota, by three assailants who had previously been removed from the premises following an earlier assault but were permitted to reenter without adequate communication among staff or use of a metal detecting wand. The nightclub, operated by R.C. of St. Cloud, Inc., had policies to remove anyone involved in a fight, yet these protocols were not properly followed. McGill’s brother, Alvin Glay, acting as trustee for the next of kin, brought a wrongful death civil suit against R.C. under an innkeeper negligence theory, arguing that R.C. failed to use reasonable care to protect patrons.The Stearns County District Court denied summary judgment for R.C., finding that whether the attack was foreseeable was a close factual question suitable for a jury. At trial, the jury found R.C. negligent for failing to prevent McGill’s death but determined R.C.’s negligence was not the direct cause, and thus did not hold R.C. liable. Glay’s motion for a new trial was denied as to R.C.’s liability, but granted for damages against the assailants. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s denial of a new trial on R.C.’s liability, finding the jury instructions on superseding intervening cause were confusing and prejudicial.The Minnesota Supreme Court reviewed whether the district court’s jury instruction on superseding intervening cause was erroneous and prejudicial. The Court held that Glay did not invite error in the instructions and that it was improper to instruct the jury on superseding intervening cause when the same conduct (the attack) was both the basis for innkeeper negligence and the alleged superseding cause. The jury instructions were found likely to confuse and mislead, and the error was prejudicial. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals and ordered a new trial on R.C.’s liability. View "Glay vs. R.C. of St. Cloud, Inc." on Justia Law

An 11-year-old student, Therese, died by suicide at her father's home during her school’s winter break. Her parents brought claims against the school district, alleging negligent hiring, supervision, and training of staff, failure to protect Therese from bullying, and inadequate response to her expressions of suicidal ideation. They argued the district failed to fulfill its duty to supervise students and to inform them of Therese’s condition. The parents also pursued a survival claim for Therese’s pre-death suffering, alleging harm occurred on campus due to the district’s negligence.The Superior Court of Solano County denied the school district’s motion for summary judgment, finding triable issues of fact as to whether the district exercised reasonable care and whether Therese suffered injury on campus due to the district’s negligence. The court relied on the California Supreme Court’s decision in Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School District, determining that statutory immunity under Education Code section 44808 did not apply because there were factual questions about on-campus harm and failure to exercise reasonable care.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandate. The appellate court held that under section 44808, the district is immune from liability for harms resulting from Therese’s off-campus suicide, as she was not under the district’s supervision at the time. However, the court determined that this immunity does not extend to the survival claim, which concerns alleged on-campus harm while Therese was under the district’s supervision. The appellate court ordered the trial court to grant summary adjudication in favor of the district on the wrongful death and related claims but allowed the survival claim to proceed. View "Vallejo City Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law