Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Appellees Edgar and Clara Shelton filed a complaint against St. Vincent Infirmary Medical Center, Catholic Health Initiatives (collectively, Appellants) and Golden Living Center, alleging negligence, medical malpractice, and violations of the Arkansas Long Term Care Resident's Rights Statute for Edgar's treatment while he was a patient at the facilities. Golden Living was dismissed from the suit after a settlement. Appellants subsequently filed a cross-claim and third-party complaint against Golden Living. The circuit court struck Appellants' cross-claim and third-party complaint, finding that Appellants did not have a claim or cause of action against Golden Living. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in striking Appellants' third-party complaint; and (2) the dismissal of Appellants' third-party complaint did not operate to prevent Appellants from presenting to the jury potential evidence of Golden Living's responsibility for a portion of Edgar's injuries. View "St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Shelton" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a medical helicopter accident in Arkansas. Employer was the owner and operator of the helicopter and provided air-ambulance services to the area. Nurse and EMT (collectively, Appellants) and Pilot (Appellee) were all employees of Employer. On the day of the accident, Appellants picked up the victim of an automobile accident in Arkansas, and Pilot piloted the helicopter toward the hospital. However, the helicopter crashed. Nurse and EMT brought a negligence suit against Pilot, alleging their injuries were caused by Pilot's negligent operation of the helicopter. The circuit court dismissed the suit based on the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. Appellants appealed, and the case was transferred to the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission concluded that, at the time of the accident, Pilot was performing his employer's duty to provide a safe work place for Appellants and was therefore entitled to immunity under the workers' compensation statutes. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not err in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. View "Miller v. Enders" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was employed by a staffing company and had been contracted to work at Gates Rubber Company (Gates) when he suffered an injury to his arm and hand, including the severing of fingers. Plaintiff alleged that Total Compliance Consultants, Inc. (TCC) had contracted with Gates to consult on safety-compliance issues and that TCC either breached its contract or was negligent. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Plaintiff was a third-party beneficiary of the contract between TCC and Gates but that TCC was not negligent and did not breach its contract. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff's points on appeal were either not appealable or lacked merit. View "Meador v. Total Compliance Consultants, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that, without their knowledge, the City had erected a sewer line across Plaintiffs' property. Plaintiffs contended that in doing so, the City damaged a water pipe owned by Plaintiffs and that the damaged culvert was the proximate cause of three washouts on their property. Plaintiffs alleged causes of action for negligence and inverse condemnation. The City filed a motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court denied. The City appealed, arguing that the circuit court mischaracterized Plaintiffs' claim as based on contract, rather than tort, and in so doing denied the City the immunity to which it was entitled. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in finding Plaintiffs' negligence claim sounded in contract rather than tort; and (2) the City was entitled to statutory immunity as to the tort cause of action. View "City of Malvern v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Newton Dorsett, Donald Buffington, Richard Williamson, and Diamond Transport & Drilling were owners of an oil-drilling rig. After disputes arose among the owners, the parties entered into a compromise agreement. Buffington filed this action against Diamond Transport and Dorsett, alleging breach of contract, conversion, and fraud in connection with the compromise agreement. Dorsett filed a third-party complaint against Williamson, but the circuit court later granted Dorsett's motion to dismiss his third-party complaint. After the circuit court entered judgment in the case, Dorsett appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the appeal because, where the circuit court failed to issue an order dismissing Williamson from the case, there was no final judgment as required by Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b). View "Dorsett v. Buffington" on Justia Law

When Cody Metheny underwent brain surgery, the physician (Doctor) mistakenly operated on the wrong side of his brain. Fifteen months later, Cody's parents (the Methenys) learned tissue had been removed from the wrong side of Cody's brain. The Methenys filed a direct-action suit, alleging medical negligence on the part of Hospital where Doctor practiced and against Hospital's liability-insurance carrier (Insurer). The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Methenys. Insurer appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in (1) failing to instruct the jury in a manner that would allow it to apportion liability among it and certain physicians who were sued in a prior case but ultimately settled; (2) refusing to allow Insurer to present evidence of fault attributable to the settling physicians; and (3) denying Insurer's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict where the evidence supporting Cody's future damages was based on improperly bundled calculations. The Methenys cross-appealed the circuit court's order reducing the jury's verdict from $20 million to $11 million. The Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal and cross-appeal, holding that the circuit court did not err in its judgment. View "ProAssurance Indem. Co. v. Metheny" on Justia Law

Mark Smith died after he was taken to the emergency room at Rebsamen Medical Center. Appellants sought to be appointed as co-special administrators of Smith's estate and then filed the instant wrongful-death action. However, the order of appointment was not filed until two days after Appellants filed the action. Appellees moved for summary judgment arguing that the wrongful-death complaint was a nullity as Appellants lacked standing to bring such an action. While the motions were pending, Appellants filed a motion in the probate court seeking entry of a nunc pro tunc order to reflect that the order of appointment had been filed two days before it was actually filed. The probate court entered an order on motion nunc pro tunc. Nevertheless, the circuit court granted Appellees' motions for summary judgment on the basis that the complaint was a nullity because Appellees lacked standing to bring the action at the time of its filing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the grant of summary judgment was in error, as the circuit court lacked authority to invalidate or disregard the order from the probate division, which established that Appellants had been appointed as administrators prior to the filing of the wrongful-death complaint. Remanded. View "Smith v. Rebsamen Med. Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose out of a personal-injury action brought by Appellant against Appellees, an insurance company and two people who were involved with Appellant in a three-vehicle automobile accident. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellant and against one of the individual appellees. Appellant's son received a verdict against the other individual appellee. Appellant subsequently filed a motion for new trial based on jury misconduct, insufficient damages, and a verdict contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) juror affidavits attached to Appellant's motion for new trial that asserted that the jury considered Appellant's employer-provided health insurance in calculating his damages did not fall within the extraneous-information exception of Ark. R. Evid. 606(b); and (2) the record was inadequate to address Appellant's argument that the jury's calculation of damages was insufficient. View "Blake v. Shellstrom" on Justia Law

Appellants filed a complaint against Appellees asserting claims for conspiracy, fraud, and violating the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act after Appellees took control of a biotech company and bought out the former CEO of the company. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of Appellees. Appellants then filed a motion to reconsider seeking to vacate the judgment, which was denied. On appeal, Appellees filed motions to dismiss Appellants' appeal, alleging that Appellants' motion to reconsider was a nullity and that the notice of appeal was untimely because it was not filed within thirty days of entry of summary judgment. The Supreme Court denied the motions to dismiss, holding that the motion to reconsider was a valid motion. View "Muccio v. Hunt" on Justia Law

Appellant was involved in an automobile accident with Appellee. After litigation involving Appellant, Appellee, Appellant's insurance carrier, and Appellee's insurer, the circuit court found that Appellant was entitled to an offset or credit and allowed her to file a satisfaction of judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant failed to preserve for appellate review his arguments that (i) the circuit court erred in allowing Appellee to file a satisfaction of judgment, (ii) the court erred in not sustaining Appellant's objection to the satisfaction of judgment, and (iii) the filed satisfaction of judgment was void; (2) Appellant's argument that the order of the circuit court should be reversed because the circuit court lacked authority to grant an offset was without merit; (3) the circuit court erred by misstating a sum paid by Appellee's insurance company, but the error was harmless; and (4) Appellant was precluded from raising the argument on appeal that the circuit court erred in depriving him of court costs. View "Brown v. Lee" on Justia Law