Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In this case, an accident occurred where Sara Spagnolini, a provider under the In-Home Supportive Services (IHSS) program, ran a stop sign and crashed into a car driven by Hanah Keren Samson Yalung. Yalung and four of her five children were seriously injured, and one child was killed. Yalung, individually and as an administrator of her deceased daughter's estate and guardian ad litem for her other children, sued the State of California, among others, for Spagnolini's negligence.The plaintiffs argued that the State was liable for Spagnolini's negligence as her employer or as a joint employer with Spagnolini's recipient under the IHSS program. The Superior Court of Tulare County, however, sustained the State's demurrer to the first amended complaint without leave to amend. The trial court did not find the statutory scheme made the State the employer or joint employer of IHSS providers for all purposes, noting that no cases held the State was an employer for purposes of vicarious liability.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court concluded that the IHSS statutes are incompatible with a finding of joint employment as a matter of law. The court found that while the State administers the IHSS program and has some oversight responsibilities, it does not control or direct the day-to-day tasks or activities of IHSS providers. Accordingly, the State could not be deemed an employer or joint employer for the purposes of vicarious liability. View "Yalung v. State of California" on Justia Law

In this case, Crista Miller tripped on a vertical misalignment of less than one inch between a metal plate covering an underground utility vault, owned by the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), and the surrounding sidewalk adjacent to a property owned by Hip Sen Benevolent Association (Hip Sen), resulting in an injury to her ankle. Miller filed a lawsuit against both PG&E and Hip Sen, alleging general negligence and premises liability. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that the lawsuit was barred by the trivial defect doctrine.Miller appealed, but the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed the trial court's ruling. The appellate court concluded that the vertical misalignment was a trivial defect as a matter of law. The court stated that to recover damages for negligence or premises liability, Miller had to prove that the defendants breached a legal duty to either repair or warn about the existence of the misalignment. However, it is well-established law that landowners are not liable for damages caused by minor, trivial, or insignificant defects in property. Even considering the steepness of the sidewalk, the weather conditions, the time of the incident, and the crowded nature of the street, the court found that these factors did not render the misalignment a dangerous condition. The court also found that the city's guidelines and repair notices did not impose a legal duty to repair such minor defects.Miller also argued that the city's repair notices to PG&E and Hip Sen for their violations of the city's Guidelines rendered them liable under a theory of negligence per se. However, the appellate court found this argument to be forfeited as Miller did not raise this issue in the trial court and only presented it for the first time in her appellate reply brief.Therefore, the appellate court concluded that no reasonable trier of fact could find the trivial sidewalk defect posed a substantial risk of injury to a foreseeable pedestrian exercising due care and affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Miller v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co." on Justia Law

In 2017, plaintiff Marcelina Barron sued the Santa Clara County Valley Transportation Authority and bus driver Bruce Arnold Gaillard for general negligence after she was injured in a bus accident. After several delays, the defendants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that it had not been brought to trial within the five-year deadline defined by the Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310. Barron countered that the deadline had been extended by six months due to Emergency rule 10(a), enacted during the COVID-19 pandemic by the Judicial Council of California. The trial court granted the dismissal, interpreting the Ables v. A. Ghazale Brothers, Inc. decision to mean that the emergency rule did not extend the five-year period because it was not a statute. Barron appealed.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the Judicial Council had the authority to enact Emergency rule 10(a), and therefore the time to bring the case to trial was legally extended by six months. The court held that the trial court erred in dismissing Barron's complaint prematurely based on an incorrect interpretation of the five-year statute of limitations in section 583.310 and Emergency rule 10(a). The case was reinstated and remanded for further proceedings. View "Barron v. Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority" on Justia Law

