Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Isaak, an 84-year-old retired farmer, was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease in 2020 and suffers physical and mental impairments. He is wheelchair-bound and receiving palliative care. Several parties have sued the manufacturers of Paraquat alleging that the pesticide caused their Parkinson’s disease and successfully petitioned the Judicial Council to form a Judicial Council Coordination Proceeding (JCCP) in 2019. By March 2021, discovery was underway in the JCCP.Isaak filed a products liability lawsuit in May 2021. The case was coordinated with the JCCP. Isaak sought trial preference under Code of Civil Procedure section 36; a party to a civil action is entitled to trial preference where the person is over 70 years of age and the court finds that the party has a substantial interest in the action as a whole and that the party’s health is such that preference is necessary to prevent prejudicing the party’s interest in the litigation. Defendants argued that the law governing coordinated proceedings conflicted with, and took precedence over, section 36. The trial court denied Isaak’s motion but approved a special procedure for seeking preference that it found would balance the interests of parties for whom a preference might be warranted with the need to streamline coordinated proceedings. The court of appeal upheld the ruling. Section 36 does not supersede California Rules of Court, 3.504, which governs coordinated proceedings. View "Isaak v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2018, plaintiff-appellant Monica Mayes was struck in the face by a foul ball while attending an intercollegiate baseball game between two private universities, Marymount University (Marymount) and defendant-respondent La Sierra University (La Sierra). Mayes suffered skull fractures and brain damage, among other injuries. When struck by the foul ball, Mayes was seated in a grassy area along the third-base line, behind the dugout, which extended eight feet above the ground, and there was no protective netting above the dugout. Mayes sued La Sierra for her injuries, alleging a single cause of action for negligence for its failure to: (1) install protective netting over the dugouts; (2) provide a sufficient number of screened seats for spectators; (3) warn spectators that the only available screened seats were in the area behind home plate; and (4) exercise crowd control in order to remove distractions in the area along the third-base line that diverted spectators’ attention from the playing field. La Sierra moved for summary judgment, claiming that the primary assumption of risk doctrine barred Mayes’s negligence claim. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, observing that the case was “a textbook primary assumption of the risk case.” To this, the Court of Appeal reversed, finding La Sierra did not meet its burden of showing that the primary assumption of risk doctrine barred Mayes’s negligence claim. In addition, Mayes showed there were triable issues of material fact concerning whether La Sierra was negligent for the reasons she alleged in her complaint. View "Mayes v. La Sierra Univ." on Justia Law

California law sets up a presumptive safe harbor for notaries if, as pertinent here, the notary is presented with a driver's license issued by the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) that is current or issued within the preceding five years, and if there is an absence of information, evidence, or other circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to believe that the person appearing before the notary is not the individual he or she claims to be. This appeal requires the Court of Appeal to define the scope of this statutory safe harbor.In the published portion of the opinion, the court ultimately concluded that the safe harbor (1) applies when a notary relies upon a driver's license that looks like one the DMV would issue (and thus does not require a notary to verify with the DMV that the driver's license is, in fact, a legitimately issued license), (2) applies even if an expert opines that industry custom requires a notary to do more than the statutory safe harbor requires, and (3) is not overcome by the simple fact that the person who appeared before the notary was an imposter. Therefore, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment on negligence-based claims against the two notaries in this case as well as the surety that insured them. View "North American Title Co. v. Gugasyan" on Justia Law

Scott filed suit in Alameda County Superior Court, alleging that Scott was involved in three separate automobile accidents in 2017 and could not determine which accident caused her injuries: a San Mateo County accident involving Jobs, an Alameda County accident involving Forni, and a Contra Costa County accident, involving Aquino, who was working for Pacific Auto. None of the defendants resided in Alameda County. The defendants filed answers and cross-complaints. Jobs, Aquino, and Pacific alleged an affirmative defense of improper venue. Scott settled with the Forni defendants. The court issued a good faith settlement determination and dismissed the Forni defendants.The remaining defendants unsuccessfully moved to transfer venue to Santa Clara County, where Aquino and Pacific reside (Code of Civil Procedure 397). The court found they had waived their challenge. The court of appeal denied their petition for relief. The superior court clerk’s service of a document containing both the order denying the motion to change venue and a declaration of service satisfied the requirements for written notice under section 1013a, thereby commencing the period for filing the petition under section 400. Petitioners’ failure to file their petition by the end of that period rendered their petition untimely, whether or not the real party in interest should have also given notice of the order under section 1019.5. View "Aquino v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Matilde Ek (Mrs. Ek), Karla Ek-Elhadidy, Lucila del Carmen Ek, and Maria Ek-Ewell, filed suit alleging that defendants' employee, Mrs. Ek, contracted COVID-19 at work because of defendants' failure to implement adequate safety measures. Plaintiffs claimed that Arturo Ek subsequently caught the disease from Mrs. Ek while she convalesced at home and subsequently died from the disease a month later. Defendants filed a demurrer asserting that plaintiffs' claims are preempted by the exclusivity provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA).The Court of Appeal denied the petition for writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate an order overruling defendants' demurrer to a wrongful death action. Assuming arguendo that Mrs. Ek's workplace infection constitutes an injury for purposes of the WCA, the court rejected defendants' efforts to apply the derivative injury doctrine to any injury causally linked to an employee injury. The court explained that defendants' interpretation is inconsistent with the language of Snyder v. Michael's Stores, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 991, 1000, which establishes that the fact an employee's injury is the biological cause of a nonemployee's injury does not thereby make the nonemployee's claim derivative of the employee's injury. Furthermore, Snyder's discussion of prior case law applying the derivative injury doctrine does not support applying the doctrine based solely on causation. View "See's Candies, Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Civil Code section 3333.2, known as the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA), limits noneconomic damages to $250,000 based on professional negligence. The Court of Appeal held that this limitation