Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was injured when a gun manufactured by the defendant accidentally discharged. Plaintiff and her family filed several claims in the district court. The district court dismissed all parties’ claims except the plaintiff’s defective-design claim under the Louisiana Product Liability Act. Plaintiff recovered $500,000 and the defendant appealed.On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that the Louisiana Product Liability Act (“LPLA”) permitted the plaintiff’s claim. Section 60(b) of the LPLA provides that no firearm manufacturer can be held liable for any shooting injury unless the injury was “proximately caused by the unreasonably dangerous construction or composition of the product.” The court held that this language unambiguously bars design-defect claims. The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the natural reading of Section 60(b) leads to an absurd result. View "Seguin v. Remington Arms" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs filed suit in South Carolina state court against fourteen defendants (ten individuals and four agencies), alleging five causes of action. The circuit court reviewed five preserved issues: (1) the applicable statutes of limitations for plaintiffs' claims under the Rehabilitation Act ("RA") and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"); (2) whether the district court abused its discretion in excluding the witnesses' testimonies; (3) the plaintiffs' assertion that the district court improperly instructed the jury as to the duty owed under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act; (4) whether the district court improperly dismissed plaintiff’s RA claims; and (5) whether the court erred in dismissing plaintiff’s 1983 claims.The circuit court affirmed the district court’s decision to limit the plaintiffs' witness's testimony and further found that the court did not abuse its discretion by limiting the hybrid witness's testimony or by determining whether the defendant’s deposition had any potential to lead to admissible evidence.Further, the court found no error in the district court’s instruction or its' finding that the ADA and RA claims were subject to the South Carolina Human Affairs Law’s one-year statute of limitations. The plaintiffs failed to show reversible error as they neither pleaded nor proved any action or inaction by any individually named defendants that caused them harm. View "Johnny Timpson v. Anderson County Disabilities" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleges he was unlawfully assaulted, pepper-sprayed, detained in an unlawful mass arrest, and ultimately incarcerated. He sued the City of St. Louis and multiple police officers for First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment violations, conspiracy to deprive him of civil rights, and supplemental state law claims. One officer moved to dismiss the 1983 claims, arguing plaintiff’s amended complaint failed to state a claim and he is entitled to qualified immunity. The only allegations relating to the defendant’s involvement are that he was working on September 17 and took custody of the plaintiff’s bicycle lying in the street at the time of his arrest. These allegations do not establish a causal link between the plaintiff and the specific wrongs the defendants as a whole allegedly committed. Further, the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity because the amended complaint did not contain specific and plausible allegations linking the defendant to overt acts alleged as part of the conspiracy of all the defendants. The assertion that he agreed to participate in those acts does not state a plausible claim.Finally, the circuit court held that the district court erred in denying the other defendants' motion to dismiss. The defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine was not clearly established. View "Michael Faulk v. Gerald Leyshock" on Justia Law

While shopping at a Wal-Mart Supercenter retail store in Weatherford, Texas, the plaintiff slipped and fell in the store’s deli section. Her amended complaint referred to the cause of her fall as “grease or a similar slick substance.” She alleged that Wal-Mart had either actual or constructive knowledge of the spilled grease yet failed to clean it up or warn her of the hazardous condition.Wal-Mart argued that the plaintiff’s testimony showed that she had no evidence that it had actual or constructive knowledge of the spill Plaintiff submitted an affidavit, and Wal-Mart objected that it “lack[ed] credibility” and was a “self-serving sham.” The Fifth Circuit explained that the sham-affidavit doctrine is not applicable when discrepancies between an affidavit and other testimony can be reconciled such that the statements are not inherently inconsistent.The court found that affidavit testimony did not inherently contradict her deposition testimony, and the district court abused its discretion in applying the sham-affidavit rule. Further, because the evidence shows a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Wal-Mart had constructive notice of the spilled grease, the district court erred in granting summary judgment. View "Svetlana Lokhova v. Stefan Halper" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s, two patients at an acute psychiatric hospital, obtained judgments against the hospital and its parent company under the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (“the Elder Abuse Act”).On appeal, Defendants claimed that the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (“MICRA”) applied to Plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants contend that under MICRA, Plaintiffs’ claims are time-barred.The Second Appellate District explained that MICRA is “designed to discourage medical malpractice lawsuits,” whereas the Elder Abuse Act permits “interested persons to engage attorneys to take up the cause of abused elderly persons and dependent adults. The legislative intent is clear that professional negligence and the Elder Abuse Act are separate and distinct. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims under the Elder Abuse Act were not time-barred.The otherwise court affirmed the lower court’s rulings over Defendants’ objections. However, on Plaintiffs’ appeal, the court ordered a new trial on the issues of respondeat superior and ratification. View "Samantha B. v. Aurora Vista Del Mar" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was seriously injured when a pledge of the defendant fraternity snuck into her room and slit her throat after a night of drinking. The plaintiff filed tort claims against the fraternity and related parties (“the fraternity”). Plaintiff claimed primary and vicarious liability.Applying Nebraska law, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s primary liability claims, finding that the attack was not a foreseeable result of the fraternity’s forced hazing. The attacker’s criminal conduct was an intervening cause, severing the chain of causation. As to the plaintiff’s vicarious liability claims, the court held that the plaintiff failed to prove that any supposed agents of the fraternity were negligent under Nebraska law.The Eighth Circuit also held that social host liability does not apply. Nebraska’s Minor Alcoholic Liquor Liability Act provides a cause of action related to the “negligence of an intoxicated minor.” Here, the attacker was convicted of second-degree assault, which requires a finding that he acted knowingly or intentionally. This precludes a finding that the attacker acted negligently. View "Teresa Spagna v. Collin Gill" on Justia Law

