Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Coosa Cable Company, Inc. (Coosa Cable), sued Sycamore Management Group, LLC (Sycamore), and DirecPath, LLC (DirecPath). Coosa Cable sought and obtained both a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction barring DirecPath from providing video-programming services to the tenants of an apartment building owned by Sycamore. As a condition of the TRO, Coosa Cable provided a security bond of $250. As a condition of the preliminary injunction, the trial court required Coosa Cable to provide a security bond of $100,000. After a hearing, the trial court entered a permanent injunction against Sycamore and DirecPath and discharged Coosa Cable's security bond. Sycamore and DirecPath appealed; the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order granting permanent injunctive relief to Coosa Cable. Sycamore and DirecPath then sought to recover costs, damages, and attorney fees caused by the wrongful injunction, but the trial court denied their motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the trial court's decision: "[the Court held] that after this Court held in [the first Sycamore case] that Sycamore and DirecPath had been wrongfully enjoined, they were entitled to seek an award from Coosa Cable of the damages caused by the wrongful injunction. Because the trial court erred in denying Sycamore and DirecPath damages for the wrongful injunction, we reverse the trial court's order denying their motion seeking those damages."

Defendant Jo Ann Hood appealed a trial court's order that granted a motion for a new trial filed by Plaintiff Elizabeth McElroy as personal representative of the estate of Austin Taylor Terry (the estate). The mother of Austin Taylor Terry, who was then 12 months old, admitted him to the Children's Hospital of Alabama. A social worker at the hospital notified the county Department of Human Resources (DHR) that Terry had suffered "suspicious non-accidental injuries." Terry's father, who was divorced from Terry's mother, also contacted DHR after he learned of his son's hospitalization. He spoke with an after-hours on-call DHR service worker learned that Chris Wesson, the mother's boyfriend, had been in the house with Terry. The service worker recommended that Terry not be allowed to return home when he was discharged. A DHR supervisor who had not seen the report, assigned Defendant to investigate Terry's suspected abuse and informed the Hospital that Terry could go home with his mother when he was discharged. Based on her investigation, Defendant determined that it was safe to leave Terry in his mother's care. Subsequently, Terry died from brain injuries caused by Wesson. Terry's parents filed separate wrongful-death actions naming Wesson, Children's Hospital, Hood, and other DHR social workers as defendants. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the estate and awarded $25,000 in damages against Wesson and Hood. The estate filed a motion for a new trial, arguing among other things, that a juror's failure to respond to a voir dire question prevented the estate from using its jury strikes effectively because it would have used one to remove the juror had the juror answered the question. After Hood filed her opposition to the estate's postjudgment motion, the court granted the motion on the ground that the estate was probably prejudiced in its right to a fair and impartial trial as a result of the juror's failure to respond to the voir dire question. Upon review, the Supreme Court could not conclude that "[the juror's] failure to reveal, in response to the particular questions asked, [provided] adequate support for a finding ... so as to warrant retrying this case." The Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Tate & Lyle Sucralose, Inc. (TLS) petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Washington Circuit Court to vacate its December 1, 2010 order denying its motion to dismiss, and to enter an order dismissing as time-barred the negligence and wantonness claims asserted by William C.Anderson, Jr. against it. Upon review of the circuit court's record, the Supreme Court concluded that Anderson failed to exercise due diligence in ascertaining TLS's identity, and that failure barred his attempt to amend his complaint to substitute TLS for a fictitiously named defendant so as to avoid the application of the statute of limitations barring his negligence claims. The Court also concluded that as to Anderson's wantonness claims, the limitations period had not yet expired. Therefore, the Court granted the petition in part and denied it in part and issued the writ.

