Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In May 2018, Howard Cole Burton ("Cole") and Nicholas Hood ("Nicholas") were Auburn University students enrolled in the field-camp course offered by the Department of Geosciences. As part of that geology course, students participated in a series of field exercises, including traveling to geologically significant sites in Alabama. One of the geologically significant sites in Alabama is known as "the Gadsden site," considered a "world-renowned example of a foreland-fold-and-thrust belt." Before the field-exercise portion of the course began, the faculty conducted an informational meeting to brief the students on safety and the specifics of what they could expect to encounter during the field exercises. At that meeting, the students were told to wear bright colors during field exercises for the purpose of staying visible to drivers when near a roadway and to hunters when in a wooded area. No safety cones, signs, or flags were placed along the section of the highway where the group was conducting the field exercise to alert oncoming traffic as to the presence of the group. The students began working on the field exercise approximately 12 to 15 feet from the edge of the highway. Jennifer Fulkerson was driving southbound on Highway 431 in an impaired state and under the influence of several prescription medications. Fulkerson's driver's side tires ran off the highway into the median, causing Fulkerson to react and overcorrect, ultimately striking Cole and Nicholas. Cole suffered severe injuries, and Nicholas died approximately one month after the accident from the injuries he had sustained. Caitlin Hood, as the personal representative of Nicholas's estate, and Cole individually sued Fulkerson, among others, asserting various claims arising out of the accident. At issue in this appeal was whether the University faculty were entitled to State-agent immunity from suit. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the University defendant were indeed entitled to such immunity, and affirmed summary judgment entered by the trial court in defendants' favor. View "Burton v. Hawkins, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Wedgewood in Texas state court after his mother, Emma Mitchell, died in a nursing home. Plaintiff alleged state-law causes of action for medical negligence, corporate negligence, and gross negligence. After removal to federal court, the district court granted plaintiff's motion to remand to state court.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness (PREP) Act does not completely preempt plaintiff's state-law negligence claims. The court explained that, because the compensation fund created by the Act does not satisfy this Circuit's test for complete preemption, and because plaintiff could not have brought his claims under the willful-misconduct cause of action, those claims are not completely preempted. The court also rejected Wedgewood's claim that plaintiff's claims raise a significant federal issue that creates federal jurisdiction under the Grable doctrine. The court concluded that Wedgewood cannot avail itself of the federal officer removal statute because it failed to satisfy the third prong of the test where it was not acting pursuant to a federal officer's directions. Accordingly, the court remanded with directions to further remand to the appropriate state court. View "Mitchell v. Advanced HCS, LLC" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether a plaintiff could receive a full recovery under OCGA 13-6-11 and OCGA 9-11-68(b)(2). Because the Court concluded the provisions provided for different recoveries despite using somewhat similar measures for calculating the respective amount of damages or sanction, a prevailing plaintiff could recover under each statutory provision without regard to any recovery under the other. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case with direction that the case be remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of the plaintiff’s claim for attorney fees and litigation expenses pursuant to OCGA 9-11-68(b)(2). View "Junior v. Graham" on Justia Law

In December 2018, Phillip Doe filed suit against Saint Joseph’s Catholic Church, Archbishop Wilton Gregory, and the Archdiocese of Atlanta (collectively, “the Church”), asserting various tort claims based in part on childhood sexual abuse Doe allegedly suffered while serving as an altar boy at Saint Joseph’s in the late 1970s. The trial court granted the Church’s motion to dismiss, ruling, in pertinent part, that Doe’s “non-nuisance tort claims” were barred by the applicable two-year statute of limitation, OCGA 9-3-33,2 and could not be tolled for fraud by OCGA 9-3-96. A divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Court of Appeals, finding that although the trial court correctly determined that Doe’s claim seeking to hold the Church vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior was time-barred, the court erred in concluding at the motion-to-dismiss stage that Doe could not introduce evidence of fraud within the framework of his complaint sufficient under OCGA 9-3-96 to toll the limitation period as to his claims of negligent training and supervision, negligent retention, negligent failure to warn and provide adequate security, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent misrepresentation and concealment. View "Doe v. St. Joseph's Catholic Church, et al." on Justia Law

