Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Dr. Michael Brandner suffered a heart attack in September 2009 and was admitted to Providence Alaska Medical Center for emergency bypass surgery. Dr. Kenton Stephens was the cardiac surgeon who performed the operation; Dr. Robert J. Pease administered anesthesia. Dr. Brandner was also a medical doctor, licensed to practice plastic and reconstructive surgery. Bradner sued the anesthesiologist and medical providers involved in the surgery. The superior court dismissed Bradner’s claims on summary judgment, concluding that Bradner had offered no admissible evidence that the defendants breached the standard of care or caused the patient any injury. On appeal Bradner relied on his expert witness’s testimony that certain surgical procedures were suboptimal and that patients generally tended to have better outcomes when other procedures are followed. The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s conclusion that this testimony was insufficient to raise any issue of material fact regarding whether the defendants had violated the standard of care in a way that caused injury to the patient. View "Brandner v. Pease" on Justia Law

Lee Stenseth was injured at work many years ago. He and his employer, the Municipality of Anchorage, entered into a compromise and release agreement (C&R) in August 1996 in which Stenseth waived all future benefits except medical benefits in exchange for $37,000. Stenseth retired from the Municipality in 1996, but he continued to receive medical benefits for his work-related injury, including narcotic pain medication. Ten years later, Stenseth was charged with multiple felonies related to selling or delivering narcotics that he had acquired, some from forged prescriptions modeled on the prescriptions for his work-related injury. Stenseth pleaded guilty to a number of felonies and served time in jail. He was released in June 2010. The Municipality sought to terminate future workers’ compensation benefits and be reimbursed for the benefits it paid out, alleging that Stenseth obtained those benefits by making a false statement or misrepresentation. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Board dismissed the Municipality’s fraud petition after deciding that the parties had reached an enforceable settlement. The Municipality appealed the dismissal, arguing that any settlement of its fraud petition was void because the settlement did not meet the requirements set out in the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Act and the Board’s regulations. The Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board’s decision. The Municipality appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court, arguing that the Commission’s interpretation of the statute was incorrect and that the Commission incorrectly interpreted our decisions about estoppel. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s decision. View "Municipality of Anchorage v. Stenseth" on Justia Law

Lennie Lane appealed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment against him in a personal injury case. The superior court applied the doctrine of collateral estoppel to find that Lane's criminal conviction for assaulting Annie Ballot established that he was liable to her in tort. Lane challenged the sufficiency of the of the evidence of his criminal conviction, and the application of collateral estoppel, arguing: (1) his conviction was not final because it was on appeal at the time the court relied on it; and (2) the verdict against him, "guilty but mentally ill," was not sufficient to establish the elements of the crime of which he was convicted. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Lane v. Ballot" on Justia Law

The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board denied a death benefit claim filed by the decedent's same-sex partner because the death benefit statute grants benefits only to a worker’s "widow or widower" as defined by statute. The Board construed these terms by applying the Marriage Amendment to the Alaska Constitution, which defined marriage as "only between one man and one woman," thus excluding a decedent's same-sex partner. Because this exclusion lacked a fair and substantial relationship to the purpose of the statute, the Supreme Court concluded that this restriction on the statutory definition of "widow" violated the surviving partner's right to equal protection under the law. View "Harris v. Millennium Hotel" on Justia Law