The case concerns a firefighter, Matthew Vann, who was injured when a bus driver, Louis Yu, drove through an active emergency scene and over a fire hose, causing it to break off from a fire engine and strike Vann. Vann sued the City and County of San Francisco and Yu for negligence. The trial court dismissed the case, sustaining the defendants' demurrer without leave to amend. The court ruled that the action was barred by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act, as Vann was receiving workers' compensation benefits for the injuries he sustained in the incident.On appeal, the Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Two affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court rejected Vann's argument that the San Francisco Fire Department (SFFD) and the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (SFMTA), which employed Vann and Yu respectively, were separate legal entities akin to separate businesses within a multi-unit corporate enterprise. The court reasoned that the SFFD and the SFMTA were not independent entities but were merely parts of the same entity, the City and County of San Francisco. Consequently, the City was the employer of both Vann and Yu. Therefore, under the Workers’ Compensation Act, workers' compensation was Vann's exclusive remedy against the City as his employer and against Yu as his coemployee. View "Vann v. City and County of S.F." on Justia Law

Jose Velasquez, as a condition of probation, had entered a residential rehabilitation program sponsored by The Salvation Army and was injured while working in its warehouse. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (the Board) denied Velasquez's claim for workers’ compensation benefits, determining that Velasquez was not employed by either The Salvation Army or the County of Santa Barbara (the County). The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District held that The Salvation Army is statutorily excluded from being an employer for workers’ compensation purposes under section 3301 of the Labor Code, and affirmed the Board’s decision in that respect. However, the Court found that the record was inadequately developed during the administrative proceedings to determine whether the County was Velasquez’s employer. Therefore, the Court annulled the Board’s decision as to the County and remanded the matter for further consideration. View "Velasquez v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

In the Court of Appeal of the State of California Sixth Appellate District, Francisco Gutierrez appealed a judgment granting summary judgment to Uriel Tostado and ProTransport-1, LLC, in a personal injury case. Gutierrez was injured when his vehicle was hit by an ambulance driven by Tostado, an emergency medical technician employed by ProTransport-1, during a patient transport. Nearly two years after the accident, Gutierrez filed a complaint against Tostado and ProTransport-1. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Gutierrez's claims were time-barred under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act's (MICRA) one-year statute of limitations for professional negligence. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, a decision Gutierrez appealed.In considering Gutierrez's appeal, the appellate court held that because Tostado was providing professional medical services at the time of the incident, MICRA's one-year statute of limitations applied, despite Gutierrez not being the recipient of those services. The court reasoned that the act of driving the ambulance was an integral part of the provision of medical care, and it was foreseeable that third parties could be injured during the provision of such care. The court rejected Gutierrez's argument that MICRA only applied where the defendant owed a professional duty to the plaintiff, holding instead that MICRA applied as long as the plaintiff was injured due to negligence in the rendering of professional services, and their injuries were foreseeable. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Gutierrez v. Tostado" on Justia Law

Doe alleged that his ex-girlfriend and her friends, including Ledor, embarked upon a “vengeful smear campaign” to harass and defame him after his senior year of high school. In 2020, Ledor sent emails to Dartmouth College officials, stating essentially that Doe had committed voter fraud to win an election for student body president at Berkeley High School (BHS) and providing links to what she represented to be articles and a podcast about the incident. After receiving the emails, Dartmouth revoked Doe’s offer of admission. Ledor later sent Instagram messages to two of Doe's acquaintances, advising them to “avoid him” because “men like him grow up thinking it’s okay to disrespect women and be violent.”Doe sued for defamation, false light, invasion of privacy, civil harassment, civil stalking, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, with a claim for vicarious liability against Ledor’s parents. The Ledors filed a special motion to strike the complaint as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP, Code Civ. Proc. 425.16). The trial court denied the motion. The court of appeal affirmed. The Ledors did not meet their burden of showing that the statements in the Dartmouth emails involve protected activity under section 425.16(e)(2) or (4), View "Doe v. Ledor" on Justia Law

