Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Joshi was injured while using a sauna at City Sports Club, which is owned by Fitness. Joshi filed a personal injury suit alleging premises liability based upon Fitness’s failure to maintain the sauna in a safe condition. She claimed Fitness failed to guard against or warn against a dangerous condition, specifically an interior light that was burned out; when she entered the sauna and closed the door, she tripped and fell because the area was dark, resulting in her right arm being severely burned after making contact with the sauna heating element.The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of Fitness. Fitness negated a claim for ordinary negligence because Joshi signed a membership agreement containing a release of claims for injuries arising from accidents at the Club and presented evidence that it had no actual or constructive knowledge at the time of the incident that the sauna light bulb was burned out. View "Joshi v. Fitness International, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this defamation case against Defendants based on allegations that Defendants falsely told several reporters that plaintiff had provided explicit nude photographs of one of the Defendants to the National Enquirer. In response, Defendants filed a special motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute). To prove his case, Plaintiff provided his own declaration stating that numerous reporters had informed him of Defendants’ accusations against him. The trial court precluded admission of the reporters' statements under hearsay rules. The court then granted judgment in favor of Defendants. Plaintiff appealed.On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of Defendants. The reporters' statements involved statements that were not witnessed by Plaintiff. Thus, they were presented by Plaintiff to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Thus, the trial court properly applied the rules against hearsay to exclude the reporters' statements. View "Sanchez v. Bezos" on Justia Law

Plaintiff C. Achay was a student on a high school track team, which usually practiced after school until 5:30 p.m. One day practice ended early, so Achay and her friend walked to Starbucks and returned about 45 minutes later. On the way back to the open campus, they encountered a stranger who Achay thought was “suspicious.” Someone identified him as A. Meer, a former student who was “kind of weird.” Achay retrieved her schoolbooks from the girls’ locker room, which was to be locked at 6:00 p.m. While Achay was walking from the girls’ locker room to the school parking lot she was stabbed by Meer, suffering serious injuries. Achay sued defendant Huntington Beach Union High School District (the District) for negligence. The District moved for summary judgment on the grounds of duty and causation. The trial court granted the motion, finding the District owed Achay no duty of care because at the time of the stabbing, she “was no longer on campus during school hours during a school-related activity.” To this the Court of Appeal disagreed: at the time of the stabbing, Achay was on campus to retrieve her books from an open locker room after her track practice and another sports team was still practicing nearby. “Achay’s brief departure from school is a red herring.” Alternatively, the trial court stated it “cannot assume that more security would have prevented the incident from occurring.” But the Court found that was “plainly a triable issue of material fact: whether the District used reasonable security measures to protect Achay from an arguably preventable injury at the hands of Meer.” Thus, the Court reversed the trial court’s order, which granted the District’s motion for summary judgment. View "Achay v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist." on Justia Law

Southwest Airlines passenger Ilczyszyn suffered a massive pulmonary embolism while locked inside an airplane lavatory during the final stages of a flight from Oakland to Orange County. Rather than treating Ilczyszyn’s circumstances as a medical emergency, the flight crew perceived him to be a security threat; he did not receive medical care until after the flight had landed and the other passengers had disembarked. By then, he had gone into cardiac arrest. Although he was resuscitated, he later died in a hospital.A jury found that Southwest was negligent but found against the plaintiffs on the issue of causation. The court of appeal affirmed. The trial court properly found that Southwest was immune from liability under both 49 U.S.C. 44941 (Aviation and Transportation Security Act), and Civil Code section 47(b) for any act or omission occurring after the flight crew decided to treat Ilczyszyn’s medical emergency as a security threat. The court rejected arguments that these statutory immunities apply only to the actual disclosure of a security threat, not to conduct associated with such disclosures, and that the immunity is inapplicable here because the gravamen of their case was based solely on the flight crew’s negligent failure to identify the medical emergency. View "Ilczyszyn v. Southwest Airlines Co." on Justia Law

