Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company filed a declaratory-judgment action in the federal district court seeking, among other things, a determination of the status of a settlement agreement they had reached with D.V.G., a minor, resolving her claims for coverage stemming from injuries she received in an automobile accident, following her death in a subsequent unrelated automobile accident. The federal district court ultimately concluded that the issue presented involved a question of Alabama law for which there was no clear controlling precedent, and it certified the following question to the Alabama Supreme Court: "Under Alabama law, is an insurance company bound to a settlement agreement negotiated on behalf of an injured minor, if that minor dies before the scheduling of a pro ami hearing which was intended by both sides to obtain approval of the settlement?" The Court answered in the affirmative: "an insurance company is bound to a settlement agreement negotiated on behalf of an injured minor, even if that minor dies before the scheduling of the court hearing that all parties agreed was necessary to obtain approval of the settlement agreement. In accordance with the parties' understanding, such a hearing is still required, and the minor's death does not render that hearing impossible." View "Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Wood" on Justia Law

Petitioners James Waltman and Progressive Casualty Insurance Company petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Perry Circuit Court to vacate its order that denied their respective motions to transfer the underlying action to the Tuscaloosa Circuit Court. The underlying case arose from a truck accident in which a utility trailer Waltman was towing disconnected from his vehicle and struck Respondent John Owens' truck. Owens was injured from the accident. Owens filed suit against Waltman, Progressive and GEICO Indemnity Company, including a workers' compensation claim against his employer Griffin Wood, alleging that he was working within the scope of his employment when the accident took place. Owens filed the action in Perry County because Griffin Wood's principal place of business was in Perry County. Waltman filed a motion to transfer venue, contending that a more appropriate forum would be Tuscaloosa since the accident took place in Tuscaloosa County. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court exceeded its discretion in denying Waltman's and Progressive's motions for change of venue, and granted their petitions for the writ of mandamus. The Court directed the Perry Circuit Court to transfer the case. View "Owens v. Griffin Wood Company, Inc." on Justia Law

Ryan Price-Williams sued Admiral Insurance Company and Gabriel Dean and Charles Baber in Circuit Court pursuant to Alabama's direct-action statute. Both Dean and Baber were alleged by Price-Williams to be covered under a commercial general-liability insurance policy Admiral had issued the national Kappa Sigma fraternity to which Dean and Baber belonged. Price-Williams alleged that Admiral was obligated to pay a judgment that had been entered in favor of Price-Williams and against Dean and Baber in a previous action. Following a bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Price-Williams and against Admiral, holding that the Admiral policy provided coverage to Dean and Baber for the negligent and/or wanton acts that formed the basis of the underlying action. Price-Williams sued Admiral after obtaining a judgment against Dean and Baber, who he alleged were insured by Admiral under a policy Admiral had issued to Kappa Sigma, by virtue of their positions as officers of the local chapter of Kappa Sigma. Following another bench trial, the trial court entered a judgment in favor of Price-Williams, obligating Admiral to fulfill the judgment entered against Dean and Baber in the underlying action. Because the evidence presented at trial supported the trial court's conclusion that Admiral's policy with Kappa Sigma provided liability coverage to Dean and Baber with regard to the negligence and wantonness claims tried in the underlying action, the Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. View "Admiral Insurance Company v. Price-Williams " on Justia Law

