Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Patricia Adams filed claims against Truman Arnold Companies (TAC) for negligent supervision, retention, and hiring of a store manager, claiming that she was a victim of sexual assault and harassment while employed by TAC and that she was exposed to this harm due to TAC’s negligence. TAC moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Adams’s sole remedy was through the Workers’ Compensation Act and that the Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Commission had the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the applicability of the Act. The circuit court denied TAC’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the allegations fell outside of the Commission’s jurisdiction. TAC then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition to preclude the circuit court from continuing to exercise jurisdiction over Adams’s claims against TAC. The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition, holding that the writ was warranted for the reasons stated in Truman Arnold Cos. v. Miller County Circuit Court, handed down this same date. View "Truman Arnold Cos. v. Miller County Circuit Court" on Justia Law

In 2013, Felicia Farris filed an amended complaint alleging that, in 2005, she entered into a contract with Cynthia Conger, d/b/a Conger Wealth Management (Conger), entitled “Wealth Management Agreement.” In 2008, Farris sought to have Conger transfer sufficient funds from Farris’s Fidelity Investment Account to Farris’s personal checking account so that Farris could purchase certain property prior to a foreclosure sale. Conger failed to transfer the funds, and the property was sold to a third party. Farris ultimately obtained the parcel at additional costs. Farris brought this action against Conger in 2013. Conger moved for dismissal and for summary judgment, asserting that the cause of action sounded in the tort of negligence and, therefore, was barred by the three-year statute of limitations for tort actions. Farris argued that her cause of action was for breach of contract, and thus the five-year statute of limitations applied. The circuit court granted summary judgment, finding that Farris’s complaint sounded in negligence and, consequently, was time-barred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erred in failing to apply the five-year statute of limitations for contract claims, making Farris’s cause of action timely. View "Farris v. Conger" on Justia Law

Dayong Yang, as special administrator of the estate of his deceased child, filed this negligence action against the City of Little Rock, its employees, and Metropolitan Emergency Medical Services (MEMS) (collectively, Appellants) for the alleged mishandling of a 911 call by a City employee that had been made by Yang’s wife. Appellants moved for summary judgment on the grounds of statutory immunity. The circuit court denied summary judgment on Yang’s negligence claims against the City and the employees in their official capacities only. The court also denied summary judgment on Yang’s negligence claims against MEMS on all claims not covered by insurance. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding (1) the City and its employees did not show they were entitled to assert the affirmative defense of immunity; and (2) the circuit court erred in denying MEMS summary judgment for statutory immunity beyond its insurance coverage. View "City of Little Rock v. Yang" on Justia Law

Guy Hendrix, the decedent in this case, worked for Alcoa Inc. for nearly thirty years. After he retired, Hendrix filed a claim against Alcoa for workers’ compensation benefits, alleging that he was exposed to asbestos during the course of his employment, leading to his diagnosis of an asbestos-related cancer. An administrative law judge found that the claim was time-barred because it was not filed within three years of his last date of the injurious exposure. After Hendrix died, his estate initiated this wrongful-death and survival action against Alcoa. Alcoa moved to dismiss the claims, asserting that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because the claims fell within the exclusive-remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the claims against Alcoa with prejudice. The estate appealed, arguing that because the statute of repose extinguished Hendrix’s remedy under the Act before it accrued, the exclusive-remedy provision no longer applied. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the claim falls within the coverage formula of the Act, even though Hendrix was ultimately denied recovery on the ground that the claim was time-barred. View "Hendrix v. Alcoa Inc." on Justia Law

Randeep Mann targeted Dr. Trent Pierce in a bombing. Dr. Pierce was seriously injured in the bombing. Mann was subsequently convicted of using and conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction against a person within the United States, among other charges. Dr. Pierce and Melissa Pierce subsequently brought tort claims against Mann. The circuit court granted the Pierces’ motion for partial summary judgment as to liability, concluding that offensive collateral estopped could be applied as a result of Mann’s criminal convictions. After a trial on the issue of damages, the jury awarded a total of $122,500,000 in compensatory and punitive damages to the Pierces. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in applying the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel in granting partial summary judgment on liability in favor of the Perces. View "Mann v. Pierce" on Justia Law

