Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In 2005, Alexander Rudnicki suffered serious injuries when OB-GYN Peter Bianco, D.O., negligently performed an operative vaginal delivery using a vacuum extractor to assist in the delivery. Alexander suffered injuries to his brain as a result of the trauma to his scalp and skull caused by the vacuum extraction. Alexander required ongoing physical, occupational, and speech therapy; he was intellectually disabled and enrolled in special education at school; and he was not likely to be able to live independently in the future. In 2014, Alexander’s parents, Francis and Pamela Rudnicki, in both their individual capacities and as parents, filed a complaint against Dr. Bianco and the hospital where Alexander was born, alleging, among other things, professional negligence by Dr. Bianco. Dr. Bianco moved to dismiss, asserting that Alexander’s parents did not bring their individual claims against him within the applicable statute of limitations. The district court agreed and dismissed the parents' individual claims, and the case proceeded to trial with Alexander as the sole plaintiff. A jury ultimately found Dr. Bianco had acted negligently and awarded Alexander damages, including, among other things, sums for past and future medical expenses until Alexander reached the age of twenty-two. Dr. Bianco filed a post-trial motion to reduce this verdict, arguing that under Colorado common law, only Alexander’s parents could recover Alexander’s pre-majority medical expenses and, therefore, the court was required to deduct from the verdict the medical expenses incurred prior to Alexander’s eighteenth birthday. The district court ultimately agreed with Dr. Bianco and vacated the entirety of the jury’s award for past medical expenses, as well as sixty percent of the award for future medical expenses, concluding that the claim for pre-majority medical expenses belonged solely to Alexander’s parents, but their claim for such expenses had been dismissed as time-barred. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether to adhere to a common law rule under which only a minor plaintiff’s parents may recover tort damages for medical expenses incurred by their unemancipated minor child. The Supreme Court concluded the traditional rationales for the common law rule no longer applied, and that "the realities of today’s health care economy compel us to abandon that rule. Accordingly, we conclude that in cases involving an unemancipated minor child, either the child or their parents may recover the child’s pre-majority medical expenses, but double recovery is not permitted." View "Rudnicki v. Bianco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Cindy Planchard, filed suit against defendant, the New Hotel Monteleone, LLC. Plaintiff alleged that as she crossed the lobby of defendant’s hotel, she slipped on a foreign substance on the marble floor and fell, sustaining an injury. After discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment, relying on a surveillance video of the accident. The video showed a hotel employee dry mopping the lobby area at 8:36 p.m., approximately three minutes before plaintiff’s accident. Two “wet floor” signs are in place in the area. At 8:37 p.m., approximately one minute before plaintiff’s fall, two more “wet floor” signs were added to the area, and an employee continued to dry mop the area. Plaintiff was then seen to fall at 8:38 p.m. Defendant also submitted plaintiff’s deposition testimony. In her deposition, plaintiff acknowledged seeing the signs. Plaintiff also testified she “had to walk around” the signs because there “was no other path to the front door.” As a result, plaintiff stated she “walked to the side of the signs to get to the front door.” Plaintiff opposed defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Relying on her deposition testimony, plaintiff did not dispute that she saw the signs, but asserted that she thought they were “chalkboard” and did not read them. Plaintiff introduced pictures of the signs showing they did not have the traditional bright orange or yellow appearance, but were made of wood and brass. The district court denied the hotel's motion, concluding there were questions of fact concerning the “reasonableness on the part of the defendant” based on the visibility of the signs. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed, finding that the undisputed evidence established plaintiff saw the warning signs in the area prior to her fall. "Any failure of plaintiff to read these signs was a product of her own inattentiveness and not a result of the defendant’s failure to take reasonable precautions." View "Blanchard v. New Hotel Monteleone, LLC." on Justia Law

