Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

D.G. sued the Orange County Social Services Agency and the County of Orange for negligence, alleging that he was sexually abused by his foster father from the mid-1970s until he was a teenager. D.G. claimed he informed his social worker that "bad people are hurting me," but no action was taken. The County moved for summary judgment, arguing there was insufficient evidence that it was aware of any abuse or risk of abuse while D.G. was in the foster home. The trial court agreed, finding the information reported was insufficient to make the abuse foreseeable and that discretionary immunity applied.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that there was no duty to protect D.G. from the unforeseeable criminal conduct of his foster father and that the social worker was immune under Government Code section 820.2 for discretionary acts. D.G. appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the County failed to meet its burden to demonstrate that a duty of care did not exist and that discretionary act immunity did not apply. The court held that the failure to investigate potential abuse when indicators were present made the harm foreseeable, thus imposing a duty of care. Additionally, the court found no evidence that the social worker made a considered decision regarding the potential abuse. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "D.G. v. Orange County Social Services Agency" on Justia Law

In this case, Joely Ng filed a complaint against Los Alamitos Medical Center, Inc. and several doctors, alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death following the death of her husband, Kenneth Ng. Kenneth was admitted to the Medical Center due to a malfunction of his G-tube, which was improperly placed by Dr. McMahon. Subsequent doctors failed to confirm the correct placement, leading to Kenneth developing sepsis and dying three months later. Joely Ng sought noneconomic damages for both wrongful death and medical malpractice claims.The Superior Court of Orange County granted the Medical Center’s motion to strike portions of Ng’s complaint that sought two separate caps on noneconomic damages under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA). The court reasoned that the wrongful death claim was not separate from the medical negligence claim and thus could not be subject to a separate MICRA cap. The court denied leave to amend but allowed for the possibility of future amendments if Ng could allege facts supporting the claims as separate and distinct.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court concluded that wrongful death and survival claims, even when based on the same medical malpractice, are separate and distinct. Therefore, Ng is entitled to seek two separate MICRA caps for noneconomic damages. The appellate court granted the petition, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to strike and to issue a new order denying the motion. View "Ng v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were injured during a nightclub shooting at a rap concert featuring performers from rival gangs. They sued the nightclub's owner and operators for negligence per se and strict liability on an ultrahazardous activity theory, claiming inadequate event planning and security. The trial court granted summary adjudication for the defendants on the negligence per se claim and judgment on the pleadings for the ultrahazardous activity claim, leading to a judgment in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs appealed, arguing there were triable issues of fact for both claims.The Superior Court of Riverside County initially reviewed the case. The court granted summary adjudication on the negligence per se claim, finding that the conditional use permit was not designed to prevent the type of injuries sustained by the plaintiffs. Additionally, the court treated the motion regarding the ultrahazardous activity claim as a motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted it without leave to amend, concluding that hosting a rap concert, even with performers from rival gangs, was not an ultrahazardous activity.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish that the conditional use permit constituted a statute, ordinance, or regulation under the negligence per se doctrine. Furthermore, the court found that the permit was not designed to prevent the specific type of harm suffered by the plaintiffs. Regarding the ultrahazardous activity claim, the court concluded that hosting a rap concert, even with rival gang members, did not constitute an ultrahazardous activity as the risks could be mitigated with proper planning and security measures. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Carmichael v. Cafe Sevilla of Riverside, Inc." on Justia Law

A minor, L.W., suffered severe injuries when an Audi Q7, allegedly defective, surged forward and crushed him against a garage wall. L.W., his mother, and two siblings filed a products liability suit against Audi AG and Volkswagen Group of America Inc. (VWGoA), claiming the vehicle lacked necessary safety features. Audi AG, a German company, manufactures vehicles sold in the U.S. through VWGoA, which markets and sells them to authorized dealerships, including in California.The Superior Court of Placer County granted Audi's motion to quash service of summons, finding no personal jurisdiction. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to establish Audi's purposeful availment of California's market or a substantial connection between Audi's activities and the plaintiffs' injuries. The court also found that exercising jurisdiction would not be reasonable or consistent with fair play and substantial justice.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that Audi, through VWGoA, deliberately served the U.S. market, including California, and thus could reasonably anticipate being subject to suit in California. The court held that the plaintiffs met their burden of demonstrating Audi's purposeful availment and the relatedness of the controversy to Audi's contacts with California. The court also found that exercising jurisdiction over Audi would be fair and reasonable, given California's significant interest in providing a forum for its residents and enforcing safety regulations.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order granting the motion to quash and remanded the case with directions to enter a new order denying the motion. The plaintiffs were awarded their costs on appeal. View "L.W. v. Audi AG" on Justia Law

