Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from injuries Anthony Verdon Lujan sustained when his arm got caught on a luggage conveyor when he was inspecting the conveyor as an employee of Lloyd W. Aubry Co. (Aubrey), an independent contractor hired by US Airways to maintain and repair the conveyor. Aubry's workers' compensation insurer paid Verdon benefits based on the injury and subsequently sued US Airways seeking what it paid in benefits. Verdon intervened as plaintiff in the action, alleging causes of action for negligence and premises liability. At issue was whether the Privette v. Superior Court rule applied when the party that hired the contractor (the hirer) failed to comply with workplace requirements concerning the precise subject matter of the contract and the injury was alleged to have occurred as a consequence of that failure. The court held that the Privette rule did apply in that circumstance. The court concluded that, by hiring an independent contractor, the hirer implicitly delegated to the contractor any tort law duty it owed to the contractor's employees to ensure the safety of the specific workplace that was the subject of the contract. That implicit delegation included any tort law duty the hirer owed to the contractor's employees to comply with applicable statutory or regulatory safety requirements. Accordingly, plaintiffs here could not recover in tort from US Airways on a theory that Verdon's workplace injury resulted from defendant's breach of what plaintiffs described as a nondelegable duty under California Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1973 (OSHA), Cal. Code Regs., tit. 8, sections 3999, 4002, regulations to provide safety guards on the conveyor. Therefore, the court erred in reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for defendant.

This case arose when plaintiff was seriously injured in an automobile accident negligently caused by a driver for defendant. At issue was whether an injured person could recover from the tortfeasor, as economic damages for past medical expenses, the undiscounted sum stated in the medical care provider's bill but never paid by or on behalf of the injured person. The court held that the collateral source rule, which precluded deduction of compensation the plaintiff had received from sources independent of the tortfeasor from damages the plaintiff "would otherwise collect from the tortfeasor" ensured that plaintiff here could recover in damages the amounts her insurer paid for her medical care. The rule, however, had no bearing on amounts that were included in a provider's bill but for which the plaintiff never incurred liability because the provider, by prior agreement, accepted a lesser amount as full payment. Such sums were not damages the plaintiff would otherwise have collected from the defendant and were neither paid to the providers on the plaintiff's behalf nor paid to the plaintiff in indemnity of his or her expenses. Therefore, because they did not represent an economic loss for the plaintiff, they were not recoverable in the first instance. The collateral source rule precluded certain deductions against otherwise recoverable damages, but did not expand the scope of economic damages to include expenses the plaintiff never incurred.

Plaintiff sued a truck driver, the truck driver's employer, and a second driver after plaintiff sustained severe, permanent injuries from an automobile accident. At issue was whether plaintiff, who asserted both theories of respondeat superior and negligent entrustment against the employer and the employer admitted vicarious liability for any negligent driving by its employee, could still pursue the negligent entrustment claim. The court affirmed its holding in Armenta v. Churchill that an employer's admission of vicarious liability for an employee's negligent driving in the course of employment barred a plaintiff from pursuing a claim for negligent entrustment. Therefore, the trial court erred in not applying that holding to this case. The court held that, had the trial court not made the error, it was reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a result more favorable to defendants. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and directed that court to reverse the trial court's judgment and remand the case for a complete retrial.

Plaintiff sued defendants, manufacturers of the cigarettes that she smoked for 35 years, where plaintiff was diagnosed with chronic obstructive pulmonary disease in 1989, diagnosed with periodontal disease in 1990 or 1991, and did not sue defendants of the cigarettes that she had smoked until she was diagnosed with lung cancer in 2003. At issue was whether the lawsuit was barred by the statute of limitations, which required that a suit be brought within a specified period of time after the cause of action accrued. The court held that when a later-discovered latent disease was separate and distinct from earlier-discovered disease, the earlier disease did not trigger the statute of limitations for a lawsuit based on the later disease.