Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Tomas Vebr was employed by a painting contractor which contracted with defendants Gary and Georgia Culp to paint the interior of their home. An hour into working in the Culps’ home, Vebr fell 12 to 15 feet from an extension ladder provided by the painting contractor and was injured. Vebr sued the Culps for negligence and premises liability based on allegations that his fellow painters were negligent. The trial court granted the Culps’ motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeal affirmed: the undisputed facts showed the cause of Vebr’s fall was a mystery. There was no evidence showing what had occurred or that Vebr was free from negligence himself. On this record, there was no reasonable and logical inference anyone else present in the residence at the time of the accident was negligent. “Someone might have been negligent, but we do not and likely never will know whether that was the case. The trial court did not err by concluding that the evidence before the court did not show all three conditions of the res ipsa loquitur presumption were satisfied.” View "Vebr v. Culp" on Justia Law

Defendant’s vehicle collided into plaintiff’s vehicle at a busy intersection. Plaintiff sustained spinal injuries in the accident and filed suit against defendant. Eventually, plaintiff had surgery to repair a herniated lumbar disc. The jury found defendant negligent and awarded plaintiff a total of $429,773.71 in damages, including $261,773.71 in past medical expenses, which was the full amount of her medical bills. The trial court then entered judgment on the verdict. Defendant appealed. This case raised an issue regarding the calculation of reasonable medical expenses in economic damages awards. Plaintiff lacked medical insurance and contracted with her medical providers to treat her in exchange for a lien on whatever she might recover from defendant in this lawsuit. A third party assignee, MedFin Managers, LLC (MedFin), purchased the lien from the medical providers for a discounted amount. Plaintiff remained liable on the total bill. Defendant contended that the trial court erred in denying her motion to admit evidence of the amounts MedFin paid to purchase the right to recover the full amounts plaintiff’s medical providers billed plaintiff. Defendant argued that the trial court should have allowed her to introduce evidence of the amounts MedFin paid to the medical providers as evidence of the reasonable cost of treatment provided plaintiff, particularly since the court denied defendant’s motion to exclude evidence of the billed amounts. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court of Appeal concluded that because defendant proffered no evidence to show that the MedFin payments represented the reasonable value of plaintiff’s treatment, the probative value of that evidence was substantially outweighed by the probability that it would create a substantial danger of undue prejudice as well as a danger of confusing and misleading the jury. Consequently, the trial court’s ruling precluding evidence of the MedFin payments was not an abuse of discretion. View "Uspenskaya v. Meline" on Justia Law

Valentino Bocanegra claimed that he was arrested on a warrant for a man with a similar (but not identical) name. Bocanegra repeatedly told the authorities that they had the wrong man and noted that his driver’s license, social security number, booking photos, and fingerprints would all prove this, he remained in jail for nine days. While incarcerated, he was forcibly sodomized by another inmate. This appeal centered on one of the multiple defendants who Bocanegra contended were responsible for his plight: Donald Jakubowski, a deputy district attorney who, according to Bocanegra, negligently failed to determine his true identity and tried to prevent him from ultimately being released. The trial court sustained Jakubowski’s demurrer, which was based on several alternative governmental immunity statutes.The Court of Appeal affirmed. In the published portion of this opinion, the Court held that Bocanegra adequately alleged that Jakubowski was liable for false imprisonment; the Court also held that statutory prosecutorial immunity did not apply to the false imprisonment claim. However, the demurrer had to be sustained based on common-law prosecutorial immunity. View "Bocanegra v. Jakubowski" on Justia Law

