Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

After years of spraying Roundup herbicide on their property, Pilliod and her husband, Pilliod, each developed non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma. The Pilliods sued Monsanto, Roundup’s manufacturer, alleging design defect and failure to warn. After a six-week trial, the jury awarded Alberta over $37 million in compensatory damages, awarded Alva over $18 million in compensatory damages, and awarded each of them $1 billion in punitive damages. The trial court conditionally denied Monsanto’s motion for new trial, contingent on the Pilliods’ acceptance of substantially reduced compensatory and punitive damages, resulting in a total award to Alberta of about $56 million (including about $45 million in punitive damages) and a total award to Alva of about $31 million (including about $25 million in punitive damages). The Pilliods accepted the reductions.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Monsanto’s arguments that the claims were preempted by federal law, the jury’s liability findings are not supported by substantial evidence, the jury was improperly instructed as to the Pilliods’ design defect claim, the jury’s causation findings are legally and factually flawed, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence, the verdict is the product of attorney misconduct, the punitive damages awards should be stricken or further reduced because they are unsupported by evidence and constitutionally excessive. View "Pilliod v. Monsanto Co." on Justia Law

In February 2018, Blake McKenna filed a form complaint against Lance Beesley and Smoothreads, Inc. (Smoothreads). McKenna alleged that on August 4, 2017, he was a pedestrian lawfully crossing the street when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Ann Rogers. McKenna alleged that Rogers’s vehicle struck him due to the negligence of “Doe 1,” (i.e., Ronald Wells) who had “negligently [run] a red light.” Specifically, McKenna alleged that Wells negligently drove his vehicle through a red light, striking Rogers’s vehicle; Rogers’s vehicle in turn struck McKenna. McKenna alleged that he suffered severe bodily injuries as a result of the accident. McKenna also alleged that Wells was driving a vehicle owned by Beesley and Smoothreads. McKenna contended Beesley and Smoothreads knew or should have known that, due to Wells’s past driving experience and/or lack of driving experience, Wells was a negligent driver who created a risk of harm to persons and property and that Beesley and Smoothreads nevertheless knowingly entrusted Wells with the use of the vehicle involved in the accident. The Court of Appeal concluded that a jury may find that an owner who breaches its Vehicle Code section 14604 duty and permits an unlicensed driver to drive the owner’s vehicle had constructive knowledge of the driver’s incompetence to drive. Under the circumstances of this case, the Court held a jury may find that the hirer has constructive knowledge of the hiree's incompetence to drive. The February 28, 2020 judgment in favor of Smoothreads and the September 6, 2019 order granting Smoothreads’s motion for summary judgement were reversed. The October 30, 2019 judgment in favor of Beesley and the September 6, 2019 order granting Beesley’s motion for summary judgment were also reversed. View "McKenna v. Beesley" on Justia Law

Harris was diagnosed with mesothelioma in 2014 and filed suit, alleging negligence and strict liability. Harris died weeks later. The claims arose out of Harris’s alleged exposure to asbestos while he served in the U.S. Navy, during repairs aboard the U.S.S. San Jose in 1973. Harris was a hull maintenance technician. Dee is a contractor that works with “refractory brick, mortar and castable cement situated on the inside of boilers.” Dee performed boiler repairs aboard the U.S.S. San Jose during 1973 and had to “ ‘tear out’ ” existing insulation and refractory material.Dee Engineering moved for summary judgment, alleging that the plaintiffs were unable to establish that Harris was exposed to asbestos by an act or omission of Dee. Ewing, a certified industrial hygienist, was Plaintiffs’ expert witness and opined that Harris “did not need to be present at the exact time that the insulation block was being removed, swept up, and/or installed" to be exposed because asbestos fibers can remain suspended for up to 80 hours before settling and are subject to re-entrainment.The trial court granted Dee summary judgment, stating that Harris was not in the ship's boiler room, while Dee performed its work, or at any specific time shortly after such work, The court rejected Ewing’s opinion about suspension and re-entrainment as “a new, previously not disclosed opinion that is contradicted by his deposition testimony.” The court of appeal reversed. The trial court erred in its evaluation of Ewing’s declaration; there is a triable issue whether Dee’s refractory work exposed Harris to asbestos. View "Harris v. Thomas Dee Engineering Co., Inc." on Justia Law

