Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Hennessy manufactured and supplied brake arcing machines used to grind asbestos brakes. Rondon used Hennessy’s machines while working as a mechanic, 1965-1988. Rondon developed mesothelioma as the result of exposure to asbestos while working as a mechanic and brought claims for strict liability and negligence against Hennessy, alleging that its brake arcing machines released asbestos dust that caused him injury when he used them to grind standard brake linings. Hennessy’s grinders themselves did not contain asbestos. Hennessy alleged that the machines were not designed to be used exclusively with asbestos-containing products and were used on non-asbestos brakes. The trial court dismissed. The court of appeal reversed, citing the 2015 decision from the Second District Court of Appeal in Sherman v. Hennessy, holding that the proper test is not the “exclusive use” standard argued by Hennessy and relied on by the trial court, but whether the “inevitable use” of Hennessy’s machines would expose a worker like Rondon to asbestos dust absent safety protection or adequate warning. Rondon produced sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether the “inevitable use” standard was met. View "Rondon v. Hennessy Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Attorney Hassell obtained a judgment holding Bird liable for defamation and requiring her to remove defamatory reviews she posted about Hassell on Yelp.com. The judgment contained an order requiring Yelp to remove Bird’s defamatory reviews from its site. Yelp, who was not a party in the defamation action, moved to vacate the judgment. The court of appeal affirmed denial of that motion, but remanded. The court concluded that Yelp is not “aggrieved” by the defamation judgment against Bird, but is “aggrieved” by the removal order; Yelp’s motion to vacate was not cognizable under Code of Civil Procedure section 6632; Yelp has standing to challenge the validity of the removal order as an “aggrieved party,” having brought a nonstatutory motion to vacate; Yelp’s due process rights were not violated by its lack of prior notice and a hearing on the removal order request; the removal order does not violate Yelp’s First Amendment rights to the extent that it requires Yelp to remove Bird’s defamatory reviews; to the extent it purports to cover statements other than Bird’s defamatory reviews, the removal order is an overbroad unconstitutional prior restraint on speech; and Yelp’s immunity from suit under the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. 230, does not extend to the removal order. View "Hassell v. Bird" on Justia Law

After defendant bought the commercial building housing plaintiffs‘ rug cleaning business, disputes developed. The tenants complained that landlords behavior interfered with their business operations and amounted to a campaign of harassment and retaliation. The tenant obtained a preliminary injunction, enjoining landlord‘s construction activities exceeding a stated decibel level during business hours. Three consumer reviews criticizing tenant’s business subsequently appeared on the Internet site Yelp.com posted from different online aliases. Tenant suspected landlord was responsible and amended the complaint to allege defamation. Landlord successfully moved in limine to exclude the evidence related to the Yelp reviews on hearsay and authenticity grounds. The trial court later granted landlord a directed verdict on the defamation cause of action. A jury found that, although landlord had breached the lease agreement, no damages resulted. The trial court deemed landlord the prevailing party and granted his request for attorney‘s fees. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the exclusion of the Yelp evidence and the resulting disposition of the defamation cause of action was error and it is not clear that the outcome on the contract-based causes of action would have remained unaffected by the presentation of evidence on the alleged defamation. View "Kinda v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

William E. Rice and others filed suit against Attorney Gary P. Downs for legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and breach of a written agreement Downs drafted to govern a limited liability corporation he formed with Rice and others. Both parties appealed after arbitration. The court concluded that Rice’s malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and rescission claims do not arise out of the operating agreements. Accordingly, the court reversed with respect to the court’s order compelling arbitration of Rice’s legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and rescission causes of action and otherwise affirmed the judgment. View "Rice v. Downs" on Justia Law

Brett Bertsch tragically died while skateboarding with his brother in the resort town of Mammoth Lakes. The two were traveling downhill at a “pretty fast” speed, and without helmets, when the front wheels of Brett’s skateboard hit a small gap between the paved road and a cement collar surrounding a manhole cover, stopping the wheels and ejecting Brett from the board. The impact of Brett’s skull with the pavement resulted in a traumatic brain injury and ultimately death. Brett’s father and brother, plaintiffs Richard and Mitchell Bertsch, brought a wrongful death action against various defendants, including Mammoth Community Water District and Sierra Star Community Association. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants, concluding the doctrine of primary assumption of risk barred plaintiffs’ lawsuit as a matter of law. Plaintiffs appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the summary judgment motions were properly granted and affirmed. View "Bertsch v. Mammoth Community Water District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Uriel Jimenez was injured at a middle school within defendant Roseville City School District. The 14-year old Jimenez was in a classroom where fellow middle school students were purportedly practicing break dancing, but in which some were also performing “flips.” Students had been ordered not to perform flips; and the teacher who allowed the students to use his classroom for dancing violated school policy by leaving them unsupervised. Jimenez was seriously injured when other students waited for the teacher to leave them unsupervised, and then induced Jimenez to attempt a flip. The trial court granted the District summary judgment, concluding Jimenez assumed the risk of injury by participating in break dancing. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Jimenez, the Court of Appeal found two viable theories of liability, and as such, reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to deny the District’s summary judgment motion. View "Jimenez v. Roseville City School Dist." on Justia Law

