Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs K.M., H.R., and M.L. sued the Grossmont Union High School District (the District) for negligence based on alleged sexual abuse by their high school drama teacher, James Chatham. They also asserted sexual harassment claims under California Civil Code section 51.9, to which the District successfully demurred. The District made Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offers, which Plaintiffs did not accept. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the trial court excluded certain evidence and mistakenly included Plaintiffs in an oral jury instruction regarding apportionment of fault. Plaintiffs prevailed, and the jury assigned 60 percent of fault to Chatham, and 40 percent to the District, with resulting damage awards lower than the section 998 offers. The parties moved to tax each other’s costs. The trial court ruled the offers were invalid, granted Plaintiffs’ motion, and denied the District’s motion in pertinent part. Both parties appealed. The California Legislature later enacted Assembly Bill No. 218 which amended Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1, to reduce procedural barriers for childhood sexual abuse claims, and to allow treble damages for a claim involving a prior cover- up of abuse. Plaintiffs sought a new trial, contending they were entitled to pursue treble damages, and that the trial court erred by sustaining the demurrers to their sexual harassment claims, excluding certain evidence, and giving the erroneous oral jury instruction. The District argued the trial court wrongly determined its Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offers were invalid. The Court of Appeal concluded the treble damages provision in Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 was neither retroactive, nor applicable to public school districts. The Court further concluded Plaintiffs did not establish they could pursue sexual harassment claims against the District under Civil Code section 51.9. The parties do not establish reversible error on the other asserted grounds, either. Therefore, the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment and postjudgment orders. View "K.M. v. Grossmont Union High School Dist." on Justia Law

After D.G. was injured in a car accident involving a rental car driven by I.M. H.A. rented the car involved in the accident from Enterprise Rent-A-Car Company of Los Angeles (ERAC-LA). I.M. was listed as an additional authorized driver in the rental agreement between H.A. and ERAC-LA. At the time of rental, I.M.  presented ERAC-LA with a facially valid driver’s license issued by Kyrgyzstan and a local California address on the rental paperwork. D.G. sued ERAC-LA, I.M., and EAN Holding, LLC (EAN) for negligence. Specifically, D.G. alleged ERAC-LA negligently entrusted I.M. with the rental vehicle, and therefore proximately caused her injuries. ERAC-LA filed a petition for writ of mandate in this court to reverse the trial court’s order denying its motion for summary judgment.   The Second Appellate District issued a writ of mandate directing respondent court to vacate its May 24, 2022 and July 29, 2022 orders denying ERAC-LA’s motion for summary judgment and enter a new order granting the motion. The court held that requiring a rental car agency to investigate whether a prospective renter who presents a facially valid foreign driver’s license is still a resident of that jurisdiction at the time of rental goes beyond the scope of duties prescribed by the Legislature. The court further concluded that D.G. failed to carry her burden to demonstrate a triable issue of material fact exists regarding ERAC-LA’s compliance with section 14608, subdivision (a)(2). View "Enterprise Rent-A-Car of L.A. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Estate of N.K (the Estate), by and through Plaintiff, appealed from the judgment after the trial court granted the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Defendant, Glendale Adventist Medical Center (GAMC), following a jury trial of the Estate’s claim of neglect under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act. The decedent, presented at the acute care hospital operated by GAMC with complaints of weakness and lightheadedness. N.K. underwent an MRI scan and sustained a burn to his abdomen due to GAMC’s failure to screen N.K. for electrically conductive materials prior to the scan.The trial court concluded that substantial evidence failed to support that GAMC had a substantial caretaking or custodial relationship with N.K., and substantial evidence failed to support that GAMC’s conduct in failing to properly screen N.K. was neglect under the Act   The Second Appellate District affirmed holding that the trial court was correct on both grounds.  The court held that the evidence, in this case, does not permit the conclusion that a robust and substantial caretaking or custodial relationship with ongoing responsibilities existed between GAMC and N.K. The court clarified that it does not suggest that such a relationship can never exist when an elder or dependent adult is an inpatient for only two days. Rather, here, substantial evidence does not support the relationship. Moreover, there is no substantial evidence that GAMC harmed N.K. by “failing to provide medical care” or by failing to “attend to his basic needs and comforts.” View "Kruthanooch v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center" on Justia Law

