Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Arkansas Supreme Court
Gibbs, et al. v. Primelending, et al.
Plaintiffs Mark and Karla Gibbs brought claims in the federal district court against, among other defendants, Corinthian Title, Jeffrey Brown, Shelley Hickson, and Christine Tueckes, for civil conspiracy. The above defendants argued that the federal district court did not have in personam jurisdiction over them because Arkansas's long-arm statute does not allow application of conspiracy jurisdiction. The federal district court certified to the Supreme Court the question of whether the use of the conspiracy theory of in personam jurisdiction violates the state's long-arm statute. The Court answered in the negative. Arkansas's long-arm statute does not limit the exercise of personal jurisdiction to certain enumerated circumstances and is therefore limited only by federal constitutional law. Because jurisdiction based on the conspiracy theory does not violate due process, the conspiracy theory of in personam jurisdiction does not violate Arkansas's long-arm statute.
Bradley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
Megan Bradley, who was insured by State Farm, was injured in a motor-vehicle accident. State Farm paid $3844 in medical benefits to Bradley. State Farm then pursued a subrogation claim against the tortfeasor's insurer, Farmers Insurance. Bradley responded that the settlement with Farmers Insurance was not sufficient for her to be made whole. State Farm refused to release its subrogation claim. Bradley filed a petition for declaratory judgment and complaint for bad faith against State Farm and later filed an amended declaratory action to invalidate lien and complaint for injunctive relief, deceptive trade practices, bad faith and tortious interference with a contract. The circuit court dismissed count one of Bradley's amended pleading, finding (1) State Farm had a valid but unenforceable lien for sums paid to Bradley, (2) State Farm's right of subrogation arose at the time State Farm paid the medical benefits by operation of law, and (3) State Farm's right of subrogation is not enforceable until a subsequent judicial determination that Bradley was made whole by the settlement. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the reasons set forth on the same day in Riley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
Baxter v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
Steve Baxter, who was insured by State Farm, was injured in a motor-vehicle accident. State Farm paid medical coverage in the amount of $5000 and informed the tortfeasor's insurer carrier, Farmers Insurance, of its notice of subrogation rights. Baxter informed State Farm that the amount of his settlement with Farmers was not sufficient for him to be made whole and filed a petition for declaratory judgment and complaint for bad faith against State Farm. Later Baxter filed an amended declaratory action to invalidate lien and complaint for injunctive relief, deceptive trade practices, bad faith, and tortious interference with a contract. The circuit court found that State Farm had a valid but unenforceable lien against any settlement paid to Baxter and dismissed count one of Baxter's complaint with prejudice. Baxter appealed, arguing the court erred in dismissing the first count of his complaint because, pursuant to the Supreme Court's case law, an insurer's right to subrogation only arises once the insured has been made whole. The Court reversed and remanded for the reasons set forth on the same day in Riley v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
Bunn Builders, Inc. v. Womack
Appellants Bunn Builders, Inc. (Bunn) hired Appellees Richard Womack and Roy Turner (Womack & Turner) to paint the ground floor office of the Bunn Building in Arkadelphia. On August 19, 2004, a fire was reported at the building. The building sustained major structural damage as a result of the fire. Bunn insured the building through Employers Mutual Casualty Company (EMC). Within a few days, EMC hired investigators to find the cause and origin of the fire. The investigators asked Womack & Turner's liability insurance carrier Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company of Arkansas, Inc. (Farm Bureau) to preserve certain items for testing. In particular, they requested to test a halogen work lamp that the painters used on the Bunn job. EMC later sent a letter to Farm Bureau stating that EMC believed that the electrical components from the "electrical tools" used on the job were eliminated as a possible cause for igniting the fire. Testimony at trial by Womack & Turner revealed that EMC believed that the halogen lamp had been eliminated as a possible cause. However, EMC's investigators submitted reports identifying the lamp as the possible source of ignition. These reports were not sent to Farm Bureau. Farm Bureau wanted to do its own independent testing and asked EMC for the tools. EMC admitted that it had destroyed the items once its investigation was complete. Bunn and EMC sued Womack & Turner for negligence, alleging that the halogen lamp started the fire. In their response, Womack & Turner raised the issue of "spoliation," arguing that Bunn and EMC had a duty to preserve the evidence if they intended to sue for negligence. A trial was held, and the jury was given an instruction on "spoliation." The jury returned a verdict in favor of Womack & Turner. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Bunn and EMC argued that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to instruct the jury on spoliation. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and affirmed the decision in favor of Womack & Turner.
Crenshaw v. Special Adm’r of the Estate of Ayers
Appellant Hunter Crenshaw appealed the dismissal of his lawsuit against Steven Ayers. The case was dismissed because it fell outside the applicable statute of limitations. Appellant and Mr. Ayers were involved in an automobile accident, in which Mr. Ayers died. Appellant filed a complaint against Mr. Ayers days after Mr. Ayers had died. The summons was never returned. One month later, "Steven Ayers" responded to the complaint by asserting a lack of jurisdiction and defective service of process. In August, Appellant filed a motion to get more time to properly serve the complaint on Mr. Ayers' estate. In September, "Mr. Ayers" responded again, this time asserting the defense of limitations. Four days before the statute would expire, Appellant filed a response, asserting that he properly served an appointed "special administrator" of Mr. Ayers' estate. The circuit court dismissed Appellant's complaint for defective service. The Supreme Court agreed with the lower court, and affirmed its decision to dismiss Appellant's case.
Henry v. Continental Casualty Co.
