Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant, a severely disabled child whose congenital abnormalities were undetected during his mother’s pregnancy, sued various medical providers for wrongful life. The California Department of Health Care Services (“DHCS”) asserted a lien on Appellant’s settlement to recover what DHCS paid for his medical care through the state’s Medi-Cal program, and the trial court awarded DHCS the full amount of the lien.   The Second Appellate District reversed, rejecting Appellant’s contentions that DHCS’s lien is preempted by federal law and that there is no substantial evidence that Appellant’s settlement included payments for past medical expenses. However, the court held that the trial court erred by failing to distinguish between past medical expenses and other damages.   The court concluded that the provisions of the Medi-Cal Act permitting DHCS to impose a lien on Appellant’s tort recovery are not preempted by federal law. Further, the court concluded that the trial court did not err by concluding that Appellant’s settlement included past medical expenses. The court reasoned that the Welfare and Institutions Code provides that DHCS “shall have a right to recover . . . the reasonable value of benefits” provided to a MediCal beneficiary, and it further provides that the court, not the Medi-Cal beneficiary, determines what portion of a settlement is fairly allocated to satisfy DHCS’s lien.  However, it does not appear that the trial court determined which portion of Appellant’s settlement was attributable to past medical expenses, thus the court remanded the trial court to apportion the settlement accordingly. View "Daniel C. v. White Memorial Medical Center" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a product liability lawsuit against the manufacturer of a device used in his hip replacement surgery. After a limited retrial of Plaintiff’s personal injury claims, Defendant asserted that the trial court made two categories of evidentiary error and that the jury awarded Plaintiff excessive damages.   The Second Appellate District reversed for a retrial and agreed that the trial court erred in categorically excluding all of Defendant’s proffered medical opinions expressed to less than a reasonable medical probability as to issues on which Plaintiff bore the burden of proof. The court reasoned the error prevented Defendant from presenting any expert testimony as to an issue where expert testimony was essential. Here, Plaintiff acknowledged that he bore the burden of proving that Defendant caused his injuries to a reasonable medical probability. Defendant was entitled to put on a case that Plaintiff failed to satisfy that burden. To accomplish this, Defendant did not need to show it was more likely than not that a cause identified by Defendant resulted in Plaintiff’s injuries. In other words, Defendant did not need to show that a different cause was more likely than not the cause of Plaintiff’s injuries. Further, the court reasoned that the trial court properly admitted Plaintiff’s expert testimony on the subject but erroneously excluded Defendant’s. As a result, Defendant was unable to offer any expert testimony, notwithstanding that it had proffered admissible and material testimony that the jury was entitled to hear. This resulted in a one-sided presentation of evidence. View "Kline v. Zimmer, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, heirs of a nursing home resident who died after wandering off-site and getting hit by a car, filed a lawsuit against the nursing facility, its director, and its manager, alleging negligence, willful misconduct, elder abuse, and wrongful death. The facility demurred to the complaint on the ground that it is barred by the two-year statute of limitations. Plaintiffs argued that the managers and director’s felony convictions revived the statute of limitations under section 340.3. Plaintiffs claimed that because the facility was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the statute of limitations was also revived as to the facility.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s ruling and held that the extended statute of limitations does not apply to the employer of the felon in an action based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Further, the court held that Labor Code section 2802, which allows an employee to be indemnified by his or her employer, does not apply to third parties. The court reasoned that Plaintiffs’ reliance on the Victims’ Bill of Rights embodied in Article I, Section 28 of the California Constitution is misplaced. Under that section, victims have the right to seek restitution “from the persons convicted of the crimes causing the losses they suffer.”  Further, the court reasoned that Labor Code section 2802 allows an employee to be indemnified by his or her employer. It does “not provide access to the employer’s or its insurer’s pocketbook through a third-party suit against the employee.” View "Cardenas v. Horizon Senior Living" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Nshan Simonyan had a dispute with his insurer, Nationwide Insurance Company of America ("Nationwide") over the company's handling of his defense arising out of a three-car accident in which Simonyan was a driver. Simonyan asked Nationwide to appoint, as "Cumis" counsel, a law firm that he had already hired to advance his affirmative claim against the driver who hit him. Nationwide refused. Simonyan appealed the dismissal of his case after the trial court sustained Nationwide’s demurrer to his second amended complaint without leave to amend. Simonyan argued his allegations were sufficient to state claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to reconsider based on new allegations. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Simonyan v. Nationwide Ins. Co. of America" on Justia Law

A cryogenic storage tank, manufactured by Chart and used by PFC, a San Francisco fertility clinic, to store patients’ reproductive material, experienced a failure. A putative class action was filed in federal court against four defendants. Claims against Chart proceeded in federal court; claims against other defendants proceeded in arbitration. Claimants not involved in the federal litigation filed subsequently-coordinated suits in California state courts against the four defendants. Arbitration was compelled for about 260 claims against PFC but not the other defendants. After 18 months of negotiations and discovery, three defendants reached an agreement to resolve the claims against them in all proceedings. The trial court entered a good faith settlement determination, dismissing with prejudice “[a]ll existing cross-complaints” for equitable indemnity or contribution against the settling defendants.Chart, the non-settling defendant, unsuccessfully challenged the good faith settlement determination in a mandamus proceeding, then filed an appeal. The court of appeal dismissed the appeal, noting a split among the divisions. When one tortfeasor defendant intends to settle a case before it is resolved against all defendants, the tortfeasor may petition the court for a determination that the settlement was made in good faith. (Code Civ. Proc. 877.6.) so that the other defendants are barred from obtaining contribution or indemnification from the settling tortfeasor based on the parties’ comparative negligence or fault. The court’s good faith determination is reviewable only by a timely petition for writ of mandate. View "Pacific Fertility Cases" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a personal injury lawsuit against a Hilton hotel after she was allegedly hit by a shuttle operated by Hilton. Although Hilton denied liability, mid-trial the parties settled for $85,000. The trial court confirmed Plaintiff's desire to accept the agreement on the record. Through different counsel, Plaintiff later filed a motion to rescind the settlement agreement, claiming counsel forced her to accept the agreement. According to Plaintiff, counsel stated that if she did not accept the settlement "he would not be coming back to trial tomorrow."The trial court denied Plaintiff's motion and the Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Hilton was not involved in any potential duress, but was unaware of counsel's refusal to resume proceedings if Plaintiff did not accept the agreement. The court explained the contract was not voidable because Hilton acted in good faith and lacked knowledge of any potential duress. View "Fettig v. Hilton Garden Inns Management LLC" on Justia Law