Chand was treated for his injuries at San Francisco General Hospital and subsequently sued the driver of the car that struck him, among others. Chand settled with the driver for $100,000 and filed a notice of partial settlement. The City of San Francisco Bureau of Delinquent Revenue Collections filed a medical reimbursement lien for approximately $370,000 in Chand’s personal injury case to recover the cost of the medical care it provided to him. Chand moved to expunge the City’s lien. The trial court concluded the City had a valid lien pursuant to section 124 of the San Francisco Health Code, which authorizes it to place a lien on a patient’s recovery from a third party tortfeasor, and rejected Chand’s claims that section 124 is preempted by state law and alternatively determined that the City may rely on section 124 because it is a charter city and its ordinance regulates a municipal affair. The court rejected Chand’s claim that the City waived section 124 when it adopted a subsequent resolution that expanded its options for pursuing medical reimbursement from patients and third parties.The court of appeal affirmed View "Chand v. Bolanos" on Justia Law

While Bikkina was in a Ph.D. program at the University of Tulsa, Mahadevan, Bikkina’s first dissertation advisor and supervisor, repeatedly charged that Bikkina falsified data in published papers and plagiarized Mahadevan’s work. In each case, the University found no wrong doing by Bikkina, but that Mahadevan had violated the University‘s harassment policies. Bikkina completed his Ph.D. and began working at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL). Mahadevan contacted Bikkina‘s superiors to state that Bikkina had falsified data, then made a presentation at LBNL and told Bikkina‘s colleagues that Bikkina had published a paper using false data., Bikkina filed a complaint for damages against Mahadevan, who filed an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16. Mahadevan argued that Bikkina improperly sought to chill public discourse on carbon sequestration and its impacts on global warming. Mahadevan asserted that his statements concerned important public issues and constituted protected speech. The court of appeal affirmed denial of the motion, finding that Mahadevan had not engated in protected conduct, even if the conduct arose from protected activity, Bikkina’s claims have sufficient merit to survive a motion to strike. View "Bikkina v. Mahadevan" on Justia Law

The health care service plan in this case, Kaiser Permanente, covered three patients who received care at an emergency room operated by Dameron Hospital Association. The patients were injured due to the negligence of third party tortfeasors who had automobile liability insurance with California Automobile Association Inter-insurance Bureau (AAA) and Allstate Insurance Company. Unlike Kaiser, neither AAA nor Allstate had contracts with Dameron. In the absence of an agreement for negotiated billing rates, Dameron sought to collect from AAA and Allstate its customary billing rates by asserting liens filed under the Hospital Lien Act (HLA). AAA and Allstate, however, ignored Dameron’s HLA liens when paying settlements to the three Kaiser patients. Upon learning of the settlements, Dameron sued AAA and Allstate to recover on its HLA liens. The trial court granted insurers’ motions for summary judgment on grounds the patients’ debts had already been fully satisfied by their health care service plans. Reasoning the HLA liens were extinguished for lack of any underlying debt, the trial court dismissed the case. The trial court further found dismissal was warranted because Dameron failed to timely file some of its HLA liens against AAA. The question this case presented to the Court of Appeal was whether the health care service plan’s payment of a previously negotiated rate for emergency room services insulated the tortfeasor’s automobile liability insurer from having to pay the customary rate for medical care rendered. AAA and Allstate argued they were not responsible for any amount after Kaiser paid in full the bill for the emergency room services provided by Dameron. Dameron argued that it contracted with Kaiser to preserve its rights to recover the customary billing rates from tortfeasors and their automobile liability insurers, and that the tortfeasors and their liability insurers were responsible for the entire bill for medical services at the customary rate - not just the difference between the reimbursement received from Kaiser and the customary billing rate. The Court of Appeal concluded that the Dameron/Kaiser contract did not contain the term described by case law as sufficient to preserve the right to recover the customary billing rate for emergency room services from third party tortfeasors. Consequently, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of AAA and Allstate. View "Dameron Hosp. Assn. v. AAA Nor. Cal., Nev. & Utah Ins. Exc." on Justia Law