Matthew Gee, a former University of Southern California (USC) football player, died in 2018 at age 49. The coroner attributed his death to the combined toxic effects of alcohol and cocaine, along with other health issues. His widow, Alana Gee, donated his brain to Boston University’s CTE Center, where it was determined he had Stage II Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (CTE). Alana Gee filed a wrongful death lawsuit against the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), alleging that CTE was a substantial factor in her husband's death and that the NCAA negligently failed to take reasonable steps to reduce his risk of contracting CTE.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled in favor of the NCAA, finding that the assumption of risk doctrine applied. The jury concluded that the NCAA did not unreasonably increase the risks to Matthew Gee over and above those inherent in college football, nor did it unreasonably fail to take measures that would have minimized the risks without altering the essential nature of the sport. Alana Gee appealed the judgment, arguing that the trial court erred in applying the assumption of risk doctrine and in refusing her proposed jury instruction on the liability of an unincorporated association for the acts of its members.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that the assumption of risk doctrine applied because repeated head hits are an inherent risk of college football. The court also found that any instructional error regarding the NCAA’s responsibility for the actions or inactions of its members was harmless. The court concluded that the NCAA did not have a duty to mitigate the inherent risks of the sport and that the failure to take additional safety measures did not increase those inherent risks. View "Gee v. National Collegiate Athletic Assocation" on Justia Law

Mark Stokes was severely injured in the parking lot of Levi’s Stadium after a San Francisco 49ers game on October 7, 2018, when he was punched twice by David Gonzales following an altercation involving a kicked bottle. Stokes sustained a brain injury and later died in March 2021. Gonzales pleaded no contest to assault and was sentenced to one year in county jail. Stokes and his wife initially filed a complaint against Forty Niners Stadium Management Co., LLC, and Landmark Event Staffing Services, Inc., alleging negligence, premises liability, and loss of consortium. After Stokes’s death, his wife, on behalf of their children, continued the lawsuit.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants, concluding that there were no triable issues of fact regarding the breach of duty or causation. The court found that the plaintiffs could not establish that the defendants’ actions or inactions were a substantial factor in causing Stokes’s injuries.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs failed to present substantial, nonspeculative evidence that the defendants’ alleged negligence was a substantial factor in causing Stokes’s injuries. The court emphasized that the incident occurred suddenly and quickly, making it speculative to assert that increased security measures would have prevented the assault. The court also found that the expert opinions provided by the plaintiffs were speculative and did not establish a causal connection between the defendants’ actions and the injury. Thus, the judgments in favor of the defendants were affirmed. View "Stokes v. Forty Niners Stadium Management Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Sentinel Energy Center, LLC owns a power plant in North Palm Springs and hired DGC Operations, LLC (OPS) to manage and operate the plant. In 2017, during annual maintenance, five OPS employees failed to follow the new depressurization protocol for the fuel filter skid, leading to an explosion that killed Daniel Collins. Collins's family sued Diamond Generating Corporation (DGC), which has a 50% indirect ownership in Sentinel and is the parent company of OPS, claiming DGC's negligence in safety oversight led to Collins's death.The Superior Court of Riverside County denied DGC's request to instruct the jury on the Privette doctrine, which generally shields a hirer from liability for injuries to an independent contractor's employees. The jury found DGC 97% at fault and awarded the plaintiffs over $150 million. DGC's motions for nonsuit and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, based on the Privette doctrine, were also denied.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court declined to grant judgment notwithstanding the verdict to DGC, citing unresolved factual questions about whether DGC retained control over the plant and negligently exercised that control. However, the court found that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the Privette doctrine and its exceptions, which could have led to a more favorable outcome for DGC. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial with instructions to include the Privette doctrine and its exceptions. View "Collins v. Diamond Generating Corp." on Justia Law