Walmart employees stopped the plaintiffs, a woman and her daughter, on suspicion of shoplifting. The plaintiffs sued Walmart in state court, alleging false imprisonment, among other claims. Walmart removed the case to federal court, and the district court dismissed some claims and entered summary judgment in favor of Walmart. Regarding the plaintiffs' Texas Deceptive Trade Practices & Consumer Protection Act claim, the court found they failed to identify any facts that would establish an unconscionable action. Next, plaintiffs assert that Walmart employees committed acts underlying their false imprisonment claims and that Walmart is vicariously liable. The court reasoned that the off-duty police officer is treated as an anon-duty police officer for vicarious liability purposes. As a result, Walmart cannot be vicariously liable for the off-duty officer’s actions. Plaintiffs further argue that Walmart did not establish that her detention was reasonable. The court found that plaintiff cannot state a prima facie case for assault, battery, or offensive contact. Finally, they do not provide any argument that they were harmed, let alone substantially prejudiced, by allowing Walmart to attach portions of depositions, an asset protection case record sheet, and body camera footage. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate the necessary elements for their claims. View "Huynh v. Walmart" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Janet Bisceglia appealed a superior court order granting summary judgment to defendants' the New Hampshire Secretary of State and the New Hampshire Department of Natural and Cultural Resources (collectively the State). The court ruled that the State was immune from liability for plaintiff’s negligence claim under New Hampshire’s recreational use statute. Plaintiff and her family visited a historic lighthouse situated on land in New Castle, which was owned by the United States. That federal land was adjacent to Fort Constitution, which was owned and operated by the State. While plaintiff was standing on the federal land next to the outer wall of Fort Constitution, a portion of the wall fell on top of her, causing her substantial injuries. The trial court determined that because the State “held Fort Constitution out to the public at no charge” and the wall “was maintained as part of the historic site for the use and enjoyment of the public,” RSA 508:14, I, shielded the State from liability, “regardless of whether Plaintiff was physically on [the State’s] property at the time of the injury.” The court denied the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration. The New Hampshire Supreme Court reversed, finding it was undisputed that plaintiff did not use the State’s land; the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion for summary judgment based on RSA 508:14, I. View "Bisceglia v. New Hampshire Secretary of State & al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Hamid Harris alleged that Donald Stabile, a Newark Police Department detective, falsely accused him of four armed robberies that were committed in Newark in January 2015, and unlawfully arrested him in connection with those robberies based on an improperly issued arrest warrant. After the charges against plaintiff were dismissed, he filed this action. Defendants the City of Newark, Detective Donald Stabile, and Police Officer Angel Romero following the trial court’s denial of their motion for summary judgment, contended the trial court erred in denying them qualified immunity as a defense to Harris’s claims brought under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (NJCRA). Defendants contended the trial court’s order denying summary judgment was a legal determination and should therefore be deemed appealable as of right, in keeping with both New Jersey appellate practice and federal law. The trial court reasoned that because Stabile did not have probable cause to arrest plaintiff, and because Stabile’s belief that plaintiff committed the robberies was objectively unreasonable, defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Appellate Division ruled that “[t]he appeal is interlocutory as it is not from a final order” and dismissed defendants’ notice of appeal. The appellate court also denied defendants’ motion for leave to appeal. The New Jersey Supreme Court found the trial court’s order was a decision premised on factual findings as well as legal conclusions, not an exclusively legal determination. "In an NJCRA action, a defendant seeking to challenge a trial court’s order denying qualified immunity prior to final judgment must proceed by motion for leave to file an interlocutory appeal in accordance with Rules 2:2-4 and 2:5-6. View "Harris v. City of Newark, et al." on Justia Law

Shelley Droz alleged that her husband, Eric Droz, used an arc grinding machine to resurface brake drum shoes that contained asbestos. She claimed the arc grinder manufacturer, Hennessy, knew that the grinding process generated asbestos dust, and Hennessy had a duty under Washington State law to warn about the dangers of asbestos dust exposure. Eric Droz died of mesothelioma while the litigation was pending. The Superior Court granted Hennessy’s summary judgment motion, holding that once Hennessy showed that the arc grinder could be used with asbestos-containing and asbestos-free brake drum shoes, the burden shifted to Ms. Droz to show that Mr. Droz used asbestos-containing brake drum shoes with the arc grinder. The court agreed with Hennessy that Droz did not offer sufficient evidence of exposure to brake drum shoe asbestos dust to counter Hennessy’s summary judgment motion. The issues for the Delaware Supreme Court were whether the Superior Court misapplied Superior Court Rule 56’s burden-shifting framework and, once the burden shifted to the plaintiff to raise a genuine issue of material fact, whether Ms. Droz came forward with evidence demonstrating that Mr. Droz used asbestos-containing brake drum shoes with the arc grinder. The Supreme Court found the Superior Court properly allocated the summary judgment burdens. But the Court reversed, finding Ms. Droz met her burden to raise a genuine issue of material fact whether Mr. Droz was exposed to asbestos dust from using the arc grinder with asbestos-containing brake drum shoes. View "Droz v. Hennessy Industries, LLC" on Justia Law