Appellant Jane Henry, as the personal representative of the estate of her deceased husband Ernest, sued multiple parties, including Continental Casualty Company (Continental), Washington Regional Medical Center (Washington), Irma De La Cruz R.N., and Amber Hefner R.N. Among other things, Mrs. Henry asserted that Washington was vicariously liable for the conduct of its employees, including nurses De La Cruz and Hefner. Mrs. Henry proceeded against the hospital's insurer, Continental, under the state's "direct-action" statute. All Defendants moved to dismiss, because Mrs. Henry failed to obtain service of process on the nurses before the statute of limitations expired. Because Washington's alleged negligence arose from its vicarious liability based on the actions of the nurses, Defendants argued that claims against Washington and Continental must also be dismissed. The circuit court granted Defendants' motion, and Mrs. Henry appealed. The Supreme Court held that "because direct-action statutes are remedial in nature, we liberally construe them for the benefit of the injured parties and to effectuate the intended purposes." On review of the applicable case law, the Court found that failing include the nurses in this case was not fatal. Appellant could still pursue the hospital and its insurance carrier for the alleged negligence of its employees. The Court reversed the lower courts' decisions and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Crockett v. C.A.G. Investments, Inc.
Appellant Kim Crockett appealed the circuit courtâs order in favor of Appellee C.A.G. Investments, Inc. (CAG). CAG was created as an investment vehicle to provide funds to Omni Holding and Development Corporation (Omni). Omni operated a crop-dusting and farm-equipment export business. CAG purchased equipment and land for Omniâs operations and a house for Omniâs manager. Ms. Crockett became Omniâs sole stockholder, president and chairman of the board in 2005. CAG made a series of loans to Omni. The loans were secured by the property Omni used in the businessâ operation, and by the house in which Ms. Crockett lived. In late summer 2003, Omni suffered numerous financial difficulties, resulting in the deterioration of the business relationship between the management of CAG and Omni. While Omni contemplated filing for bankruptcy protection, CAG sought to recover the collateral pledged for the loans it had made to Omni. CAG asked Omni to remove all personal property Omni owned from the premises, and demanded to take possession of the real property. Omni refused to comply, and CAG sued for possession, believing the property to be unlawfully detained. The circuit court entered an order against Omni for unlawful detainer, and found that CAG was entitled to a writ of possession. Omni did not vacate the premises, and appealed the circuit courtâs order. The appellate court dismissed Omniâs appeal. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the circuit and appellate courts.
Kesai v. Almand
Appellant Kojleb Kesai filed a complaint for damages stemming from an automobile accident. A trial was held two years later. The jury was impaneled, and proceedings got underway. Appellant moved to use his first voluntary dismissal in the case, and the trial court responded by reminding Appellant that he would have to pay the expenses of the trial to date, which included impaneling the jury, lunch for the jury, and opposing counselâs fees. The court entered a nonsuit in the case, and assessed all of the expenses for the trial to that point to Appellantâs counsel. Appellant appealed the trial courtâs order for fees, arguing that it was a mistake to assess costs prior to the refilling of the case. The Supreme Court found that the circuit court ordered payment of the costs on the same day the nonsuit was entered. There was no showing that Appellant had commenced the same claim against the same defendant, what was indeed, premature. Accordingly, the Court reversed and dismissed the trial courtâs order for costs against Appellant and his attorney.
Posted in:
Arkansas Supreme Court, Injury Law
Kirkland v. Sandlin
Appellant Reagen Kirkland appealed the circuit courtâs order in favor of Appellees Jay and Allison Sandlin (The Sandlins). The Sandlins owned a residential lot adjacent to Mr. Kirklandâs. The Sandlins had notified the original owners of Mr. Kirklandâs lot that they intended to build a fence between the two lots, but their boundary differed from that which was on the recorded plat of the subdivision. The Sandlins attempted to purchase the strip of land outside the official boundary, but they could not reach an agreement with their neighbors. When the neighbors sold their lot to Mr. Kirkland, they advised him that the Sandlinsâ fence encroached on his property line, and that he could sell that portion, or ask the Sandlins to move their fence. Mr. Kirkland asked the Sandlins to move the fence, and the Sandlins refused. Mr. Kirkland filed a suit for ejectment. The circuit court found that the Sandlins had entered into a valid boundary agreement with the original owners of Mr. Kirklandâs lot, and he took possession of the lot subject to that agreement. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Mr. Kirkland argued that he could rescind the agreement as a successive owner. The Court found a valid agreement existed between the Sandlins and the original owners of Mr. Kirklandâs lot. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision.
Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Phillips County Circuit Court
In a pending negligence case in Philips County, the Circuit Court entered an order compelling Petitioner Cooper Tire & Rubber Company to fully and completely respond to the discovery requests made by the plaintiffs. The underlying case was a product's liability action, in which the Plaintiffs alleged the Company made defective tires that were ultimately responsible for the death of several people. The Plaintiffs made 467 specific requests for Company documents and materials. The Company alleged that many of the requested materials contained trade secrets or otherwise protected information. In all, Plaintiffs requested thousands of pages of materials that would cost the Company significant time and manpower to review, redact and produce to the Plaintiffs. The Company moved the Court to grant it time, or to limit the number of plaintiffsâ requests. The Court denied the Companyâs motions. The Company subsequently petitioned for a writ of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, or other supervisory writ for relief from the Circuit Courtâs rulings. The Supreme Court granted the Company certiorari to review the case. On review, the Supreme Court found the Circuit Court âgrossly abused its discretion,â and vacated some of the Circuit Courtâs rulings pertaining to discovery deadlines and the production of Company materials.