Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Prior to her death, Eyvon Ambrose (decedent) had become entirely dependent upon others for her basic care needs. Defendants Oroville Hospital d/b/a Golden Valley Home Health and Oroville Hospital, agreed to provide decedent in-home nursing services for wound care for a pressure injury to her left ischium or buttock. Defendants provided such in-home wound care on six occasions in July 2015 and four additional occasions in October 2015. According to real parties in interest (plaintiffs), decedent’s wound worsened, she sustained additional wounds, she was hospitalized, and she ultimately died from her wound and complications. Plaintiffs filed the underlying actions against defendants alleging a number of causes of action. Defendant’s writ petition and arguments related solely to plaintiff’s cause of action to recover under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act for defendants’ alleged neglect which, they asserted, was committed with recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice. Therefore, plaintiffs asserted entitlement to enhanced remedies under the Elder Abuse Act. They sought no other relief in their petition. Defendants moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication, asserting they did not have a substantial caretaking or custodial relationship with the decedent, a prerequisite for recovery for neglect under the Elder Abuse Act. They further asserted that a reasonable jury could not find them guilty of forms of abuse or neglect rising to the level of recklessness. The trial court denied defendants’ motion. To the Court of Appeal, Defendants sought a preemptory writ of mandate directing the trial court to vacate its denial of their motion for summary adjudication and to grant the motion. The Court concluded that, in opposition to defendants’ prima facie showing of entitlement to summary adjudication on plaintiffs’ Elder Abuse Cause of action based on the absence of a substantial caretaking or custodial relationship, plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of material fact. The Court therefore issued the requested writ. View "Oroville Hospital v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

On the evening of May 21, 2014, Denise Garrison went to Target in Anderson, South Carolina with her eight-year-old daughter. Before entering the store, however, Denise retrieved her coupon book from her car, placed it on the hood, and proceeded to examine it. Looking up from the book, her daughter appeared with what looked like a hypodermic needle in her hand. Denise instinctively swatted the syringe out of her daughter's hand. However, in the swatting process, the syringe punctured the palm of her hand. Denise informed Target's store manager, who apologized for what happened. Denise believed the manager assured her that her medical bills would be paid, testifying that the manager said "bring us the bill." Despite Denise's belief that Target would cover her medical costs, Target refused to do so. The case proceeded to a jury trial, in which Target was found negligent, and awarded Denise $100,000 in compensatory damages and $4.51 million in punitive damages. The jury also awarded Clint $3,500 for lost wages and $5,000 for loss of consortium. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the court of appeals erred in: (1) affirming the trial court's denial of Target's motion for JNOV as to liability based on a theory of constructive notice; (2) holding the statutory cap on punitive damages was an affirmative defense; (3) instructing the trial court to consider on remand the potential harm caused by Target's conduct in evaluating the constitutionality of the amount of punitive damages; and (4) refusing to award interest on punitive damages under Rule 68, SCRCP. The Supreme Court determined the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Target had constructive notice of the syringe in its parking lot and failed to discover and remove it in the exercise of due care. In addition, Court held the statutory cap on punitive damages pursuant was not required to be pled by the defendant as an affirmative defense in order to apply. The court of appeals properly instructed the trial court to consider on remand the potential harm caused by Target's conduct in evaluating the constitutionality of the amount of the Garrisons' punitive damages award. Lastly, the Supreme Court held Denise was entitled to eight percent interest on the entirety of her damages award, including punitive damages, pursuant to Rule 68, SCRCP. View "Garrison v. Target Corporation" on Justia Law

An explosion at the Omega Protein Plant in Moss Point, Mississippi killed one man and seriously injured several others. Multiple lawsuits were filed against Omega in federal district court. Colony Insurance Company filed a declaratory judgment action in state circuit court seeking a declaration that it did not cover bodily injuries arising out of the Moss Point facility explosion. Evanston Insurance Company intervened also seeking a declaration of no coverage for the same injuries: Evanston provided a $5 million excess liability policy, which provided coverage after Colony’s $1 million policy was exhausted. Because Colony settled one of the underlying personal injury cases for $1 million (the limits under its policy), Omega sought excess coverage from Evanston for the injuries that occurred at its plant. A special master was appointed, and the trial court granted Evanston’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the pollution exclusion in the insurance contract barred coverage. Omega appealed that grant of summary judgment. The Mississippi Supreme Court found that a pollution exclusion in the insurance contract was ambiguous, and should have been construed in favor of the insured, allowing coverage. Further, the Court found the question of whether coverage was triggered was governed by the language of the contract, and that Evanston failed to prove there could be no coverage under the excess liability policy. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment as to all issues and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Omega Protein, Inc. v. Evanston Insurance Company" on Justia Law

After Lauren Bridges’ daughter S.B. was born severely disabled, Bridges sued the many healthcare providers involved in S.B.’s birth. When Bridges’s attorneys failed to timely oppose the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the superior court granted summary judgment and then final judgment in favor of all defendants. Bridges then moved for relief from judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b). The superior court found that Bridges' attorneys’ neglect was inexcusable, precluding relief under Rule 60(b)(1), but nonetheless granted relief under Rule 60(b)(6) to avoid injustice. The Alaska Supreme Court found the superior court did not abuse its discretion in finding the neglect of Bridges’s counsel inexcusable and denying relief under Rule 60(b)(1). But the Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s decision granting relief under Rule 60(b)(6). "An attorney’s neglect, whether excusable or inexcusable, cannot be grounds for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) unless the attorney abandons the client. Because that is not what the record shows, we reverse the superior court’s ruling and remand for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants." View "Chena Obstetrics and Gynecology, et al. v. Bridges" on Justia Law

