Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In this nursing-home, abuse-and-neglect complaint, Appellants, the licensee of the nursing home where Richard Hatchett was a resident, its management company, and the owner of both entities were sued for wrongful death, negligence, and breach of fiduciary and confidential duty. The complaint averred that the actions or inactions of Appellants caused Hatchett's death. Appellants filed timely answers, but the circuit court struck part of Appellants' answers as a sanction for discovery violations. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in striking part of the answer, as (1) Appellants' failure to comply with discovery requests and orders was sufficient to impose discovery sanctions; and (2) the scope of the sanctions was appropriate.

Appellee Cory Duffy filed a complaint alleging that he was shot twice while standing outside The Entertainer, Inc. waiting for a taxi. Appellee named as defendants The Entertainer, an Arkansas corporation, and Charles Wells, the alcohol-permit holder. Appellee asserted claims for breach of high duty of care, negligent hiring, negligent retention, and negligent supervision and training. Appellee also sought punitive damages. The district court subsequently granted default judgment against both Defendants. Appellants filed a motion for a new trial, which the circuit court denied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a new trial; (2) The Entertainer did not show that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction in entering the default judgment against it; and (3) the circuit court's award of punitive damages was not clearly erroneous.

Appellant Central Oklahoma Pipeline successfully bid for the construction of a natural gas pipeline. Appellant subsequently sued the companies that engaged it (the Hawk defendants), and an engineering company (CTS), asserting (1) against the Hawk defendants, claims for breach of contract and a violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA); and (2) against CTS, negligence or failing to give notice of its requirement to inform Appellant of the necessity of having a contractor's license. Appellant then filed an amended complaint adding Lee Hallmark and several John Does as defendants, contending that they were employees of the Hawk defendants and that their negligence was imputed to the Hawk defendants under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The circuit court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in (1) ruling that Ark. Code Ann. 17-25-103(d) barred Appellant's claims for breach of contract and a violation of the ADTPA; (2) determining that section 17-25-103(d) was constitutional; and (3) ruling that Ark. Code Ann. 17-25-313 does not impose a tort duty on engineers who fail to inform prospective bidders that they must have a contractor's license.

Donnell Richard filed a complaint in the federal district court in Texas against Union Pacific alleging that, during the course and scope of his employment, he suffered physical injuries because of Union Pacific's negligence. Richard then filed a notice of nonsuit without prejudice, which the district court granted. Richard refiled his cause of action in the circuit court. Union Pacific moved to dismiss Richard's complaint. After finding that Richard's summons and service of summons was defective, the circuit court dismissed the case with prejudice, holding that in light of Richard's prior voluntary dismissal of his suit in Texas, the case should be dismissed with prejudice under Ark. R. Civ. P. 41 because the parties did not enter into a joint agreement regarding dismissal of the first complaint. The Supreme Court reversed the order of dismissal with prejudice, holding that the circuit court erred in its interpretation and application of the two-dismissal rule in Rule 41 to the facts of this case. Remanded.

This case began as a dispute over construction costs between Appellee TriBuilt Construction Group, LLC and Appellants NISHA, LLC and Centennial Bank. After Appellee filed suit against Appellants, the circuit court ordered arbitration with regard to Appellee's claims. Appellee subsequently decided to represent itself in the arbitration and circuit court proceedings. Appellants filed a petition for a permanent injunction requesting the circuit court to enjoin the corporation's officers, director, or employees from representing Tribuilt in the circuit court or arbitration proceedings. The circuit court denied Appellants' petition so far as it pertained to arbitration proceedings, holding (1) nonlawyer representation in an arbitration proceeding does not constitute the practice of law; and (2) an arbitrator, rather than the court, should determine issues regarding legal representation during arbitration proceedings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a corporate officer, director, or employee who is not a licensed attorney, engages in the unauthorized practice of law by representing the corporation in arbitration proceedings; and (2) issues regarding legal representation during arbitration proceedings fall squarely within the ambit of the court's constitutional powers and may not be decided by an arbitration body.

