Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Progressive Direct Insurance Company ("Progressive") appealed a circuit court order granting a motion for a partial summary judgment filed by Madison Keen and joined by Robert Creller and Alfa Mutual Insurance Company ("Alfa"); the trial court certified its order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P. In September 2019, Keen was involved in a motor-vehicle accident. She sought compensation from Creller, who was the driver of the other vehicle involved in the accident. The vehicle Creller was driving was owned by his parents and was insured by Alfa. The evidence suggested that Creller and his spouse were living with Creller's parents at the time of the accident. Alfa paid Keen the limits of the insurance policy, and Keen executed a settlement agreement and a release in favor of Creller and Alfa. In June 2021, Keen filed the lawsuit at issue here seeking underinsured-motorist benefits from two different policies, namely, a policy issued by Progressive covering the vehicle Keen was driving at the time of the accident and a policy issued by State Farm Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") covering a second vehicle in Keen's household. Because Keen was driving the vehicle insured by Progressive at the time of the accident, her Progressive underinsured-motorist coverage was the primary insurance and the State Farm underinsured-motorist coverage was the secondary insurance. During the litigation, Creller was deposed and revealed the existence of an additional insurance policy covering his spouse's vehicle, which had been issued by Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate") and which identified Creller as a named insured. The discovery of the Allstate policy raised the possibility that Creller might have had additional liability insurance coverage that could have compensated Keen for her injuries. Based on the alleged existence of additional insurance benefits, she asserted that there had been a mutual mistake among the parties to the settlement agreement and the release. Keen eventually moved for partial summary judgment, arguing the Allstate policy did not provide coverage. For its part, Progressive opposed Keen's motion, because the availability of benefits under the Allstate policy might affect Progressive's interests with respect to Keen's underinsured- motorist claim. The trial court granted Keen's motion and certified its order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). Progressive appealed. Because it appeared there was a question of fact based on the evidence before the trial court existed when it entered the partial summary judgment, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed that judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Progressive Direct Ins. Co. v. Keen, et al." on Justia Law

After being arrested twice in a two-day span, once in Lauderdale County (Mississippi) and once in Jones County, for being suspected of driving under the influence and public intoxication, Shelley Rose allegedly drove a rental van the wrong way down Interstate 59 in Pearl River County. A motor vehicle collision ensued, killing Jada Bright. Plaintiff Estate of Jada Bright (Bright) filed a wrongful death suit at the Pearl River County Circuit Court against Defendants Estate of Shelley Rose; EAN Holdings, LLC; Enterprise Leasing Company-South Central, LLC; Elco Administrative Services Company; Enterprise Holdings, Inc.; National Car Rental System, Inc.; Lauderdale County; Jones County; City of Ellisville; Beech’s Towing & Recovery LLC; ABC 1-5; and John Does 1-5, and asserted that venue was proper per Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3 (Rev. 2019) because the claim arose out of a motor vehicle accident which occurred in Pearl River County. Defendants Jones County, Lauderdale County, and the City of Ellisville, filed motions to change venue, alleging that they had not been sued in the proper venue, based on the specific venue statute, Mississippi Code Section 11-46-13(2) (Rev. 2019), of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. The trial court ultimately denied the motions, and the Counties and City petitioned for an interlocutory appeal. After review, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment denying the change of venue motions, and remanded the case with instructions to transfer venue either to Jones County or Lauderdale County. View "Jones County, et al. v. Estate of Jada Bright, et al." on Justia Law

Pakistan International Airlines (“PIA”) failed to transport the body of N.B. to Pakistan for burial due to a miscommunication by employees of Swissport USA, PIA’s cargo loading agent. N.B.’s family members sued PIA and Swissport in New York state court under state law; PIA removed the action to the district court. Following cross-motions for summary judgment and an evidentiary hearing, the district court held that Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted by the Montreal Convention and dismissed the suit. On appeal, Plaintiffs argued that the Montreal Convention, which preempts state-law claims arising from delayed cargo, does not apply because human remains are not “cargo” for purposes of the Montreal Convention and because their particular claims are not for “delay.”   The Second Circuit affirmed. The court explained that human remains are cargo for purposes of the Montreal Convention; and on the facts found by the district court, the claims arise from delay. The claims are therefore preempted by the Montreal Convention. The court further wrote that it was Plaintiffs who cut off PIA’s ability to perform under the terms of the waybill. That decision was understandable given the need to bury N.B. quickly, and it cannot be doubted that Plaintiffs found themselves in a hard situation. But their only recourse against PIA and Swissport was a claim under the Montreal Convention, a claim which they have consistently declined to assert. View "Badar v. Swissport USA, Inc." on Justia Law