In 2007 Rufini purchased his Sonoma residence with a $600,000 loan. Rufini and his fiancée lived in the home until they separated. In June 2009, CitiMortgage approved Rufini for a loan modification and told him he would receive a permanent modification after making timely trial payments of $2787.93 in July, August and September. Rufini timely made the payments at the modified rate through December. In January, 2010, CitiMortgage informed him that his permanent loan modification agreement would be ready in three days. Three months later, with still no written agreement, he rented out his house to offset expenses In August Rufini learned that Citibank was denying his loan modification, because the home was not owner-occupied. He attempted to make timely mortgage payments at the modified level, but CitiMortgage returned his checks. Rufini received a notice of default in September 2010, followed by a notice of trustee’s sale scheduled for January 2011. He contacted CitiMortgage and obtained its agreement to delay the foreclosure. CitiMortgage assigned Semien to Rufini’s account, but Rufini was unable to contact him on the phone for three and a half weeks. On April 11 Rufini was informed his modification was “in final state of completion.” On May 4, his house was sold at auction. The trial court dismissed Rufini’s complaint alleging “breach of contract—promissory estoppel,” breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unfair business practices, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation. The appeals court reversed and remanded the claims of negligent representation and under Business and Professions Code section 17200, the unfair competition law. View "Rufini v. CitiMortgage" on Justia Law

After the jury awarded damages to plaintiffs for their injuries resulting from a tractor-trailer accident, both parties appealed the trial court's orders. The court concluded that defendants' motion for a new trial and motion notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) were premature because they were filed before the case was fully decided. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order as to those rulings. Further, the trial court's order striking the awards of noneconomic damages is nonappealable and defendants' appeal from the judgment is of no effect and must be dismissed because there is no judgment. The court also concluded that unpaid medical bills are not evidence of the reasonable value of the services provided, and no expert witness declaration is required for a treating physician offering an opinion based on facts acquired in the physician-patient relationship or otherwise acquired independently of the litigation, including, to the extent it is otherwise admissible, an opinion on reasonable value. View "Ochoa v. Dorado" on Justia Law

Mark Ganoe filed suit against multiple corporations, including Metalclad, after he was diagnosed with mesothelioma, alleging that the disease was caused by his exposure to asbestos from when he worked at the Goodyear plant. Ganoe died during the pendency of this action and the case was converted to a survival and wrongful death action. The trial court granted summary judgment to Metalclad. The court concluded that the evidence supported a reasonable inference that plaintiffs could show causation. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding that plaintiffs had failed to raise a triable issue of fact. Accordingly, the court reversed and awarded plaintiffs their costs on appeal. View "Ganoe v. Metalclad Insulation Corp." on Justia Law

Hardin suffered complete blindness and permanent, severe and painful scarring after she took Lamotrigine, the generic form of the medication Lamictal. Hardin sued the prescribing physician, the manufacturer, the store where she bought the prescription (Safeway), WKH, which produced the drug information pamphlet (monograph), and PDX, a software provider that distributes drug information to pharmacy customers. Unlike physician package inserts and patient medication guides, which are FDA-mandated, WKH monographs are not regulated or reviewed by the FDA, but are produced as part of a self-regulating action plan required under 110 Stat. 1593. The WKH monograph was the only information received by Hardin when she first filled her prescription for Lamictal. The abbreviated warning used by Safeway and provided to Hardin omitted the “Black Box” warning: “BEFORE USING THIS MEDICINE” that stated: “SERIOUS AND SOMETIMES FATAL RASHES HAVE OCCURRED RARELY WITH THE USE OF THIS MEDICINE. Hardin says that had she been provided this warning, she would not have taken the medication. WKH moved to strike Hardin’s claims against it under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the “anti-SLAPP” (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation ) statute.. The trial court ruled that WKH’s production of drug monographs was protected speech concerning a public issue or an issue of public interest and that Hardin had no probability of prevailing because she could not establish that WKH owed her any duty. The court denied PDX’s motion to strike, finding that the activity underlying PDX’s alleged liability was the reprogramming of its software to permit Safeway to give customers an abbreviated, five-section monograph that omitted warnings instead of the full eight-section version that included those warnings. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Hardin v. PDX, Inc." on Justia Law