Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from a dispute among the owners of an oil-drilling rig. Donald Buffington owned 62.5 percent of the rig. Newton Dorsett, through his company, Diamond Transport & Drilling, owned the remaining 37.5 percent of the rig. Two lawsuits brought by the owners were resolved when the parties entered into a compromise agreement. The third case was brought by Buffington against Diamond and Dorsett in the Lafayette County circuit court and alleged causes of action for breach of contract and conversion arising out of the agreement. The fourth case was filed by Diamond in Louisiana seeking an order enforcing the agreement. Thereafter, Louisiana court found, inter alia, that the compromise agreement remained in effect. Subsequently, the Lafayette County circuit court found that, in light of the Louisiana judgment, res judicata applied to a majority of the issues brought by Buffington in the Lafayette County circuit court. The case proceeded to trial, and the circuit court entered judgment against Dorsett. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) res judicata did not bar Buffington's action in Arkansas court; and (2) there was substantial evidence to support the jury's award of damages. View "Dorsett v. Buffington" on Justia Law

Petitioner Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company petitioned for a writ of prohibition with the Supreme Court, arguing the circuit court did not have jurisdiction after ninety days to set aside its previous order in this case. This matter stemmed from a motorcycle accident in which Stuart Parsons was injured with an uninsured driver. Parsons had uninsured-motorist coverage with Farm Bureau. He made a claim against that coverage, and signed a release allowing farm bureau to obtain his medical bills, and received a personal-injury protection payment. Parsons' medical bills exceeded the policy limit. Farm Bureau them filed a complaint for interpleader, requesting the circuit court disburse its uninsured-motorist limits. At that time, no other party had filed a lien nor claimed any interest in the policy proceeds. Acting pro se, Parsons answered and requested his policy be paid to him. The circuit court ordered Farm Bureau to deposit the funds into the court's registry and to disburse the money accordingly. Then Parsons filed a counterclaim seeking a statutory penalty, interst and attorney's dees, and to dismiss Farm Bureau's interpleader. After a hearing, the circuit court vacated an earlier order thereby allowing Parsons to proceed with his counterclaims against Farm Bureau. Farm Bureau then filed for a writ of prohibition, arguing the circuit court had no jurisdiction to set aside the order after ninety days from entry of the order. The Supreme Court considered Farm Bureau's petition for a writ of prohibition as a request for a writ of certiorari, and found that Farm Bureau had another adequate remedy. As such, the Court denied Farm Bureau's petition for certiorari, and dismissed the petition for the writ of prohibition as moot. View "S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Parsons" on Justia Law

A construction company and its principals (collectively, Appellants) hired a plumbing company (Peters), excavation company (Bostic), and marble company (Esquire) as subcontractors for the construction of Appellants' home. After Buyers purchased the home, Buyers filed a complaint against Appellants, alleging negligence and breach of the implied warranties of habitability, sound workmanship, and proper construction. Appellants filed a third-party complaint against Peters, Bostic, and Esquire, alleging several causes of action. Bostic subsequently filed cross-claims against Peters, and Peters filed cross-claims against both Bostic and Esquire. Thereafter, the circuit court (1) granted Peters' motion for summary judgment on the third-party complaint, (2) granted summary judgment for Bostic on Peters' cross-claim, and (3) granted Esquire's motion for summary judgment on the third-party complaint. Appellants appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Court lacked jurisdiction because a final order had not been entered disposing of all the claims. View "J-McDaniel Constr. Co. v. Dale E. Peters Plumbing Ltd." on Justia Law

Appellant was a police department officer when he arrested Appellee for disorderly conduct and refusal to submit to arrest. Appellee was convicted of both offenses. The circuit court subsequently overturned the disorderly-conduct conviction. Appellee brought suit against Appellant in his individual and official capacities in the U.S. district court. After Appellee's federal case was dismissed, she brought suit against Appellant in his individual and official capacities in state court. The suit was virtually identical to the suit brought in federal court. Appellant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Appellee's cause of action was barred by collateral estoppel and that he was entitled to qualified immunity. The circuit court denied Appellant's motion, and Appellant brought this interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) Appellant was entitled to qualified immunity on Appellee's right-to-remonstrate claim; and (2) collateral estoppel barred the remaining claims. View "Graham v. Cawthorn" on Justia Law

