Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In November 2007, Marten performed surgery on Doe’s face and neck. In June 2008, Doe sent Marten a letter stating she was considering suing him and demanded that he preserve her documents, files, and photos. In November, Doe’s attorney served Marten with a written demand for arbitration pursuant to a Physician-Patient Arbitration Agreement. In January 2009 Marten’s counsel responded, identifying an arbitrator, without questioning the origin of the agreement or disputing that Marten had signed it. The applicable one-year statute of limitations ran in March 2009. (Code Civ. Proc.340.5) In May 2009, Merten subpoenaed and obtained the records of Dr. Daniel, whom Doe earlier consulted. Located within Daniel’s records was a signed arbitration agreement. Nearly three years later, Marten’s counsel first confronted Doe with the arbitration agreement and refused to continue with the arbitration.Doe sued for medical malpractice and medical battery. The court overruled dismissal motions, finding triable issues as to whether equitable tolling or equitable estoppel disallowed the statute of limitations defense. The court imposed sanctions after hearing evidence that Marten destroyed electronically stored information. After the close of evidence, the trial court dismissed the medical battery claim. On the malpractice claim, the jury awarded over $6.3 million in damages. The court then found the malpractice claim time-barred. The court of appeal reversed in part. The medical malpractice claim was not time-barred because Merten’s conduct actually and reasonably induced Doe to refrain from filing a timely action. View "Doe v. Marten" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the hospital in an action brought by the family of an emergency room patient who was released from the hospital and died eight hours later of "acute dissection of aorta."The court held that no evidence showed that the nursing staff caused or contributed to the patient's death; no evidence showed the hospital was negligent in the selection and retention of the two emergency room doctors who treated the patient; and the evidence conclusively established the emergency room doctors were not the ostensible agents of the hospital. View "Wicks v. Antelope Valley Healthcare District" on Justia Law

While going down Festival’s waterslide, Sharufa inadvertently slipped from a seated position on an inner tube onto his stomach. When he entered the pool below, his feet hit the bottom with enough force to fracture his hip and pelvis. Sharufa sued for negligence, product liability (including breach of express and implied warranties), and negligent misrepresentation. Sharufa’s opposition to a summary judgment motion included a mechanical engineer's opinion that going down the slide on one’s stomach could lead to injury because it would cause a person to enter the water with more velocity than sliding on one’s back. The court found that the engineer did not qualify as an expert on the relevant subject matter and granted Festival summary adjudication on all but the negligent misrepresentation claim. Sharufa dismissed that claim without prejudice to allow an appeal. The court of appeal affirmed as to Sharufa’s negligence cause of action, Festival owes a heightened duty of care as a common carrier; but there was no evidence of breach. The court reversed as to Sharufa’s products liability causes of action; the record is insufficient to show the park provided primarily a service rather than use of a product. The purpose of riding a waterslide is “entertainment and amusement,” but where a product is intended for entertainment, to allow a supplier to be characterized as an “amusement service” provider would risk weakening product liability protections for consumers. View "Sharufa v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC" on Justia Law

Goros, age 92, filed suit alleging that Kindred Healthcare violated the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (Welf. & Inst. Code 15600) by failing to timely obtain medical treatment for her after she suffered a stroke while a patient at their nursing home. After Goros’s death about two years later, her daughter substituted in as successor in interest and added a claim for wrongful death. The trial court granted the defendants summary judgment, predicated on the exclusion of the opinion of the plaintiff’s expert on the issue of causation.The court of appeal affirmed. The plaintiff’s expert failed to provide any basis for his opinions and stated only that “his opinion is based on his experience and documented medical literature.” The plaintiff cites no evidence contradicting the court’s finding that her expert did not have the education or experience to render an opinion about the cause or treatment of Goros’s stroke, as required by Evidence Code section 720(a). Qualifications on a related subject matter are insufficient. View "Lowery v. Kindren Healthcare Operating, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the trial court's reduction of economic damages awarded by the jury in a negligence/trespass action where the jury returned a special verdict in plaintiffs' favor and against Capital Agriculture.The Court of Appeal modified the judgment to vacate the 68 percent reduction of the economic damages award. The court held that the trial court erred by reducing Capital Agriculture's joint and several liability for economic damages, and agreed with plaintiffs that Capital Agriculture was jointly and severally liable for 100 percent of the economic damages, reduced by 2 percent for plaintiffs' contributory negligence and an offset for amounts paid by settling tortfeasors. View "Shuler v. Capital Agricultural Property Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-respondent Melanie Arace, as personal representative and successor in interest for Grace R. Miller (Miller) and trustee of the Grace R. Miller Trust dated May 8, 2002, filed a complaint against Medico Investments, LLC (Medico), a residential care facility, and others. Plaintiff alleged that Medico, or its employee Elizabeth Colon (Colon), engaged in multiple acts of elder abuse of Miller. The jury found in favor of plaintiff, who was awarded damages, attorney fees, and costs. On appeal, Medico contended: (1) the trial court erred in denying its motion to continue the trial based on the unavailability of a material witness; (2) the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees and costs; and (3) plaintiff was not entitled to economic damages under her claim for elder abuse (neglect) since the jury declined to award noneconomic damages. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed judgment against Medico. View "Arace v. Medico Investments, LLC" on Justia Law

