Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Stella Grace Yeh (Yeh) attended the University of San Diego. Following a party where Yeh became highly intoxicated, a friend summoned an Uber to take Yeh back to her dorm at the University. That ride was terminated before completion, and the Uber driver, one of the codefendants, Louvensky Geffrard, exited the Interstate and allegedly ordered Yeh out of the car. Subsequently, Yeh initiated a second ride request from Uber, and petitioner Mark Rycz (Petitioner) arrived. Yeh did not enter that car and instead left the area. Half an hour later, an eyewitness observed Yeh walk onto the freeway, where she was struck by two different cars. Petitioner alleged Yeh was several miles away from where Petitioner saw her when she was killed. Plaintiffs and real parties in interest (Plaintiffs) were Josefina McGarry, Yeh’s mother, in her individual capacity; Josefina McGarry in her capacity as a successor in interest to Yeh; and McKenna McGarry Limentani, Yeh’s sister, in her capacity as a successor in interest to Yeh. In April 2021, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Uber Technologies, Inc. (Uber); Geffrard, an Uber driver; and Petitioner, also an Uber driver. The Superior Court denied Petitioner’s motion for change of venue to San Diego County under Code of Civil Procedure section 397 (c) based on the convenience of witnesses and the interests of justice. Petitioner sought a writ of mandate from the Court of Appeal directing the Superior Court to set aside denial of the motion and to grant the motion. Among other things, the Court of Appeal concluded the Superior Court erred: (1) in reasoning the location of the witnesses was unimportant because they could appear remotely under section 367.75, enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic; and (2) in finding Petitioner failed to show venue in San Diego would be more convenient for most witnesses and promote the interests of justice. The Court granted writ relief to require the Superior Court to grant Petitioner’s motion. View "Rycz v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Luis Munoz and LR Munoz Real Estate Holdings, LLC (together, Munoz) bought a hotel from a company owned and managed by Rajesh Patel and his son, Shivam. Before escrow closed, the parties negotiated a leaseback arrangement requiring Munoz to lease the hotel back to the Patels’ company after the sale. Escrow closed and the parties thereafter executed the previously-negotiated lease. However, Munoz contended the Patels secretly swapped out the agreed-upon lease for a lease substantially more beneficial to the Patels and worse for Munoz, and then tricked him into signing it. Munoz filed suit against the Patels, an alleged alter ego entity of the Patels called Inn Lending, LLC, and other defendants involved in the sale, asserting causes of action for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, promissory fraud, and elder financial abuse, among other causes of action. Rajesh and Inn Lending demurred to the operative second amended complaint, the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. In a prior opinion, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment and determined, among other things, that Munoz alleged a viable fraud cause of action based on a theory of fraud in the execution. The California Supreme Court granted review and remanded the case back to the appellate court, ordering a rehearing of the parties arguments for fraud. After reconsideration, the Court of Appeal concluded operative complaint alleged facts sufficient to state a viable cause of action for fraud in the execution against Rajesh, but not against Inn Lending. Additionally, the Court concluded the complaint plead facts sufficient to state an elder financial abuse cause of action against both Rajesh and Inn Lending. The Court concluded Munoz failed to establish that the trial court erred in dismissing his breach of contract and bad faith causes of action. In light of these determinations, the appeals court reversed the trial court judgment and remand the matter with instructions that the trial court vacate its order sustaining the demurrer to the entire complaint, and enter a new order. View "Munoz v. Patel" on Justia Law

Plaintiff fell while walking on a public sidewalk in the City of Redondo Beach. More specifically, Plaintiff's back foot hit a raised sidewalk slab causing her to trip and fall forward to the ground. As a result, Plaintiff fractured her kneecap and elbow. Plaintiff sued the City.The City successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing that any alleged defect was trivial as a matter of law. On Plaintiff's appeal, the Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that under Government Claims Act Sec. 830(a), a public entity is not liable for injuries caused by a condition of the property if the "risk created by the condition was of such a minor, trivial or insignificant nature in view of the surrounding circumstances that no reasonable person would conclude that the condition created a substantial risk of injury."After considering the "type and size" of the defect, the court determined it was trivial as a matter of law. Further, the court did not find any additional factors indicating that the defect was sufficiently dangerous to a reasonable person. Thus, the Second Appellate District found no error in the trial court's ruling. View "Nunez v. City of Redondo Beach" on Justia Law

