Doe v. San Diego-Imperial Council

Plaintiff John PD Doe was sexually abused by a Boy Scout master beginning in 1998 and continuing for a number of years at a ranch owned and operated by defendants, San Diego-Imperial Council and Boy Scouts of America. In 2013, after Doe obtained psychological therapy, he filed this action against the defendants. Defendants ultimately demurred to Doe's complaint on the ground that he failed to file a certificate of merit, as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1. The trial court sustained defendants' demurrer on this ground, without leave to amend. Doe appealed the trial court's judgment, and the Court of Appeal court affirmed the judgment in favor of defendants. Following the issuance of the remittitur, defendants moved for an award of attorney fees with respect to the fees incurred in defendant Doe's appeal pursuant to subdivision (q) of section 340.1. The trial court awarded defendants the fees that they requested without analyzing the statutory provision or stating the court's reasoning as to why such fees were appropriate. Doe appealed the trial court's award of attorney fees resulting from the prior appeal, contending section 340.1(q) was designed to permit an award of attorney fees only in situations in which there is some indication that the plaintiff's claim of sexual abuse is without merit, such that the conclusion of the litigation may be deemed to constitute a "[']favorable conclusion of the litigation with respect to[']" the defendants for whom a certificate of merit was filed or should have been filed. Doe asserted that in this case, where the trial court acknowledged that Doe's claim was not frivolous, and there was no indication that the claim lacked merit, defendants were not eligible for an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 340.1(q). Defendants argued that because they obtained a dismissal of the action, and, as a result, they were prevailing parties and were entitled to attorney fees. The Court of Appeal concluded that a defendant is eligible for an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 340.1(q) only where the litigation has resulted in a "favorable conclusion" for that defendant, and that a "favorable conclusion" requires a result that is reflective of the merits of the litigation. In this case, the dismissal of Doe's action was procured as a result of a procedural defect that did not reflect on the merits of the action. As a result, there was no "favorable conclusion" with respect to defendants, and they were therefore not eligible to be awarded their attorney fees. View "Doe v. San Diego-Imperial Council" on Justia Law