Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent George Zeber filed a workers' compensation claim for cumulative injury sustained during his employment with the New York Yankees from 1968 to 1978. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) found Zeber had a compensable injury but deferred any award pending further proceedings, including mandatory arbitration of the insurance coverage dispute. Travelers Indemnity Company (Travelers) disputed the applicability of mandatory arbitration, arguing it only applies to injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1994, while Zeber's injury occurred no later than 1978.The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) found Zeber sustained an injury during his employment but deferred findings on permanent disability and other issues. The WCJ also found the statute of limitations did not bar Zeber’s claim, as he only became aware of his right to file a claim in 2017 or 2018. The WCJ determined the New York Yankees had insurance coverage provided by Travelers and noted that disputes involving the right of contribution must be sent to arbitration. Travelers filed for reconsideration, which the WCAB partially granted, amending the WCJ’s decision to defer the insurance coverage issue to mandatory arbitration.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that section 5275, subdivision (a)(1) applies only to injuries occurring on or after January 1, 1990. The WCJ had not made a finding on the date of injury for purposes of section 5275. The court annulled the WCAB’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings, including a determination of the date of injury for the purposes of mandatory arbitration. The court emphasized that the "date of injury" for cumulative injuries should be determined under section 5412, which considers when the employee first suffered disability and knew or should have known it was work-related. View "Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Brian Thomas sued Corbyn Restaurant Development Corp and its employees for personal injuries sustained during an altercation. The parties settled the lawsuit for $475,000, with the payment to be made to Thomas's attorney's client trust account. However, an unknown third party impersonated Thomas's counsel and sent fraudulent wire instructions to the defendants' counsel, who then wired the settlement funds to the imposter's account. When the fraud was discovered, Thomas requested the settlement money, but the defendants refused to pay again.The Superior Court of San Diego County reviewed the case and granted Thomas's application to enforce the settlement agreement. The court applied federal case law, which shifts the risk of loss to the party in the best position to prevent the fraud. The court found that the defendants were in the best position to prevent the fraud and that Thomas bore no comparative fault. Consequently, the court entered judgment in favor of Thomas for $475,000.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's judgment, agreeing that the defendants were in the best position to prevent the fraud. The court noted several red flags that should have alerted the defendants to the fraudulent scheme, including conflicting payment instructions, inoperable phone numbers, and spoofed email addresses. The appellate court held that the risk of loss from the imposter's fraudulent diversion of the wire transfer should be borne by the party in the best position to prevent the fraud, which in this case was the defendants. View "Thomas v. Corbyn Restaurant Development Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Jennifer Restivo was skateboarding on a residential street in Petaluma, California, when her skateboard wheel caught in a large crack, causing her to fall and sustain a serious arm injury. She alleged that the City of Petaluma was negligent in maintaining the street and that the city had sufficient notice of the dangerous condition to repair it before her accident. The city moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had neither actual nor constructive notice of the dangerous condition.The Sonoma County Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of the city. The court found that there was no triable issue of material fact regarding the city's notice of the dangerous condition. The court noted that the city had maintained records of complaints about city streets for over ten years and had received no complaints about the street in question. Additionally, the city engineer testified that the city had conducted inspections of the street and found no significant issues that required repair.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the city had neither actual nor constructive notice of the dangerous condition. The court emphasized that the city's inspection and maintenance practices, including the bi-annual pavement condition reports and subsequent inspections, did not reveal the specific crack that caused the plaintiff's fall. The court also noted that the plaintiff's expert's opinion did not provide sufficient evidence to establish that the city had notice of the dangerous condition.The main holding of the appellate court was that the city did not have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition that caused the plaintiff's injury, and therefore, the city was not liable for the plaintiff's injuries. The judgment in favor of the city was affirmed. View "Restivo v. City of Petaluma" on Justia Law