Appellant, then proceeding pro se, brought an action against Respondent, her brother, alleging he had falsely accused her of committing crimes against him and their elderly parents. Respondent emailed the attorney in this matter (“Attorney”), who was Appellant’s husband since June 2015, her former coworker at his law firm, and later her counsel in this action, warning that if Appellant did not settle the action, Respondent would file a cross-complaint the next day.   The court subsequently dismissed Respondent’s cross-complaint. Appellant retained Attorney to represent her pro bono or at a discounted rate, having been advised by Attorney that he would likely need to testify at trial, and having executed informed written consent to Attorney’s representation notwithstanding his expected dual role as advocate and witness   Two months before trial, Respondent moved to disqualify Attorney as Appellant’s counsel under California’s advocate-witness rule, viz., rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Rule 3.7). The trial court disqualified Attorney from all phases of the litigation.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s disqualification order, holding that the trial court failed to apply the proper legal standards, and thereby abused its discretion, in disqualifying Attorney from representing Appellant under the advocate witness rule. The court explained that the trial court failed to apply Rule 3.7’s informed-consent exception. Indeed, the trial court failed even to cite Rule 3.7, instead applying the ABA Rule, which is not binding and lacks any informed-consent exception. The trial court further abused its discretion in failing to apply Rule 3.7’s limitation to advocacy “in a trial.” View "Lopez v. Lopez" on Justia Law

M & L Financial, Inc. (M&L) took 45 vivid yellow diamonds worth $4 million to Sotheby’s for auction on consignment. M&L told Sotheby’s it was the exclusive owner of the diamonds, but Sotheby’s later released them to a stranger without telling M&L. The diamonds vanished. M&L sued Sotheby’s, which escaped on demurrer.   The Second Appellate District reversed the breach of contract ruling and affirmed the tort ruling, and remanded. The court explained that there was no agreement yet that Sotheby’s definitely would auction the diamonds for M&L, but a potential auction was the point of Sotheby’s involvement. Sotheby’s breached this agreement by giving the diamonds to a stranger without M&L’s permission. This breach cost M&L the value of the lost diamonds.   The court further wrote that as for M&L’s negligence claim, however, the trial court’s ruling was right. The court explained that the economic loss rule governs. “In general, there is no recovery in tort for negligently inflicted ‘purely economic losses,’ meaning financial harm unaccompanied by physical or property damage.” (Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905, 922 (Sheen).) By deferring to the contract between parties, the economic loss rule prevents the law of contract and the law of tort from dissolving one into the other. M&L offers no good reason for departing from the fundamental economic loss rule, which bars its tort claim. View "M & L Financial v. Sotheby's" on Justia Law

The real parties in interest, two truck drivers, were injured in a single-vehicle truck accident. At the time of the accident, the injured drivers were operating a truck manufactured by Defendant. Defendant is a Delaware company that maintained a hub in Fontana, California but did not manufacture or assemble trucks in the state.The injured truck drivers filed product liability, negligence and loss of consortium claims against Defendant. Defendant moved to quash, claiming that California courts lack personal jurisdiction over Defendant because the truck drivers' causes of action did not arise out of or relate to its forum-related activities. The truck drivers responded that Defendant was subject to specific jurisdiction because it had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in California by marketing, selling, and servicing the specific model of truck that was involved in the accident. The trial court denied Defendant's motion to quash and Defendant sought a writ of mandate from the Second Appellate District.The Second Appellate District denied Defendant's petition for writ of mandate, finding 1.) Defendant purposefully availed itself of the benefits of operating in California, 2.) the truck drivers' claims "relate to Defendant's forum contacts, and 3.) the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant comports with fair play and substantial justice. View "Daimler Trucks North America LLC v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

