Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Faye Gilmer sued Crestview Memorial Funeral Home, Inc. ("Crestview"), Garland Jones, Barry Taul, and Mary Caldwell, alleging claims related to services Crestview had provided with regard to the funeral of Mrs. Gilmer's husband. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on all the claims against them. Mrs. Gilmer appealed, and the Supreme Court: (1) affirmed the trial court's judgment as to the claims against Jones, (2) affirmed the negligent-supervision claim against Jones and Crestview, and (3) affirmed the negligent- or wanton-conduct claim against all the defendants. The Court reversed the trial court's judgment as to the tort-of-outrage, suppression, and breach-of-contract claims against Crestview, Taul, and Caldwell. The case was then remanded the case for further proceedings. Taul and Caldwell were eventually dismissed from the action. The trial court granted Mrs. Gilmer's motion for a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") on the breach-of-contract claim. The suppression and tort-of-outrage claims were submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict in Crestview's favor on the tort-of-outrage claim and in Gilmer's favor on the suppression claim. Crestview appealed the trial court's judgment as to the breach-of-contract and suppression claims, as well as the compensatory-damages and punitive-damages awards. Upon re-review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remand the case for a new trial on the breach-of-contract and suppression claims: "Crestview presented substantial evidence creating a question of fact requiring resolution by the jury as to the materiality of the alleged breach of the contract, the trial court erred in entering a JML in favor of Gilmer with regard to that claim." Moreover, the Court was unable to determine from the lump-sum award of compensatory damages what damages were assessed with regard to the suppression claim and the breach-of-contract claim, respectively: "[t]herefore, we must reverse the trial court's judgment as to both claims and remand the case for a new trial on the suppression and breach-of-contract claims."

Defendants Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company, L.P. (KKR), KKR Associates, KKR Partners II, and Crimson Associates, L.P., as well as several individuals, petitioned the Supreme Court for the writ of mandamus to direct a circuit court to vacate its order that denied their motion to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint because it lacked personal jurisdiction. The plaintiffs in this action were 46 individuals, partnerships, corporations, foundations, trusts and retirement and pension funds located throughout the country that invested in certain promissory notes issued as part of a leveraged recapitalization of Bruno's Inc., a supermarket-grocery business with its headquarters in Alabama. Plaintiffs contended that despite a negative due-diligence report from its forensic accountant, KKR decided to proceed with its acquisition of Bruno's. In order to achieve the recapitalization, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants made material, fraudulent misrepresentations to the Plaintiffs' investment money manger that induced them into purchasing the notes. Based on the torts allegedly committed by the individual defendants, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court did not err in denying Defendants' motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court denied Defendants' application for the writ of mandamus, and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Appellee Younus Ismail, M.D. appealed a trial court's denial of his motion for summary judgment pertaining to claims made by Appellants Randy and Joy Paradise. Mr. Paradise was treated in the emergency room of Highlands Medical Center, and a chest x-ray was ordered as part of his treatment. While in the radiology department, he fell and was injured. Mr. and Mrs. Paradise filed suit alleging negligence and wantonness stemming from Mr. Paradise's injuries. Dr. Ismail was the emergency room physician "in charge and control of [Mr.] Paradise's treatment." The Doctor filed a motion to dismiss the charges, arguing the claim was barred by a two-year statute of limitations. Upon review of the trial court's record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the claim was indeed time-barred as to Dr. Ismail. The Court vacated the trial court's order denying the Doctor's motion and remanded the case for the trial court to enter summary judgment in the Doctor's favor.

Appellee Compass Bank and Amy Hovis petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct a circuit court to dismiss an action filed in that court filed by Appellant Jerome Sirote based on Alabama's abatement statute. Appellant filed suit against the Bank and several of its employees alleging breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, violations of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, fraud, deceit, and violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Appellant alleged that the Bank improperly processed transactions in his deposit account and misstated material facts related to that account. The Bank moved to dismiss the complaint. The district court entered an order dismissing Appellant's federal claims with prejudice. The court remanded the case for further proceedings on the state law claims. The Bank moved to dismiss the remaining charges under the Abatement Statute, arguing that Appellant was barred from prosecuting two actions simultaneously in different courts if the claims alleged in each action arose from the same underlying operative facts. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the Bank's petition and issued the writ to direct the lower court to dismiss Appellant's state claims.

Petitioner Delta International Machinery Corporation (Delta) sought a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to vacate an order that granted Respondent Brandon Landrum access to "certain technology" in its control. Respondent was operating a portable bench saw manufactured by Delta. His hand came into contact with the sawblade and ended with injuries to his hand and amputation of his index finger. In 2007, Respondent sued Delta alleging the saw was defective and unreasonably dangerous. Though the parties agreed to a protective order which forbade certain confidential materials from being released to Respondent's expert witness who happened to be employed by one of Delta's competitors, the trial court allowed Respondent's expert to review certain technology in Delta's possession pertaining to design of safety features of the saw. The technology Respondent sought to discover had pre-dated technology that had been developed by a joint venture of all saw manufacturers, of which Delta was a part. Delta claimed that its "flesh-sensing" technology was not discoverable because it did not exist at the time Respondent's saw was manufactured, and pre-dated the joint venture. Delta objected to Respondent's discovery request as "irrelevant" and "confidential." The trial court granted Respondent's motion to inspect. Delta subsequently filed its petition to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the flesh-sensing technology was both a trade secret and was not relevant to Respondent's claims. As such, the Court concluded that the trial court exceeded its discretion in allowing discovery of that technology and in allowing access to the technology by Delta's competitor. The Court granted Delta's request for the writ, and directed the trial court directed the trial court to vacate its order granting Respondent's motion to inspect.