Developers purchased forty acres with the intent to develop it. Appellants secured a mortgage on the property with a bank. Later Developers formed a municipal property owners' district (the District). Law Firm was retained by the District as legal counsel for the proposed issuance of improvement bonds to finance public improvements in the development. At issue in this case were certain bonds issued by the District that were sold to several banks (Appellants). Developer defaulted on payment of the capital improvement use fees on the bonds and subsequently defaulted on the original mortgage, and the property was sold. Appellants sued Law Firm, alleging that Law Firm had a duty to inform Appellants of the mortgage on the real property and that it failed to inform them. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Law Firm. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the circuit court (1) correctly found Law Firm was not liable under the Arkansas Security Act; (2) erred in granting judgment on the issue of attorney malpractice; and (3) correctly found Law Firm had no duty to Appellants under contract, negligence, or breach of a fiduciary duty. View "First Ark. Bank & Trust v. Gill Elrod Ragon Owen & Sherman, P.A." on Justia Law

State Farm filed a complaint for negligence against Appellant, alleging that Appellant was at fault in an automobile accident with State Farm's insured. Appellant counterclaimed, alleging that State Farm was unjustly enriched as a result of having engaged in the deceptive and unlawful business practice of causing collection-style letters to be mailed in an attempt to collect unadjudicated, potential subrogation claims as debts. Appellant's counterclaim identified two putative classes. State Farm filed a motion to strike the class allegations. Rather than granting the motion to strike class allegations, the circuit court denied class certification "for the reasons stated in State Farm's motion." The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court acted without due consideration of the Court's foregoing case law on typicality, commonality, and predominance and therefore abused its discretion in prematurely denying class certification at the early pleading stage of this case. Remanded. View "Kersten v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a complaint against his employer (Employer), alleging that he was terminated in retaliation for asserting his rights under the Arkansas workers' compensation statutes. After the case was removed to federal court, Employer filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the claim for retaliation had been abolished under Ark. Code Ann. 11-9-107, and therefore, Petitioner failed to state a claim. Petitioner argued that he was seeking relief allowed under Ark. Code Ann. 16-118-107, the crime victims' civil-liability statute for felonious conduct. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer a question of law and held that, by enacting section 16-118-107 under the Workers' Compensation Act, the Arkansas General Assembly did not intend to revive the individual cause of action for common-law remedies for retaliation under Arkansas' workers' compensation law that it expressly annulled at section 11-9-107, and therefore, the exclusive remedy provision of the Act precluded recovery under section 16-118-107. View "Lambert v. LQ Mgmt. LLC" on Justia Law

Johnny Washington and his son were traveling in their 1994 Ford Explorer when their vehicle was struck by a driver (Karah Williams) who had run a stop sign. The Explorer rolled over twice, fatally injuring Johnny. Paulette Washington, individually and as administratrix of Johnny's estate, filed a complaint against Ford Motor Company for negligence, strict liability, failure to warn, and breach of warranties. The jury returned a verdict finding that Ford and Williams, in equal measure, had been the proximate cause of Johnny's death. The jury awarded $4,652,125 in compensatory damages and $2.5 million in punitive damages. Ford appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the judgment was not final because it did not set forth a specific dollar amount owed by Ford. View "Ford Motor Co. v. Washington" on Justia Law

Appellant issued a motorcycle insurance policy to Brian McCallum that contained accident and healthcare coverage. The policy included a provision for subrogation of payments made for any injury caused by a third party. After McCallum was involved in a collision with Margarita Saldivar, Appellant paid McCallum's medical expenses. Appellant then filed a complaint alleging Saldivar's negligence and seeking to receive subrogation benefits from Saldivar. The circuit court rejected Appellant's argument that it was entitled to subrogation benefits from Saldivar and granted summary judgment in Saldivar's favor. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the relevant statutes; and (2) Appellant properly sought general "subrogation benefits from the third party,'" as permitted by Ark. Stat. Ann. 23-79-146. View "Progressive Halcyon Ins. v. Saldivar" on Justia Law

Appellant Diane Ausman, the administrator of the Estate of Daniel Ausman, filed a complaint on August 24, 2009 against a geriatric center and doctor, alleging, among other claims, medical negligence and negligence. Shortly after the suit was filed, Appellant passed away. The attorneys representing Appellant did not learn of her death until May 2011. As a result, the attorneys filed a motion for a continuance of the trial, which was scheduled to begin on July 11, 2011. The parties disputed whether the one-year statute of limitations found in Ark. Code Ann. 16-62-108 was applicable where a special administrator of an estate dies during the pendency of litigation or whether the matter was simply governed by Ark. R. Civ. P. 25's requirement for substitution of parties. The circuit court dismissed the case with prejudice, finding that the Estate improperly failed to revive the action within one year from the date of Appellant's death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Estate's failure to move for substitution within one year from the time of Appellant's death prevented the revivor of the action. View "Ausman v. Hiram Shaddox Geriatric Ctr." on Justia Law