In May 2019, Andy Kim filed a lawsuit against law firm Metsch & Mason, LLP, its partners Paul Metsch and Michael Mason (collectively, the law firm defendants), and their clients R Consulting & Sales, Inc. (R Consulting), Raquel Michel, and Lance Ricotta for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In his suit, Kim alleged the defendants wrongfully initiated contempt charges in connection with their enforcement of a civil judgment against him in R Consulting v. Info Tech et al. (Super. Ct. San Diego County, 2015, No. 37- 2015-00002561-CU-BC-CTL.) The defendants filed motions to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute, and the court granted the motions and entered judgments against Kim. Kim appealed the court’s grant of the anti-SLAPP motions, contending: (1) an order to show cause regarding contempt can form the basis of a malicious prosecution action; (2) the trial court erred in concluding that Kim could not show a probability of success on his malicious prosecution claim because it applied an incorrect standard to determine whether the defendants had probable cause to seek contempt; and (3) the defendants acted maliciously by continuing to prosecute the contempt action following the Court of Appeal’s decision in R Consulting & Sales, Inc. v. Info Tech Corporation et al. (Jan. 18, 2019, D072492) [nonpub. opn.]. The Court of Appeal concluded the defendants’ motion for an order to show cause (OSC) re contempt did not form a basis for a malicious prosecution action here, preventing Kim from demonstrating a probability of success on the merits; the Court thus affirmed the judgments in favor of the law firm defendants, R Consulting, and Michel on that basis. Because the Court concluded an OSC re contempt did not form a basis for a malicious prosecution action, the Court did not reach Kim’s arguments that the court applied an incorrect standard in reaching its decision or that defendants acted maliciously in pursuing contempt. Further, because Kim failed to provide a complete record on appeal, even if the Court reached the second and third issues, it would be unable to fully evaluate the judgment in favor of R Consulting and Michel, and we would affirm that order and judgment on that basis. Kim did not file a notice of appeal regarding the order or judgment in favor of Ricotta, so the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to entertain any challenge regarding Ricotta. View "Kim v. R Consulting & Sales, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Lisa Braganza sued defendant Albertson’s LLC (Albertson’s) for personal injuries and other damages she sustained as a result of slipping and falling on the floor of an Albertson’s grocery store. The trial court granted Albertson’s motion for summary judgment after denying plaintiff’s request to continue the hearing on the motion in order to allow plaintiff time to conduct discovery necessary to oppose the motion. The trial court later denied plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, based on her claim that the court abused its discretion in denying her continuance request. Appealing those judgments, plaintiff claimed the trial court abused its discretion: (1) in denying her request to continue the hearing on Albertson’s motion; and (2) in denying her new trial motion. The Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion in either ruling, and affirmed the judgment. View "Braganza v. Albertson's LLC" on Justia Law

After Kirk Hollingsworth was involved in a fatal accident while working for HT, Hollingsworth's wife and son filed a wrongful death action against HT and Bragg. Plaintiffs alleged that HT lacked the required workers' compensation insurance at the time of the incident, and therefore plaintiffs were entitled to sue Bragg/HT under Labor Code section 3706. Bragg/HT then filed an application for adjudication of claim with the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). In the Court of Appeal's previous opinion, Hollingsworth v. Superior Court (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 927 (Hollingsworth I), the court held that the superior court, which had exercised jurisdiction first, should resolve the questions that would determine which tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims. Following remand, plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to a jury trial on the factual issues that would determine jurisdiction. The trial court ultimately entered a judgment terminating proceedings in the superior court, and plaintiffs appealed.The Court of Appeal concluded that, although a jury may determine questions relevant to workers' compensation exclusivity when the issue is raised as an affirmative defense to common law claims, jurisdiction under Labor Code section 3706 is an issue of law for the court to decide. In this case, plaintiffs asserted jurisdiction under section 3706, and thus it was appropriate for the court, not a jury, to determine the questions relevant to jurisdiction. Therefore, there was no error in denying plaintiffs' request for a jury trial. The court also found that the trial court's consideration of parol evidence was not erroneous, and that substantial evidence supports its findings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Hollingsworth v. Heavy Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