Cassell has owned the Hermosa Beach residential property since 1972; it has one bathroom, which has a two-step stairway leading up to a platform with a commode. The stairway did not have a handrail. Mazza rented the property from Cassell for 18 years. Mazza’s sister, Kaney visited Mazza many times, staying for as long as two weeks, without any mishaps. In September 2014, the light to the bathroom stopped working. Kaney used the stairs, fell, and suffered injuries.Kaney sued, claiming premises liability and negligence. The trial court granted Mazza summary judgment, concluding that as a matter of law, a plaintiff is precluded from proving causation in a slip and fall case if there were no witnesses to the fall and she remembers only being on stairs and then waking up in pain but does not remember the fall itself. The court of appeal reversed. Though Kaney cannot remember falling on Cassell’s stairs, the circumstantial evidence would permit a trier of fact to make a reasonable and probable inference that the condition of the stairs, including the absence of a handrail, was a substantial factor in the fall. View "Kaney v. Mazza" on Justia Law

After sustaining injuries in a one-vehicle accident, Terry and Jane Pruitt filed a complaint against several defendants, including AAA Interstate Transportation, LLC ("AAA"), in the Walker Circuit Court. The court dismissed their claims against AAA for lack of personal jurisdiction, and it certified that dismissal as a final judgment under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. The Pruitts appealed. Because the circuit court did not have either general or specific personal jurisdiction over AAA, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pruitt v. AAA Interstate Transportation, LLC" on Justia Law

Cudd Pressure Control, Inc. and WISCO, Inc. appealed a judgment entered in favor of Murex Petroleum Corporation in a personal injury case. As between WISCO and Murex, the case presented the question of whether a defense and indemnification provision in a contract applied. As between Cudd and Murex, the case presented a question of whether the district court abused its discretion when it sanctioned Cudd for spoliation of evidence. The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court erred as a matter of law when it granted summary judgment for Murex determining the defense and indemnification provision applied. The Supreme Court also concluded the trial court abused its discretion when it sanctioned Cudd. Therefore, the Court reversed those portions of the judgment. Because the sanctions included an adverse inference instruction against Cudd at trial that may have affected the jury’s fault determination, the case was remanded for a new trial on the issue of fault apportionment. View "Simmons v. Cudd Pressure Control, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court's entry of partial final judgment in accordance with Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 54(b) and the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction of Plaintiff's action under Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) as to certain defendants, holding that the hearing justice did not err.At issue was the superior court's authority to exercise jurisdiction over claims brought against foreign corporate defendants based on a fatal injury to a Rhode Island resident following an accident that occurred outside of Rhode Island. The corporate defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, which the hearing justice granted. Partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b) was entered in favor of the corporate defendants. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, holding that the hearing justice (1) did not err in dismissing the claims against the corporate defendants based on a lack of personal jurisdiction; and (2) did not err in denying Plaintiff's request to conduct jurisdictional discovery. View "Martins v. Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC" on Justia Law

In an interlocutory appeal, Schaffner Manufacturing Company, Inc., argued that the circuit court erred by denying a portion of its motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Schaffner contended Darius Powell’s claims of negligence, negligent hiring, retention, and supervision all fell within the ambit of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act. Powell alleged that on December 11, 2017, Rederick Kelly and O’Derrick Clark severely injured him while in the course and scope of their employment. The trial court ruled that the claims of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Kelly and Clark were barred by the statute of limitations. However, the trial court found that Powell’s claims of “Negligence, Negligent Hiring, Retention, and Supervision, and Vicarious Liability” against Schaffner did not fall within the scope of the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Act and denied the joint motion to dismiss those claims. The Mississippi Supreme Court agreed with Schaffner that Powell’s claims of negligent hiring, retention, supervision, and general negligence for failing to provide a safe work environment were all claims of direct negligence against Schaffner. "These claims properly fall within the scope of the Act. Therefore, the Act is Powell’s exclusive remedy for those claims, and those claims should have been dismissed." View "Schaffner Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. Powell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Dr. Carter Page, a public figure with ties to President Trump’s 2016 campaign, claimed that defendant-appellee Oath Inc.’s online news organizations published eleven defamatory articles about him in 2016 and 2017. Michael Isikoff authored a Yahoo! News article that formed the backbone of the amended complaint (the “Isikoff Article”). Three other articles were written by employees at TheHuffingtonPost.com (“HuffPost”) and refer to the Isikoff Article (the “Employee Articles”). The remaining seven articles were written by HuffPost non-employee “contributors” (the “Contributor Articles”). The articles discussed an “intelligence report” from a “well-placed Western intelligence source” with information that Page met with senior Russian officials and discussed potential benefits to Russia if Donald Trump won the presidential election. The Superior Court granted Oath’s motion to dismiss, finding that the Isikoff Articles and Employee Articles were either true or substantially true; Page was at least a limited purpose public figure, meaning he was required to plead actual malice by the individuals responsible for publication, and he failed to meet that standard; the fair report privilege for government proceedings applied; and Oath was protected for the Contributor Articles under the federal Communications Decency Act. Page appealed the judgment except the superior court’s ruling that the Employee Articles were true. After review, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed, finding that "[a]t a minimum, the article is substantially true, and as such, Page did not state a claim for defamation based on that article." Page also failed to state a claim for defamation with respect to the remaining articles. Page also failed to allege that the individuals responsible for publication of those articles acted with actual malice. Finally, Page did not contest the superior court’s holding that the Employee Articles were true. Because these grounds dispose of Page’s defamation claims, the Supreme Court did not address any of the trial court's other grounds for dismissal. View "Page v. Oath Inc." on Justia Law