Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

This case involved a medical-malpractice suit brought by Jalena and Brian Taylor against Jalena’s OB/GYN, Dr. Donielle Daigle, and her clinic, Premier Women’s Health, PLLC. In 2017, Jalena was admitted to Memorial Hospital of Gulfport in active labor preparing to give birth. After pushing for two and a half hours, the baby’s head became lodged in the mother’s pelvis, and it was determined that a caesarean section was necessary. Following delivery of the child, Jalena’s blood pressure dropped, and her pulse increased. The nurses worked to firm Jalena’s uterus post delivery, but she continued to have heavy clots and bleeding. Jalena was given a drug to tighten the uterus, and an OR team was called to be on standby in the event surgery became necessary. Dr. Daigle called the OR team off after Jalena’s bleeding was minimal, and her uterus remained completely firm. But Jalena’s heart rate remained extremely elevated. Dr. Daigle allowed Jalena to go back to her room, and she checked her again, and the uterus was firm. A minute or two later, Jalena sat up and felt a gush of blood. Dr. Daigle prepared to perform a hysterectomy, There was still bleeding from the cervical area, which doctors decided they needed to amputate. Even after doing so, there was still bleeding because of a laceration extending into the vagina. When the vagina was sutured and incorporated into the repair of the vaginal cuff, the bleeding finally stopped. The Taylors allege that Dr. Daigle failed to adequately treat Jalena and, as a result, she cannot have any more children. A five-day jury trial was held in January 2021, and the jury returned a twelve-to-zero verdict in favor of Dr. Daigle and Premier. On appeal, the Taylors argued the trial court committed reversible error by: (1) refusing to grant their cause challenges of patients of Dr. Daigle and Premier, thus failing to give them a right to a fair and impartial jury; and (2) failing to find a deviation from the standard of care for failing to perform a proper inspection of a genital tract laceration. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the jury verdict because it was reached on factual evidence in favor of Dr. Daigle and Premier by an impartial jury. "All twelve of the jurors agreed on the verdict, and the verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. It should not be disturbed." View "Taylor v. Premier Women's Health, PLLC, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant, then proceeding pro se, brought an action against Respondent, her brother, alleging he had falsely accused her of committing crimes against him and their elderly parents. Respondent emailed the attorney in this matter (“Attorney”), who was Appellant’s husband since June 2015, her former coworker at his law firm, and later her counsel in this action, warning that if Appellant did not settle the action, Respondent would file a cross-complaint the next day.   The court subsequently dismissed Respondent’s cross-complaint. Appellant retained Attorney to represent her pro bono or at a discounted rate, having been advised by Attorney that he would likely need to testify at trial, and having executed informed written consent to Attorney’s representation notwithstanding his expected dual role as advocate and witness   Two months before trial, Respondent moved to disqualify Attorney as Appellant’s counsel under California’s advocate-witness rule, viz., rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (Rule 3.7). The trial court disqualified Attorney from all phases of the litigation.   The Second Appellate District reversed the trial court’s disqualification order, holding that the trial court failed to apply the proper legal standards, and thereby abused its discretion, in disqualifying Attorney from representing Appellant under the advocate witness rule. The court explained that the trial court failed to apply Rule 3.7’s informed-consent exception. Indeed, the trial court failed even to cite Rule 3.7, instead applying the ABA Rule, which is not binding and lacks any informed-consent exception. The trial court further abused its discretion in failing to apply Rule 3.7’s limitation to advocacy “in a trial.” View "Lopez v. Lopez" on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal the Supreme Court declined to adopt the apex doctrine, which can prevent parties from deposing top-level corporate executives absent the requesting party making certain initial showings, holding that remand was required for the trial court to consider a motion for a protective order with the benefit of guidance set forth in this opinion.Plaintiffs sued the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) alleging that despite being aware of the consequences of repetitive head trauma, the NCAA failed to implement reasonable concussion-management protocols to protect its athletes, causing three former college football players to die from a neurodegenerative disease linked to repetitive head trauma. The NCAA moved twice for a protective order to prevent Plaintiffs from deposing three of its high-ranking executives. After the trial court denied the motions the NCAA sought discretionary interlocutory review, inviting the Supreme Court to adopt the apex doctrine. The Supreme Court remanded the case, holding (1) this appeal was properly before the Court; and (2) although the Court declines to adopt the apex doctrine, it establishes a framework that harmonizes its principles with the applicable trial rules to aid courts in determining whether good cause exists to prohibit or limit the deposition of a top-level official in a large organization. View "National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Finnerty" on Justia Law