In 2015, Dr. Robert Easton performed a left total hip arthroplasty on Mrs. Cheryl Mitchell, who had dislocated her hip. Shortly thereafter, Mrs. Mitchell re-dislocated her hip and Dr. Easton performed a revision surgery. While Mrs. Mitchell was in the recovery room, Dr. Easton observed that she had "foot drop;" Dr. Easton performed a second surgery that same day. During the surgery, he discovered that Mrs. Mitchell’s sciatic nerve had been lacerated. Dr. Easton advised Mrs. Mitchell’s family of the situation and consulted with Dr. Rasheed Ahmad, a hand surgeon who handled nerve repairs for Dr. Easton’s medical group. Dr. Easton further advised Mrs. Mitchell that “time would tell how much, if any, function and sensory perception she would get back.” Unfortunately, Mrs. Mitchell’s foot drop never improved and she was left with sciatic nerve palsy. In 2017, Mrs. Mitchell and her husband Michael, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Easton, his employer, the Baton Rouge Orthopaedic Clinic, L.L.C., and their insurers, Physician Assurance SPC. Defendants filed a peremptory exception of prescription, which the trial court granted, dismissing the action. The court of appeal affirmed, reasoning that, although Mrs. Mitchell continued to treat with Dr. Easton for more than a year after the alleged act of malpractice, that treatment was unrelated to the alleged act of malpractice. The Louisiana Supreme Court found no question the Mitchells, knew of the alleged act of malpractice within a day of its occurrence. "It is equally certain that suit was not filed against the treating physician, Dr. Robert Easton, within a year of the alleged malpractice. ... The sole issue, therefore, is whether prescription was suspended during this time period pursuant to the continuing treatment rule." The Court determined the record supported the lower courts' determinations that Mrs. Mitchell did not receive any specific care from Dr. Easton designed to correct or otherwise treat the injury related to the alleged act of malpractice. Even had Mrs. Mitchell received continuing treatment of her injury, the Court did not find Dr. Easton’s statements regarding her questionable prognosis to fall within the scope of the continuing treatment rule. Accordingly, under the specific circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court found the continuing treatment exception of contra non valentem did not apply to suspend prescription in this case, and affirmed the judgments below. View "Mitchell v. Baton Rouge Orthopedic Clinic, LLC et al." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed on a limited basis the district court's ruling that Plaintiffs suit must be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, holding that dismissal was required.Plaintiff, a New York resident, brought this suit over a for-profit Israeli corporation that ranked the performance of United States investment analysts, claiming that that company defamed her in Massachusetts by posting a low rating of her professional performance. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to meet her burden to adduce evidence of specific facts sufficient to satisfy the requirements of constitutional due process for the exercise of personal jurisdiction. View "Lin v. TipRanks, Ltd." on Justia Law

In July 2015, R.N. went boating on Lake Coeur d’Alene with his friends, C.N. and B.L. All three boys were sixteen years old at the time. The boat was owned by C.N.’s father. C.N., B.L., and R.N. obtained about 12 beers from an unknown source and consumed them while boating. Later, the boys stopped at Shooters, a restaurant and bar near the south end of the lake. Respondent Tracy Lynn allegedly provided C.N., B.L., and R.N. with an alcoholic drink known as a “Shooter sinker” (also known as a “derailer”). The boys left the restaurant and drank the derailer on the lake. At some point during the trip, R.N. jumped or fell off the boat into the water and drowned. Appellant-plaintiffs Brandi Jones (R.N.'s mother), and Dasha Drahos (R.N.'s sister) filed a complaint against Lynn, alleging she recklessly and tortiously caused R.N.’s death by providing him with alcohol before he drowned in Lake Coeur d’Alene. Lynn moved for summary judgment, asking the district court to dismiss the case because the Plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice requirements under Idaho’s Dram Shop Act. The district court agreed and granted Lynn’s motion for summary judgment after concluding there was no uniform body of federal maritime dram shop law that would preempt Idaho’s Dram Shop Act. Thus, the Plaintiffs had to comply with the Dram Shop Act’s notice requirements. The Plaintiffs appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court. Finding that the district court correctly applied with the Idaho Dram Shop Act after concluding the Act did not conflict with any uniform federal common law, and that the district court did not err in finding Appellants' claims were barred because they did not comply with the Dram Shop Act, the Supreme Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "Jones v. Lynn" on Justia Law

Doe sued Parillo based on physical and sexual assaults and the violation of an order of protection. The following 30 months involved multiple delays and disputes. Parillo was sanctioned several times for failing to answer the complaint, failing to cooperate in discovery, and for his (and his attorney’s) failure to appear for scheduled hearings. In 2019, following a trial that Parillo and his attorney did not attend, a jury awarded Doe $200,000 for “Loss of Normal Life,” $200,000 for “Pain and Suffering,” $200,000 for “Emotional Distress,” $200,000 for “Future Loss of Normal Life,” and $200,000 for “Future Pain and Suffering,” totaling $1 million in compensatory damages, plus $8 million in punitive damages.In ruling on a post-trial motion, the court stated “[T]he defendant lied in an affidavit to seek a trial continuance, the defense attorneys failed to follow a well-known and well-understood circuit court rule ... and the defense attorneys and defendant abandoned the trial ... defendant’s attempt should read, ‘A Conspiracy to Undermine the Integrity of the Judicial Process—or— How Not to Get a Trial Continuance in the Law Division.’ First, lie; second, don’t follow rules; and third, if the first and second don’t work, don’t show up for trial.” The appellate court reduced Doe’s punitive damages to $1 million. The Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the trial court judgments. The punitive damages award was not unconstitutionally excessive. View "Doe v. Parrillo" on Justia Law