Appellant Today’s IV filed a civil complaint against respondents Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority and Regional Connector Constructors for their “unreasonable” construction of an underground subway line in downtown Los Angeles, which affected the Westin Bonaventure Hotel and Suites (the Bonaventure), owned by Today’s IV.   Today’s IV alleged claims for nuisance and inverse condemnation due to 1) respondents’ use of the cut-and-cover construction method instead of the tunnel boring machine method; 2) construction work during nights and weekends, which was particularly harmful to the Bonaventure’s operation as a hotel; 3) violation of certain noise limits; and 4) interference with access to the Bonaventure. Today’s IV alleged lost contracts, including a $3.3 million airline contract, and loss of business. It requested compensatory and punitive damages from Respondents.   The trial court found no liability and entered judgment in favor of Respondents. The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the first two circumstances that justify an inverse condemnation claim are not applicable here, as Appellant does not contend that its property has been physically invaded or physically damaged. Thus, Appellant necessarily relies upon the intangible intrusion theory. To recover under this theory, Appellant must be able to establish its property suffered from an intangible intrusion burdening the property in a way that is direct, substantial, and peculiar to the property itself. View "Today's IV, Inc. v. L.A. County Metropolitan Transportation Auth." on Justia Law

A client who retained Plaintiff, the Law Corporation, to represent him in a marital dissolution action. The client assigned the judgments to Musick Peeler & Garrett LLC (Musick Peeler). In October 2019, the Law Corporation filed a motion (the setoff motion) in the superior court to set off against its judgment debt to Musick Peeler a debt that Dougherty allegedly owes to the Law Corporation. The client’s alleged tortious actions to hinder, delay, or defraud the Law Corporation in its efforts to collect on a 1999 default judgment prior to our opinion vacating that judgment and declaring it void in 2009. The trial court denied the motion and the Law Corporation appealed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that to the extent the Law Corporation incurred any fees or costs in connection with its defense against the collateral attack actions in California, they were incurred in defending actions by the client, not a third person. These actions, therefore, do not support a setoff claim based on the tort of another doctrine. Further, even if the Law Corporation’s motion was procedurally proper, the Law Corporation failed to support its setoff claims with relevant evidence and, therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. View "Karton v. Musick, Peeler, Garrett LLP" on Justia Law

The People of the State of California (People), appealed the denial of the motion for victim restitution, i.e., attorney fees and costs after Respondent was convicted by plea of felony driving with a .08 blood alcohol level or higher causing bodily injury. the denial of the motion for victim restitution, i.e., attorney fees and costs, after Respondent was convicted by plea of felony driving with a .08 blood alcohol level or higher causing bodily injury release of liability signed by the victim in the civil case discharged respondent’s obligation to pay restitution in the criminal case.The Second Appellate District agreed with the People and reversed. Here, the People presented evidence that the injured driver received a civil settlement of $235,000. Of the settlement, $61,574.44 was paid to the driver’s attorney as a contingency fee of 25 percent plus costs. Respondent did not present any witnesses or evidence in opposition. Instead, he argued the signed releases by the victims meant they “ha[d] received full and complete compensation,” and the contingency fee was “not a true amount of attorney’s fees.” However, “[a] crime victim who seeks redress for his injuries in a civil suit can expect to pay counsel with a contingency fee.” Because the People established that the driver paid her attorney a contingency fee of 25 percent, the burden shifted to Respondent to refute this showing. Respondent contends the trial court’s denial of fees was an “implied finding”. But an implied finding of fact must be supported by substantial evidence. View "P. v. Nonaka" on Justia Law