Hennessy manufactured and supplied brake shoe arcing machines, (grinders) used to grind asbestos brakes. Hetzel allegedly used its grinder while working as a mechanic from 1958 to 1962 and alleged Hennessy knew or should have known its grinders would be used in conjunction with asbestos-containing brake linings. All brake shoe linings used with automobiles during the relevant period contained asbestos. He claimed Hennessy had a duty to warn of the risks. Hennessy’s grinders did not contain asbestos and are designed to reshape the friction material of a brake shoe, regardless of the shoe’s composition, by mechanical abrasion. When the grinder comes into contact with an asbestos-containing brake shoe, it releases asbestos into the air. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Hennessy, reasoning that brake shoes without asbestos existed at the time of plaintiff’s exposure and Hennessy’s grinders worked on all brake linings, regardless of whether they contained asbestos. Hetzel, who suffered lung damage, died in 2012. The court of appeal reversed. The combined use of Hennessy’s machines with the asbestos brakes inevitably created a hazardous condition by releasing asbestos fibers into the air. Hennessy was in a position to provide safeguards from this exposure. View "Hetzel v. Hennessy Indus., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, by and through her mother and guardian ad litem, filed suit against Sony, alleging that her prenatal exposure to toxic substances caused her to suffer birth defects and permanent injuries. Plaintiff was born in April 1999, with numerous birth defects. She alleges that, during her mother’s employment with Sony, she was exposed for prolonged periods of time to chemicals which caused her birth defects. The court concluded that Code of Civil Procedure section 340.4, which is applicable to tort actions for birth and prebirth injuries, governs plaintiff’s claims and that her action is time-barred. In so holding, the court departed from its colleagues in the Sixth District who concluded that section 340.8 supplants the limitations period of section 340.4 for claims based on prenatal injuries caused by exposure to hazardous materials or toxic substances (Nguyen v. Western Digital Corporation). Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment entered in favor of Sony. View "Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc." on Justia Law

An adult student filed suit against the District and Igor Daza, a guidance counselor employed by the District, alleging Daza sexually assaulted her when she went to his office for counseling services (the main lawsuit). The District refused to defend Daza, so he paid for his own defense and filed a cross-complaint denying the allegations of sexual assault and seeking indemnity and reimbursement for his defense. After the District settled the main lawsuit, it then demurred to Daza’s cross-complaint, arguing that the student’s allegations of sexual assault in the main lawsuit fell outside the scope of Daza’s employment as a matter of law. The California Tort Claims Act, Gov. Code, 810 et seq., requires public employers to defend and indemnify their employees for third party claims arising out of acts within the scope of employment. The court agreed with the trial court that the sexual assault alleged in the main lawsuit fell outside the scope of Daza’s employment as a matter of law. But under a proper interpretation of section 996.4 of the Act, the determination of whether an employee acted within the scope of employment is factual and cannot be limited to the third party’s allegations in the underlying lawsuit when the employee denies those allegations, and the employee’s version of events would demonstrate acts within the scope of employment. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Daza v. LA Community College Dist." on Justia Law

On June 13, 2011, Sanford was injured when a car driven by 17-year-old Jacy ran a stop sign and struck his motorcycle. The car was owned by Jacy’s father, William. On February 20, 2013, Sanford filed suit against the Rasnicks, alleging vehicular negligence against Jacy and general negligence against both Rasnicks. The Rasnicks made a joint Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer for $130,000. The offer lapsed, the case went to trial, and a jury returned a verdict for less than $130,000. The trial court held the 998 offer valid, and ordered that the Rasnicks could recover some expert witness fees and other costs. The court entered a separate order taxing certain of Sanford’s costs. The court of appeal reversed and remanded, holding that the 998 offer was not valid because it improperly contained a request for an undescribed “Settlement Agreement” and the court erred in connection with its rulings on the cost items. View "Sanford v. Rasnick" on Justia Law