Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Lawton Higgs, Sr., formerly a pastor and pastor emeritus at the Church of the Reconciler ("COR"), a United Methodist church, brought an action against Tom Bole, a lay member of COR, alleging defamation, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. During the proceedings, Higgs filed a civil subpoena requesting the production of certain documents from Reverend Ron Schultz, the district supervisor of the South Central District of the North Alabama Conference of the United Methodist Church ("the Conference"). Reverend Schultz filed a verified objection to and a motion to quash the civil subpoena based on First Amendment concerns. Subsequently, Bole filed a motion to dismiss the claims against him, alleging that the trial court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; the trial court denied Bole's motion. The trial court later entered an order in which it granted in part and denied in part Reverend Schultz's motion to quash. In case no. 1110868, Bole petitioned for a writ of mandamus requesting that this Court dismiss Higgs's claims against him. In case no. 1110892, Reverend Schultz petitioned for a writ of mandamus asking this Court to quash the subpoena in its entirety on the basis that the records subpoenaed by Higgs were privileged, ecclesiastical records of the United Methodist Church. Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the petition in case no. 1110868 and dismissed the petition in case no. 1110892. View "Higgs, Sr. v. Bole" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama, Eastern Division certified two questions of first impression to the Alabama Supreme Court: whether a coverage exclusion clause in an automobile insurance policy applied to the use of the vehicle used for transporting people or delivering newspapers (as part of the insured's job) was enforceable. A secondary issue was whether that exclusion applied when an accident takes place after the delivery of the last paper, "but while the insured is driving back to his point of origin or some other location." Scott and Lori Touart Thomas were injured as the result of an automobile accident; Lori had been driving. The Thomases recovered a judgment in state court against defendant Kenneth Gooden, Jr., the driver of the other vehicle. The dispute involved whether the Thomases were entitled to recover from Nationwide under the provisions of a Nationwide automobile liability insurance policy naming Gooden as an insured. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the answer to the first certified question is "yes:" a clause in an automobile liability-insurance policy excluding coverage for the "use of any motor vehicle to carry persons or property for a fee" could be enforced as to an insured if the finder of fact concludes that the insured delivers newspapers for a fee and that the insured was using the covered vehicle for that purpose at the time of the accident. With regard to the second question, the Court concluded that the answer to the second certified question is "no:" a clause in an automobile liability-insurance policy excluding coverage for the "use of any motor vehicle to carry persons or property for a fee" cannot be enforced as to an insured after the delivery of the "property," i.e., newspapers in this case, is complete. View "Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Thomas" on Justia Law

John Woodruff appealed a circuit court order dismissing his malicious-prosecution, false imprisonment, and tort-of-outrage claims against the City of Tuscaloosa ("the City") and several of its employees. On October 16, 2006, Woodruff went to the Tuscaloosa Police Department headquarters to resolve a warrant that had been sworn against him for harassing communications. After presenting himself, Woodruff was arrested and handcuffed by a Tuscaloosa police officer and told to wait until another officer could arrive to complete the booking process. While waiting in the public lobby of police headquarters, Woodruff became involved in a verbal altercation with an off-duty Tuscaloosa police officer, and he was subsequently charged by Officer Canterbury with disorderly conduct, another Class C misdemeanor. Woodruff was thereafter booked and transported to the county jail, where he was released on bond later that night. On October 19, 2006, Woodruff returned to the Tuscaloosa Police Department to file a written complaint regarding the events surrounding his arrest and booking on October 16. The Tuscaloosa Police Department ultimately determined that Woodruff's complaint was without merit. On November 15, 2006, Woodruff was convicted of disorderly conduct. He thereafter sought a trial de novo on the charge in Circuit Court; however, in December 2008, while the matter was still pending, Woodruff and the City apparently reached an agreement to nol-pros the charge if Woodruff would undergo counseling. On January 2, 2009, the disorderly conduct charge was formally dropped. On January 3, 2011, Woodruff filed the this action. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that it was "evident" that Woodruff did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court affirmed the circuit court in denying his claims. View "Woodruff v. City of Tuscaloosa" on Justia Law