Defendants Lafarge North America, Inc. and Wayne Looney appealed a jury verdict in favor of Plaintinff Lawrence Nord. Plaintiff's claims arose from a personal injury he sustained at Lafarge's cement packhouse. Various forms of bagged cement are loaded onto flatbed trucks owned and operated by companies other than Lafarge, by Lafarge employees using forklifts. The drivers of the flatbed trucks drive their trucks into the loading zone of the packhouse. Plaintiff, a driver for Southern Tank, was injured in the loading zone of the packhouse when Lafarge employee Looney ran over Plaintiff's foot with a forklift, breaking several bones. In their postjudgment motion, Defendants argued that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to support the jury's findings on his wantonness claim; that Plaintiff's negligence claim was barred because he had been contributorily negligent; that if the jury verdict stood, Defendants were "entitled to a setoff in the amount of the damages claimed by [Nord] which [had] already been recovered by ... Nord ..."; that the trial court had erred by instructing the jury on wantonness, punitive damages, and premises liability; and that the verdict form submitted to the jury was improper. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court found that the record was insufficient to support the jury's verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for judgment in favor of Defendants.

Getloaded Corporation, TransCore, and Roper Industries, Inc. (collectively, Getloaded), and American Timber & Steel Company, Inc. (ATSC), petitioned the Supreme Court for writs of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court to dismiss them as defendants based on a lack of personal jurisdiction in actions filed by Plaintiffs Bishop Ivey, Carolyn Kelley, Joan Foye Wynn, Sonie Taylor, Annette Fenn, Kendra Bouier, and Jenny Simmons. The plaintiffs were representatives of the estates of passengers riding in an Alabama Department of Corrections van who died as a result of an October 2008 accident. A truck carrying lumber purchased by ATSC from Getloaded tried to pass another vehicle on the highway. The van hit the passing truck and caught fire, engulfing the van in flames killing all inside. The plaintiffs' respective complaints asserted claims against the purchasers of the lumber, the truck drivers and their trucking companies, and others who were otherwise involved in the loading and delivery of the lumber. ATSC filed an answer to the complaints in which, among other things, it pleaded lack of personal jurisdiction. In April 2009, the claims against ATSC were voluntarily dismissed without prejudice. The plaintiffs then reached a settlement with one of the trucking companies and its driver. The circuit court found that the remaining Defendants had the sufficient "minimum contacts" with the state to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction. Upon review, the Supreme Court found Defendants did not have sufficient contact with the state in order for the circuit court to exercise personal jurisdiction over them. The Supreme Court reversed the court's decision and remanded the case to dismiss Defendants from this action.

Reginald Hayes appealed the circuit court's dismissal of his action against Jo Ann Henley both individually and in her capacity as the personal representative of the estate of her deceased husband Earl Hoyt Henley (Hoyt). Hayes sustained injuries when his automobile struck a horse on a highway. The horse rolled onto the roof of the automobile and the roof collapsed, breaking Hayes's neck and rendering him a quadriplegic. Hayes filed a multicount complaint against Mazda and against Henley, alleging that the horse he struck belonged to Hoyt and/or Henley and that Hoyt and/or Henley had allowed the horse to roam onto the highway thereby causing the accident. As to Mazda, Hayes alleged that the automobile was defectively designed and/or manufactured and that it was not crashworthy. The circuit court entered two orders in which it granted Henley's motions and dismissed the claims against Henley individually and as representative of the estate. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that "the circuit court's order disposing of Hayes's claims against Henley in her individual capacity is due to be affirmed. We cannot reach the same conclusion, however, as to the circuit court's disposition of all Hayes's claims against Henley in her capacity as personal representative of Hoyt's estate." The Court reversed the circuit court's ruling that the estate "knowingly and willfully" placed the horse upon the highway.

Stenum Hospital, Sue Hart, James Rider, Malte Peterson, Dr. Jens Dannenberg, Dr. Karl Ritter-Lang, Dr. Heiner Beese, and Dr. Hans-Georg Zechel, third-party defendants in an action pending in the Madison Circuit Court (collectively "the hospital parties"), petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the trial court to vacate its order that denied their motion to dismiss the third-party complaint filed against them by Madison Square Associates, Ltd. (Madison Square), ERMC II, L.P., CBL & Associates Properties, Inc., and CBL & Associates Management, Inc. (collectively "the mall parties"), and to enter an order dismissing the third-party complaint. In 2007, Elizabeth Duncan slipped and fell on a wet tile floor at Madison Square Mall. According to her second amended complaint, Ms. Duncan sustained a fracture to her left patella and "aggravated and/or sustained injuries to her spine, including her neck and back." She became partially paralyzed after she underwent disk-replacement surgery at Stenum, which is located in Germany. Ms. Duncan and her husband, John, subsequently sued the mall parties. Ms. Duncan alleged claims of negligence and wantonness resulting in the injuries she suffered when she fell; her husband alleged a claim of loss of consortium. The hospital parties argued that the dispositive issue presented by their petition for the writ of mandamus was whether the mall parties had standing to assert the claims made in the third-party complaint. The hospital parties maintained that the mall parties do not have standing; therefore, the hospital parties argued, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the petition, and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying the hospital parties' motion to dismiss the complaint. The Court concluded the mall parties lacked standing to assert the claims they asserted against the hospital parties in the third-party complaint.