Alabama Title Loans, Inc., Accurate Adjustments, LLC and Kevin Sanders all appealed a trial court order that denied their motions to compel arbitration filed against them by Plaintiff Kimberly White. In 2009, Ms. White borrowed money from Alabama Title Loans (ATL), securing the loan with an interest in her automobile. ATL required Ms. White to surrender the title to the automobile. The title-loan agreement contained an arbitration clause. Ms. White subsequently paid off her loan and borrowed more money against her car several more times. In August 2009, Ms. White said she went to ATL ready to pay off her loan in full. In January 2010, ALT contracted with Accurate Adjustments to conduct a "self-help" repossession of Ms. White's automobile. The police were called, and Accurate and ATL were required to release the automobile when it could not produce the title they claimed gave them the right to repossess. Ms. White filed suit alleging multiple theories: assault and battery, negligence, wantonness, trespass, wrongful repossession and conversion. At trial, the court denied the title-loan parties' motion to compel arbitration without making any findings of fact. Based on the broad language of the arbitration clause in the title-loan agreements executed by Ms. White, the Supreme Court held that the trial court should have granted the title-loan parties' motions to compel arbitration. The Court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Thomasville Feed & Seed, Inc. (Thomasville Feed) petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Wilcox County Circuit court to transfer the action filed against it by Roy Saulsberry and Roy Saulsberry, Jr. (The Saulsberrys) to the Clarke Circuit Court. The Saulsberrys own and operate a cattle farm in Wilcox County. Thomasville Feed is located in Clarke County. In April 2010, the Saulsberrys sued Thomasville Feed in Wilcox County Circuit Court, alleging that fertilizer they purchased from Thomasville Feed was defective and that Thomasville Feed was liable for damages under Alabama tort law. Thomasville Feed moved to dismiss the complaint, contending that Thomasville Feed only does business in Clarke County, and that Clarke County had jurisdiction over it. The trial court denied Thomasville Feedâs motion to dismiss. Thomasville Feed then filed a motion to transfer the case to Clarke County, which the trial court denied. Thomasville subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for extraordinary relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that venue was proper in Clarke County. The Court vacated the Wilcox County order that denied Thomasville Feedâs motion to transfer, and issued the writ of mandamus to direct the court to transfer the case to Clarke County.

The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Alabama certified a question to the State Supreme Court. The Court was asked whether the failure of an insured to give notice of a proposed settlement to an insurance company causes the insured to forfeit underinsured motorist coverage (UIM), regardless of the insuredâs actual knowledge of that coverage, and regardless of prejudice to the insurance company if the insured has a copy of the policy that contains the coverage. In 2007, Delbert and Lou Ann Downey were stopped at an intersection on their motorcycle when a vehicle driven by Wyndell Thompson failed to stop and hit them. At the time of the accident, multiple insurance policies were in force. The Downeys had underinsured motorist coverage. The Downeys, in consideration of $10,000 and while represented by counsel (but without having notified Travelers Property Casualty Insurance Company that they were doing so), executed a general release to discharge Mr. Thompson and his insurance company from all liability arising out of the accident. Subsequently, and with different counsel, the Downeys notified Travelers of the accident for the first time and that they were making a claim under their underinsured motorist policy. Travelers denied the claim and the Downeys sued. The Supreme Court found that the Downeys were at all relevant times in possession of the policy, and it clearly provided UIM coverage. However, the Downeys did not meet the threshold of showing any condition under which their lack of notice could be excused. "In other words, the Downeys have âforfeit[ed]â UIM coverage."

The United States Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation consolidated approximately 1800 cases involving claims that sought damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by exposure to welding fumes. Several dozen of these cases are governed by Alabama law, and the MDL court identified three issues of law that may be determinative in those cases. The Supreme Court responded in summary: (1) a plaintiff injured by long-term continuous exposure to a toxic substance is limited to recovering damages attributable to injuries occurring within the period of limitations; (2) a six-year statute of limitations applies to wantonness claims filed before the Courtâs holding in "Ex parte Capstone" was released; and (3) a plaintiff injured by long-term continuous exposure to a toxic substance has the burden to establish what damages (if any) are attributable to his injuries occurring within the applicable limitation period.

At issue in this case was the application of a six-year statute of limitations to a claim of "wantonness." Plaintiff William Walker filed suit against Capstone Building Corporation (Capstone) and several fictitiously named parties. Capstone had been the general contractor on a construction job on which he worked. While working at the construction site, Plaintiff stepped onto a manhole cover which flipped over, causing him to fall into the hole. Plaintiff asserted that Capstone had been responsible for providing a safe work environment at the site, but it failed to do so. Plaintiff alleged that Capstone's failure to secure the manhole cover constituted "negligence" or "wantonness." Alabama law provides that wanton conduct must be commenced within six years. Capstone moved to dismiss the claims, asking the Supreme Court to change Alabama case law in favor of a two-year limitation for this case. The Supreme Court engaged in an extensive review of the trial record and the applicable law. The Court overruled its previous holding in "McKenzie v. Killian" which mandated the six-year limitation on claims for wantonness, finding that if it "did not ... overrule 'McKenzie,' [the Court] would be enshrining in out law an erroneous decision." The Court found that "the law in Alabama concerning the proper legal analysis of wantonness was not settled and was in fact based on confusing and inconsistent discussions of causality rather than culpability." The Court applied its change prospectively to litigants as to whom the six-year limitations had begun but had not yet expired. To this end, the Court found that Plaintiff's case was timely filed under the McKenzie rule. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision that dismissed Plaintiff's wantonness claim, and remanded the case for further proceedings.