Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs sued Defendant for personal injuries related to an automobile accident in which Defendant’s car rear-ended Plaintiff’s car. A jury trial resulted in a judgment in favor of Plaintiffs for past noneconomic damages only, and Plaintiffs appealed. After trial on remand, a jury awarded Plaintiffs a total of $15,125 in damages. Plaintiffs moved for attorney fees and costs pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.4201 on the ground Defendant had unreasonably denied several requests for admission regarding, primarily, the status of certain medical records as business records within the meaning of Evidence Code section 1271. The trial court denied the motion and awarded costs to Defendant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 998. Plaintiffs appealed the trial court’s denial of their motion for fees and costs and the award of costs to Defendant.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the award of costs to Defendant, reversed the denial of Plaintiffs’ motion for fees and costs and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the trial court erred by denying Plaintiffs’ motion for expenses pursuant to section 2033.420. The court held that Plaintiffs are entitled to recover expenses incurred in proving the medical records were business records. Further, the court wrote that it agreed with the trial court it was unreasonable of Defendant to deny she had caused “some injury” to Plaintiff. The record contains substantial evidence that at the time of the requests for admission, Defendant knew at least some injury had been caused by the accident. View "Vargas v. Gallizzi" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Anel Perez filed a personal injury action against the defendant-respondent school district after she was seriously injured while volunteering at an elementary school event. Following a bench trial, the court entered judgment in favor of the district on the ground that a resolution passed under Labor Code section 3364.5 in 1968 by the “Governing Board of Galt Joint Union School District of Sacramento and San Joaquin Counties” for the “Galt Joint Union School District” converted plaintiff’s status to that of an employee under the Act, rendering workers’ compensation the sole and exclusive remedy to compensate plaintiff for her injuries. Plaintiff argued that because there was no evidence the district board members were aware of their duties under Labor Code section 3364.5 when she was injured, none of the members were present at the event at which she was injured (a spelling bee), and there was no evidence they knew about the bee, she was not “authorized by the governing board” to act as a volunteer, and she was not performing services under their “direction and control” at the time she was injured. Thus, plaintiff reasoned, the trial court should have rejected the defendant’s affirmative defense that she was covered by the Act and, therefore, that workers’ compensation provided her exclusive remedy. Finding no reversible error in finding plaintiff's exclusive remedy was under the Act, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court. View "Perez v. Galt Joint Union Elementary School District" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed from a post-judgment order awarding Respondent attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.4.1 Appellant argued that the trial court erred by not reducing the fee award in accordance with the percentage of Respondent’s comparative fault, that the court abused its discretion by awarding fees that were not supported by sufficient documentation, that the hourly rate awarded for a first-year attorney was unreasonable, and that the court applied an excessive multiplier to the lodestar amount.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the trial court was not required to reduce Respondent’s attorney fee award in accordance with his comparative fault. Further, the court held that Appellant failed to establish that the trial court abused its discretion. The court explained that the record indicates the trial court considered Respondent’s comparative fault. Further, the fee award was supported by substantial evidence. Additionally, the court wrote that the use of a blended $450 hourly rate for Respondent’s counsel was not an abuse of discretion. Finally, the court noted that the court did not abuse its discretion in awarding a 2.0 multiplier. View "Isom v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Tina and David Glynn, parents of decedent Nicholas Glynn (Nicholas), appealed the grant of summary judgment against them and in favor of defendants Orange Circle Lounge Inc., Lounge Group, Inc., and Mario Marovic, owners and operators of the District Lounge, a bar. Plaintiffs argued the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on the physical and temporal distance between defendants’ bar (at which a fight took place between Nicholas and some assailants) and the subsequent fight a block away and nearly an hour later that resulted in Nicholas’s death. "In the absence of ongoing or imminent criminal conduct, we cannot find defendants owed a duty to Nicholas to protect him from the assailants during the final altercation. Once Nicholas, J.D., and the assailants left defendants’ bar peaceably and in separate directions, the bar’s duty ended." The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. View "Glynn v. Orange Circle Lounge Inc." on Justia Law

Decedent was hit by a pickup truck in a crosswalk at a major intersection. After the accident, the decedent, who was on a 15-minute work break, walked back to the Whole Foods Market (the store) where he worked. There, store employees gave him an ice pack, a form to fill out relating to his injury, and a ride home. He died several hours later. The decedent is survived by his wife and three children (Plaintiffs), who filed this wrongful death action against several parties, including Mrs. Gooch’s Natural Food Markets, Inc. (Mrs. Gooch’s), the parent company of the store and the decedent’s employer. Mrs. Gooch’s demurred to the operative first amended complaint because an administrative law judge and the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board had found the decedent’s injury and death to be employment-related and, therefore within the scope of workers’ compensation. The trial court sustained the demurrer.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. Plaintiffs first argued that Mrs. Gooch’s, through its employees, acted in a dual capacity following the accident. The court explained that Plaintiffs cite no case holding that a negligent undertaking theory is viable in the circumstances of the case. Plaintiffs also argued that the fraudulent concealment exception to the exclusive remedy rule applies. The court explained that the complaint does not allege that the decedent was unaware of his injury. Moreover, according to the operative complaint, Mrs. Gooch’s was unaware of the decedent’s injury until he advised his supervisors that he had been in an accident. View "Jimenez v. Mrs. Gooch's Natural Food Markets, Inc." on Justia Law