Alanna Nail, Paul Watson, and Gennie Farragher, all registered nurses, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Calhoun Circuit Court to vacate its order denying the summary-judgment motion they filed, which raised a statute-of-limitations defense. George Dulin was admitted to the Northeast Alabama Regional Medical Center ("the Center") in May 2005 for treatment of "crush injuries to his chest." Dulin's tracheostomy tube allegedly became dislodged during a bath administered by the nursing staff, resulting in the loss of oxygen for an undetermined period. He allegedly suffered brain damage as the result of oxygen deprivation. One month later, Vivian Dulin, George's wife, obtained and reviewed the hospital records. Included in the records was a "Cardiopulmonary Pulmonary Arrest Flow Sheet," purported to identify, by handwritten entries, eight members of a "Code Team" involved in the incident. The Dulins commenced a medical malpractice action against the Center and 17 fictitiously named defendants. Subsequently, Nail, Watson, and Farragher moved for a summary judgment on the ground that the amended complaint, which purported to substitute their names for certain fictitiously named defendants, was filed more than two years after the alleged incident on June 3, 2005, and did not relate back to the filing of the original complaint, because, they argued, the Dulins failed to exercise "due diligence" in ascertaining the nurses' identities. The trial court denied the nurses' motion, and they filed this petition. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that "[d]ue diligence means ordinary, rather than extraordinary, diligence." Under the circumstances of this case, including (1) the Dulins' prompt acquisition of the medical records, (2) the state of the names of the nurses in the room with George Dulin in his medical records, and (3) the promptness of discovery and of the substitution, the Court could not say, as a matter of law, that the Dulins failed to exercise due diligence in substituting the nurses for the fictitiously named defendants. The Court denied the nurses' application for a writ of mandamus. View "Dulin v. Northeast Alabama Regional Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Dawn Elaine Patterson and her husband Brooks appealed the judgment entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing their claims against Consolidated Aluminum Corporation ("CAC") and its corporate owner Lonza America, Inc. ("Lonza"), as being barred by the applicable statute of limitations. On September 11, 2008, Dawn Patterson was diagnosed with malignant mesothelioma. On August 13, 2009, the Pattersons initiated this legal action, alleging that Dawn's mesothelioma was caused by exposure to asbestos. The Pattersons did not allege that Dawn had been directly exposed to materials containing asbestos at her home or workplace; rather, they alleged that Dawn was a victim of secondary exposure to asbestos as a result of her close contact with her father, Jerry Dison, and her grandfather, Melvin Lester, who they alleged had worked around materials containing asbestos for many years and who had allegedly brought home the asbestos dust that ultimately caused Dawn's mesothelioma. The Pattersons accordingly named Dison's and Lester's employers as defendants in their complaint, as well as various manufacturers of asbestos-containing products that Dison and Lester were alleged to have been exposed to in the course of their employment. The complaint also asserted claims against unknown defendants that had not yet been identified. The Pattersons sought to amend their complaint to substitute them for fictitiously named defendants. The trial court initially allowed the amendment but, in response to a motion filed by CAC and Lonza, subsequently held that the Pattersons' claims against them was barred by the statute of limitations. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed: because the Pattersons did not promptly move to amend their complaint to substitute CAC and Lonza as defendants after learning of their identity and potential liability, they were not entitled to the benefit of the relation-back doctrine. View "Patterson v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. " on Justia Law