Richards sued 105 defendants, including Cahill, with claims arising out of Richards’s alleged asbestos exposure during his 30-year career as a pipefitter. The trial court granted trial preference based on a declaration from Richards’s physician that Richards, then 72 years old, was suffering from mesothelioma and had a life expectancy of fewer than six months. Richards produced voluminous responses to interrogatories, the transcript of Richards’s prior deposition in asbestos litigation involving Richards’s co-worker, and Richards’s employment records.Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.295 provides that in a civil action “for injury or illness that results in mesothelioma” if a licensed physician declares the plaintiff “suffers from mesothelioma . . . , raising substantial medical doubt of the survival of the [plaintiff] beyond six months,” deposition examination of the plaintiff is limited to seven hours of total testimony. The statute permits a court to grant up to an additional seven hours if more than 20 defendants appear at the deposition. Defendants deposed Richards for 14 hours. Cahill challenged the time limit.The court of appeal denied Cahill’s petition for mandamus relief. A court may not grant deposition time in excess of the 14-hour cap established in section 2025.295(b)(2) despite other Code of Civil Procedure provisions addressing a court’s right to control discovery. Section 2025.295’s limitation on deposition time does not violate Cahill’s due process rights. View "Cahill Construction Co., Inc. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Michael and Crystal Haytasingh appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendants, City of San Diego (City) and Ashley Marino, a City lifeguard. Plaintiffs sued defendants after an incident that occurred at Mission Beach in San Diego in August 2013, while Michael Haytasingh was surfing and defendant Marino was operating a City-owned personal watercraft. Plaintiffs alleged Marino was operating her personal watercraft parallel to Haytasingh, inside the surf line, when she made an abrupt left turn in front of him. In order to avoid an imminent collision with Marino, Haytasingh dove off of his surfboard and struck his head on the ocean floor. Haytasingh suffered serious injuries. Plaintiffs alleged that Marino was negligent in her operation of the personal watercraft. Prior to trial, the trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action, finding Government Code section 831.7 provided complete immunity to defendants on the plaintiffs’ negligence cause of action. After that ruling, plaintiffs amended their complaint to allege they were entitled to relief pursuant to two statutory exceptions to the immunity provided in section 831.7. The case proceeded to trial, and a jury ultimately found in favor of defendants. On appeal, plaintiffs contended the trial court erred in concluding that the immunity granted to public entities and their employees under section 831.7 barred plaintiffs from pursuing a cause of action for ordinary negligence against the City and Marino. Plaintiffs also contended the trial court erred when it concluded, prior to instructing the jury, that the City and its lifeguards were not required to comply with the state’s basic speed law set forth in Harbors and Navigation Code section 655.2. Plaintiffs contended the court’s instructional error with respect to the speed limit issue constituted reversible error because the state’s basic speed law was relevant to the standard of care that Marino was obliged to meet, and was therefore relevant to whether Marino’s conduct constituted an extreme departure from the standard of care. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err in determining that section 831.7 provided defendants with complete immunity with respect to the plaintiffs’ cause of action for ordinary negligence, given that Haytasingh’s injuries arose from his participation in a hazardous recreational activity on public property. However, the Court also concluded the trial court erred in determining that Harbors and Navigation Code section 655.2’s five mile per hour speed limit did not apply to City lifeguards, and in instructing the jury that all employees of governmental agencies acting within their official capacities were exempt from the City’s five mile per hour speed limit for water vessels that are within 1,000 feet of a beach under San Diego Municipal Code. This error, the Court held, was prejudicial. It therefore reversed judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Haytasingh v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

Malekeh Khosravan appealed the denial of her motion to strike or tax costs with respect to the expert witness fees incurred by defendants Chevron Corporation, Chevron U.S.A. Inc., and Texaco Inc. (Chevron defendants) following the trial court’s granting of the Chevron defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Malekeh and her husband Gholam Khosravan brought claims for negligence, premises liability, loss of consortium, and related claims, alleging Khosravan contracted mesothelioma caused by exposure to asbestos while he was an Iranian citizen working for the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) at the Abadan refinery the Khosravans alleged was controlled by the predecessors to the Chevron defendants, Exxon Mobil Corporation, and ExxonMobil Oil Corporation (Exxon defendants). The trial court concluded the Chevron and Exxon defendants did not owe a duty of care to Khosravan, and the California Court of Appeal affirmed. The trial court awarded the Chevron defendants their expert witness fees as costs based on the Khosravans’ failure to accept the Chevron defendants’ statutory settlement offers made to Khosravan and Malekeh under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. On appeal, Malekeh contended the trial court erred in denying the motion to strike or tax costs because the settlement offers required the Khosravans to indemnify the Chevron defendants against possible future claims of nonparties, making the offers impossible to value; the Khosravans obtained a more favorable judgment than the offers in light of the indemnity provisions; and the offers were “token” settlement offers made in bad faith. The Court of Appeal concurred with this reasoning and reversed: "We recognize the desire by defendants to reach a settlement that protects them from all liability for the conduct alleged in the complaint, whether as to the plaintiffs or their heirs in a wrongful death action. But if defendants seek that protection through indemnification, they may well need to give up the benefit of section 998." View "Khosravan v. Chevron Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that their neighbors, comedian Kathleen Griffin and her boyfriend Randy Ralph Bick, Jr., invaded their right to privacy by recording images of plaintiffs' backyard and audio of their private conversations with their iPhones and Nest security cameras. The trial court concluded that any privacy intrusion was insubstantial and granted summary adjudication in defendants' favor.The Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that there is no material dispute regarding the offensiveness or seriousness of the intrusion. The court explained that there was no evidence repositioning the security cameras would adequately safeguard defendants' security interests, or that those interests were pretext. Furthermore, defendants never testified they intended to surveille plaintiffs; instead, they testified that they sought to document the impact of plaintiffs' loud parties on their property. The court also explained that only a small portion of plaintiffs' backyard could be seen, plaintiffs and their guests could barely be seen, and the content of their conversations could not be discerned. Even if the Nest cameras enhanced the clarity of the recorded sounds, and were more sensitive than the human ear, the court concluded that the content of plaintiffs' conversations was still barely audible. Therefore, any impact on plaintiffs' privacy interests were insubstantial as a matter of law. The court also concluded that there was no serious privacy invasion that occurred here, and there was no violation of Penal Code section 632, subdivision (a). The court rejected defendants' request to take judicial notice that Ms. Griffin sold her home in December 2020. View "Mezger v. Bick" on Justia Law