Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

A public elementary school district arranged for its students to attend a four-day overnight outdoor science camp operated by the county office of education. The county office provided direct overnight supervision, while district teachers were present but only on call. A student alleged that, during her attendance at the camp as a fifth grader, she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by a county office employee who served as a night monitor. The student claimed that both the district and the county office knew or should have known of the employee’s prior misconduct and failed to protect her.The student filed a negligence claim against the district, the county office, and the employee. The district moved for summary judgment in the Santa Clara County Superior Court, arguing that it was immune from liability under Education Code sections 35330 and 44808. The district contended that the camp was a “field trip or excursion” subject to a statutory waiver of claims and that, alternatively, it could not be liable because its employees were not providing immediate and direct supervision at the time of the alleged assaults. The trial court granted summary judgment for the district based solely on section 35330, finding the statutory waiver applied.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo. It held that the district failed to establish as a matter of law that the camp was a “field trip or excursion” under section 35330, as the program was part of the required science curriculum rather than a recreational or observational departure. The court also found the district did not meet its burden under section 44808 to show that no district employee should have been providing immediate and direct supervision, especially in light of allegations that the district knew of risks posed by the county employee. The appellate court reversed the summary judgment in favor of the district. View "Doe v. Mount Pleasant Elementary School District" on Justia Law

In 2021, a plaintiff filed a complaint against a public school district, alleging that she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by a teacher while attending middle and high school. The complaint asserted that the teacher’s abusive conduct was widely known within the school and that the district either knew or should have known about the abuse but failed to act, allowing the teacher to remain employed. The plaintiff brought claims for negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, relying on statutory provisions that exempt certain childhood sexual assault claims from the usual requirement to present a claim to the public entity before filing suit.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case after the school district moved for judgment on the pleadings. The district argued that the plaintiff’s claims were only possible due to Assembly Bill 218 (AB 218), which retroactively eliminated the claims presentation requirement for childhood sexual assault claims against public entities. The district contended that AB 218 violated the gift clause of the California Constitution by imposing liability for past acts where no enforceable claim previously existed. The trial court agreed, finding that AB 218 retroactively created liability and constituted an unconstitutional gift of public funds, and dismissed the complaint with prejudice.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the trial court’s decision de novo. The appellate court held that AB 218 does not violate the gift clause because it did not create new substantive liability; rather, it removed a procedural barrier to enforcing pre-existing liability for negligence and negligent hiring, retention, and supervision. The court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded with directions to deny the school district’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. View "O.B. v. L.A. Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

After being diagnosed with lung cancer, Kirt Bjoin and his wife brought a lawsuit against J-M Manufacturing Company, Inc. (JMM) and others, alleging that Bjoin’s cancer was caused by exposure to asbestos dust generated when he cut JMM’s asbestos cement pipe with a power saw during the 1980s. Bjoin worked for his father’s company and later co-owned a pipe-laying business, during which time he frequently cut asbestos cement pipe without respiratory protection and claimed he was never warned of the associated risks. He argued that JMM should have provided warnings about the dangers of cutting the pipe with a power saw and the need for protective equipment.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County presided over a jury trial in which JMM asserted affirmative defenses, including that Bjoin was a sophisticated user who knew or should have known of the product’s dangers, and that using a power saw to cut the pipe was an unforeseeable misuse. The jury found in favor of JMM on these defenses and on the general negligence claim, concluding that Bjoin was a sophisticated user and that his method of cutting the pipe was not a reasonably foreseeable use. The trial court also granted JMM’s motion for nonsuit on the fraudulent concealment claim. Bjoin’s post-trial motion for a new trial was denied.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court held that Bjoin failed to meet the high burden required to overturn a jury verdict for insufficient evidence, particularly because he did not adequately address evidence supporting JMM’s defenses. The court also found that Bjoin waived his claims regarding the admission of Cal-OSHA regulations and the product misuse instruction by failing to provide proper legal argument and standards. The appellate court affirmed the judgment in favor of JMM, upholding the jury’s findings and the trial court’s rulings. View "Bjoin v. J-M Manufacturing Co." on Justia Law

