Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

This proceeding stemmed from a minor’s collapse during football try-outs at Lincoln High School in Stockton in 2017. Respondent Shynelle Jones presented a timely claim on behalf of her son, Jayden, to the Lincoln Unified School District under the Government Claims Act. About four months later, Jones submitted an application to the school district for leave to present a late claim on her own behalf based on her allegedly newfound realization of the severity of her son’s injuries, their impact on her own life, and her right to file her own claim. She declared that up until that point she had been able to attend to her own interests. After the application was denied, Jones filed a petition for relief from the claim presentation requirement in the superior court based on the same facts. At the hearing on her petition, her counsel, Kenneth Meleyco, presented a new explanation for the delay in submitting Jones’s claim: the day after Jones presented a claim on her son’s behalf, she retained Meleyco on her own behalf, and an error in the handling of Meleyco’s dictated memo within his office prevented the earlier preparation of Jones’s claim. The superior court granted Jones’s petition, despite noting “legitimate concerns regarding [her] credibility” because it “determined based on the directives provided in case law, to provide relief from technical rules, that [Jones] has met her burden of proof to demonstrate that her neglect was excusable.” The Court of Appeal found this ruling was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. "[T]he general policy favoring trial on the merits cannot justify the approval of a petition that is not credible and that does not demonstrate a right to relief by a preponderance of the evidence." The Court issued a writ of mandate compelling the superior court to vacate its order and enter a new order denying Jones relief from the claim presentation requirement. View "Lincoln Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the city for injuries he sustained when he rode his bicycle into a rope attached to a badminton net stretched across a paved path in MacArthur Park. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of the city's motion for summary judgment, holding that plaintiff's claims were barred by the doctrine of trail immunity. In this case, the danger was inherently connected to and existed only because of its connection with the trail. The court explained that a badminton net is not a dangerous object in its ordinary context, but a badminton net stretched across a trail may create a dangerous condition. The court wrote that this was only true because it impedes the regular use of the trail. View "Reed v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

California resident Nicholas Nadhir sued non-resident Yousef Zehia for defamation, violation of the online impersonation law, appropriation of name or likeness, and intentional infliction of emotional distress based on Zehia's sending of allegedly defamatory statement to California residents through private online social media messages with the aim of interfering with the residents' personal relationships. Zehia moved to quash service of summons and the trial court denied the motion to quash on grounds that the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over Zehia was proper. Zehia filed a petition for writ of mandate requesting that the Court of Appeal direct the trial court to vacate its order denying his motion to quash and enter a new order granting the motion to quash. The Court concluded Zehia's suit-related conduct created a substantial connection between Zehia and California sufficient to support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction over him. Therefore, the trial court correctly denied the motion to quash. Zehia's writ petition was denied. View "Zehia v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The provision of adequate protective netting in a perceived zone of danger behind home plate (or for field-level seating along the first- and third-base lines between home plate and the dugouts) increases safety and minimizes the risk of injury to spectators without altering the nature of baseball as it is played today in professional and college ballparks.The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's judgment entered in favor of US Baseball after sustaining without leave to amend US Baseball's demurrer to the first amended complaint of a 12 year-old who was seriously injured by a line drive foul ball while watching a baseball game sponsored by US Baseball. The court held that plaintiff's proposed second amended complaint stated causes of action for negligence and premises liability against US Baseball. In this case, plaintiff adequately alleged duty and breach, and any issue of "open and obvious danger" could not be resolved on demurrer. Accordingly, the court remanded with directions to the trial court to vacate its order sustaining US Baseball's demurrer without leave to amend and to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer and granting plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. View "Summer J. v. United States Baseball Federation" on Justia Law

Ismael Torres, Jr. sued Design Group Facility Solutions, Inc. (Design) for personal injuries after he fell through a skylight at a construction site. Design moved for summary judgment. The trial court initially denied the motion. Design moved for reconsideration based on new evidence under Code of Civil Procedure section 1008(a). At the hearing on the motion, the trial court granted reconsideration and, at the same time, granted the motion for summary judgment without giving Torres an opportunity to respond to the new evidence. After review, the Court of Appeal found the trial court abused its discretion: “a party unsuccessfully moving for summary judgment cannot circumvent the requirements of section 437c by subsequently moving for reconsideration under section 1008(a).” View "Torres v. Design Group Facility Soultions, Inc." on Justia Law