Carl Weaver appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the complaint filed against him by Roger D. Firestone. In May 1995, Firestone, Charles T. Amberson, Jr., and Darrell Thomas were assaulted, battered, and burned. Amberson and Thomas died from their injuries; Firestone suffered extensive physical injuries and incurred over $1,000,000 in medical expenses. In August 2012, Charles Richard Tooley, L.C. Collins, Jr., and Mickie Wayne Collins pled guilty to attempted murder as to Firestone. On August 20, 2012, Firestone sued Weaver; Tooley; Collins, Jr.; Collins; and fictitiously named parties A-M. Recognizing that his causes of action were filed outside their respective limitations periods, Firestone noted in his complaint that the defendants then-recently led guilty, and it was not until recently that Firestone discovered the identity of the [individuals] who had attacked him "because of the fraudulent concealment of the conspiracy and the identity of the conspirators." After conducting a hearing on Weaver's motion to dismiss, the trial court denied Weaver's motion, concluding that the statutes of limitations had been tolled. The Supreme Court reversed: because Firestone did not satisfy the "reasonable-diligence" standard for equitable tolling and Firestone's causes of action were filed undisputedly after the expirations of the applicable limitations periods, his claims against Weaver were barred by the limitations periods. View "Weaver v. Firestone " on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, Southern Division certified a question to the Alabama Supreme Court: "Under Alabama law, may a drug company be held liable for fraud or misrepresentation (by misstatement or omission), based on statements it made in connection with the manufacture or distribution of a brand-name drug, by a plaintiff claiming physical injury from a generic drug manufactured and distributed by a different company?" Plaintiffs Danny and Vicki Weeks filed this action against five current and former drug manufacturers for injuries that Mr. Weeks allegedly suffered as a result of his long-term use of the prescription drug product metoclopramide, the generic form of the brand-name drug "Reglan." The Weekses contended that the Wyeth defendants had a duty to warn Danny's physician about the risks associated with the long-term use of metoclopramide and that the Weekses, as third parties, have a right to enforce the alleged breach of that duty. The Supreme Court concluded: "[i]n the context of inadequate warnings by the brand-name manufacturer placed on a prescription drug manufactured by a generic-drug manufacturer, it is not fundamentally unfair to hold the brand-name manufacturer liable for warnings on a product it did not produce because the manufacturing process is irrelevant to misrepresentation theories based, not on manufacturing defects in the product itself, but on information and warning deficiencies, when those alleged misrepresentations were drafted by the brand-name manufacturer and merely repeated by the generic manufacturer." View "Wyeth, Inc., et al. v. Weeks " on Justia Law

Dr. Stephen L. Wallace appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Belleview Properties Corporation, IPF/Belleview Limited Partnership ("IPF"), HR/Belleview, L.P., and Infinity Property Management Corporation ("the defendants"). In August 1991, Wallace leased office space in the Belleview Shopping Center to use for his dental practice. Around 1996, the defendants purchased the shopping center and renewed Wallace's lease. The lease was renewed a second time in 2003 for a term of five years. In 2005, Wallace sued the defendants,1 alleging fraud and suppression; negligence; wantonness; breach of contract; unjust enrichment; and negligent training, supervision, and retention. Wallace alleged that, during the term of the lease, he reported various maintenance problems to the defendants. He also alleged that, although the defendants assured him that the problems would be taken care of, but that they were not. Wallace asserted that, as a result of reported water leaks that were left unrepaired, the office was infested with toxic mold. Therefore, he had to close his practice to avoid exposing his employees and his patients to the toxic mold. The defendants successfully filed a motion for a summary judgment as to Wallace's claims against them. In 2010, Wallace filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that Wallace did not timely file his notice of appeal. Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Wallace v. Belleview Properties Corp." on Justia Law

