Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in an action alleging that plaintiff was sodomized by his roommate while a patient in the adolescent psychiatric unit of the Hospital. The panel held that the Hospital did not foreclose as a matter of law plaintiff's theories of negligence raised on appeal and thus the burden did not shift to plaintiff to demonstrate the existence of a triable issue of material fact. The court reasoned that, even if plaintiff's evidence was properly excluded, summary judgment should not have been granted. In this case, the Hospital's expert did not opine specifically as to the standard of care regarding room assignments and did not dispose of this theory as a matter of professional negligence. In regard to the theory of hospital safety and negligent supervision, without any evidence of standards and requirements, there was no basis on which to determine the standard of care, the scope of the duty, or to conclude that the Hospital complied. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Good Samaritan Hospital" on Justia Law

This case raised issues concerning the legal obligations imposed on health care providers when a patient's health care directives conflict with the providers' opinions that the requested care would be medically ineffective and may cause harm. Elizabeth Alexander, a 70-year-old woman suffering from end-stage terminal pancreatic cancer, died four days after she was transferred from a skilled nursing facility to Scripps Memorial Hospital La Jolla (Scripps). Elizabeth had an advance health care directive stating she wanted all measures taken to prolong her life. Defendants declined to provide Elizabeth with certain advanced life support measures on the basis that such measures would have been ineffective and caused her to suffer further harm. After Elizabeth's death, her estate (Estate) and children, Clenton Alexander, Christopher Alexander, and Jacquelyn McDermet (together, Plaintiffs), sued Scripps and numerous medical professionals, alleging Elizabeth died after defendants failed to provide the life-sustaining treatment and comfort care requested in her advance health care directive. The trial court resolved Plaintiffs' claims in favor of Defendants either by sustaining demurrers or granting summary judgment. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court properly sustained Defendants' demurrers to Plaintiffs' causes of action for elder abuse because Plaintiffs did not allege Defendants' conduct was sufficiently egregious to constitute elder abuse within meaning of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act, and Plaintiffs did not meet the pleading requirements for their elder abuse claims. Plaintiffs' allegations, at best, stated a claim for professional negligence; the Court concluded the trial court properly granted Defendants summary judgment. On Plaintiffs' professional negligence and wrongful death claims, they could not defeat summary judgment because their expert did not set forth sufficient reasoning or explanation for his opinion that Defendants' breaches of the standard of care and violations of the Probate Code caused Elizabeth injury or death. Plaintiffs' negligent misrepresentation claims failed because the statements they relied upon were not positive assertions by Defendants, and Plaintiffs did not justifiably rely on Defendants' statements. The Court found Defendants were immune from liability under section 4740 for alleged violations of sections 4730 concerning communication of health care decisions; 4732 concerning recordation of information about a patient's capacity; 4736 concerning a health care provider's or institution's duties upon declining to comply with a patient's health care instructions; and 4742, subdivision (b) concerning liability for concealing or coercing or fraudulently inducing an individual to change an advance health care directive. View "Alexander v. Scripps Memorial Hospital La Jolla" on Justia Law

An insured plaintiff who has chosen to be treated with doctors and medical facility providers outside his insurance plan shall be considered uninsured, as opposed to insured, for the purpose of determining economic damages. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court properly allowed the plaintiff in this case, as a plaintiff who is treating outside his insurance plan, to introduce evidence of his medical bills. The trial court also permitted defendants to present expert testimony that the reasonable and customary value of the services provided by the various medical facilities was substantially less than the amounts actually billed. The jury rejected the expert evidence and awarded plaintiff the billed amounts. The court held that defendants have not demonstrated error except with respect to two charges regarding the amounts billed by Ventura County Medical Center and American Medical Response. Accordingly, the court reduced the damage award and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "Pebley v. Santa Clara Organics" on Justia Law

An insured plaintiff who has chosen to be treated with doctors and medical facility providers outside his insurance plan shall be considered uninsured, as opposed to insured, for the purpose of determining economic damages. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court properly allowed the plaintiff in this case, as a plaintiff who is treating outside his insurance plan, to introduce evidence of his medical bills. The trial court also permitted defendants to present expert testimony that the reasonable and customary value of the services provided by the various medical facilities was substantially less than the amounts actually billed. The jury rejected the expert evidence and awarded plaintiff the billed amounts. The court held that defendants have not demonstrated error except with respect to two charges regarding the amounts billed by Ventura County Medical Center and American Medical Response. Accordingly, the court reduced the damage award and affirmed the judgment as modified. View "Pebley v. Santa Clara Organics" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's entry of judgment for Gursey in an action alleging that plaintiffs had been damaged because they could not collect the additional money they would have been entitled to had Gursey purchased an insurance policy with the limits they had requested. The court held that plaintiffs did not incur actual damages until they became entitled to the benefits of the underinsured motorist policy. Consequently, plaintiffs' causes of action against Gursey accrued less than two years before they filed this action, and the trial court erred in holding that plaintiffs' claims were time-barred. View "Lederer v. Schneider" on Justia Law