Irma Yolanda Munoz Soto sued Union Pacific Railroad Company and two of its employees, Scott King and Robert Finch (collectively, Union Pacific), for wrongful death (premises liability and general negligence) after Soto’s 16-year-old daughter was struck and killed by a freight train on an at-grade railroad crossing in Santa Clarita. The court granted Union Pacific’s motion for summary judgment, concluding as to Soto’s premises liability claim Union Pacific had no duty to remedy a dangerous condition because it did not own or control the railroad crossing. As to Soto’s negligence claim, the court ruled Soto could not establish that Union Pacific employees had negligently operated the train. On appeal, Soto argued she raised triable issues of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment. After review, of the evidence and governing law applicable to Soto’s claim, the Court of Appeal concurred there were no triable issues of fact, and summary judgment was appropriate. View "Soto v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Sun Pacific appealed the trial court's judgment after a jury awarded damages against it for injuries sustained by an employee of one of its independent contractors.The Court of Appeal held that the trial court prejudicially erred because it did not instruct the jury on the Privette/Hooker doctrine as it applies to either negligence or premises liability. In this case, the trial court instructed the jury that Sun Pacific was liable if its failure to use reasonable care was a substantial factor in harming the employee, but did not say that that principle only applied to the hirer of an independent contractor if its negligent exercise of retained control over safety conditions affirmatively contributed to the harm. Furthermore, the trial court told the jury that Sun Pacific was liable if its negligent use or maintenance of the property was a substantial factor in harming the employee, but did not say that these principles would only apply to Sun Pacific if the hazard were concealed. Therefore, the court held that each instruction was an incorrect statement of law and Sun Pacific has not forfeited its contention. The court also held that the trial court's error was prejudicial. The court held that Sun Pacific was entitled to a mitigation of damages of instruction; the court reversed and remanded for a new trial on the negligence cause of action; and the court directed the trial court to enter judgment in favor of Sun Pacific on the premises liability cause of action. View "Alaniz v. Sun Pacific Shippers, L.P." on Justia Law

Thimon, 14 years old, was crossing Cherry Street in Newark, when she was hit by a car driven by Soudachanh. Thimon was seriously injured and sued the city, asserting that the intersection lacked any mechanisms to alert a driver of a pedestrian’s use of the crosswalk and noting the “forced use of an unprotected, uncontrolled crosswalk particularly at a time of year and time of day when glare from the morning sun obscures visibility of pedestrians” for more than four lanes of commuter traffic traveling at 45 mph.The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of the city. The court noted Soudachanh’s negligence in continuing to drive, despite being blinded by glare; a public entity is not required to assume that third parties will act negligently. Newark presented evidence regarding each of Thimon’s allegedly dangerous features. A study by a consulting company conducted shortly after the accident, based on the California Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices, concluded a traffic signal was not warranted. Thimon did not explain how Newark’s painting of lines demarcating the crosswalk, with signs warning motorists of the pedestrian crossing, “increased or intensified” the risk of injury. The lack of any similar collisions over 10 years preceding the accident indicated that Thimon’s injury was caused entirely by the driver's negligence and not by any dangerous condition of public property. View "Thimon v. City of Newark" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her spouse filed suit alleging that the Shower to Shower cosmetic powder and Johnson's Baby Powder plaintiff used for two decades were contaminated with asbestos and a substantial factor in causing her mesothelioma.The Court of Appeal affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of JJCI, holding that JJCI's expert's declaration -- that JJCI's talcum powder and the talc from its source mines did not contain asbestos -- shifted the burden to plaintiff to produce evidence of threshold exposure to asbestos from JJCI's products. The court also held that plaintiff failed to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of fact as to the presence of asbestos in the JJCI talc products plaintiff used. In this case, plaintiff failed to present expert testimony to counter JJCI's expert's opinion, and failed to offer verified admissions or interrogatory answers by JJCI. View "Gibbons v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Inc." on Justia Law

Douglas Roger, an orthopedic surgeon, sued respondents Riverside County (the County) and its sheriff’s department after they falsely reported he had been charged with a felony. In an earlier civil action, the Riverside Superior Court held Roger in civil contempt for refusing to produce his patients’ medical records in discovery, and remanded him to jail, where he spent 52 days in custody. When the sheriff’s department booked him into custody, they incorrectly entered his civil violation in their electronic database as a felony charge, and then reported that inaccurate charge to the California Department of Justice (DOJ), creating a false criminal record for Roger. Among other things, he alleged he lost a lucrative hospital contract he had maintained for the previous 12 years as a result of the respondents’ error. The trial court sustained respondents’ demurrer to Roger's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim and later disposed of the remaining causes of action at the summary judgment stage. The court concluded Roger had failed to state a section 1983 claim as a matter of law because he had not alleged facts “establishing the nature of [respondents’] training program” and therefore failed to allege the training was so obviously inadequate as to amount to deliberate indifference to inmates’ civil rights. The court dismissed the defamation claims because the undisputed evidence showed Roger had failed to comply with the claim presentation requirements in the Government Claims Act by filing a late claim for damages with the County. The court concluded the writ claim failed because the undisputed evidence showed respondents had fixed the error in Roger’s record during the litigation, and therefore their recordkeeping errors amounted to a past wrong, not a present controversy. Finally, the court concluded there was no legal basis for declaratory relief because respondents were under no ministerial duty to act— that is, to maintain correct records. On appeal, Roger challenged the court’s dismissal of each of his claims. After review, the Court of Appeals determined there was merit to all of Roger's claims and reversed judgment. View "Roger v. County of Riverside" on Justia Law