Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Appellant Jabari Johnson, who proceeded pro se at district court but had counsel on appeal, alleged in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against three prison officers that the officers slammed him on his untreated fractured jaw, stepped on his untreated injured foot, caused him excruciating pain, and inflicted further injury on his jaw and foot to the point that he needed physical therapy and surgery. He also alleged that the incident caused him depression and anxiety. The district court ruled that Johnson failed to allege a sufficient physical injury under § 1997e(e) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) to claim mental or emotional damages and dismissed his individual-capacity claims against the officers with prejudice. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded Johnson's allegations satisfied § 1997e(e)’s physical-injury requirement. The Court affirmed the dismissal of Johnson's § 1983 complaint against one officer, but reversed dismissal against the two others. The case was thus remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. Reyna, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) after an employee of a hospital operated by the Indian Health Service (IHS) struck Plaintiff with his vehicle. Plaintiff claimed that the hospital employee was negligent by driving despite his prior seizures; and the employee’s supervisor was negligent for not preventing the employee from driving; and the employee’s doctor was negligent for releasing the employee to drive   The district court concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because United States’ sovereign immunity applied to Plaintiff’s claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that because it is Plaintiff’s burden to establish subject-matter jurisdiction, he must adduce evidence showing that Rosebud Health had sufficient control or supervision over the employee’s doctor’s work. He has not done so. Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this claim. View "Lonnie Two Eagle, Sr. v. United States" on Justia Law

Patricia and Lynette McMichael (“the McMichaels”) were the co-personal representatives for the estate of Charles McMichael (“Mr. McMichael”). The McMichaels alleged Mr. McMichael sustained injuries and died after falling on at least three occasions at a rehabilitation hospital owned by Encompass. Although Mr. McMichael was a resident and Encompass was a resident of Arapahoe County, and the alleged torts occurred at Encompass’s rehabilitation hospital in Arapahoe County, the McMichaels filed their lawsuit in Boulder County. After the McMichaels filed their complaint in May 2022, Encompass failed to file a timely response. The McMichaels moved for default judgment, which the trial court granted. Thirteen days after a response to the complaint was due, Encompass filed two separate pleadings with the court: (1) its attorneys’ entry of appearance; and (2) a motion to set aside the default judgment. In its motion, Encompass argued that the McMichaels’ counsel failed to confer with Encompass’s counsel before filing the motion for default judgment. Encompass contended the McMichaels’ lawyer had been actively engaged for months in communication with its lawyer about, among other things, the proper venue for the case. The issues this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review was the trial court’s order: (1) vacating its prior default judgment against Encompass PAHS Rehabilitation Hospital, LLC d/b/a Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital of Littleton (“Encompass”); and (2) granting Encompass’s motion to change venue from Boulder County to Arapahoe County. To this the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by choosing to hear this matter on the merits despite Encompass’s thirteen-day delay in responding to the complaint. Further, applying its holding in a companion case, Nelson v. Encompass PAHS Rehabilitation Hospital, LLC, 2023 CO 1, __ P.3d __, the Court concluded the trial court did not err in transferring venue from the Boulder County District Court to the Arapahoe County District Court. "Because the residence of a limited liability company (“LLC”), for venue purposes, is the residence of the LLC, rather than the residences of its members, the county designated in the complaint was not the proper county, and Encompass was entitled to a change of venue as a matter of right." View "McMichael v. Encompass PAHS Rehabilitation Hospital" on Justia Law

