Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

George Mason petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Macon Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment for him on the basis of State-agent immunity in an action filed against him by Kola Oyedepo, individually and as grandfather and next friend of Joshua Dosunmu. George Mason was a bus driver employed by the Macon County Board of Education. Joshua Dosunmu, a fifth-grade student in the Macon County school system, was a passenger on the school bus Mason was driving. After the bus had continued on its route, Dosunmu attempted to cross the highway. He was struck and injured by an automobile, driven by Janie Pearson Sellers. Oyedepo sued Mason and others alleging negligence and wantonness arising from Mason's alleged failure to properly supervise Dosunmu and/or his alleged failure to ensure that Dosunmu got off the bus at the appropriate school-bus stop. Mason moved for summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled to State-agent immunity because as a bus driver employed by the Macon County Board of Education at the time of the accident, he was exercising judgment in transporting and supervising students on the day of the incident. The Supreme Court concluded that Mason demonstrated that he was entitled to State-agent immunity as to the claims asserted against him in his individual capacity in Oyedepo's action. Therefore the Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Oyedepo v. Sellers" on Justia Law

Jamie Gaddy appealed a circuit court judgment that dismissed with prejudice Gaddy's medical-malpractice action against certified nurse anesthetist Lisa Brascho. According to Gaddy, the reason she requested the dismissal of her trial court case against Brascho was to seek appellate review of the trial court's decision granting Brascho's motion in limine. However, the Supreme Court has previously stated that "where the plaintiff knowingly and willingly agrees to a stipulation of dismissal, he has no standing to appeal." Therefore, based on Gaddy's failure to demonstrate to the Supreme Court that it had jurisdiction over Gaddy's appeal, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "Gaddy v. Brascho " on Justia Law

Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. (RJFS), and its employee, Bernard Michaud appealed a trial court order vacating an arbitration award in their favor and entering a judgment in favor of Kathryn Honea. Honea had multiple investment accounts with Raymond James and sued RJFS alleging violations of the Alabama Securities Act and sought damages for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, wantonness, and fraud. RJFS moved to compel arbitration, and the trial court granted the motion. An arbitration panel unanimously entered an award in favor of RJFS on Honea's claims. Honea filed a motion at circuit court to vacate the award. The trial court ultimately vacated the award, and RJFS appealed. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's judgment vacating the arbitration award, holding that a provision in the arbitration agreement Honea signed when she opened the accounts required the trial court to conduct a de novo review of the arbitration award, and remanded the case for it to conduct such a review. Both parties acknowledged on appeal that the award had not been entered as a judgment of the trial court. Because the award to RJFS was not entered as a judgment of the trial court as required by statute, the Supreme Court could reach no other conclusion but that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review the award on remand. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment purporting to vacate that award and to enter a judgment in favor of Honea was void. This appeal was dismissed. View "Raymond James Financial Services, Inc. v. Honea " on Justia Law

General Motors of Canada Limited ("GM Canada") petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Choctaw Circuit Court to enter a summary judgment in its favor on the ground that the plaintiff's substitution of GM Canada for a fictitiously named defendant was made after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations and does not relate back to the filing of the original petition. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded GM Canada met the requirements for the issuance of the writ. The Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Poole v. General Motors Corporation et al." on Justia Law

Toma E. Smith, as personal representative of the estate of Tiffani P. Smith, appeals the grant of a summary judgment in favor of Dr. James Fleming, and a judgment entered in favor of Dr. Winfield S. Fisher III and the University of Alabama Foundation on her wrongful death claims. Dr. Fisher and the Foundation cross-appealed, arguing that the action should have been dismissed as being void ab initio. Based on the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in entering a summary judgment in favor of Dr. Fleming. The Court concluded the trial court did not err in its judgment in favor of Dr. Fisher and the Foundation. View "Smith v. Winfield" on Justia Law

Jessica Eastman, as the dependent widow of David Bentley, and on behalf of Bentley's three minor children, appealed a judgment entered in favor of R. Warehousing and Port Services Inc. On appeal to the Supreme Court, she argued: (1) that she was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on R. Warehousing's affirmative defense based on the "loaned-servant" doctrine; and (2) she was entitled to a new trial because counsel for R. Warehousing implied during opening statements that she had recovered workers' compensation benefits from Richway Transportation Services,Inc. in violation of the collateral-source rule. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Eastman v. R Warehousing & Port Services, Inc. " on Justia Law

Michelle D. Morgan appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Publix Super Markets, Inc., on her claim alleging a violation of the Alabama Medical Liability Act. Morgan sued Publix, asserting that she had suffered physical, mental, and emotional injuries based on its negligence in partially filling her amlodipine prescription with furosemide. Following the close of discovery, the trial court granted Publix's motion for a summary judgment, holding that Morgan was unable to prove her case because she had not identified an Alabama-licensed pharmacist as an expert witness and could not, therefore, establish a breach of the applicable standard of care as required by the AMLA. Morgan appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment entered by the trial court. The Supreme Court concluded that a pharmacy's negligence in dispensing the wrong medication is so apparent that a layperson can understand it without the assistance of expert testimony. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Morgan v. Publix Super Markets, Inc. " on Justia Law

Rebecca B. McDonald, as administrator of the estate of her son Jeremy Wayne McDonald, sued Kubota Manufacturing of America Corporation, Kubota Corporation, and Kubota Tractor Corporation, asserting various claims after her son died as a result of injuries sustained when a Kubota lawnmower he was operating rolled over, pinning him underneath it. Following a three-week trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Kubota defendants, and the trial court entered a judgment on that verdict. McDonald's subsequent motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court, and McDonald appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that she was entitled to a new trial based on juror misconduct and errors the trial court made when instructing the jury. Finding no abuse of discretion nor errors at trial, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "McDonald v. Kubota Manufacturing of America Corporation et al. " on Justia Law

Felice McGathey appealed a circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Brookwood Health Services, Inc., d/b/a Brookwood Medical Center, and Scott Appell, M.D., in her medical malpractice action; she also challenged the trial court's order denying her motion for leave to amend her complaint to substitute real parties for fictitiously named defendants. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. McGathey suffered a severe burn on the little finger of her left hand, permanent disfigurement and impaired mobility following left-shoulder arthroscopy, subacromial decompression, and distal clavicle resection. A Spider Limb Positioner was used in the surgery. A part of the positioner was sterilized, but was not given a chance to cool down before it was used in the surgery. And because defendants allowed the hot part to be used on McGathey during the surgery, she suffered her injuries. Based on a review of the record, the Supreme Court concluded that McGathey produced substantial evidence of negligence for one of the Brookwood employees and reversed the grant of summary judgment in that defendant's favor. The Court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Appell. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "McGathey v. Brookwood Health Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Precision Gear Company, Precision Gear LLC, and General Metal Heat Treating, Inc. were granted permission to appeal an interlocutory order denying their motion to dismiss the third-party claims against them filed by Continental Motors, Inc. The trial court certified a question to the Supreme Court of whether, in a suit for non-contractual indemnification arising from an accident and alleged damage that occurred out of state, Alabama's six year statute of limitation for implied contract actions controlled because the foreign jurisdiction's law considered its common law and statutory claims for indemnity as claims based upon contract implied in law or quasi-contract, or whether Alabama's two year statute of limitation for tort actions controlled. Upon review, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that Alabama's two-year statute of limitations applied in this case and that Continental Motors' claims against the gear manufacturers were time-barred. View "Precision Gear Co. v. Continental Motors, Inc. " on Justia Law