does not apply to plaintiffs' causes of action under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act. In this case, plaintiffs, former patients at an acute psychiatric hospital, suffered sexual abuse by a hospital employee. The jury subsequently found in plaintiffs' favor and awarded substantial noneconomic damages against both defendants, as well as punitive damages against the management company.The court affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs' cause of action based on professional negligence may be barred by the statute of limitations, but their cause of action for elder abuse is not. The court also concluded that clear and convincing evidence supports the finding that defendants were reckless in their failure to protect plaintiffs from elder abuse. The court rejected defendants' challenges to the jury instructions. Finally, the court concluded that the damages are not excessive; the jury correctly attributed 70 percent of the fault to defendants; and the punitive damages were supported by clear and convincing evidence of malice or oppression.In regard to plaintiffs' appeal, the court concluded that it need not make a determination of liability under the respondeat superior doctrine where the court could uphold liability under the Elder Abuse Act. The court explained that plaintiffs have suffered the same harm whether the theory of recovery is breach of the Elder Abuse Act or respondeat superior. Finally, plaintiffs' ratification count has the same limitation as their respondeat superior count. View "Samantha B. v. Aurora Vista Del Mar, LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of the tragic rape and murder of Rachel Russell, perpetrated by her grandson, Sidney DeAvila. DeAvila suffered from severe mental illness, and at the time of the murder he was on parole. Russell’s son, plaintiff Steven Russell, brought an action against the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Department), alleging the Department’s parole agents had a special relationship with Russell, and they failed to warn her of DeAvila’s dangerous propensities. A jury agreed, and ultimately awarded plaintiff $4.5 million in noneconomic damages, which the trial court reduced to $2.7 million. The Department appealed, arguing it had no duty to warn Russell of DeAvila’s dangerous propensities and, even if it did have a duty to warn, it was immune from that liability. Plaintiff claimed on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in reducing the judgment and imposing sanctions against trial counsel. The Court of Appeal was "compelled to agree" with the Department, that because the facts presented were not sufficient to establish that there was a special relationship between the agents and Russell, no duty to warn arose. Accordingly, judgment was reversed. View "Russell v. Dept. of Corrections and Rehabilitation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the school district for negligence and for breach of the mandatory duty to report suspected abuse under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (CANRA). The trial court granted the school district's motion for summary judgment.The Court of Appeal concluded, consistent with California negligence law, that school administrators have a duty to protect students from sexual abuse by school employees, even if the school does not have actual knowledge of a particular employee's history of committing, or propensity to commit, such abuse. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's negligence causes of action.The court also concluded that, as a matter of first impression, a plaintiff bringing a cause of action for breach of the mandatory duty to report suspected abuse under CANRA must prove it was objectively reasonable for a mandated reporter to suspect abuse based on the facts the reporter actually knew, not based on facts the reporter reasonably should have discovered. In this case, plaintiff did not create a triable issue of material fact regarding whether any of the school district's employees knew of facts from which a reasonable person in a like position could suspect abuse. Therefore, the court affirmed the trial court's order granting summary adjudication on plaintiff's CANRA cause of action. View "Doe v. Lawndale Elementary School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants, Paula and Christopher LeRoy lost their 15-year-old son, Kennedy LeRoy, to suicide two days after finishing his sophomore year at Ayala High School in Chino. The LeRoys sued the Chino Valley Unified School District, Ayala’s principal, Diana Yarboi, and its assistant principal, Carlo Purther (collectively, Respondents). The LeRoys alleged Respondents were liable for Kennedy’s suicide because of their inadequate response to his complaints of bullying by his classmates. The trial court granted summary judgment for Respondents, and the LeRoys timely appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Respondents were statutorily immune from liability and therefore affirmed the judgment. View "Leroy v. Yarboi" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, plaintiffs Michael and Crystal Haytasingh appealed a judgment entered in favor of the City of San Diego and Ashley Marino, a City lifeguard. Plaintiffs sued the City after an incident at Mission Beach in 2013: Michael was surfing and defendant Marino was operating a City-owned personal watercraft. Although the parties offered different versions of what occurred that day, the plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that Marino was operating her personal watercraft parallel to Haytasingh, inside the surf line, when she made an abrupt left turn in front of him. In order to avoid an imminent collision with Marino, Haytasingh dove off of his surfboard and struck his head on the ocean floor. Haytasingh suffered serious injuries, including a neck fracture. Plaintiffs alleged that Marino was negligent in her operation of the personal watercraft. Prior to trial, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment of plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action, determining that Government Code section 831.7 provided complete immunity to the defendants on plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action. After the trial court granted summary adjudication as to plaintiffs’ claim of ordinary negligence, plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege they were entitled to relief pursuant to two statutory exceptions to the statutory immunity provided for in section 831.7: (1) that Marino’s conduct constituted an “act of gross negligence” that was “the proximate cause of injury;” and (2) that the City failed to “guard or warn of a known dangerous condition or of another hazardous recreational activity known to the public entity…that is not reasonable assumed by the participant as inherently a part of the hazardous recreational activity out of which the damage or injury arose.” A jury ultimately found in favor of defendants. While the Court of Appeal determined the trial court did not err in finding section 831.7 provided defendants with complete immunity with respect to plaintiffs’ ordinary negligence claim, the trial court did err, however, in determining that Harbors and Navigation Code section 655.2’s five mile per hour speed limit did not apply to City lifeguards, and in instructing the jury that all employees of governmental agencies acting within their official capacities were exempt from the City’s five mile per hour speed limit for water vessels that are within 1,000 feet of a beach under San Diego Municipal Code section 63.20.15. The Court concluded this error was prejudicial. Judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Haytasingh v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law