McNeal was exposed to asbestos from several sources. He was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2017. The jury found his asbestos exposure included the use of Old Spice talcum powder on a daily basis, 1958-1980, except for one year while he was in Vietnam. Talc is a naturally occurring mineral with cosmetic uses. Asbestos, a known carcinogen when inhaled, is also a naturally occurring mineral. When talc is mined, it sometimes contains asbestos.A jury awarded McNeal punitive damages. The defendant, the supplier of the talc in Old Spice that contained asbestos fiber, did not contest the finding it was negligent and otherwise responsible for McNeal's harm but argued that the evidence was insufficient to establish that any officer, director, or managing agent acted with the malice, oppression or fraud necessary for an award of punitive damages. The court of appeal agreed and reversed the award of punitive damages. The evidence does not show that defendant’s executives knew there were “probable dangerous consequences” from trace levels of asbestos in its talc, and deliberately did nothing to avoid them. It was not known until 1994 that the contamination of talc with trace amounts of asbestos could cause mesothelioma or other asbestos-related diseases. View "McNeal v. Whittaker, Clark & Daniels" on Justia Law

Joshi was injured while using a sauna at City Sports Club, which is owned by Fitness. Joshi filed a personal injury suit alleging premises liability based upon Fitness’s failure to maintain the sauna in a safe condition. She claimed Fitness failed to guard against or warn against a dangerous condition, specifically an interior light that was burned out; when she entered the sauna and closed the door, she tripped and fell because the area was dark, resulting in her right arm being severely burned after making contact with the sauna heating element.The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of Fitness. Fitness negated a claim for ordinary negligence because Joshi signed a membership agreement containing a release of claims for injuries arising from accidents at the Club and presented evidence that it had no actual or constructive knowledge at the time of the incident that the sauna light bulb was burned out. View "Joshi v. Fitness International, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this defamation case against Defendants based on allegations that Defendants falsely told several reporters that plaintiff had provided explicit nude photographs of one of the Defendants to the National Enquirer. In response, Defendants filed a special motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). To prove his case, Plaintiff provided his own declaration stating that numerous reporters had informed him of Defendants’ accusations against him. The trial court precluded admission of the reporters' statements under hearsay rules. The court then granted judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff appealed.On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Defendants. The reporters' statements involved statements that were not witnessed by Plaintiff. Thus, they were presented by Plaintiff to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Thus, the trial court properly applied the rules against hearsay to exclude the reporters' statements. View "Sanchez v. Bezos" on Justia Law

Plaintiff C. Achay was a student on a high school track team, which usually practiced after school until 5:30 p.m. One day practice ended early, so Achay and her friend walked to Starbucks and returned about 45 minutes later. On the way back to the open campus, they encountered a stranger who Achay thought was “suspicious.” Someone identified him as A. Meer, a former student who was “kind of weird.” Achay retrieved her schoolbooks from the girls’ locker room, which was to be locked at 6:00 p.m. While Achay was walking from the girls’ locker room to the school parking lot she was stabbed by Meer, suffering serious injuries. Achay sued defendant Huntington Beach Union High School District (the District) for negligence. The District moved for summary judgment on the grounds of duty and causation. The trial court granted the motion, finding the District owed Achay no duty of care because at the time of the stabbing, she “was no longer on campus during school hours during a school-related activity.” To this the Court of Appeal disagreed: at the time of the stabbing, Achay was on campus to retrieve her books from an open locker room after her track practice and another sports team was still practicing nearby. “Achay’s brief departure from school is a red herring.” Alternatively, the trial court stated it “cannot assume that more security would have prevented the incident from occurring.” But the Court found that was “plainly a triable issue of material fact: whether the District used reasonable security measures to protect Achay from an arguably preventable injury at the hands of Meer.” Thus, the Court reversed the trial court’s order, which granted the District’s motion for summary judgment. View "Achay v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist." on Justia Law