Dallas County Sheriff Harris Huffman, Jr., and Deputy Sheriff Ernest Larry Donaldson petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss a complaint filed by Plaintiff Marie Jemison alleging multiple claims against them in their individual capacities. Plaintiff alleged that on August 23, 2008, she was traveling in Selma while, at the same time, Deputy Donaldson "was operating a motor vehicle in the line and scope of his agency and/or employment with the Dallas County Sheriff's Department." According to Plaintiff, as she entered the intersection of Lauderdale Avenue and Dallas Avenue, she was struck by Deputy Donaldson's vehicle and, as a result, sustained serious personal injuries. Jemison sued Deputy Donaldson, Donaldson's supervisor Sheriff Huffman, the Dallas County Sheriff's Department, and the Dallas County Commission. Among other claims, Plaintiff alleged negligence and wantonness against Deputy Donaldson for the manner in which he operated his vehicle, negligent entrustment and negligent hiring, training, supervision, and retention against Sheriff Huffman, and vicarious liability against the Dallas County Sheriff's Department and the Dallas County Commission. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss all claims, asserting a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that under the circumstances of this case, Deputy Donaldson was acting in the line and scope of his employment and was entitled to State immunity. Therefore, the trial court erred in failing to grant the motion to dismiss all claims against Deputy Donaldson and Sheriff Huffman.

Robert S. Grant Construction, Inc. (the corporation), Robert S. Grant (RSG), and Pam E. Grant (PEG) (collectively referred to as "the Grants") appealed an order striking their jury demands in an action commenced by Frontier Bank (the bank) against the Grants and others alleging breach of contract, fraud, and the fraudulent conveyance of real estate. This case arose out of a loan from the bank to the corporation. The loan ultimately involved a number of related agreements, including a construction-loan agreement between the corporation and the bank and a series of "continuing guaranties," whereby RSG personally guaranteed repayment of the loan. The Supreme Court was unable to reach the merits of the Grants' contentions, and dismissed the appeal because, despite the invocation of Rule 54(b), the trial court's order was not final and appealable.

April Mack, mother of "Baby Mack" appealed the grant of summary judgment in her action against Thomas Carmack and Matthew Taul for the wrongful death of her unborn child. In 2007, Mack and her fiancee Reginald Thomas (father of Baby Mack) needed to go to the grocery store, but were without transportation. Mack contacted Thomas Carmack and asked him to take her and Thomas to the grocery store. Carmack agreed to do so after Mack offered to pay for the trip. En route, Carmack's vehicle was struck by Taul's vehicle when Carmack "knowingly proceeded to turn left even though the traffic light was red . . . [in] violation of the law to do so." The force of the collision caused severe damage to Carmack's vehicle and injuries to Mack and Thomas. While hospitalized, Mack suffered a miscarriage. The trial court found that the state Wrongful Death Act did not allow for a cause of action for a nonviable fetus and entered summary judgment on behalf of Carmack. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding "it is an unfair and arbitrary endeavor to draw a line that allows recovery on behalf of a fetus injured before viability that dies after achieving viability but that prevents recovery on behalf of a fetus injured that, as a result of those injuries, does not survive to viability . . . We cannot conclude that 'logic, fairness, and justice' compel the drawing of such a line; instead, 'logic, fairness, and justice' compel the application of the Wrongful Death Act to circumstances where prenatal injuries have caused death to a fetus before the fetus has achieved the ability to live outside the womb." The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.