Target Media Partners Operating Company, LLC ("Target Media"), and Specialty Marketing Corporation d/b/a Truck Market News ("Specialty Marketing"), both publishers of magazines directed to long-haul truck drivers and to the truck-driving industry, have been in a commercial-contract dispute since 2007 in which each party alleged breach-of-contract claims against the other. Specialty Marketing also alleged fraudulent-misrepresentation and promissory-fraud claims against Target Media and Ed Leader, Target Media's vice president of trucking, and sought punitive damages in addition to compensatory damages. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Specialty Marketing on its breach-of-contract and promissory-fraud claims against Target Media, in favor of Leader on the promissory-fraud claim against him, in favor of Specialty Marketing on its fraudulent-misrepresentation claim against Target Media and Leader, and in favor of Target Media on its breach-of-contract counterclaim against Specialty Marketing. Target Media and Leader appealed that aspect of the judgment entered on the jury verdict in favor of Specialty Marketing on its claims against Target Media and Leader. Specialty Marketing did not appeal the judgment insofar as it found in favor of Target Media on Target Media's counterclaim. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order denying Target Media's motion for a judgment as a matter of law (JML)and/or a new trial as to Specialty Marketing's breach-of-contract claim. The Court reversed the trial court's order denying Target Media and Leader's motion for a JML as to Specialty Marketing's fraudulent-misrepresentation and promissory-fraud claims. The case was remanded back to the trial court for entry of a JML in favor of Target Media and Leader as to Specialty Marketing's fraudulent-misrepresentation claim and to enter a JML in favor of Target Media as to Specialty Marketing's promissory-fraud claim. Because the Court concluded that the trial court should have granted a JML as to Specialty Marketing's fraudulent-misrepresentation and promissory-fraud claims, the Court pretermitted consideration of the other arguments made by the parties regarding those claims. View "Target Media Partners Operating Company, LLC v. Specialty Marketing Corp." on Justia Law

S & M, LLC, d/b/a Huntsville Cab Company ("Huntsville Cab"), petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari review of a decision of the Court of Civil Appeals which affirmed a judgment in favor of Kevin Burchel, as personal representative of the estate of Roy William Burchel on Huntsville Cab's claim against the estate damages for loss of use of a commercial vehicle. The issue before the Court was whether the measure-of-damages rule set forth in "Hunt v. Ward," (79 So. 2d 20 (1955)), was consistent with the purpose of compensatory damages, which is "'to make the plaintiff whole by reimbursing him or her for the loss or harm suffered.'" Because the Court concluded that the rule stated in "Hunt" was not consistent with this purpose, the Court modified the rule, reversed the Court of Civil Appeals' judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "S & M, LLC v. Burchel " on Justia Law

James Stanley Wilbanks appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of United Refractories, Inc. ("United"), a company supplying equipment used in the repair of coke-oven batteries, in Wilbanks's action against United seeking damages for personal injuries he sustained from an explosion involving a ceramic welding machine supplied to Wilbanks's employer by United. On the day of the accident, Wilbanks was a member of a three-person welding team engaged in the process of repairing a coke oven. However, as he attempted to remove a powder hose from the mixing chamber, an explosion occurred, causing the loss of his left hand and burns to other portions of his body. Wilbanks sued United alleging that Wilbanks was injured as the result of the "fail[ure]" of "the subject equipment" and that United had "negligently and/or wantonly fail[ed] to properly inspect and maintain the subject equipment and its component parts." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Wilbanks failed to produce evidence of any causal relationship between his injuries and any alleged acts or omissions of United. "United's summary-judgment motion was due to be granted. The judgment entered for United is, therefore, affirmed." View "Wilbanks v. United Refractories, Inc. " on Justia Law

SSC Selma Operating Company, LLC, doing business as Warren Manor Health & Rehabilitation Center ("SSC"), and Bernard Turk, the administrator of Warren Manor Health & Rehabilitation Center ("Warren Manor") (referred to collectively as "the Warren Manor defendants"), appealed a circuit court judgment denying their joint motion to compel arbitration of the medical-malpractice wrongful-death claims asserted against them by Ethel Gordon ("Gordon"), the administratrix of the estate of Jimmy Lee Gordon, Gordon's husband, pursuant to an arbitration agreement they allege Gordon had entered into with SSC. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the circuit court properly denied the Warren Manor defendants' motion to compel arbitration of Gordon's claims against them because the trial court had yet to conduct a trial to resolve the issue identified by the Supreme Court in "Gordon I" — whether a valid arbitration agreement existed between Gordon and SSC. "Only if that issue is answered in the affirmative may the Warren Manor defendants properly move to compel arbitration. If that trial results in a judgment holding that there is no valid arbitration agreement, then the Warren Manor defendants may file a timely appeal challenging the trial court's ruling excluding any evidence they wished to submit at trial." View "SSC Selma Operating Company, LLC v. Gordon" on Justia Law