In 2005, 81-year-old Novak was injured when the van in which he was a passenger suffered a tire blowout and collided with a power pole. Novak sued for strict product liability and negligence for failure to warn that tires degrade with age and should be replaced even if the tire shows good tread depth. Novak was disabled as a result of the accident and had to use a motorized scooter. Six years after the blowout, Novak was injured when a car collided with his scooter in a crosswalk. Novak died days later. A defense judgment in the tire blowout case was reversed for evidentiary and instructional errors. The action was not retried. Novak’s daughter filed a wrongful death action against Continental Tire and an auto mechanic, based on the 2005 tire blowout and extending that fault to her father’s death. The court of appeal affirmed a defense judgment. Novak’s scooter being struck by a motorist who failed to yield was not a foreseeable consequence of defendants’ failure to warn that tires on another vehicle, driven years earlier by another motorist, were prone to blowouts. The connection is too attenuated to show the later accident to be within the scope of the risk created by defendants’ conduct. The driver in the crosswalk accident was the superseding cause of Novak’s death. View "Novak v. Continental Tire North America" on Justia Law

A commercial landlord who leases space to an operator of a health studio does not owe a duty under Health and Safety Code section 104113 or the common law to acquire and maintain an automated external defibrillator (AED) at the space or ensure that the operator does so. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendants in an action alleging negligence per se and negligence based on defendants' failure to maintain an AED on the premises of a boxing club. The court considered the Rowland v. Christian, (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, factors and held that defendant did not owe a duty to the gym's patrons to provide an AED on the premises nor a duty to require as a condition of the lease that the gym provide an AED on the premises. View "Day v. Lupo Vine Street, LP" on Justia Law

While a public entity may be liable for injuries caused by dangerous conditions of public property, the entity may avoid liability through the affirmative defense of design immunity. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that Caltrans established, as a matter of law, the affirmative defense of design immunity. The court rejected plaintiff's contention that a public official’s approval of a design does not constitute an exercise of discretionary authority under Government Code section 830.6 if the official admits that he or she never actually considered whether to utilize the safety feature the plaintiff asserts would have prevented his or her injuries. Rather, the court held that the evidence established the shoulder that was actually constructed was the result of or conformed to a design approved by the employee vested with discretionary authority, which provided a basis for concluding any liability for injuries caused by the absence of rumble strips was immunized by section 830.6. View "Rodriguez v. Department of Transportation" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Edison, alleging claims related to the flow of electricity due to neutral-to-earth voltage (NEV) that came from Edison's electrical substation and flowed onto plaintiff's property. On retrial, the jury found in favor of plaintiff and awarded her damages on her nuisance claim, but the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for attorney fees. Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals held that, based upon the evidence presented at trial, the court could not conclude as a matter of law that the harm plaintiff suffered did not outweigh the public benefit of Edison's conduct. The court held, however, that the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant evidence related to stray voltage incidents involving prior owners or tenants of the house or other properties, and that the admission of that evidence was prejudicial to Edison. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for retrial of the nuisance claim. The court dismissed as moot plaintiff's cross-appeal. View "Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Edison, alleging claims related to the flow of electricity due to neutral-to-earth voltage (NEV) that came from Edison's electrical substation and flowed onto plaintiff's property. On retrial, the jury found in favor of plaintiff and awarded her damages on her nuisance claim, but the trial court denied plaintiff's motion for attorney fees. Both parties appealed. The Court of Appeals held that, based upon the evidence presented at trial, the court could not conclude as a matter of law that the harm plaintiff suffered did not outweigh the public benefit of Edison's conduct. The court held, however, that the trial court erred in admitting irrelevant evidence related to stray voltage incidents involving prior owners or tenants of the house or other properties, and that the admission of that evidence was prejudicial to Edison. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded for retrial of the nuisance claim. The court dismissed as moot plaintiff's cross-appeal. View "Wilson v. Southern California Edison Co." on Justia Law