Defendant Noland Hospital Montgomery, LLC ("NHM"), petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate its order denying NHM's motion for a summary judgment and to enter a summary judgment in NHM's favor. NHM contended that it was entitled to a summary judgment on the basis that the applicable statute of limitations for this wrongful-death action barred the claims asserted against it by Wheatton K. Pynes, individually and as executor of the estate of Houston Earl Pynes. "The disposition of this petition require[d] an interpretation of the interplay between Rule 9(h), Ala. R.Civ. P., relating to fictitiously named parties, and Rule 15(c), pertaining to the relation back of amendments to pleadings." Upon review, the Supreme Court granted the petition and issued the writ. View "Pynes v. Jackson Hospital" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a circuit court's dismissal of Brandon Johnson's action against Gary Hetzel, warden of the Donaldson Correctional Facility; Sean Carlton, a correctional officer trainee at the facility; and correctional officers Dennis Johnson and Joe Binder. Johnson was serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole following a conviction for murder. He was seen fighting with another inmate and placed under "house arrest" pending a disciplinary hearing. Johnson argued that the defendants "deliberately plac[ed] him in 'house arrest' two cells from [another inmate with whom he had the fight], and [that] the defendants were responsible for the protection of both inmates, but instead opened the door to both cells at which time [Johnson] and [the other inmate] got into another fight," in which, Johnson argued, he was injured. Johnson filed an affidavit of substantial hardship, requesting that the initial docket fee for his case be waived. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for a summary judgment. The circuit court granted the defendants' motion and dismissed Johnson's complaint. Johnson has appealed the circuit court's judgment of dismissal, arguing, in pertinent part, that the circuit court never had jurisdiction over his case because he did not pay the necessary filing fee and the circuit court never approved either of the affidavits of substantial hardship he had filed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the filing of a court-approved verified statement of substantial hardship was not met in this case. Therefore, the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to enter its judgment dismissing Johnson's complaint. The Court ruled the circuit court's judgment void. "[B]ecause a void judgment will not support an appeal," the Court vacated the trial court's judgment and dismissed the appeal. View "Johnson v. Hetzel" on Justia Law

The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("the BAP") certified a question to the Alabama Supreme Court: "In Alabama, is a 'default' judgment premised upon discovery sanctions or other post-answer conduct of the defendant sufficient to support the application of issue preclusion in a later proceeding?" Debtor-Defendant Anthony Malfatti was one of three principals of TA Financial Group ('TAF') purportedly designed to assist credit card holders in arbitration of disputes with the card issuers. The arbitration providers were selected by the card holders from a list provided by TAF. Among the arbitration providers was Arbitration Forum of America, Inc. ('AFOA'). AFOA was not conducting legitimate arbitrations; every arbitration resulted in an award in favor of the card holder, which was then reduced to judgment. Malfatti claims he was unaware that AFOA's practices and the judgments stemming therefrom were illegitimate. At some time after the banks involved learned of the judgments, they filed cross-complaints against the card holders to set aside the judgments as fraudulently obtained. In September 2005, the banks, including Bank of America, N.A. (USA) filed Amended Third Party Complaints against, among others, Malfatti and TAF, alleging tortious interference with contract, abuse of process, wantonness, and civil conspiracy, and sought an injunction against further arbitrations. The Banks moved for default judgments against Malfatti and TAF for failing to comply with discovery orders, repeated failures to appear for depositions, and failure to respond to written discovery. Malfatti and TAF filed a motion to set aside the defaults. The court found Malfatti and TAF to be jointly and severally liable for compensatory damages, awarded punitive damages against Malfatti, and found Malfatti to be liable for punitive damages awarded against TAF under the alter ego doctrine. Malfatti filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy the Banks filed an adversary proceeding alleging the debt owed to them by Malfatti was nondischargeable. Upon review, the Alabama Supreme Court answered the certified question in the negative: "[f]or purposes of determining whether an issue is precluded by the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Alabama law makes no distinction between a simple default and a penalty default."

Regions Bank, in its fiduciary capacity as trustee or cotrustee of various trusts, Delores Ancell, and David Puckett filed two permissive appeals, pursuant to Rule 5, Ala. R. App. P., to challenge the Jefferson Circuit Court's orders denying the trustees' motions to dismiss in part Ernest Kramer's and Kenyon R. Kirkland's complaints filed against the trustees. In his complaint, Kramer alleged that the trustees' management of the assets held by the Kramer revocable trust constituted a breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, wantonness, breach of contract, fraud, reckless misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, suppression, violation of the Alabama Securities Act. Finding that the trustees failed to support their argument with relevant legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's orders.

Marcus Lydell Walker, an employee of the Macon County Sheriffs Department, petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Macon Circuit Court to enter an order holding him immune from suit based on Art. I, sec. 14, Ala. Const. 1901. He further asked the Court to direct the Macon Circuit Court to dismiss the claims asserted against him by Miguel Harris. While acting within the scope of his duty for the Sherriffs Department, Walker and Harris were in a vehicle accident in which Harris was injured. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Walker demonstrated a clear legal right to the relief he sought. Therefore, the Court granted his petition and directed the circuit court to dismiss the claims asserted against Walker.