Respondent Floyd Nelson, a resident of Arapahoe County, Colorado alleged that he sustained injuries from a fall at a rehabilitation hospital owned by Encompass PAHS Rehabilitation, LLC d/b/a Encompass Health Rehabilitation Hospital of Littleton (“Encompass”), an LLC located in Arapahoe County. Nelson sued Encompass, asserting claims for negligence; medical negligence; and negligent hiring, supervision, retention, and training. Although Nelson was a resident of Arapahoe County, the LLC was located in Arapahoe County, and the alleged torts occurred in Arapahoe County, Nelson brought the action in Boulder County District Court. Encompass argued the trial court erred in looking to the residence of Encompass’s members in determining that venue was proper in Boulder County District Court and thus denying Encompass’s motion for change of venue. Nelson, analogizing to federal diversity cases, argued that the trial court properly looked to the residences of Encompass’s members in deciding where venue lied. In addressing this issue of first impression, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that the residence of an LLC for venue purposes under C.R.C.P. 98 was controlled by the residence of the LLC, not that of its members. View "Nelson v. Encompass PAHS Rehabilitation Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiff bought a laptop with a manufacturer’s warranty from Target. He filed a class action on behalf of “all citizens of Arkansas who purchased one or more products from Target that cost over $15 and that were subject to a written warranty.” His theory was that Target violated the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act’s Pre-Sale Availability Rule by refusing to make the written warranties reasonably available, either by posting them in “close proximity to” products or placing signs nearby informing customers that they could access them upon request. Target filed a notice of removal based on the jurisdictional thresholds in the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. The district court the class action against Target Corporation to Arkansas state court.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the remand order and return the case to the district court for further consideration. The court explained that the district court applied the wrong legal standard. The district court refused to acknowledge the possibility that Target’s sales figures for laptops, televisions and other accessories might have been enough to “plausibly allege” that the case is worth more than $5 million. The district court then compounded its error by focusing exclusively on the two declarations that accompanied Target’s notice of removal. The court wrote that the district court’s failure to consider Target’s lead compliance consultant’s declaration, Target’s central piece of evidence in opposing remand, “effectively denied” the company “the opportunity . . . to establish [its] claim of federal jurisdiction.” View "Robert Leflar v. Target Corporation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of two California statutes— Civil Code section 3333.2, which caps the number of damages a plaintiff may recoup for noneconomic losses at $250,000 (Civ. Code, Section 3333.2, subd. (b)); and Business and Professions Code section 6146, which sets limits on the amount of contingency fees a law firm may charge in representing a plaintiff in a professional negligence action against a health care provider. (Civ. Code, Section 3333.2 and Bus. & Prof. Code, Section 6146 are sometimes referred to collectively as the challenged statutes.)   The Fifth Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal. The court held that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge civil code section 3333.2 and Business and Professions Code Section 6146. Further, the court held that the heirs do not have standing because the heir’s alleged injuries are insufficient to confer upon them standing to challenge the statutes in question. Moreover, the court could not conclude Plaintiffs will suffer hardship if declaratory relief is withheld. View "Dominguez v. Bonta" on Justia Law

The Port of Corpus Christi Authority of Nueces County, Texas (a governmental entity), sued The Port of Corpus Christi, L.P.(a private entity) and Kenneth Berry in state court. The claims were for trespass and encroachment on its submerged land that resulted from dredge operations occurring in a ship channel. Defendants removed the case, but the district court remanded, holding there was no basis for removal either under the federal officer removal statute or due to a federal question.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in denying removal on the basis of the federal officer removal statute. Further, the court explained that it agreed with the district court that the Port Authority’s complaint “disclaims any issue regarding permit compliance, stating its claim exclusively in terms of Texas state law: common law trespass.” The Port Authority did not allege a violation of either the Clean Water Act or the Rivers and Harbors Act. View "Port of Corpus v. Port of Corpus" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Chris LaBarbera hired Richard Knight dba Knight Construction (Knight) to remodel a house pursuant to a contract that provided Knight would defend and indemnify LaBarbera for all claims arising out of the work. Knight obtained a general liability insurance policy from defendant-respondent Security National Insurance Company (Security National) that covered damages Knight was obligated to pay due to bodily injury to a third party. As relevant here, the policy also covered Knight’s “liability for damages . . . [a]ssumed in a contract or agreement that is an ‘insured contract.’ ” Security National acknowledged the indemnity provision in Knight’s contract with LaBarbera was an “insured contract” within the meaning of the policy. The policy also provided, “If we defend an insured [i.e., Knight] against a suit and an indemnitee of the insured [i.e., LaBarbera] is also named as a party to the suit, we will defend that indemnitee” if certain conditions were met. During the remodeling work, a subcontractor suffered catastrophic injuries, and sued both LaBarbera and Knight. LaBarbera’s liability insurer (plaintiff-appellant Lloyd's of London Underwriters) defended him in that lawsuit, and Security National defended Knight. LaBarbera also tendered his defense to Knight and to Security National, but they either ignored or rejected the tender. After settling the underlying lawsuit for $465,000, LaBarbera and Underwriters sued Knight and Security National, seeking to recover the full $465,000 settlement amount and over $100,000 in expenses and attorney fees incurred defending LaBarbera in that lawsuit. Security National moved for summary judgment on the ground that all claims against it were barred because the undisputed facts established it did not have an obligation to defend or indemnify LaBarbera. The trial court granted the motion and entered judgment in favor of Security National. LaBarbera and Underwriters appealed, but the Court of Appeal affirmed, adopting different reasoning than the trial court. The Court agreed with Security National that the indemnitee defense clause in Knight’s general liability insurance policy did not bestow third party beneficiary rights on the indemnitee, LaBarbera, who benefitted only incidentally from the clause. Because LaBarbera was not a third party beneficiary under Knight’s policy, he was precluded from bringing a direct action against Security National. View "LaBarbera, et al. v. Security Nat. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Valley Hospital admitted Ann as a resident to recover from hip surgery. Weeks later, Valley discharged Ann to an assisted living facility, where she died five days later. This suit alleges that Ann, unable due to dementia to communicate her needs, lost 40 pounds and became severely dehydrated at Valley, resulting in acute renal failure and that Valley, billing Medicare until her eligibility expired, "dumped" her at a non-medical facility, "misrepresenting to the family and facility that [Ann] was stable and healthy enough” for the transfer.Valley submitted an arbitration agreement that John had signed on Ann’s behalf. The agreement stated that residents were not required to sign as a condition of admission. The court sent the suit to arbitration. The plaintiffs paid their portion of the arbitration filing fee. Valley did not timely pay the balance. More than 30 days after the deadline, citing Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.98, the plaintiffs moved to vacate the stay of litigation and to withdraw from arbitration. Valley paid its fees that day. The court of appeal affirmed an order permitting the resumption of litigation. The statute provides that a business pursuing arbitration under a pre-dispute arbitration agreement is in material breach of that agreement—thereby waiving its right to arbitrate—if it fails to timely pay its share of arbitration fees; it does not require an arbitrator’s determination of default and it is not limited to only to mandatory pre-dispute agreements. View "Williams v. West Coast Hospitals, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, plaintiff R. Kemp was convicted, released from prison, and placed on parole. In 2020, Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) offered Kemp a job in Sacramento. Defendant Accurate Background LLC (Accurate) provided a background report to Amazon revealing Kemp’s criminal conviction. Amazon then withdrew its job offer. Because Kemp’s 2011 conviction predated the 2020 report by more than seven years, he filed a complaint alleging Accurate: (1) violated the California Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (ICRAA); (2) violated the California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (CCRAA); and (3) derivatively violated the state’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL). Accurate filed a demurrer: Kemp’s parole ended in 2014, which predated the 2020 report by less than seven years. Accurate argued under the ICRAA and the CCRAA, “the term ‘parole’ refers to the end of the parole period,” thus barring liability. Alternatively, Accurate argued the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) preempted the state ICRAA, and therefore Kemp’s ICRAA claim was barred as a matter of law. The trial court overruled Accurate’s demurrer, in part, finding “the plain meaning of ‘from the date of . . . parole’ refers to the start date of conditional release.” The court sustained Accurate’s demurrer, in part, finding “the FCRA preempts the ICRAA claim.” Accurate and Kemp both filed petitions for extraordinary writ relief to the Court of Appeal. The Court held the phrase "from the date of parole" referred to the start date of parole, and the FCRA did not preempt Kemp’s ICRAA claim. Thus, the appellate court directed the trial court to vacate its prior order, which partially sustained Accurate’s demurrer, and to issue a new order overruling the demurrer in its entirety. View "Kemp v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law