Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Johnson worked successively as a firefighter for South San Francisco (CSSF) and Pacifica. He developed nasopharyngeal cancer. Labor Code section 3212.11 establishes a presumption that cancer manifesting during and for a specified period following employment in certain public safety positions, including firefighters, arose out of and in the course of that employment. Section 5500.5(a) limits employer liability for a cumulative injury to the employer who employed the applicant during the one year preceding the earliest of the date of injury or the last date of injurious exposure to the hazards that caused the injury, so either CSSF or Pacifica would be potentially responsible for compensation for the entire injury. CSSF settled Johnson's workers’ compensation claim and sought contribution from Pacifica. An arbitrator denied the petition, ruling that evidence of the latency period for Johnson's cancer showed the injurious exposure occurred during Johnson’s earlier employment with CSSF. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board adopted the order. CSSF argued the Board erroneously utilized a more lenient preponderance evidentiary standard in applying section 5500.5(a), rather than the more stringent cancer presumption rebuttal standard of section 3212.1. The court of appeal affirmed; the evidence supports the award. Worker protection policies embodied in section 3212.1 are not implicated in the allocation of liability between employers. View "City of South San Francisco v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

Guzman was operating a soil compactor on a hillside with a 45-degree slope when the compactor hit a rock. The compactor rose in the air, causing Guzman to fall backward, and then fell on top of him. The workers’ compensation judge determined that Guzman sustained an injury to his back and psyche and that the psychiatric injury was caused by a “sudden and extraordinary employment condition,” Lab. Code, 3208.3(d). The workers’ compensation carrier for Guzman’s employer unsuccessfully sought reconsideration by the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, arguing that Guzman failed to meet his burden of proving that his psychiatric injury was caused by a “sudden and extraordinary employment condition.” The court of appeal annulled the Board’s order denying reconsideration. Guzman did not provide any evidence establishing that it is “uncommon, unusual, and totally unexpected” for a rock to be in soil, for a compactor to rise when striking a rock, or for an operator to become unbalanced and to fall when the compactor rises on a 45-degree hillside. He did not introduce any evidence regarding what regularly or routinely happens if a compactor hits a rock on a slope. Guzman admitted that he had previously worked on flat surfaces only. View "State Compensation Insurance Fund v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff, a professional window washer, filed a premises liability action against defendant, after he lost his footing and fell off the roof of defendant's house. Plaintiff alleged that loose rocks, pebbles and sand on the roof of the property constituted a dangerous condition that had caused him to fall. The court held that defendant failed to establish that plaintiff's claims were precluded under the doctrine in Privette v. Superior Court, 5 Cal.4th 689, which prohibits an independent contractor or his employees from suing the hirer of the contractor for workplace injuries. In this case, there were triable issues of fact regarding the hazardous condition exception to the Privette Doctrine. View "Gonzalez v. Mathis" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed the trial court's order awarding costs to plaintiffs in a wrongful death case under Code of Civil Procedure section 998. The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that the joint offer to settle both wrongful death claims was valid. The court held that the trial court properly awarded plaintiffs costs under section 998. In this case, defendants did not anticipate that either wrongful death claim, standing alone, would exceed the settlement offer. The court explained that this was precisely the situation in which an additional cost award under section 998 was appropriate and in furtherance of the goal of encouraging parties to accept reasonable settlement offers. View "Gonzalez v. Lew" on Justia Law

A woman checked into a hotel room in the early evening. She did not answer her husband’s calls for several hours. He suspected that she may have been injured. The husband called the hotel and a maintenance worker checked the room. The worker reported that no one was there. Hours later, the husband went to the hotel room and found his wife lying on the floor. She had suffered a brain aneurism. The couple sued the hotel and the maintenance worker’s employer (a staffing agency) for negligence. The agency filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no legal duty to the married couple. The trial court granted the motion and the couple appealed. Ordinarily, a person has no legal duty to come to the aid of another; however, if that person does, and does so without exercising reasonable care, the person coming to the aid of the other may be responsible for any damages caused under a “negligent undertaking” theory of liability. The Court of Appeal could not say as a matter of law that the maintenance worker owed no legal duty; there were triable issues of material fact such that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment and reverse. View "O'Malley v. Hospitality Staffing Solutions" on Justia Law