Defendants in this case included a Union, a subsidiary of the Union, and John Does (collectively, Defendants) who conducted demonstrations to help current and former Walmart employees on issues related to their employment. Walmart filed a complaint in the circuit court alleging trespass and seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. The circuit court found that Walmart had met the requirements for a permanent injunction and a declaratory judgment. The injunction prohibited any non-employee defendant from engaging in any non-shopping activities on Walmart’s private property in Arkansas, and the circuit court declared that Defendants’ entrance onto Walmart private property for non-shopping purposes constituted a trespass. The Supreme Court affirmed as modified, holding (1) the National Labor Relations Act does not preempt Walmart’s trespass lawsuit; (2) the circuit court did not err in enjoining Defendants from entering parking lots and sidewalks that Walmart does not hold the right to exclusively possess; and (3) the injunction and declaration are overly broad as to their scope in that they prohibit “all non-shopping activity,” and the circuit court’s order is modified to limit the scope of the order to those activities that were proven by Walmart to cause irreparable harm. View "United Food & Commercial Workers International Union v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc." on Justia Law

After Tony Havner was injured in a motorcycle accident involving an overhead communications cable, Havner and his wife, Tina Havner, filed a negligence action against Northeast Arkansas Electric Cooperative (NAEC) and other defendants. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of NAEC. Havner subsequently filed a motion for entry of judgment and an Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b) certificate with the circuit court. The court entered a judgment and a Rule 54(b) certificate, which was stamped as ‘presented’ and ‘recorded.’ The case was then submitted to the court of appeals. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal without prejudice for lack of a final order, concluding that because the judgment and 54(b) certificate was recorded but never filed, it was not entered as required by court rules. The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals opinion, holding that, in light of In re Administrative Order No. 2(b)(2), the circuit court’s summary-judgment order was a final, appealable order. Remanded. View "Havner v. Northeast Arkansas Electric Cooperative" on Justia Law

Drew May worked for Integrated Direct Marketing, LLC (IDM) as an executive vice president until his termination. May later began working for Merkle, Inc., a competitor of IDM. IDM filed a complaint against May and Markle alleging breach of contract and conversion, among other claims. The federal district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all claims except conversion. The court then certified to the Supreme Court the question whether, under Arkansas’s tort of conversion, intangible property such as electronic data, standing alone and not deemed a trade secret, can be converted. The Supreme Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that, under Arkansas law, intangible property such as electronic data, standing alone and not deemed a trade secret, can be converted “if the actions of the defendant are in denial of or inconsistent with the rights of the owner or person entitled to possession.” View "Integrated Direct Mktg. Inc. v. May" on Justia Law

Appellants sued Appellees in circuit court, alleging causes of action for civil conspiracy, intentional interference with a contractual relationship or business expectancy, fraud and fraudulent inducement, and violation of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA). Appellants later voluntarily dismissed their intentional interference and ADPTA claims. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees on the remaining claims. Appellants appealed, arguing that there remained genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment in this case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellees failed to present sufficient proof to raise a question of fact with regard to the claims before the trial court on summary judgment. View "Muccio v. Hunt" on Justia Law

Corina Mendoza was a passenger in the backseat of a vehicle operated by Anthony Adams when Adams ran into the back of a parked excavator. Mendoza filed a complaint against Adams and WIS International, Inc. and Washington Inventory Services, Inc. (collectively, WIS) seeking damages for her injuries and alleging that Adams was acting in the course of his employment with WIS at the time of the accident. WIS and Adams pled the affirmative defense of comparative fault, citing Mendoza’s failure to wear a seat belt at the time of the accident. WIS and Adams then filed motions challenging the constitutionality of Ark. Code Ann. 27-37-703, which restricts the admissibility of seat belt nonuse in civil actions. The Supreme Court accepted a request from the district court to determine the certified question of whether section 27-37-703 is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held that section 27-37-703 is procedural and therefore offends the principle of separation of powers under article 4, section 2 of amendment 80, section 3 of the Arkansas Constitution. View "Mendoza v. WIS Int’l, Inc." on Justia Law