T&J White, LLC, d/b/a Brown Heating & Cooling ("Brown Heating & Cooling"), and its employee, Bobby Morse ("the defendants"), appealed a circuit court’s denial of their motions seeking a judgment as a matter of law ("JML") and a new trial following the entry of judgment on a jury verdict against the defendants and in favor of the plaintiff, Timothy Williams. Morse, while engaged as an employee of Brown Heating & Cooling, rear-ended Williams in a motor-vehicle collision. Thereafter, Williams filed a complaint asserting, among other things, negligence and wantonness claims against the defendants. The case proceeded to trial. After the trial court instructed the jury but before the jury retired, counsel for the parties discussed the verdict form and the jury instructions that had been given. Ultimately, the defendants requested, and received, an additional blank line on the verdict form to allow the jury to award compensatory/nominal damages with respect to the wantonness claim; this additional line was placed just before the line for an award of punitive damages. The court then read the final verdict form to the jurors, and no objections were made. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Williams, awarding the following: $500,000 in compensatory damages for negligence, $250,000 in compensatory damages for wantonness, and $750,000 in punitive damages for wantonness. After the jury was polled, defense counsel orally renewed its motion for a JML based on, among other grounds, the alleged insufficiency of the evidence of wantonness and alleged inconsistency of the verdict. The court denied the motion, concluded the trial proceedings, and entered a final judgment on the verdict. The defendants, appealing the denial of a JML on the wantonness claim and that the trial court exceeded its discretion by denying their motion for a new trial. Finding no reversible error, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Brown Heating & Cooling v. Williams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a premises liability claim against Defendant after she fell on an asphalt patch in front of Defendant's property. The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that the condition of the sidewalk was a trivial defect. The Second Appellate District reversed, holding that Defendant failed to carry the burden of establishing that the defect was trivial as a matter of law. View "Fajardo v. Dailey" on Justia Law

Tamatha Hennessey alleged a radiology technician sexually assaulted her during her visit to the University of Kansas hospital for emergency medical care. Proceeding pro se, Hennessey brought a civil action for negligent supervision against the University of Kansas Hospital Authority (“UKHA”), which oversaw operation of the hospital. UKHA moved to dismiss the action, arguing Hennessey failed to plead facts supporting subject matter/diversity jurisdiction and that it was entitled to sovereign immunity. UKHA premised both arguments on it being an arm of the state of Kansas and therefore entitled to the same immunities as the state. But the Tenth Circuit found UKHA failed to support its motion with any evidence demonstrating it was an arm of the state or any analysis of the factors governing whether a state-created entity is an arm of the state. The district court, relying on the statutory scheme creating UKHA, Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 76-3301–3323 (the “University of Kansas Hospital Authority Act” or the “Act”), found the Act characterized UKHA as an entity of the state, UKHA was not autonomous from the state, and UKHA was concerned with state-wide rather than local functions. Therefore, the district court concluded UKHA was an arm of the state and, therefore, dismissed Hennessey’s action. Hennessey appeals, arguing: (1) a procedural argument that the burden was on UKHA to demonstrate it was an arm of the state and it failed to meet this burden by not presenting any evidence and not arguing the factors governing the arm-of- the-state analysis; (2) a substantive argument that, regardless of the burden, the University of Kansas Hospital Authority Act supported the conclusion that UKHA was not an arm of the state; and (3) a fallback argument that a remand for limited discovery and presentation of evidence was appropriate. The Tenth Circuit concluded the burden fell on the entity asserting it was an arm of the state, and UKHA did not meet its burden. While Tenth Circuit precedent permitted a district court to raise the issue sua sponge, the Tenth Circuit found the district court erred in concluding UKHA was not autonomous under the language of the Act. The district court’s order granting UKHA’s motion to dismiss was vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Hennessey v. University of Kansas Hospital Authority" on Justia Law