Ryan Lawhon alleged he was severely injured when an 18650 lithium-ion battery he bought from a San Diego vape shop suddenly exploded in his pants pocket. In addition to the vape shop and vape distributor, he sued LG Chem Ltd. (LG Chem), the South Korean manufacturer of lithium-ion batteries for negligence and product liability. The trial court denied LG Chem’s motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding the court’s exercise of specific jurisdiction over LG Chem comported with federal due process. LG Chem petitioned the California Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to quash. The Court issued the writ: LG Chem sold 18650 batteries as industrial component products to original equipment manufacturers and battery packers who sell to original equipment manufacturers. It did not design, manufacture, distribute, advertise or sell the batteries for sale to or use by individual consumers as standalone, replaceable batteries. It had no connection to the vape shop or the vape distributor responsible for selling the defective battery that injured Lawhon. Its activities in California consisted of sales of 18650 batteries to three California companies in the electric vehicle industry for use in electric vehicles. The question presented was whether Lawhon’s personal injury claims arose from or related to those sales, to which the Court concluded they did not. Thus, the Court granted the petition and directed the trial court to vacate its order denying the motion to quash, and to enter a new order granting the motion. View "LG Chem, Ltd. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from a judgment of the superior court in their lawsuit against Southern California Edison Company (SCE) following summary judgment in SCE’s favor. Plaintiffs previously lived on a property on Knob Hill Avenue in Redondo Beach (Plaintiffs’ former home), which is located a few doors away from one of SCE’s electricity substations, the Topaz substation. Plaintiffs’ lawsuit alleged that electricity from the substation caused them to experience shocks at various places on their property, and sought recovery primarily for the emotional distress they suffered as a result.   On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the court (1) excluded evidence that would have created a triable issue of fact as to causation; (2) applied the wrong legal standard for causation; and (3) erred in concluding the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor did not establish causation.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the judgment of the superior court. The court held that that, under the applicable substantial factor causation standard, the evidence presented on summary judgment established Plaintiffs could not prove causation in fact. The court further concluded that the court correctly rejected res ipsa loquitor as a means of establishing causation in this case. The court wrote it need not decide whether the court erred in excluding the evidence Plaintiffs identify because even considering that evidence, the record does not create a triable issue of fact as to whether stray voltage from the Topaz substation caused Plaintiffs’ claimed shocks. Specifically, SCE offered evidence that stray voltage shocks require certain conditions and that those conditions did not exist at the Plaintiffs’ former home. View "Barber v. Southern Cal. Edison Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s guardian ad litem filed suit against Defendants for damages resulting from personal injuries suffered by Plaintiff in connection with a bicycle accident that occurred at Defendants’ residence when Plaintiff was six years old. The jury determined, by special verdict, that Defendant was not negligent. Judgment was entered in favor of Defendant.   Plaintiff challenged the trial court’s rulings on three motions in limine. The first motion in limine sought permission for Plaintiff’s counsel to give a brief opening statement prior to voir dire questioning. The remaining two motions sought to exclude testimony from two witnesses. Plaintiff also challenged the court’s denial of his motion for a new trial.   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment denying Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial.  Ultimately, the court held that Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial was grounded upon the same arguments he made on appeal. The court reasoned that a trial judge is accorded wide discretion in ruling on a motion for a new trial and the exercise of this discretion is given great deference on appeal. Here, Defendant acknowledges he did not file an opposition to Plaintiff’s motion for a new trial. Plaintiff contends that, as a result, Defendant has now waived all opposition to the legal errors and abuse of judicial discretion Plaintiff raised in his Motion for New Trial, as well as on appeal. However, neither authority Plaintiff cites stands for the proposition that the failure to oppose a motion for a new trial operates to waive any argument on appeal that the judgment should be affirmed. View "D.D. v. Pitcher" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seven adults who claimed they were molested by a priest when they were children, brought suit against The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles and related parties ("Defendants"). The Plaintiffs' claims were that the Defendants ratified the assaults and acted negligently in failing to supervise the priest who committed the assaults.In response, Defendants moved to strike the complaint, claiming that some of the acts that allegedly ratified the priest's conduct, as well as those serving as the basis for the allegations of negligence, constituted speech and litigation conduct that was protected under California's anti-SLAPP law (Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16). The district court rejected Defendants' anti-SLAPP motion.The Second Appellate District affirmed. As to the ratification claims, the court held that Defendants mischaracterized Plaintifffs' complaint, "cherry-picking allegations of litigation conduct, and, without support, suggesting that they are the only allegations incorporated by reference into the sexual abuse cause of action."As to the negligence claims, Defendants too narrowly construed Plaintiffs' complaint, focusing only on what Defendants claim was protected speech. Any allegations in Plaintiffs' complaint that may have been "conclusory" when taken out of context, were supported by factual allegations earlier in the complaint. View "Ratcliff v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of L.A." on Justia Law

Appellants alleged that Respondents, Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Insurance Company (Berkshire), Cypress Insurance Company (Cypress), Zenith Insurance Company (Zenith), and others conspired to “hack” a third-party computer system. At the direction of the insurance-company Respondents, allegedly copied thousands of electronic litigation files, which had been uploaded to the system by workers’ compensation and personal injury attorneys and their clients (including Appellants), and transmitted the copies to insurers and insurance defense law firms. Appellants first sued respondents in federal district court on various causes of action, including invasion of privacy.   The Second Appellate District, affirmed and agreed with the trial court that Appellants failed to state a claim. The court concluded that Appellants failed to allege any actionable injury because: (1) they did not allege damage or disruption to the computer system, as required by Intel; and (2) they did not allege injury to the copied files or their asserted property interests therein. The trial court properly sustained Respondents’ demurrers to Appellants’ trespass-to-chattels claim, because Appellants failed to allege any actionable injury to a property interest, whether in the HQSU system or in the files copied from it. In response to Appellants’ unfounded warnings that affirmance will leave future victims of hacking without any effective remedy. Having abandoned a privacy claim during their federal litigation, Appellants effectively attempted, both in the trial court and on appeal, to repackage an alleged invasion of privacy as a trespass to chattels. Because Appellants failed to plead facts satisfying the latter tort’s element of injury to a property interest, the trial court properly sustained respondents’ demurrers. View "Casillas v. Berkshire Hathaway Homestate Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of dismissal entered as to Defendants State of California, acting by and through the California Highway Patrol (CHP), and CHP Sergeant (together, the CHP defendants), after the trial court sustained without leave to amend the CHP defendants’ demurrers to the Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint. Plaintiffs asserted on behalf of their deceased son claims for negligence and wrongful death after CHP Sergeant’s patrol car struck and killed Plaintiffs’ son while Langford was responding to an emergency call concerning an altercation on the freeway. The trial court found the claims against the CHP defendants were barred by investigative immunity conferred under California Government Code section 821.6 (section 821.6).The Second Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s sustaining the Sergeant’s demurrer based on Plaintiffs’ concession at oral argument that the Sergeant is entitled to immunity as an emergency responder under California Vehicle Code section 17004. However, because California Vehicle Code section 17001 provides an independent statutory basis for CHP’s liability based on the Sergeant’s alleged negligence, the court did not reach the scope and application of section 821.6 immunity, and the court reversed the judgment as to CHP and remand for further proceedings. View "Silva v. Langford" on Justia Law