During a decade as a member of USA Gymnastics, J.J. was one of the hundreds of gymnasts sexually assaulted by Larry Nassar, the organization’s physician. In response to the claims based on Nassar’s conduct, USA Gymnastics filed for bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court set a deadline for filing proofs of claim. USA Gymnastics mailed notices to all known survivors who had filed or threatened to file lawsuits, had reported abuse, had entered into a settlement agreement, or had received payment as a result of an allegation of abuse--more than 1,300 individuals. USA Gymnastics also emailed copies of the notice to more than 360,000 current and former USA Gymnastics members, and placed information about the bar date on its website, social media pages, in USA Today, and in gymnastics journals, podcasts, and websites J.J. did not receive actual notice and filed her proof of claim five months late.The bankruptcy court treated her claim as untimely. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed. J.J. argued that she was entitled to actual notice; she claimed USA Gymnastics should have known that she was a potential claimant because it needed to retain medical records under Michigan law and should have known that she had seen Nassar for medical care. The court found no evidence that USA Gymnastics had these records; J.J.’s argument that Michigan law required retention of any relevant documents “is dubious.” View "Jane Doe JJ v. USA Gymnastics" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee James Nelson was seriously injured while riding his bicycle on a trail on Air Force Academy property in Colorado. He and his wife, Elizabeth Varney, sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Nelson sought damages for his personal injuries; Varney sought damages for loss of consortium. After several years of litigation, the district court ruled the government was liable for Nelson’s accident and injuries. The court based its decision on the Colorado Recreational Use Statute (“CRUS”). The court awarded Nelson more than $6.9 million, and awarded Varney more than $400,000. In addition to the damages awards, the district court also ordered the government to pay plaintiffs' attorney’s fees. CRUS contained an attorney’s-fees-shifting provision, allowing prevailing plaintiffs to recover their fees against defendant landowners. Providing an exception to the United States’s sovereign immunity, the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”) provided that “[t]he United States shall be liable for such fees and expenses to the same extent that any other party would be liable under the common law or under the terms of any statute which specifically provides for such an award.” The district court concluded that the government had to pay for plaintiffs' fees. The issue this case presented for the Tenth Circuit's review centered on whether the district court erred in ordering the government to pay the attorney's fees after holding the CRUS qualified under the EAJA as “any statute which specifically provides for” an attorney’s fees award. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Nelson, et al. v. United States" on Justia Law