Daniel Schafer, a teacher at a high school in the Anderson Union High School District (District), had a sexual relationship on school premises with one of his students, plaintiff Jane Doe. Doe sued the District, principal Carol Germano, and superintendent Tim Azevedo for negligent hiring and negligent supervision. The trial court granted the District’s motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of the District, finding that there was no evidence the District knew or should have known that Schafer posed a risk of harm to students. On appeal, Doe contended the trial court erred by granting summary judgment because the District had a duty to supervise and monitor Schafer and Doe, and whether the District breached its duty to Doe was a question of fact for the jury to decide. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that on the trial court record, the District did not have a duty to review alarm data and video recordings in order to constantly monitor all teachers, students, and campus visitors, nor did it have such a duty specifically with regard to Schafer and Doe. View "Doe v. Anderson Union High School Dist." on Justia Law

Appellant Dameron Hospital Association (Dameron) required patients or their family members sign Conditions of Admissions (COAs) when Dameron provides the patients’ medical care. The COAs at issue here contained language assigning to Dameron direct payment of uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM) benefits and medical payment (MP) benefits that would otherwise be payable to those patients under their automobile insurance policies. Dameron treated five of AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah Insurance Exchange’s (CSAA) insureds for injuries following automobile accidents. Those patients had UM and/or MP coverage as part of their CSAA coverage, and Dameron sought to collect payment for those services from the patients’ UM and/or MP benefits at Dameron’s full rates. Instead of paying to Dameron the lesser of either all benefits due to the patients under their UM and MP coverage, or Dameron’s full charges, CSAA paid portions of those benefits directly to the patients which left balances owing on some of Dameron’s bills. Dameron sued CSAA to collect UM and MP benefits it contended CSAA owed Dameron under the assignments contained in the COAs. The trial court concluded that Dameron could not enforce any of the assignments contained in the COAs and entered summary judgment in CSAA’s favor. After its review, the Court of Appeal held Dameron could not collect payment for emergency services from the UM or MP benefits due to patients that were covered under health insurance policies. Additionally, the Court found: (1) the COA forms were contracts of adhesion; (2) it was not within the reasonable possible expectations of patients that a hospital would collect payments for emergency care directly out of their UM benefits; and (3) a trier of fact might find it is within the reasonable expectations of patients that a hospital would collect payments for emergency care directly out of their MP benefits. Accordingly, the Court concluded Dameron could not maintain causes of action to collect MP or UM benefits due to four of the five patients directly from CSAA. However, consistent with its opinion, the trial court could consider whether an enforceable assignment of MP benefits was made by one adult patient. View "Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern Cal., Nevada etc." on Justia Law

Petitioner State of California (the “State”) is a defendant in an action in which Plaintiffs sought damages for wrongful death and personal injuries suffered in an automobile collision. The superior court ordered the State to produce unredacted accident reports revealing identifying information of the parties and witnesses involved in accidents that occurred in the same area.   The Second Appellate Division denied the State’s petition for a writ of mandate and required the State to reveal the information the Plaintiffs/real parties in interest seek. Petitioner argued the superior court abused its discretion when it ruled that personally identifiable information was not protected under section 20014 of the Vehicle Code. Plaintiffs contended that under section 20012 they have a proper interest in the disclosure of unredacted police reports. The court reasoned that Plaintiffs have shown the accidents are similar in nature and the evidence of the reported accidents “either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Thus, this evidence illustrated that Plaintiffs are persons with a “proper interest” in obtaining the unredacted accident reports they seek. View "State of Cal. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

While shopping at the Carmel Mountain Ranch location of Costco in San Diego, plaintiff Lilyan Hassaine slipped and fell on a slippery substance that she believed was liquid soap. Claiming serious injuries from the fall, she sued Costco and Club Demonstration Services (CDS), an independent contractor that operated food sample tables within the store. The trial court granted a motion for summary judgment filed by CDS, concluding that the company owed Hassaine no duty of care. In the court’s view, it was dispositive that CDS’s contract with Costco limited its maintenance obligations to a 12-foot perimeter around each sample table, and that Hassaine’s fall occurred outside that boundary. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding the trial court erred in concluding CDS’s contract with Costco delineated the scope of its duty of care to business invitees under general principles of tort law. Businesses have a common law duty of ordinary care to their customers that extends to every area of the store in which they are likely to shop. "While the CDS-Costco agreement may allocate responsibility and liability as a matter of contract between those parties, it does not limit the scope of CDS’s common law duty to customers. ... Breach and causation present triable factual issues here, precluding summary judgment on those grounds." View "Hassaine v. Club Demonstration Services, Inc." on Justia Law