In 2009, John Roe DZ 20, John Roe DZ 21, and John Roe DZ 22 (Plaintiffs) sued an employee of Doe 3, Family Services Organization (Family Services) for alleged childhood sexual assault. The trial court dismissed the claims against the employee with prejudice due to the statute of limitations. In 2022, Plaintiffs filed a new complaint against Family Services based on the same allegations, relying on the revival provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1.The trial court overruled Family Services' demurrer, which argued that Plaintiffs' claims could not be revived under section 340.1, subdivision (q), because they were derivative of the claims litigated to finality in the 2009 action. Family Services then petitioned for a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its order and sustain the demurrer without leave to amend.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that a claim for derivative liability against a principal (Family Services) was "litigated to finality" under section 340.1, subdivision (q), where a previous suit against an agent (Dowell) for the same damages based on the same operative facts was dismissed with prejudice. The court directed the trial court to vacate its order overruling the demurrer and to sustain the demurrer with leave to amend, allowing Plaintiffs the opportunity to amend their complaint to allege facts supporting liability based on conduct other than that of Dowell. View "Doe 3, Family Services Organization v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Maxwell Tillinghast, a 13-year-old student, collapsed from sudden cardiac arrest while jogging during a physical education class at Palms Middle School. Although the school had a defibrillator in the main office, the teachers were unaware of its presence. Despite being trained to use a defibrillator, the teachers could not utilize it, leading to Tillinghast's death. His father sued the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) and several employees, alleging negligence for failing to inform the teachers about the defibrillator.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County heard the case, where the jury focused on whether Tillinghast's latent heart defect would have been fatal even if the teachers had known about the defibrillator. The jury found the school district negligent and awarded Tillinghast's father $15 million in damages. The jury exonerated the school principal, Dr. Derek Moriuchi, from negligence.The LAUSD appealed to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, arguing that the trial court erred in giving a specific jury instruction (CACI No. 423) related to public entity liability for failure to perform a mandatory duty. The appellate court found that the school district had forfeited its objections to this instruction by not raising the issue during the trial. Additionally, the court noted that the school district had conceded mistakes were made regarding the defibrillator's availability and training.The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the evidence supported the jury's verdict and that the school district's failure to inform the teachers about the defibrillator constituted negligence. The court awarded costs to the respondent, Tillinghast's father. View "Tillinghast v. L.A. Unified School District" on Justia Law

Pablo Arredondo Padron was hired by Hugo Osoy to install two skylights in Osoy’s home. The project was agreed to take 10 to 12 days, equating to 80 to 96 hours of work. Padron fell from a ladder and was injured before completing the project. He subsequently sued Osoy for negligence, premises liability, and breach of specific Labor Code sections, alleging that his work was part of a larger remodeling project and that Osoy was at fault for the accident.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted summary judgment in favor of Osoy, finding that Padron’s claims were exclusively covered by workers’ compensation. The court determined that Padron was a residential employee under Labor Code section 3351(d) and did not fall within the exclusion from workers’ compensation coverage set forth in section 3352(a)(8)(A), as he had contracted to work for more than 52 hours. The court also rejected Padron’s arguments that he could sue in tort under section 3706 due to Osoy’s alleged failure to secure workers’ compensation insurance.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The appellate court held that Padron was not excluded from workers’ compensation coverage under section 3352(a)(8)(A) because he had contracted to work for more than 52 hours, regardless of the actual hours worked before his injury. The court also found that Osoy had secured workers’ compensation insurance as required by law, and thus, Padron could not pursue tort remedies under section 3706. The court concluded that Padron’s exclusive remedy was within the workers’ compensation system. View "Padron v. Osoy" on Justia Law