Claimant Christina Zayas, a paratransit bus driver, sued her employer, DART/State of Delaware (“Employer”), for injuries she sustained in a 2016 work incident where a passenger physically assaulted her (the “Incident”). In 2019, Zayas underwent left shoulder arthroscopic surgery performed by Dr. Evan Crain (“Dr. Crain”). After the surgery, Zayas was placed on total disability from May 2019 through October 2019. Zayas filed Petitions to Determine Additional Compensation Due relating to the Incident. Specifically, she sought payment of medical expenses, total disability benefits, and acknowledgement of the compensability of the surgery Dr. Crain performed in 2019. Zayas’ hearing was scheduled for November 2019. Prior to the Hearing, the parties stipulated that the limited issue in dispute was whether the May 2019 surgery was causally related to the Incident. The Board held that Zayas failed to meet her burden of proof that the surgery in 2019 was causally related to the Incident. Notably, although the Board had excluded them, the Board stated in its Decision that Medical Records by Zayas' physician were admissible. A review of the record indicated the Medical Records were never admitted into evidence; and the Superior Court did not consider this inconsistency, or the issues Zayas had raised regarding the medical testimony and records. Nevertheless, the Superior Court affirmed the Board’s decision and found that substantial evidence existed to support the Board’s legal conclusions. On appeal, Zayas again argued the Board erred by not admitting her Medical Records and that it abused its discretion by admitting the Employer's expert's deposition testimony during the Hearing. The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that because Dr. Tadduni, the Employer's expert, refused to answer relevant questions, Zayas was deprived of the opportunity to elicit relevant information. "In essence, Dr. Tadduni unilaterally determined that he would not answer questions concerning Dr. Cary’s treatment of Zayas. In admitting Dr. Tadduni’s testimony, and simultaneously excluding the Medical Records, the Board’s actions prevented Zayas from adequately presenting her case, violated fundamental notions of fairness, and thereby abused its discretion." As a result, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Superior Court's judgment, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Zayas v. Delaware" on Justia Law

Claude Rogers, a former resident of a residential care facility for the elderly known as Meadow Oaks of Roseville, died after experiencing heatstroke. His wife and successor-in-interest Kathryn and sons Jeffrey, Phillip and Richard sued Meadow Oaks of Roseville, Roseville SH, LLC, CPR/AR Roseville SH Owner, LLC, DCP Investors Roseville SH, LLC, DCP Management Roseville SH, LLC, Westmont Living, Inc., Tanysha Borromeo, Ana Rojas, and Andrew Badoud for elder abuse, fraud, and wrongful death. Defendants appealed an order denying their petition to compel plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims pursuant to an arbitration agreement that was part of the Residency Agreement Richard signed as Claude’s representative. Although defendants filed a notice of appeal, the appellate briefs were filed on behalf of Roseville SH, LLC only. Roseville SH, LLC contended that in denying the petition to compel arbitration: (1) the trial court erroneously believed defendants had to show that Claude lacked mental capacity to consent before they could prove that Richard had the authority to sign the arbitration agreement for Claude; (2) the trial court erred in concluding that Richard did not act as Claude’s actual or ostensible agent when he signed the arbitration agreement on Claude’s behalf; and (3) the trial court’s order violated the Federal Arbitration Act. The Court of Appeal concluded: (1) Roseville SH, LLC misconstrued the trial court’s analysis; (2) the trial court did not err in denying the petition to compel arbitration; and (3) the trial court’s order did not violate the Federal Arbitration Act. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Rogers v. Roseville SH, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs alleged that Hyles committed sexual abuse and assault at Hammond, Indiana's First Baptist Church, and its affiliated school, Hyles-Anderson College, in the late 1970s and that the institutions conspired to conceal the abuse. One plaintiff alleged that she paid fees and tithes to the institutions while being abused as a teenager. In 2020, they filed a civil claim under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.The district court dismissed the complaint because the plaintiffs had not alleged the injury to “business or property” required for RICO’s civil cause of action, 18 U.S.C. 1962, 1964(c). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs suffered personal injuries during the exercise of a property right (while expending money to participate in Church-related activities) that had an “indirect, or secondary effect” on the value of the property right. That is insufficient to satisfy the business or property element of a civil RICO claim. They contend that the institutions misappropriated their funds by using them to fund a sham investigation in the 2010s but did not describe how money paid in the 1970s could plausibly have been used to fund a phony investigation decades later. The allegations are too “speculative and amorphous” to permit their RICO claim to proceed. View "Ryder v. Hyles" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court granted review of a court of appeals' decision affirming a trial court's finding that Respondents Fred's, Inc. (Fred's) and Wildevco, LLC (Wildevco) were entitled to equitable indemnification from Petitioner Tippins-Polk Construction, Inc. (Tippins-Polk). Respondent Fred's was a Tennessee corporation that operated a chain of discount general merchandise stores in several states, including South Carolina. Respondent Wildevco is a South Carolina limited liability company that owned a tract of undeveloped commercial property in Williston, South Carolina. In February 2005, Wildevco and Fred's entered into a lease agreement in which Wildevco agreed to construct a 16,000-square-foot commercial space located in Williston, South Carolina, according to Fred's conceptual design specifications. In turn, Fred's agreed to lease the property for ten years. In April 2005, Wildevco entered into a contract with general contractor Tippins-Polk for the construction of the Fred's store and adjoining strip center. Pursuant to the lease agreement between Wildevco and Fred's, Wildevco was the party responsible for "keep[ing] and repair[ing] the exterior of the [] Premises, including the parking lot, parking lot lights, entrance and exits, sidewalks, ramps, curbs," and various other exterior elements. Fred's was responsible for maintenance of the interior of the premises. Five years after the Fred's store opened, on a sunny day in March, Martha Fountain went to the Williston Fred's to purchase light bulbs. Her toe caught the sloped portion of the ramp at the entrance of the store, causing her to trip and fall. Fountain sustained serious injuries to her hand, wrist, and arm and has undergone five surgeries to alleviate her pain and injuries. Fountain and her husband filed a premises liability suit against Fred's and Wildevco, alleging Respondents breached their duty to invitees by failing to maintain and inspect the premises and failing to discover and make safe or warn of unreasonable risks. Pertinent to this appeal, Tippins-Polk argued the court of appeals erred in finding a special relationship existed between it and Fred's and in finding Respondents proved they were without fault as to the Fountain premises liability claim. Because the Supreme Court found Respondents failed to establish they were without fault in the underlying action, judgment was reversed. View "Fountain v. Fred's, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration (the Agency) has not established a clear policy objective concerning automatic emergency breaking (AEB) technology that preempts state tort law claims based on an auto manufacturer's alleged failure to install AEB.Plaintiff sued Chrysler alleging negligence, defective product design, defective product warning, and wrongful death. Chrysler moved to dismiss the lawsuit, asserting that it was preempted given the Agency's objectives regarding the development and deployment of AEB technology. The trial court granted Chrysler's motion. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the Agency did not intend to preempt tort claims based on the absence of AEB. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's order, holding (1) the Agency has neither conveyed an authoritative statement establishing manufacturer choice as a significant federal policy objective nor made explicit a view that AEB should not be regulated; and (2) therefore, the Agency has not established a policy objective that actually conflicts with the claims at issue. View "Varela v. FCA US LLC" on Justia Law

The University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC) appealed a county court judgment granting Genevieve Jensen’s motion for extension of time to serve process on the attorney general and its decision denying UMMC’s motion for summary judgment based on a statute of limitations defense. Since Jensen failed to articulate good cause for an extension of time to serve process, the Mississippi Supreme Court determined the county court abused its discretion by granting her motion for extension, it reversed the county court’s decision and dismissed Jensen’s case with prejudice. View "University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Jensen" on Justia Law