A police officer filed a workers’ compensation claim in December 2020, alleging cumulative injuries—including orthopedic conditions and hypertensive cardiac disease—arising from employment with a city through 2013. The city and its claims administrator denied the allegations, and the matter proceeded to trial before a Workers’ Compensation Administrative Law Judge (WCJ). The WCJ found the officer sustained several injuries, but determined the cardiac disease claim was time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations, awarding medical treatment only for the other conditions.The officer timely petitioned the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB) for reconsideration, challenging the WCJ’s finding that the cardiac claim was untimely. The city and claims administrator responded, supporting the WCJ’s determination. The WCJ recommended denying reconsideration. Under former Labor Code section 5909, the Board had 60 days from the petition’s filing to act, or the petition would be deemed denied. However, due to administrative delay, the Board did not receive the petition until after the 60-day period had expired. The Board ultimately granted reconsideration, applying equitable tolling to the statutory deadline, and found the cardiac injury compensable.The City and its claims administrator sought writ review in the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, arguing the Board lacked jurisdiction to act after the statutory deadline. The Court of Appeal held that the 60-day deadline in former section 5909 is mandatory, and the Board generally acts in excess of its jurisdiction if it grants reconsideration after that period. However, the court concluded that the deadline does not affect the Board’s fundamental jurisdiction, allowing for equitable tolling in narrow circumstances. Because the officer acted diligently and was misled by administrative delay outside his control, the court affirmed the Board’s order granting reconsideration. View "City of Salinas v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Two minor plaintiffs attended a four-day overnight science camp operated by a private entity and organized by their public school district. After returning home, they and their parents alleged that, during the camp, they were exposed to discussions and lessons about gender identity, including being introduced to counselors who used “they/them” pronouns and being asked to state their own preferred pronouns. The plaintiffs also claimed they were not allowed to contact their parents to discuss these matters due to a camp policy prohibiting calls home. They asserted that these experiences caused them severe emotional distress and initiated professional therapy.The plaintiffs filed suit in the Superior Court of Orange County, asserting claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED) against both the camp operator and the school district. The camp operator responded with a special motion to strike under California’s anti-SLAPP statute (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16), arguing that the claims arose from protected speech on matters of public interest—specifically, gender identity discussions. The trial court denied the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that the claims were not based on protected activity but rather on the lack of disclosure to parents and the prohibition on contacting them. The court also denied the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees, finding the anti-SLAPP motion was not frivolous.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, held that the trial court erred in denying the anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety. The appellate court found that the IIED and NIED claims, to the extent they were based on exposure to gender identity discussions, arose from protected activity and lacked minimal merit, both factually and legally, under California public policy. However, claims based solely on the prohibition of calls home or sleeping arrangements did not arise from protected activity and could proceed. The order was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with directions. View "Sandoval v. Pali Institute" on Justia Law

Gary Birdsall was stopped in traffic on the Bay Bridge when his van was rear-ended by Barton Helfet, resulting in serious injuries to Gary and a loss of consortium claim by his wife, Pamela. The Birdsalls’ attorney sent Helfet’s insurer a settlement demand for the $100,000 policy limit, specifying acceptance required delivery of a standard bodily injury release to be executed by both Gary and Pamela, a settlement check, and proof of policy limits by a set deadline. The insurer responded before the deadline with a letter accepting the offer, a release (which mistakenly listed Pamela as a releasee rather than a releasor), the check, and proof of policy limits. A corrected release was sent after the deadline. The Birdsalls’ attorney rejected the settlement, citing the release’s error and the late correction, and returned the check.The Birdsalls filed suit in the San Francisco County Superior Court. Helfet’s answer included affirmative defenses of settlement and comparative fault for Gary’s failure to wear a seat belt. The Birdsalls moved for summary adjudication on the settlement defense, which the law and motion judge granted. At trial, the assigned judge excluded evidence and jury instructions regarding Gary’s seat belt use. The jury found Helfet negligent, awarded substantial damages to both plaintiffs, and judgment was entered. Helfet’s post-trial motions were denied, and he appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. It held that summary adjudication of the settlement defense was improper because there was a triable issue of material fact regarding mutual consent to the settlement. The court also found error in excluding seat belt evidence and instructions, holding that such evidence is admissible and, under the circumstances, expert testimony was not required. The judgment and amended judgment were reversed, with instructions for a new trial and denial of summary adjudication. View "Birdsall v. Helfet" on Justia Law