Wagstaff & Cartmell, LLP (Wagstaff) filed a declaratory-judgment action against the Defendant-Attorney, seeking a declaration that Wagstaff owed nothing to Defendant for any work on a wrongful death lawsuit or, in the alternative, a determination of the amount it owed to Defendant.   Defendant filed counterclaims against Wagstaff, including a counterclaim under the theory of quantum meruit. The district court entered judgment in Wagstaff’s favor. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in (1) denying his motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (2) denying his motion for leave to dismiss counterclaims without prejudice and motions for leave to file his second amended answer (3) denying his motion to dismiss the declaratory-judgment action without prejudice under the abstention doctrine and motion to reconsider the denial of that dismissal motion and (4) denying, in part, his motion to alter or amend the judgment or, in the alternative, relief from judgment.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling in Plaintiff’s favor. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion to alter or amend the judgment or, in the alternative, relief from judgment. The court held that the district court reasonably interpreted Defendant’s response to Wagstaff’s third summary judgment motion as an abandonment of his quantum meruit claim. In addition, Defendant had not sustained his burden of proving that Wagstaff has engaged in misconduct that prevented him from fully and fairly presenting his case. View "Wagstaff & Cartmell, LLP v. Neal Lewis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff regularly used Roundup on his lawn for about 30 years. Plaintiff was diagnosed with malignant fibrous histiocytoma, which he believes was linked to the main chemical ingredient in Roundup. Plaintiff filed against Monsanto, the manufacturer of Roundup®. In his four-count complaint, he alleged strict liability for a design defect under Georgia law (Count I); strict liability for failure to warn under Georgia law (Count II); negligence under Georgia law (Count III); and breach of implied warranties under Georgia law (Count IV). The district court granted Defendant’s motion, thereby eliminating Counts I and III from the Complaint. Plaintiff timely appealed the district court’s judgment on the pleadings as to Count II.   The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded. The court held that Plaintiff’s failure to warn claim is not preempted by the federal requirements under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) or the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) actions pursuant to it. The court explained that sometimes IFRA or the EPA’s actions pursuant to FIFRA may preempt state law. But only federal action with the force of law has the capacity to preempt state law. Here, the problem for Monsanto is that the EPA’s registration process is not sufficiently formal to carry with it the force of law under Mead. Further, Monsanto cannot wave the “formality” wand on EPA actions to accomplish compliance with the Mead standard. None of them are the product of “notice-and-comment rulemaking” or “formal adjudication.” Nor do the EPA letters Monsanto points to “bespeak the legislative type of activity that would naturally bind” Monsanto. View "John D. Carson v. Monsanto Company" on Justia Law

Relator—the decedent’s personal representative—brought a wrongful death claim under ORS 30.020 that sought, among other things, damages on behalf of the statutory beneficiaries for their loss of decedent’s society and companionship. The trial court entered an order under ORCP 44 C requiring the beneficiaries to produce records of their medical and psychological care that was relevant to those alleged damages. Relator filed a petition for an alternative writ of mandamus, which the Oregon Supreme Court allowed, arguing that the beneficiaries’ records were privileged, and that ORCP 44 C could not require disclosure because that rule applied to claims made for “damages for injuries to the party,” and the beneficiaries were not parties. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court’s ruling was in error. As a matter of law, the Court held that statutory beneficiaries of a wrongful death claim were not, by virtue of that status, “parties” who could be compelled under ORCP 44 C to provide privileged records. View "Dahlton v. Kyser" on Justia Law

Defendant rear-ended plaintiff’s vehicle, and plaintiff suffered physical and emotional injuries as a result. Plaintiff claimed that her emotional injuries were so severe that she attempted to take her own life and was hospitalized. Defendant disputed responsibility for that harm on the ground that her conduct did not unreasonably create a foreseeable risk of such harm but argued that the court should exclude certain evidence of her conduct—that, immediately before the collision, she had been using her cellphone—as irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. Reasoning that evidence of defendant’s conduct could affect the jury’s determination of the foreseeability question and was not unfairly prejudicial, the trial court denied defendant’s motion. After a jury verdict in plaintiff’s favor, the trial court entered judgment, and defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with the trial court, affirmed the judgment that it entered, and reversed the contrary decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Scott v. Kesselring" on Justia Law

The real parties in interest, two truck drivers, were injured in a single-vehicle truck accident. At the time of the accident, the injured drivers were operating a truck manufactured by Defendant. Defendant is a Delaware company that maintained a hub in Fontana, California but did not manufacture or assemble trucks in the state.The injured truck drivers filed product liability, negligence and loss of consortium claims against Defendant. Defendant moved to quash, claiming that California courts lack personal jurisdiction over Defendant because the truck drivers' causes of action did not arise out of or relate to its forum-related activities. The truck drivers responded that Defendant was subject to specific jurisdiction because it had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in California by marketing, selling, and servicing the specific model of truck that was involved in the accident. The trial court denied Defendant's motion to quash and Defendant sought a writ of mandate from the Second Appellate District.The Second Appellate District denied Defendant's petition for writ of mandate, finding 1.) Defendant purposefully availed itself of the benefits of operating in California, 2.) the truck drivers' claims "relate to Defendant's forum contacts, and 3.) the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendant comports with fair play and substantial justice. View "Daimler Trucks North America LLC v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law