In June 2018, plaintiffs-respondents Suzanne Yang and Doc Yang Medical Corporation sued defendants-appellants Tenet Healthcare Inc. doing business as John F. Kennedy Memorial Hospital (the hospital), its medical staff, and individual doctors, alleging defamation and nine other causes of action. Defendants filed a special motion to strike (anti-SLAPP motion) targeting only the defamation cause of action. Dr. Yang alleged that since March 2016, defendants conspired to drive her practice out of business in various ways, including by making defamatory statements. Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion contended that the statements were protected activity because they were made in connection with the hospital’s peer review process, and because they were made in furtherance of the exercise of the right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. Defendants also contended that Dr. Yang could not demonstrate a probability of prevailing because she consented to the peer review process that the statements were purportedly in connection with, and because the statements were privileged. Applying the California Supreme Court's recent opinion in FilmOn.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify, Inc., 7 Cal.5th 133 (2019), and concluded defendants’ conduct arose from protected activity because their allegedly defamatory statements were made in connection with an issue of public interest. Furthermore, the Court concluded Dr. Yang did not demonstrate a probability of prevailing on the merits. The Court therefore reversed the trial court, which denied the anti-SLAPP motion. View "Yang v. Tenet Healthcare Inc." on Justia Law

Under California law, the donor's intent controls the disposition of his or her gametic material upon death. Plaintiff appealed the trial court's judgment sustaining demurrers to her causes of action alleged against defendants. After plaintiff's husband entered into an irreversible coma, she arranged to extract his sperm in hopes of one day conceiving a child with it. Plaintiff stored the sperm in a tissue bank that ultimately came under the control of defendants, and, ten years later, when she requested the sperm, defendants disclosed that they could not locate it. Plaintiff filed suit, alleging contract and tort claims based on the loss of her ability to have a child biologically related to her deceased husband.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the complaint failed to adequately plead facts supporting tort damages. In this case, plaintiff's tort causes of action are all premised on the loss of her ability to conceive with her deceased husband's sperm. However, the court held that the complaint failed to allege facts establishing that plaintiff was legally entitled to use her husband's sperm to conceive a child after he died. In this case, plaintiff's status as his spouse did not entitle her to conceive with his sperm; absent an affirmative showing that the husband intended to allow plaintiff to conceive with his sperm, plaintiff was not entitled to do so; and thus the complaint failed to allege that it was the husband's intent that his sperm be used for posthumous conception. Finally, the court held that plaintiff cannot recover emotional distress damages on her breach of contract cause of action. View "Robertson v. Saadat" on Justia Law

Gaurano, driving home from a day of working at the convention center in a vehicle rented through Lyft’s “Express Drive program,” struck the plaintiffs’ vehicles and caused significant injuries. The trial court granted Lyft summary judgment.The court of appeal affirmed. Gaurano was not acting within the scope of his employment with Lyft at the time of the accident. The court rejected arguments that Lyft required drivers to drive the rental, that driving the rental was “ ‘incident to [Gaurano’s] duties’ ” because he had to be in the rental to pick up rides, and that Lyft’s encouragement of personal driving in the rental made accidents more likely. As a matter of law, Gaurano had substantially deviated from any duties he performed for Lyft at the time of the accident. Gaurano had not worked for Lyft on that day and had no intention of doing so. The potential for Gaurano to log onto the Lyft platform, alone, is insufficient to bring all of his personal driving within the scope of his Lyft employment. Gaurano’s conduct was not foreseeable and Lyft derived no benefit from it. The court also rejected an argument that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting the scope of a person most qualified (PMQ) deposition. View "Marez v. Lyft, Inc." on Justia Law

Sun Pacific appealed the trial court's judgment after a jury awarded damages against it for injuries sustained by an employee of one of its independent contractors.The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial on the negligence cause of action. The court held that the trial court prejudicially erred because it did not instruct the jury on the Privette/Hooker doctrine as it applies to either negligence or premises liability; Sun Pacific did not forfeit its challenge to the negligence instructions; and the trial court's error was prejudicial. The court also held that the trial court improperly refused a jury instruction on mitigation of damages based on the employee's delay in seeking medical care, and Sun Pacific was entitled to the instruction. Because a properly instructed jury could have found Sun Pacific liable for negligence, the court remanded so a properly instructed jury may evaluate the evidence. Finally, the court held that judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been granted on the premises liability cause of action. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Alaniz v. Sun Pacific Shippers, LP" on Justia Law