Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court addressed whether an employer can be held vicariously liable for an after-work accident caused by an employee who was on an extended away-from-home assignment. The accident occurred when the employee was driving back to his hotel after dinner. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that an employee on out-of-town travel status is not acting within the course and scope of his employment while traveling to or from a restaurant for a regular meal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the employee was not subject to his employer's control, he was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident, and therefore, the employer was not liable for the employee's actions.

Arizona's Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Act (UMA) requires all insurers writing motor vehicle liability policies to also offer underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage that covers all persons insured under the policy. Any exceptions to UIM coverage not permitted by the UMA are void. Insurer in this case sought a declaratory judgment that it had validly denied Insured's UIM claim. Insured was injured while a passenger on a motorcycle driven by her husband, the named insured on a separate motorcycle policy issued also by Insurer. The Supreme Court held (1) the UMA required Insurer to provide UIM coverage for Insured under the auto policy, where Insured's total damages exceeded the amount of her tort recovery from her husband under the husband's motorcycle policy; and (2) the UMA did not permit Insurer to refuse to provide Insured with UIM coverage under her auto policy because she was partially indemnified as a claimant under the liability coverage of the separate motorcycle policy issued by Insured to her husband, whose negligence contributed to her injuries.

In the underlying federal court action, an auto insurer (Insurer) sought a declaratory judgment that it had validly denied Insured's underinsured motorist (UIM) claim. Insured was injured while a passenger on a motorcycle driven by her husband, who had a motorcycle insurance policy with Insurer. Insured counterclaimed for breach of contract and bad faith. The U.S. district court certified several questions to the state Supreme Court. The Court held (1) Ariz. Rev. Stat. 20-259.01(G) required Insurer to provide UIM coverage for Insured under the auto policy, where Insured's total damages exceeded the amount of her tort recovery from her husband under the husband's motorcycle policy; and (2) Ariz. Rev. Stat. 20-259.01(H) did not permit Insurer to refuse to provide Insured with UIM coverage under her auto policy because she was partially indemnified as a claimant under the liability coverage of the separate motorcycle policy issued by Insurer to Insured's husband, whose negligence contributed to Insured's injuries.

This case concerned commercial property that was subject to a deed of trust and auctioned at trustee's sales twice in 2009. Alleging it was the successful bidder at the second sale, BT Capital, LLC sued the trustee and the trust beneficiary seeking title to the property and damages. The trial court granted summary judgment against BT and dismissed BT's tort claims. While BT's appeal was pending, another trustees sale was conducted in 2010, and a trustee's deed conveyed the property to a beneficiary. The court of appeals subsequently reversed the entry of summary judgment and remanded. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' opinion and affirmed the superior court's entry of summary judgment against BT, holding that the case was rendered moot when the property was purchased by the beneficiary at the third trustee's sale in 2010.

After Jerome Walsh died, Elizabeth Walsh and the couple's four children filed a wrongful death action against Advanced Cardiac Specialists Chartered (ACS) and its employees (collectively, Defendants). Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants had caused Jerome's death by failing to diagnose and treat an infection. The jury found in favor of Plaintiffs and awarded $1 million to Elizabeth but no damages to the children. The children moved for a new trial, arguing insufficient damages and that the verdict was not justified by the evidence. The trial court denied the motion, finding that Plaintiffs had waived the issue. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether wrongful death claimants whose trial testimony on damages is uncontroverted, but who receive a jury verdict awarding zero damages, are entitled to a new trial on damages as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a jury may award no compensation in these circumstances if it deems that award to be fair and just; and (2) although a new trial is not automatically required, the trial court may grant one pursuant to Ariz. R. Civ. P. 52(a) if it determines the award is insufficient or not justified by the evidence. Remanded.

Linda Brown sued a common carrier and its driver (SunTran) after sustaining serious injuries from being thrown from her wheelchair when the bus she was riding braked sharply. SunTran requested the judge to instruct the jury that common carriers have a duty to passengers to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. The judge rejected that instruction and instead instructed that a failure to exercise the highest degree of care under the circumstances was negligence. The jury awarded compensatory damages. The court of appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether a common carrier has a duty to exercise the highest degree of care practicable under the circumstances or only the duty to exercise reasonable care. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals, holding that the general negligence standard, reasonable care under all the circumstances, applies. Remanded for a new trial.