An elderly man with significant medical needs was admitted to a skilled nursing facility, where a physician provided in-facility care. The physician was responsible for evaluating the patient, making treatment orders, and recording medical information. The complaint alleged that the physician performed only cursory examinations, failed to follow up on necessary tests, did not adequately address serious medical issues, and maintained illegible records. The patient’s condition deteriorated, leading to hospitalization and eventual death.The patient’s brother, acting as successor in interest and on behalf of the heirs, filed suit in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County against the facility, its operators, and the physician. The complaint included claims for elder neglect and financial abuse under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, as well as negligence and wrongful death. After settling with all defendants except the physician, the plaintiff proceeded against him alone. The physician demurred to the elder abuse claims, arguing that he did not have the requisite caretaking or custodial relationship with the patient and that the financial abuse claim was not viable. The Superior Court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, finding the allegations amounted only to professional negligence, which is excluded from the Act’s heightened remedies.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Five, reviewed the case. The court held that a physician’s negligent provision of medical services to an elder in a skilled nursing facility, without more, does not constitute “neglect” under the Act because the physician lacks the necessary robust caretaking or custodial relationship. The court also held that a financial abuse claim based solely on alleged professional negligence is not actionable under the Act. The judgment in favor of the physician was affirmed. View "Frankland v. Etehad" on Justia Law

Kristopher Birtcher, experiencing a mental health crisis, was reported to law enforcement by a Hobby Lobby manager. Birtcher, unarmed and not threatening anyone, was detained by sheriff’s deputies. During the detention, Birtcher attempted to flee but was subdued by multiple deputies who restrained him in a prone position, applying bodyweight pressure to his back. Despite Birtcher’s pleas that he could not breathe, the deputies maintained the restraint, and Birtcher eventually stopped moving and died from asphyxiation and sudden cardiac arrest.In the Superior Court of San Diego County, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding no triable issues of material fact regarding the excessive force claim. The court concluded that the deputies’ actions were in accordance with their training and that Birtcher’s restraint was proper. The court also ruled that plaintiff failed to establish a legal basis for the negligent training claim against Sheriff William D. Gore.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that there were indeed triable issues of material fact regarding the excessive force used by the deputies. The appellate court found that the evidence, including expert testimony, suggested that the deputies’ use of bodyweight pressure on Birtcher while he was restrained in a prone position could be considered excessive force. The court also held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the negligent training claim against Sheriff Gore, as there was a statutory basis for the claim and evidence suggesting his involvement in the training policies.The appellate court reversed the judgment in favor of all defendants and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "A.B. v. County of San Diego" on Justia Law

Anthony Mitchell was driving his Ferrari in Dana Point when he ran over large rocks that had rolled onto the road from an adjacent slope, causing damage to his car and unspecified personal injuries. Mitchell and his passenger, Scott Sieverts, sued multiple parties, including Gail B. Hutchinson, trustee of the Hutchinson Family Trust, for negligence and premises liability, alleging that the defendants failed to maintain their properties to prevent rocks from becoming hazards.The Superior Court of Orange County granted summary judgment in favor of Hutchinson, concluding that she met her initial burden of showing that the plaintiffs could not prove causation. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to create a triable issue of material fact regarding whether the rocks came from Hutchinson’s property or whether the defendants negligently maintained their slopes. The plaintiffs appealed the decision.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Hutchinson met her initial burden under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (p)(2), by showing that the plaintiffs could not prove causation. The burden then shifted to the plaintiffs, who failed to show a triable issue of material fact. The court found that the plaintiffs' expert's opinion was speculative and lacked foundation, and there was no admissible evidence tying the rocks to Hutchinson’s property or proving negligence. Consequently, the summary judgment in favor of Hutchinson was affirmed. View "Mitchell v. Hutchinson" on Justia Law

Kenya Taylor hired Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) employee Tyler Martin-Brand to babysit her six-year-old son, Dayvon, during the winter break in 2019. Tragically, Martin-Brand killed Dayvon. Taylor sued LAUSD, alleging negligent hiring and supervision of Martin-Brand. A jury found in favor of Taylor, awarding her $30 million in damages. LAUSD appealed the trial court's denial of its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) and the judgment itself.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied LAUSD's motions for JNOV and a new trial, asserting that LAUSD was immune from liability under Education Code section 44808. The jury had found LAUSD negligent in hiring and supervising Martin-Brand, attributing 90% of the fault to LAUSD and 10% to Taylor.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court concluded that LAUSD was immune from liability for Dayvon’s off-campus death under Education Code section 44808, which limits school district liability for student injuries occurring off school property unless the district has specifically undertaken responsibility for the student. The court found that Dayvon’s death did not occur during any school-sponsored activity or under LAUSD’s supervision. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's order and judgment, directing the trial court to enter judgment in favor of LAUSD. View "Taylor v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist." on Justia Law