From August 2018 through January 2019, plaintiffs were six-year-old first grade students who attended Maple Elementary School (Maple) within the Hesperia Unified School District (the District). Pedro Martinez worked at Maple as a janitor. Martinez’s position as a janitor did not require him to have any one-on-one contact with the students. Martinez engaged in a variety of activities with the students that plaintiffs characterized as “‘grooming’ activities” that were “designed to lure minor students, including [p]laintiffs, into a false sense of security around him.” Plaintiffs alleged that numerous District employees who were mandated reporters under the Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act (CANRA), witnessed Martinez’s behavior and did not report it to school officials or to law enforcement, in violation of the District’s policies. In January 2019, the State charged Martinez with numerous felonies involving his alleged sexual abuse of minors. In February 2019, plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the District and Martinez, alleging numerous claims arising from Martinez’s alleged sexual abuse of plaintiffs. The trial court was persuaded by the District's argument, concluding that plaintiffs did not adequately plead a negligence cause of action against the District, because they failed to state any facts “establishing that [the] District knew of any prior acts of sexual abuse by Martinez and/or that the District had actual or constructive knowledge that Martinez was abusing [p]laintiffs so as to impose liability upon [the] District.” One month after plaintiffs sought reconsideration, the trial court entered judgment against plaintiffs. Plaintiffs argued on appeal that they were not required to plead facts demonstrating that the District had actual knowledge of past sexual abuse by Martinez, and that they otherwise pled sufficient facts to state negligence causes of action against the District. The Court of Appeal agreed with plaintiffs on all of those points. The Court disagreed with plaintiffs' contention that the trial court erred by dismissing their sex discrimination claims under Title IX and California Education Code section 220: plaintiffs’ allegations are insufficient to constitute actual notice of a violation of Title IX or Education Code section 220. The judgment of dismissal was reversed, the order sustaining the demurrer to the third amended complaint was vacated, and the trial court was directed to enter a new order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend as to the causes of action under Title IX, Education Code section 220, and the Unruh Civil Rights Act but otherwise overruling the demurrer. View "Roe v. Hesperia Unified School Dist." on Justia Law

Respondent Myra Windham was seriously injured while driving a rental car that was considered a temporary substitute vehicle under her State Farm policy. In this declaratory judgment action instituted by Petitioner State Farm, the issue this case presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's determination was whether Windham could stack her underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage pursuant to section 38-77-160 of the South Carolina Code. The circuit court agreed with State Farm that stacking was prohibited, and the court of appeals reversed. Because both parties offered reasonable interpretations of the policy language, the Supreme Court found an ambiguity existed, which it construed against the drafter. Accordingly, the Court agreed with the court of appeals that Windham could stack, and affirmed as modified. View "State Farm v. Windham" on Justia Law

In 2017, Jeremy Thornhill said that he had injured his back while working. He sought workers’ compensation benefits from his employer, Walker-Hill and its insurance carrier, Zurich American Insurance Company of Illinois, but the Employer/Carrier denied that Thornhill had sustained a compensable injury. Ultimately, the parties agreed to compromise and settled pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 71-3-29 (Rev. 2021). Thornhill submitted the settlement to the Mississippi Workers’ Compensation Commission for approval. After examining the application, the Commission approved the settlement and dismissed Thornhill’s case with prejudice. Pursuant to the settlement, Thornhill signed a general release, which reserved his right to pursue a bad faith claim. Believing he had exhausted his administrative remedies, Thornhill filed a bad faith suit against the Employer/Carrier; the Employer/Carrier moved to dismiss the case, arguing the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because the Commission never made a factual finding that he was entitled to workers’ compensation benefits. The trial court concurred it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding that Thornhill had exhausted his administrative remedies and that the circuit court had jurisdiction to hear his bad faith claim. The appeals court determined that “Thornhill exhausted his administrative remedies because he fully and finally settled his workers’ compensation claim against the Employer/Carrier, the Commission approved the settlement, and there is nothing left pending before the Commission.” To this, the Mississippi Supreme Court agreed. The circuit court judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Thornhill v. Walker-Hill Environmental, et al." on Justia Law

Robert Fulfer, while making a delivery, exited his truck and stepped down into a nine-inch-deep pothole, resulting in serious personal injuries. He was working for Ruan Logistics Corporation (“RLC”), which was contracted as a transportation and cargo-hauling provider by Sorrento Lactalis, Inc. (“SLI”). Fulfer filed a personal injury action against SLI seeking damages based on premises liability and negligence. SLI moved to dismiss pursuant to Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(c), arguing that it was immune from a tort action because it was a statutory employer of Fulfer, meaning that Idaho’s Workers’ Compensation laws provided Fulfer’s exclusive remedy. In response, Fulfer argued that an exception to the exclusive remedy rule applied. The district court determined Fulfer’s complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because he: (1) failed to comply with Idaho’s notice pleading requirements by not addressing statutory employer immunity; and (2) failed to allege specific facts required for establishing an exception to the exclusive remedy rule based on the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in Gomez v. Crookham Co., 457 P.3d 901 (2020), which was controlling at the time. Accordingly, the district court dismissed Fulfer’s complaint without prejudice and later denied Fulfer’s motion to reconsider and for leave to file a second amended complaint. Fulfer appealed. The Supreme Court determined the district court erred in dismissing Fulfer’s first amended complaint pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because it satisfied Idaho’s pleading requirements. Further, the Supreme Court concluded the exception to the exclusive remedy rule in I.C. 72-209(3) applied to direct and statutory employers. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Fulfer v. Sorrento Lactalis, Inc." on Justia Law