The Moras sued Pauline Cosper for damages arising from a car accident. After mandatory arbitration, the arbitrator entered an award in favor of the Moras. The next day, Cosper filed a notice of appeal seeking a trial de novo and a list of witnesses and exhibits. Approximately two months later, Cosper filed a supplemental witness list designating an expert and disclosing her report. The superior court struck the supplemental disclosures as untimely, noting that Cosper had not attempted to show good cause for the later disclosure under Ariz. R. Civ. P. 77. The court of appeals granted relief, holding that Rule 77 permits supplemental disclosure within eighty days after the filing of an appeal from compulsory arbitration without requiring that parties show good cause. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the superior court, holding that Rule 77(g)(1) requires that those appealing from arbitration awards simultaneously with the filing of the appeal file a list of witnesses and exhibits intended to be used at trial, and this list can only be supplemented for good cause under Rule 77(g)(4).

In April 2008, plaintiff American Asphalt sued CMX for professional negligence and breach of implied warranty. On October 1, 2008, the superior court issued an order informing plaintiff that if it did not file a motion to set as required by Ariz. R. Civ. P. 38.1(e), the case would be placed on the inactive calendar after January 20, 2009 and dismissed without further notice after March 23, 2009. American did not file a motion to set and the case was dismissed without further notice on April 29, 2009. Plaintiff moved to set aside the dismissal, contending that its failure to comply with Rule 38.1(a) was excusable because it had substituted counsel around the time of the Rule 38.1(d) filing deadline. The superior court denied the motion. The court of appeals affirmed, finding no excusable neglect partly because the court's order provided notice as required by the rule. On review, the Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' decision and remanded, holding that a notice issued several months prior to placing the case on the inactive calendar does not comply with the rule because the rule requires contemporaneous notice when a case is placed on the inactive calendar.

Appellees Randall and Penny West were charged with child abuse after an infant in their foster care died from severe head trauma. During their joint trial, each moved for an acquittal at the close of the Stateâs case and after the close of evidence. The trial court denied those motions. The jury found both guilty on child abuse charges. After the trial, Appellees renewed their motions for acquittal which this time was granted by the trial court. The court held that there was no evidence to prove who injured the child. The appellate court reversed the trial courtâs decision granting Appelleesâ motions. The appellate court used the Supreme Courtâs holding in the âHyderâ case. Upon review of this case, the Supreme Court overturned its holding in âState ex rel. Hyder v. Superior Courtâ (âHyderâ), which placed conditions on trial courtsâ granting of post-verdict motions for acquittal. The Court held that the âHyderâ case was now inconsistent with state law. In this case, the trial judge thoroughly explained his reasons for granting defendantsâ post-verdict motions. Because the appellate court reviewed the trial courtâs ruling under âHyderâ conditions, it did not determine whether the trial courtâs record reflected substantial evidence to warrant the convictions. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate courtâs decision, remanded the case for the lower court to address the sufficiency of the evidence and the merits of the trial courtâs decision.

A state administrative rule provides that a physician should rate an injured worker's impairment using standards set forth in the "most recent edition" of the American Medical Association Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (AMA Guides). Appellee Jesus Gutierrez injured his back in 2007 while working for a framing company. His claim for workers' compensation was accepted and he received medical treatment. The treating physician later released Appellee to return to work with physical restrictions. Concluding that Appellee was not permanently impaired, the insurance carrier (the "carrier") closed the claim. Appellee requested a hearing to challenge the "no impairment" determination. At the Industrial Commission of Arizona (ICA) hearings, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) heard testimony from two physicians: Appellee's treating physician and one presented by the carrier. Appellee's physician relied on the Fifth Edition of the AMA Guides; the carrier's physician relied on the Sixth Edition. Based on the insurance carrier's expert, the ALJ found that the carrier did not err in closing Appellee's claim. On special review, the appellate court affirmed the ALJ's decision. The issue before the Supreme Court was framed to address whether "the most recent edition" as specified in the Arizona Administrative Rules refers to the edition that was most recent when the Rule was promulgated or the latest edition existing when the claimant's impairment was rated. The Supreme Court on review of the lower courts' decisions found that the Rule's "fair and sensible meaning" anticipated that the guides would change and that "an evolving standard was intended." The Court affirmed the award and decision of the ICA.