While T.L. was being transported by ambulance from a crisis stabilization unit to an inpatient psychiatric facility, she suddenly unbuckled the belts strapping her to the semi-reclined gurney and stepped out of the back of the moving ambulance, sustaining serious injuries. At the stabilization unit, she had been placed on a “section 5585” 72-hour mental health hold. (Welf. & Inst. Code 5585) However, she was calm and cooperative while at the unit, was never diagnosed as being a danger to herself, and was transported by ambulance to and from a local hospital for medical clearance, without incident. Her attending psychiatrist determined she was stable for transport to the in-patient facility.The trial court rejected T.L.'s suit on summary judgment, finding that the defendants owed no duty to prevent her from engaging in impulsive, reckless, irrational, and self-harming conduct. The court of appeal reversed. The defendants, like any other provider of medical services or medical support services, owe a general duty of care to those to whom they provide such services. While the professional standard of care does not, as a matter of law, require the use of restraints during the transport of any patient subject to a 5585 hold, the court should address T.L.’s claims that the gurney should have had shoulder harnesses and that the rear door of the ambulance should have been locked. View "T.L. v. City Ambulance of Eureka, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant is a severely disabled child whose congenital abnormalities went undetected during his mother’s pregnancy until after viability. Appellant sued various medical providers for wrongful life, settling with one in 2018. The California Department of Health Care Services (DHCS) asserted a lien on Appellant's settlement to recover what DHCS paid for Appellant's care. The trial court awarded DHCS the full amount of the lien and Appellant appealed.The Second Appellate District reversed. Although the court rejected Appellant's claim that the DHCS lien is preempted by federal law and that there is no substantial evidence that Appellant's settlement included payments for past medical expenses, the Second Appellate District found that the trial court erred by failing to distinguish between past medical expenses and other damages. View "Daniel C. v. White Memorial Medical Center" on Justia Law

Defendant-respondent Roseville Lodge No. 1293, Loyal Order of Moose, Inc. (the Lodge) hired Charlie Gelatini to move an automated teller machine (ATM) on its premises. Plaintiff and appellant Ricky Lee Miller, Jr., worked for Gelatini and was the person who performed the work. Miller was injured on the job when he fell from a scaffold, and he sought to hold the Lodge and its bartender John Dickinson liable for his injuries. Citing the Privette doctrine, the Lodge and Dickinson argued they were not liable, and they moved for summary judgment. Miller argued triable issues of fact existed over whether an exception applieed. The trial court granted the motion, and Miller appealed. Because the alleged hazard in this case was not concealed and was reasonably ascertainable to Gelatini (and Miller), the concealed hazardous condition exception to the Privette doctrine did not apply. Instead, the Privette presumption remained unrebutted, and the Lodge delegated to Gelatini any duty it had to protect Miller from hazards associated with using a wheeled scaffold. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Miller v. Roseville Lodge No. 1293" on Justia Law

Appellants are patients at medical facilities operated by respondent Centrelake Medical Group. In reliance on Centrelake’s allegedly false representations that it employed reasonable safeguards for patients’ personal identifying information (PII), Appellants entered into contracts with Centrelake. Appellants brought an action against Centrelake on behalf of themselves and a putative class of patients affected by a data breach. The complaint contained causes of action for breach of contract, negligence, and violations of the Unfair Competition Law (UCL). Centrelake demurred, arguing that Appellants had failed to adequately plead any cognizable injury and that their negligence claim was barred by the economic loss rule. Appellants opposed the demurrer. On appeal, Appellants contend the court erred in sustaining the demurrer with respect to each of their claims and abused its discretion in denying their request for leave to amend.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment with respect to the dismissal of Appellants’ negligence claim without leave to amend, but reverse with respect to Appellants’ UCL and contract claims. The court concluded that Appellants adequately alleged UCL standing and contract damages under their benefit-of-the-bargain theory, and the Appellant who purchased monitoring services, did the same under Appellants’ monitoring-costs theory. However, Appellants have not shown the court erred in dismissing their negligence claim under the economic loss rule; nor have they shown the court abused its discretion in denying their request for leave to amend. View "Moore v. Centrelake Medical Group, Inc." on Justia Law