In 2008, Ekaterina Pouzanova drove past a stop sign and into an intersection in Anchorage and was broad-sided by a vehicle driven by Kuuipo Morton. Morton went to the emergency room and was diagnosed with lower back pain and a possible compression fracture. She continued to complain of pain in her back and neck in the months that followed, and she received some additional treatment for these complaints. Pouzanova did not contest liability for the accident, but she did dispute the extent of Morton’s injuries. Morton sued in district court for non-economic and punitive damages. She initially included claims for lost earnings and medical expenses as well but dropped them before trial. The district court dismissed the punitive damages claim on summary judgment, finding that the evidence could not support a finding of recklessness. During jury selection, Morton challenged three potential jurors for cause. The court declined to excuse the jurors, and Morton used three of her four peremptory challenges to replace them. At trial, the court allowed testimony about domestic violence in Morton's marriage as relevant to her claim for loss of enjoyment of life, including evidence of an incident in which she allegedly threatened her husband with a hammer. The jury returned a verdict of $5,000 for past non-economic loss and zero for future non-economic loss. Morton appealed to the superior court, which vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. The superior court found reversible error in the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the punitive damages claim; its refusal to grant the challenges for cause during jury selection; its failure to require the joinder of Morton’s husband as a third-party defendant for purposes of allocation of fault; and its admission of evidence of the domestic violence incident involving the hammer. The Supreme Court agreed with the superior court that a remand was in order because certain evidence of domestic violence should have been excluded under Alaska Evidence Rule 403. On two other issues, however, the Court reversed the superior court’s decision and held that the district court was correct: it correctly dismissed the plaintiff's punitive damages claim and correctly declined to require that the plaintiff's husband be joined as a third-party defendant. View "Pouzanova v. Morton" on Justia Law

A highly paid worker suffered a debilitating stroke while traveling for his employer. The employer did not think the stroke was work related, but it later accepted the claim and paid workers' compensation benefits. The statutory maximum compensation rate at the time of the injury was $700 a week. A little more than five months after the employee's stroke, an amended version of the Alaska Workers' Compensation Act took effect. Instead of an absolute maximum compensation rate, the amended statute set a variable rate indexed to the statewide average weekly wage. The employee asked for an increased rate of compensation, arguing that the law in effect at the time he was recognized as being permanently and totally disabled should govern his benefit amount. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Board, with one panel member dissenting, decided that the version of the statute in effect at the time of the injury was the applicable statute and consequently capped the employee's benefits at $700 a week for life. The dissenting panel member would have construed the statute as permitting increased benefits. The Alaska Workers' Compensation Appeals Commission affirmed the Board's decision. The employee appealed, arguing that the amount of his benefits did not fairly compensate him for lost wages during the period of his disability so that the date of his disability, rather than the date of his injury, should have been used to determine the version of the statute governing his claim. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission's decision.View "Louie v. BP Exploration (Alaska), Inc." on Justia Law

Jessica Milwicz negligently rear-ended a vehicle driven by Justin Pralle. Pralle sued. Milwicz admitted negligence but argued that she had not caused Pralle’s injuries. A jury agreed with her, and judgment was entered in Milwicz’s favor. Pralle appealed, arguing that the verdict was not supported by the evidence and that the superior court abused its discretion in its refusal to excuse several jurors for cause and its admission of expert testimony. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Pralle v. Milwicz" on Justia Law

Tommie Patterson’s vehicle was struck from behind when he braked to avoid a car stalled in his lane of travel. He sued the owner of the stalled vehicle and subpoenaed her for trial, but she refused to appear. The Supreme Court concluded that the superior court should have issued a warrant or an order to show cause to compel the appearance of this party. In addition, the superior court instructed the jury on Patterson’s products liability claim against Ford Motor Company (manufacturer of Patterson's vehicle), but this claim was erroneously omitted from the special verdict form. Therefore, the Court reversed the superior court’s judgment and remanded this case for a new trial. View "Patterson v. Cox" on Justia Law

A tractor-trailer driver was injured while unloading cargo. The driver sued the receiving company for damages, arguing that the company negligently trained its forklift operator, the operator was negligent, and the operator caused his injuries. A jury found the company was negligent, but also found that the negligence was not a substantial factor in causing the driver’s injuries. The driver appealed, arguing that the superior court erred by admitting propensity evidence regarding his safety record; denying a res ipsa loquitur instruction; and denying motions for directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s rulings. View "Conley v. Alaska Communications System Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

Charles Kemp attempted suicide while in administrative segregation at the Anchorage Correctional Complex. He survived but suffered a serious brain injury. His mother, Marjorie Achman, sued the Alaska Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging both a negligent failure to protect Kemp from self-harm and medical malpractice. The superior court granted summary judgment to DOC and awarded attorney’s fees to DOC as the prevailing party. Achman appealed that decision. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Achman v. Alaska" on Justia Law