A three-year-old child, Charlie L., was brought to the emergency department at PIH Health Hospital-Whittier with abdominal pain. The emergency department physician ordered "stat" X-ray and ultrasound images, which were remotely reviewed by Dr. Peyman Kangavari, an on-call radiologist. Dr. Kangavari reported that the images showed no bowel obstruction. The child was discharged but returned to the hospital shortly after with severe symptoms, leading to multiple surgeries and long-term health issues.In the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Charlie L., through his mother, filed a negligence action against Dr. Kangavari, alleging medical malpractice for failing to diagnose the bowel obstruction. Dr. Kangavari moved for summary judgment, supported by an expert declaration from Dr. John Lieu, asserting adherence to the standard of care. Charlie L. opposed the motion with an expert declaration from Dr. Ravi Srinivasa. The trial court ruled that Health and Safety Code section 1799.110 applied, requiring stricter qualifications for expert witnesses in emergency medical cases. The court found Dr. Lieu qualified but Dr. Srinivasa not, and granted summary judgment for Dr. Kangavari.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1799.110’s stricter qualifications for expert witnesses apply to on-call radiologists providing emergency medical services. The court found that neither Dr. Lieu nor Dr. Srinivasa met the qualifications required under section 1799.110. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment for Dr. Kangavari and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Charlie L. v. Kangavari" on Justia Law

In 2019, Steven Watts, an automotive repair shop owner, was diagnosed with mesothelioma, a cancer caused by asbestos exposure. He and his wife, Cindy Watts, filed a lawsuit against 28 defendants, later adding eight more. By the time of trial, only one defendant, Pneumo Abex, LLC (Abex), a brake linings manufacturer, remained. The jury awarded the plaintiffs $2,943,653 in economic damages, $6.75 million in noneconomic damages, and $1 million for loss of consortium, attributing 60% fault to Abex, 25% to other brake manufacturers, and 15% to Watts.The trial court directed a verdict against Abex on its sophisticated user defense and made several rulings on the allocation of fault. Abex appealed, arguing for a new trial on all issues, particularly challenging the directed verdict on the sophisticated user defense and the allocation of fault.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in directing a verdict against Abex on the sophisticated user defense, as there was substantial evidence that Watts, as a trained mechanic and business owner, should have known about the dangers of asbestos. The court also found errors in the trial court's rulings on the allocation of fault, including the exclusion of joint compound manufacturers from the verdict form and the preclusion of Watts's interrogatory responses.The appellate court concluded that these errors warranted a new trial. The court reversed the September 15, 2022 judgment, the November 28, 2022 order, and the March 20, 2023 amended judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial. Abex was awarded its costs on appeal. View "Watts v. Pneumo Abex" on Justia Law

Eva Osborne, the plaintiff, sued Pleasanton Automotive Company, LOP Automotive Company LP, HAG Automotive Investments LP, and Bob Slap, alleging workplace misconduct by Slap during her four years as his executive assistant. The claims included discrimination, retaliation, harassment, failure to prevent harassment and retaliation, and wage and hour violations. Slap later filed a cross-complaint against Osborne, alleging libel, slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with contractual relations, and negligence based on statements Osborne made in a letter to HAG’s HR director.The Alameda Superior Court granted Osborne’s special motion to strike Slap’s cross-complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute, concluding that her statements were protected activity and rejecting Slap’s arguments that they were extortionate and illegal. The court held that Slap could not establish minimal merit in his claims because Osborne’s statements were both absolutely and conditionally privileged under Civil Code section 47, and Slap failed to show malice to overcome the conditional privilege. Slap appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, applied de novo review and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court rejected Slap’s attempt to invoke an exception to the anti-SLAPP statute for activity that is illegal as a matter of law. The court concluded that the litigation privilege barred Slap’s claims, preventing him from meeting his burden under the second step of the anti-SLAPP analysis to show his claims had minimal merit. The court did not address Osborne’s alternative arguments regarding the conditional privilege, malice, or the prima facie showing on Slap’s claims. View "Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co., LP" on Justia Law