In the early 1990s Appellant Kenneth Middleton was convicted of murdering his wife and sentenced to life in prison. In 1992, a default judgment was entered against Appellant in a wrongful death action brought by Appellees, Appellant's wife's siblings. In 1999, a chancery court entered a decree finding that a conveyance Appellant had made to Appellant Lynn Middleton after the 1992 judgment was fraudulent. In 2009, Appellees filed a petition for writ of scire facias to revive the 1999 decree. The circuit court denied Appellants' motion for summary judgment and ordered that the 1999 decree be revived for another ten-year period. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the 1999 decree, which was entered in the chancery court prior to the adoption of an amendment merging law and equity, was entitled to "the same footing" as a judgment, and the circuit court did not err in concluding it could be revived by a writ of scire facias; and (2) the circuit court did not err in finding that Appellees timely revived the 1999 decree where they filed their writ of scire facias on May 13, 2009, within ten years from May 25, 1999, the effective date of the decree.

Employee had previously been injured on the job and was working on light duty when Employer terminated Employee's employment due to insubordination and gross misconduct. The ALJ denied Employee's claim for temporary-total disability for the remainder of his disability period. The Workers' Compensation Commission reversed on the grounds that termination for misconduct is not a sufficient basis for a finding that the employee refused suitable employment under Ark. Code Ann. 11-9-526, which provides that an injured employee who refuses suitable employment shall not be entitled to compensation during the period of his refusal. Accordingly, the Commission found that Employee was entitled to temporary-total-disability benefits for the remainder of his disability period, that he was entitled to wage-loss benefits at the rate of five percent, and that he was thus entitled to attorney's fees. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals and affirmed the decision of the Commission, holding that the Commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence and correct statutory interpretation.

Metropolitan National Bank (MNB) loaned Grand Valley Ridge several million dollars for the completion of a subdivision. After Grand Valley failed to make its interest payments, MNB filed a petition for foreclosure. Grand Valley and Thomas Terminella, a member of Grand Valley (collectively, Appellants), filed an amended counterclaim alleging various causes of action. During the trial, the circuit court granted Appellants' motion to take a voluntary nonsuit of their claims of negligence and tortious interference with contract. The circuit court held in favor of MNB. The court subsequently granted MNB's petition for foreclosure and awarded a judgment against Appellants. Thereafter, Appellants filed a complaint alleging their original nonsuited counterclaims and adding additional claims. MNB moved to dismiss Appellants' complaint and filed a motion for sanctions. The circuit court granted both motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, (1) because Appellants brought claims clearly barred by the statute of limitations, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions; and (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment for MNB on Grand Valley's nonsuited issues based on the applicable statute of limitations.

Ketan Bulsara filed a medical-malpractice and wrongful-death action against Dr. Julia Watkins stemming from the stillbirth of his child. A jury returned a judgment in favor of Dr. Watkins. The trial court subsequently denied Bulsara's motion for new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in denying Bulsara's motion for a new trial where Bulsara demonstrated a reasonable possibility of prejudice in light of defense counsel's continued representation of Dr. Watkins after the filing of Bulsara's lawsuit while in possession of confidential information from an expert who previously consulted with Bulsara and his former counsel, in contravention of the Court's rules.

Appellants, Little Rock Healthcare (LRHC), a nursing care facility; Donald Bedell, the sole member of the governing body for LRHC; and Heartland Personnel Leasing, appealed from a judgment in favor of Appellee Brenda Williams, as personal representative of the Estate of Minnie Valentine, who died after being discharged from LRHC. The Supreme Court reversed, dismissing Bedell and remanding for a new trial as to LRHC and Heartland, holding (1) the circuit court erred by denying Bedell's directed-verdict motion and judgment notwithstanding the verdict as Bedell owed no personal duty to Valentine; and (2) the circuit court erred in excluding Valentine's post discharge medical evidence, which error was prejudicial and warranted a new trial.