Myranda De la Cruz tripped on a pothole in a parking lot at a Mission Hills shopping center, which was managed by Triwell Properties. De la Cruz sued Mission Hills Shopping Center LLC and Triwell Properties (collectively referred to as Mission) for her injuries. Mission moved for summary judgment based on a contract between Mission and De la Cruz’s employer, a tenant in the shopping center. The contract contained an exculpatory clause relieving Mission from liability for negligent or wrongful acts. However, De la Cruz had not signed this contract.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Mission’s motion for summary judgment, accepting the argument that the exculpatory clause in the contract applied to De la Cruz. The court did not address why De la Cruz, who was not a party to the contract, would be bound by its terms.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because Mission failed to establish a legal basis for binding De la Cruz to a contract she had not signed. The court emphasized that contracts require mutual assent, and it was Mission’s burden to demonstrate why De la Cruz was bound by the contract. The appellate court exercised its discretion to consider De la Cruz’s argument, despite it not being raised in the trial court, due to the foundational nature of the legal error.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and remanded the case, instructing the trial court to enter a new order denying Mission’s summary judgment motion. The appellate court also awarded costs to De la Cruz. View "De la Cruz v. Mission Hills Shopping Center LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Zackary Diamond was injured by a punch from a third party during an altercation in the restricted pit area at Bakersfield Speedway. He alleged that the defendants, Scott Schweitzer, Schweitzer Motorsports Productions, and Christian Schweitzer, were negligent in providing security, responding to the altercation, and undertaking rescue efforts. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Diamond's claims were barred by a release and waiver of liability form he signed to enter the pit area. The trial court granted the motion, finding the release clear, unequivocal, and broad in scope, covering the negligent conduct alleged.The Superior Court of Kern County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the release included risks related to racing activities and that the assault was such a risk. The court interpreted the release as covering the type of event that occurred, thus barring Diamond's negligence claims.On appeal, Diamond contended that the release was unenforceable because the injury-producing act was not reasonably related to the purpose of the release, which he described as observing the race from the pit area. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, concluded that the release met the requirements for enforceability: it was clear, unambiguous, and explicit in expressing the intent to release all liability for Diamond's injury; the alleged acts of negligence were reasonably related to the purpose of the release; and the release did not contravene public policy. The court also found that the defendants adequately raised a complete defense based on the signed release and that Diamond failed to rebut this defense. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Diamond v. Schweitzer" on Justia Law

Pablo Arredondo Padron was hired by Hugo Osoy to install two skylights in Osoy’s home. The project was expected to take 10 to 12 days, with Padron working eight hours each day. However, Padron fell from a ladder and was injured before completing 52 hours of work. Padron sued Osoy for negligence, but the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Osoy, finding that Padron’s claims were exclusively covered by workers’ compensation.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled that Padron’s employment was covered by workers’ compensation under Labor Code section 3351(d), which includes individuals employed by homeowners for duties incidental to the ownership, maintenance, or use of the dwelling. The court also found that Padron did not fall under the exclusion in section 3352(a)(8)(A), which excludes workers employed for less than 52 hours in the 90 days preceding the injury, because Padron had contracted to work for more than 52 hours.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the exclusion in section 3352(a)(8)(A) does not apply when the employment is contracted to be for more than 52 hours, regardless of the actual hours worked before the injury. The court also rejected Padron’s arguments that he was not subject to the workers’ compensation system and that Osoy should be estopped from asserting the exclusivity defense. The court concluded that Osoy had secured workers’ compensation coverage through his homeowners’ insurance policy, which included the required coverage by operation of law. Therefore, Padron’s exclusive remedy was under the workers’ compensation system, and the summary judgment in favor of Osoy was affirmed. View "Padron v. Osoy" on Justia Law

In 2009, John Roe DZ 20, John Roe DZ 21, and John Roe DZ 22 (Plaintiffs) sued an employee of Doe 3, Family Services Organization (Family Services), alleging childhood sexual assault. The trial court dismissed the claims against the employee with prejudice due to the statute of limitations. In 2022, Plaintiffs filed a new complaint against Family Services based on the same allegations, relying on the revival provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1.Family Services demurred to the complaint, arguing that Plaintiffs’ claims could not be revived under section 340.1, subdivision (q), because they were derivative of the claims litigated to finality in the 2009 action. The trial court overruled the demurrer. Family Services then petitioned for a writ of mandate to direct the trial court to vacate its order and sustain the demurrer without leave to amend.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that a claim for derivative liability against a principal is considered “litigated to finality” under section 340.1, subdivision (q), if a previous suit against the agent for the same damages based on the same operative facts was dismissed with prejudice. Consequently, the court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to sustain the demurrer but allowed Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint to potentially allege new facts that could support a cause of action against Family Services. View "Doe 3 v. Superior Ct." on Justia Law