Ittersagen brought a medical malpractice action against Advocate Medical and Dr. Thakadiyil, alleging that the defendants negligently failed to diagnose him with sepsis and treat him appropriately. A jury was sworn. More than halfway through the trial, the court received a note from a juror, who reported that he had a business relationship with “the Advocate Health Care System Endowment.” The juror, a partner in a company that handles investments, said he believed the endowment was affiliated with but separate from Advocate Medical. He explained that his connection to Advocate Medical was so attenuated that he forgot to mention it during jury selection. The juror insisted that the outcome of the trial would not affect him financially and that he could remain fair and impartial. The trial court denied Ittersagen’s request to remove the juror for actual bias or implied bias and to replace him with an alternate juror. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants.The appellate court and Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting an argument that the juror’s business relationship with the endowment created a presumption of bias that cannot be rebutted by claims of impartiality. The court noted the lack of evidence of the affiliation between the endowment and Advocate. The juror did not owe Advocate a fiduciary duty and did not have any other direct relationship with the defendants that would create a presumption of juror bias as a matter of law. View "Ittersagen v. Advocate Health and Hospitals Corp." on Justia Law

This appeal concerned whether the standards governing the selection of an appropriate venue for litigating libel or defamation claims grounded on newspaper publications should also be applied to causes of action premised on internet-based publication. In November 2017, Appellee Joy Fox appeared on the general-election ballot as the Democratic candidate for mayor of the Borough of Chester Heights in Delaware County, Pennsylvania. She was defeated, however, by the Republican candidate, Appellant Stacey Smith. Appellee subsequently brought a civil action in Philadelphia County against Smith, along with other individuals and Republican-affiliated organizations (collectively, “Appellants”), advancing multiple causes of action including defamation, false light, and civil conspiracy. The complaint alleged, in relevant part, that during the campaign Appellants published information on internet and social media websites falsely accusing Appellee of having been charged, in North Carolina, with criminal conduct. Appellee further averred that the false allegations were also published in campaign flyers and posted on billboards in the Chester Heights locality. Appellee contended that venue was proper in Philadelphia County because Appellants’ website was accessible to – and accessed by – Philadelphia residents. These included one of Appellee’s friends who was identified in the complaint and who had assertedly understood the posted information to be damaging to Appellee’s reputation. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the superior court, holding that when a person is defamed via a medium with worldwide accessibility, a cause of action may arise in multiple venues. "Per a straightforward application of the civil procedural rules, then, a plaintiff may select a single venue in a defamation action in any location in which publication and concomitant injury has occurred, albeit that publication and harm may have ensued in multiple counties." View "Fox v. Smith, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-appellants, Paula and Christopher LeRoy lost their 15-year-old son, Kennedy LeRoy, to suicide two days after finishing his sophomore year at Ayala High School in Chino. The LeRoys sued the Chino Valley Unified School District, Ayala’s principal, Diana Yarboi, and its assistant principal, Carlo Purther (collectively, Respondents). The LeRoys alleged Respondents were liable for Kennedy’s suicide because of their inadequate response to his complaints of bullying by his classmates. The trial court granted summary judgment for Respondents, and the LeRoys timely appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded Respondents were statutorily immune from liability and therefore affirmed the judgment. View "Leroy v. Yarboi" on Justia Law

Stephan “Craig” Mitchell suffered a work-related back injury in 1995. Since that time he had continuing back pain and received numerous medical interventions to try to treat the pain, including several surgeries. This appeal from the Alaska Workers’ Compensation Appeals Commission raised two issues: (1) whether the employer rebutted the presumption that the worker was permanently and totally disabled between 2004 and 2017 due to a back injury; and (2) whether the worker is entitled to compensation for a back surgery obtained without prior approval. The Alaska Supreme Court found that because the employer in this case failed to produce evidence of jobs that could accommodate the worker’s limitations, the employer failed to rebut the presumption that he was disabled. And because the surgery did not yield long­ term pain relief or functional improvement and because it entailed using a medical device in a way that the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had specifically warned was not established as safe or effective, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny reimbursement. View "Mitchell v. United Parcel Service, et al." on Justia Law