In January 2020, after waiting 40 minutes for a school bus that never came, 16-year-old G. got picked up from the bus stop by a friend whom she had texted. During their ride to school, the friend’s car was hit head on by another driver, causing G. to suffer fatal injuries. G.’s parents sued the school district, a board member of the school district, and school district employees (collectively, the district) for wrongful death. The parents alleged the district was liable because it breached its duty to timely retrieve G. from the designated school bus stop, to provide notice of and instructions regarding delayed buses, and to provide a reasonably safe and reliable bus system. The district demurred asserting immunity under Education Code section 44808. The trial court sustained the demurrer to the parents’ first amended complaint without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal. The Court of Appeal concluded the parents pleaded sufficient facts to fall outside section 44808 immunity for purposes of demurrer and reversed. View "Brinsmead v. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed from a trial court order sustaining a demurrer to the class allegations in their complaint against Defendants, their former landlords. The complaint asserts claims under the Ellis Act and the Los Angeles Rent Stabilization Ordinance (the Ordinance), Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC), as well as for fraud and violations of section 17200 of the Business and Professions Code (Unfair Competition Law).  Defendants evicted Plaintiffs from their rent-controlled apartments. Plaintiffs alleged that although Defendants declared they were removing the apartment buildings from the rental market entirely, Defendants subsequently listed units in the same buildings for rent on Airbnb. Defendants demurred to the class allegations in the complaint, asserting Plaintiffs could not satisfy the requirements for class certification as a matter of law. The trial court found Plaintiffs could not satisfy the community of interest requirement for liability or damages, and class treatment was not the superior method for resolving the litigation   The Second Appellate District reversed and remanded. The court concluded that the trial court erred in finding, as a matter of law, that there is no reasonable probability Plaintiffs will show common questions of law or fact predominate as to the classwide claims for liability. The court explained that Plaintiffs’ allegations indicate a need for individualized proof or calculation of damages. However, the court concluded Plaintiffs have alleged such issues may be effectively managed and there remains a reasonable probability Plaintiffs will satisfy the requirements for class certification. View "Maarten v. Cohanzad" on Justia Law

Plaintiff fell while stepping from a dock to a boat. He sued his employer—a yacht club in Long Beach—under federal admiralty law. The trial court sustained the club’s final demurrer to the second amended complaint. The court ruled there was no admiralty jurisdiction.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the court’s ruling without deciding about admiralty jurisdiction. The court explained that Congress in 1984 specified employees covered by state workers’ compensation law working at a “club” are covered by state workers’ compensation law and not federal law if they are eligible for state workers’ compensation. The court wrote that Plaintiff concedes the yacht club is a “club.” Federal law thus makes California state workers’ compensation law paramount, which means Plaintiff’s exclusive remedy is workers’ compensation. The court wrote that a core part of the state workers’ compensation bargain is that injured workers get speedy and predictable relief irrespective of fault. In return, workers are barred from suing their employers in tort. Thus, the trial court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s tort suit against his employer. View "Ranger v. Alamitos Bay Yacht Club" on Justia Law

The Law Firm of Fox and Fox (Law Firm) appealed from a judgment entered after the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Chase Bank, N.A. The Law Firm filed this action against Chase, alleging negligence in the disbursement of funds from a blocked account containing estate funds to the sole signatory on the account (as administrator of the estate), Jazzmen Brumfield (Brumfield). The trial court granted Chase’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Law Firm contends it raised triable issues of fact with respect to whether Chase owed a duty to the Law Firm, whether Chase breached any such duty, and whether Chase’s conduct in distributing the funds to Brumfield (who absconded with the funds) was the proximate cause of the Law Firm’s damages.   The Second Appellate District reversed. The court concluded Chase owed the Law Firm a duty of care based on the special relationship it had with the Law Firm as an intended beneficiary of the probate court’s order directing that the estate funds be deposited into a blocked account from which withdrawals could only be made “on court order” and Chase’s acceptance of that order by executing the “receipt and acknowledgment of order for the deposit of money into blocked account.” The court explained that although banks do not generally have a duty to police customer accounts for suspicious activity, Chase owed the Law Firm, as an intended beneficiary of the blocked account order and acknowledgment, a duty to act with reasonable care in limiting distributions from the blocked account to those authorized by court order. View "The Law Firm of Fox and Fox v. Chase Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Brian Carr appealed a trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City of Newport Beach (the City) an action arising from injuries plaintiff sustained after diving headfirst into shallow harbor waters. The court concluded the City was immune from liability pursuant to Government Code section 831.7, which concerned hazardous recreational activities. It also found no triable issue of fact as to plaintiff’s claim alleging a dangerous condition of public property. Plaintiff contended the decision was error because there are triable issues of fact regarding the City’s claimed immunities and his dangerous condition claim. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding record evidenced otherwise. "As a matter of law, the hazardous recreational activity immunity insulates the City from the alleged liability, so thus affirm the judgment." View "Carr v. City of Newport Beach" on Justia Law