Turley sued multiple defendants, alleging that he has an asbestos-related disease caused by exposure to asbestos-containing products, including valve gaskets, during his 36-year employment at PG&E. Interrogatory responses stated that Turley was exposed to asbestos-containing pipe products supplied by Familian, including “asbestos cement transite pipe, pipe collars, gaskets, elbows, pipe-repair products and other asbestos products.” Familian moved for summary judgment. arguing that plaintiffs could not show exposure to asbestos in a Familian-related product. Turley submitted a declaration from a third-party witness, Scott, who had not been deposed. The court allowed Scott to be deposed. Familian used portions of the deposition in its reply. The court concluded that the deposition testimony “conclusively negates” Scott’s declaration testimony as to exposure, refused to consider it, and granted summary judgment. The court of appeal reversed, stating that ambiguity in the evidence should be resolved at trial. Scott’s testimony established that Familian-supplied asbestos-containing gaskets were frequently used at Turley’s worksite and that Turley used them. That Familian was not the only supplier did not warrant the conclusion that Turley did not establish exposure. There was no direct contradiction between Scott’s declaration and his deposition testimony with respect to several areas, so his testimony should not have been disregarded. View "Turley v. Familian Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mahmoud Alzayat, on behalf of the People of the State of California, filed a qui tam action against his employer, Sunline Transit Agency, and his supervisor, Gerald Hebb, alleging a violation of the Insurance Frauds Prevention Act (IFPA or the Act). (Ins. Code, sec. 1871 et seq.) Alzayat alleged Hebb made false statements in an incident report submitted in response to Alzayat’s claim for workers’ compensation, and Hebb repeated those false statements in a deposition taken during the investigation into Alzayat’s claim for compensation. Hebb’s false statements resulted in Alzayat’s claim being initially denied. Defendants filed motions for judgment on the pleadings contending: (1) this lawsuit was based on allegedly false and fraudulent statements Hebb made in connection with a workers’ compensation proceeding and was, therefore, barred by the litigation privilege under Civil Code section 47(b); and (2) Alzayat’s claim was barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule. The superior court concluded the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule was inapplicable, but ruled the litigation privilege barred Alzayat’s claim. Alzayat appealed, contending the litigation privilege only applied to tort claims and not to statutory claims such as an action under the IFPA, and the IFPA was a specific statute that prevailed over the general litigation privilege. The Court of Appeal agreed with Alzayat that his lawsuit was not barred by the litigation privilege. Furthermore, the Court concluded this lawsuit was not barred by the workers’ compensation exclusivity rule. The trial court erred by granting judgment on the pleadings for defendants, so we reverse the judgment. View "California ex rel. Alzayat v. Hebb" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the respondent court to vacate its order overruling the demurrer and issue a new order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend. In this case, seven businesses filed suit to recover damages for purely economic loss resulting from a massive natural gas leak at a SoCalGas. SoCalGas filed a demurrer to the causes of action based on negligence because plaintiffs' complaint lacked allegations of personal injury, property damage, or the requisite transaction. The respondent court held that SoCalGas should bear all costs its accident caused and there was no recovery for purely economic loss under negligence theories when the precipitating event was a mass tort. Without personal injury, property damage or a special relationship, the general rule that precludes business plaintiffs from recovering for pure economic losses under a negligence theory remains viable. The court held, as a matter of law, that SoCalGas did not owe a duty to prevent plaintiffs' economic loss based on negligent conduct. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for a peremptory writ and vacated the temporary stay. View "Southern California Gas Co. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County" on Justia Law

Respondent Denise Duncan sued Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. (Wal-Mart) for personal injuries she sustained at one of Wal-Mart’s stores while acting within the course and scope of her employment with Acosta, Inc. (Acosta). The trial court entered judgment finding Wal-Mart liable for Duncan’s injuries. Under Labor Code sections 3852 and 3856, appellant Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company (Hartford) applied for a lien on Duncan’s judgment to obtain reimbursement for the workers’ compensation benefits it paid Duncan, including medical expenses and temporary disability payments for lost wages. Although the judgment included compensation for Duncan’s medical expenses, it did not include compensation for Duncan’s lost wages because she did not seek those damages at trial. The court granted Hartford a lien on Duncan’s judgment, but reduced the lien amount to exclude the indemnity payments for lost wages. Hartford appealed the trial court’s postjudgment order, arguing the court exceeded its authority by reducing the lien amount for any item other than reasonable attorney fees and costs. The Court of Appeal agreed because section 3856’s plain language and the case law applying it granted Hartford a first lien on the judgment in the amount it paid Duncan for worker’s compensation benefits. Duncan’s choice not to seek lost wages at trial did not diminish Hartford’s lien rights under the workers’ compensation statutory scheme. View "Duncan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-respondents Virgil and Glenda Jensen contended they suffered damages caused by a negligently maintained rental truck, rented by his supervisor, Charles Scannell, which blew a tire while Virgil was driving it. Defendant-appellant U-Haul Co. of California (UHCA) appealed the trial court’s denial of its motion to compel arbitration. UHCA contended plaintiffs were bound by the arbitration agreement in the rental contract, even though neither plaintiff was a party to that contract. The Court of Appeal’s review of plaintiffs’ complaint showed that plaintiffs did not rely or depend on the terms of the rental in asserting their claims, and none of their allegations were in any way founded in or bound up with the terms or obligations of that agreement. UHCA, citing to general principles and cases that it contended were analogous, argued that plaintiffs were bound to arbitrate their claims, even though they are not signatories to the agreement between Scannell and UHCA, on any of three theories: third-party beneficiary, agency, or estoppel. The Court of Appeal was not persuaded and affirmed the trial court. View "Jensen v. U-Haul Co. of California" on Justia Law