Firefighters sued Favro, who crashed his car into a firetruck before receiving aid from the firefighters, alleging that Favro was negligent in failing to comply with their directions and thereby caused them to be harmed by another crashing vehicle.The Firefighter’s Rule negates liability "by one whose negligence causes or contributes to the fire which in turn causes the death or injury of the [firefighter].” with exceptions. Civil Code 1714.9(a)(1) provides: “any person is responsible not only for the results of that person’s willful acts causing injury to a" firefighter "also for any injury occasioned to [the firefighter] by the want of ordinary care or skill in the management of the person’s property or person," "Where the conduct causing the injury occurs after the person knows or should have known of the presence of the" firefighter. The court instructed the jury on: “Assumption of Risk/Exception/Occupation Involving Inherent Risk” The Special Verdict Form asked: Did Favro increase the risks to [the firefighers] through conduct occurring after he knew or should have known of the presence of the firefighters?” The presiding juror marked, “No.”The court of appeal ordered a new trial. Favro’s counsel committed misconduct by misrepresenting to the jury the law applicable to these unusual circumstances, stating that Favro could not be held liable unless he had increased the risk to the firefighters “beyond the risk that’s inherent to their job.”. A subsequent admonition failed to cure the error. View "Rattary v. Favro" on Justia Law

Thomas was recruited to play on the women’s soccer team at the University of California, Berkeley (UCB), played on the team during her freshman year and, in the spring of that year, was released from the team. She sued UCB, the team’s head coach (McGuire), and the Director of Athletics (Knowlton), alleging that she turned down a scholarship to another school based on McGuire’s recruitment efforts and that McGuire failed to disclose his “abusive” coaching style and the team’s culture of intimidation and fear. After her federal suit was dismissed, Thomas sued in state court, alleging claims against McGuire and Knowlton for violation of the Unruh Act and negligence; against McGuire for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud; and against UCB under Government Code section 815.2.The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the suit, reinstating only a claim of sexual harassment (Civil Code section 51.9) against McGuire and UCB. Thomas failed to state a negligence claim against McGuire, Knowlton, or UCB. Thomas cites no authority imposing on a university a duty to protect students from harm of a non-physical nature. Nor did Thomas establish a breach of fiduciary duty. The court also rejected claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation. View "Thomas v. The Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

Defendant Que Phung Thi Nguyen allegedly threatened to expose the existence of plaintiff Bruce Tran's child she birthed during his marriage. Between 2010 and 2011, the Trans separated. During their separation, Tran began a romantic relationship with Nguyen; a few weeks into the relationship, Nguyen informed Tran she was pregnant with his child. Shortly thereafter, in June 2011, Tran ended the relationship. According to the complaint filed in this case, Nguyen later “began to blackmail” Tran by demanding that he pay her thousands of dollars, or she would disclose their relationship and the child’s existence to his wife. In this case, the parties disputed whether California had a civil cause of action for extortion. The trial court agreed with defendant Nguyen’s contention plaintiff Bruce Tran’s extortion cause of action could only move forward if it arose out of a threat to initiate a false criminal or civil prosecution—and thus no such cause of action could be based on the facts in this case. The Court of Appeal disagreed: Civil Code sections 1566, 1567, and 1570 established a right to rescission in cases in which a person’s consent to a transaction was obtained by “menace”: threats of confinement, of unlawful violence to the person or his or her property, or of injury to a person’s character. "This is effectively the civil version of extortion." However, because the cause of action which sought rescission sounded in contract, rather than tort, no emotional distress damages were recoverable. Because the civil extortion/rescission cause of action did not give rise to emotional distress damages, the Court found no error in the portion of the court’s order sustaining Nguyen’s demurrer to Tran’s separate cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court consequently reversed the judgment entered against Tran, and remanded the case with directions to allow him leave to amend his cause of action for recovery of the funds he paid to Nguyen as a result of her threats to reveal their affair—and the existence of their child—to his wife. View "Tran v. Nguyen" on Justia Law