Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Castle Rock firefighter Mike Zukowski was diagnosed with melanoma. He had three surgeries to remove the melanoma and was then released to return to work on full duty. He sought both medical benefits and temporary total disability benefits under the "firefighter statute" of the Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado, asserting that his melanoma qualified as a compensable occupational disease. At issue here was whether Zukowski’s employer, the Town of Castle Rock, and Castle Rock’s insurer, the Colorado Intergovernmental Risk Sharing Agency (collectively, “Castle Rock”), could overcome a statutory presumption that Zukowski’s condition resulted from his employment as a firefighter by presenting evidence indicating that Zukowski’s risk of melanoma from other sources was greater than his risk of melanoma from firefighting. After review, the Supreme Court held that the employer, through a preponderance of the evidence, could meet its burden to show the firefighter's cancer "did not occur on the job" by establishing the absence of specific causation. Here, Castle Rock sought to establish the absence of specific causation by presenting evidence indicated that Zukowski's particular risk of developing melanoma from other, non-job-related sources outweighed his risk of developing it from on-the-job, and that an employer could rely on such evidence to overcome the statutory presumption. The Court affirmed the court of appeals and remanded this case back to the ALJ for reconsideration. View "Indus. Claim Appeals Office v. Town of Castle Rock" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court's review stemmed from a medical malpractice action, and whether, as a matter of law, a known suicidal patient admitted to the secure mental health unit of a hospital and place under high risk precautions, could be subject to a comparative negligence defense when the patient attempted suicide while in the hospital's custody. P.W. sued Children's Hospital both individually and as conservator of his son K.W., who was in a minimally conscious state after an unsuccessful attempt to kill himself by hanging while at the Hospital. The trial court granted P.W.'s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the Hospital's comparative negligence and assumption of risk defenses. The trial court also issued an order preventing the Hospital from obtaining K.W.'s pre-incident mental health records. The Hospital petitioned the Supreme Court to review: (1) whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding discovery of K.W.'s mental health records; (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion by precluding discovery of K.W.'s treating psychiatrist's records when they were a part of a continuing course of treatment that included Children's Hospital; and (3) whether the trial court erred in granting P.W. summary judgment dismissing the comparative negligence and assumption of risk defenses despite evidence K.W. could think rationally and protect himself from harm during the hospitalization. The Supreme Court concluded that the Hospital could not assert comparative negligence or assumption of risk as a matter of law, and that it did not need to address the trial court's discovery order. View "P.W. v. Children's Hospital" on Justia Law

This case concerned the nature of transactions that petitioners, national litigation finance companies, made with tort plaintiffs seeking funds to pay personal expenses while waiting for their lawsuits to settle or go to trial. Plaintiffs usually agreed to pay the companies a sum of money from the future litigation proceeds. By the terms of the agreements, any money the companies give tort plaintiffs were not to be used to prosecute the legal claims. The specific issue this case presented for the Colorado Supreme Court’s review centered on whether the companies’ forwarding of expense money to tort plaintiffs constituted a “loan.” Petitioners contended they were “asset purchases,” but the Colorado Uniform Consumer Credit Code interprets these transactions as loans. The Supreme Court agreed with the UCCC: these transactions are loans. View "Oasis Legal Fin. Grp. v. Coffman" on Justia Law

Respondent Vasilios Haralampopoulos visited the emergency room with severe abdominal pain. After a CT scan revealed a large cystic mass in his liver, Petitioner Dr. Mauricio Waintrub examined Respondent, gave a differential diagnosis identifying four possible causes for his condition, and approved a fine-needle biopsy to determine the nature of the cyst. Petitioner Dr. Jason Kelly performed the procedure, during which Respondent suffered respiratory and cardiac arrest. Normal resuscitation efforts were unsuccessful, and it took over 30 minutes to revive Respondent's heart. Lack of oxygen to his brain left Respondent in a vegetative state. Ten days later, Respondent's family and friends met with doctors to determine why Respondent went into arrest and had such a poor reaction to resuscitation efforts. After the meeting, Respondent's then-roommate and ex-girlfriend Gulsans Akyol Hurd approached Dr. Kelly and asked him whether Respondent's prior cocaine use could have contributed to his injuries. Dr. Kelly responded that cocaine could have contributed to Respondent's resistance to normal resuscitation efforts, but he was not a cardiologist so he did not know. Respondent brought a medical malpractice suit against seven individuals, including Petitioners Dr. Kelly and Dr. Waintrub. Respondent filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude Hurd's statements to Dr. Kelly as inadmissible hearsay not covered by any hearsay exception. The trial court denied the motion in limine, finding that Hurd's statements were made for purposes of diagnosis and treatment under Rule 803(4), and that their probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Colorado Rule of Evidence 403. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Respondent's cocaine use. The court held that Hurd's statements to Dr. Kelly were not admissible under Rule 803(4) because the statements were made after Respondent was in a vegetative state and treatment was no longer possible, they were not made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in limiting the scope of Rule 803(4) to statements made for the purpose of prospective treatment. The Rule's plain language applies to "diagnosis or treatment," and while the term "treatment" has a prospective focus, the term "diagnosis" does not. "Here, Hurd's statements were made for the purpose of discovering the cause of Respondent's resistance to normal resuscitation efforts, and were thus admissible under Rule 803(4)." The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Kelly v. Haralampopoulos" on Justia Law

A bicyclist was attacked by two ranch dogs herding sheep while participating in a mountain bike race. The cyclist and dogs were on federally owned land on which the attack took place, subject to a sheep grazing permit and a recreational use permit. The cyclist sustained serious injuries during the attack. The cyclist and her husband sued the dog's owners, alleging negligence, negligence per se and loss of consortium. They also brought a strict liability claim under Colorado's dog bite statute. The shepherds moved for summary judgment, arguing that: (1) the Colorado Premises Liability Act preempted the cyclist's common law claims; and (2) they were immune from strict liability under the working-dog exemption to the dog bite statute. The district court granted the shepherds' motion. The court of appeals reversed, interpreting the working dog exemption as applicable only when the dog is on the owner's own property. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed the appellate court: the exemption applied when a dog bite occurs on the dog owner's property or when the dog is working under the control of the dog owner. View "Robinson v. Legro" on Justia Law

Before the Supreme Court in this case, two novel questions of Colorado law: (1) the interaction between various waiver provisions in the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA); and (2) whether the "recreation area waiver" of the Act applied to injuries sustained on a walkway adjacent to a public school playground. The plaintiff in this case (a minor child) slipped and fell in a puddle of water that accumulated on a concrete walkway at his public elementary school. As a result of his fall, the child sustained a severe head injury. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court: (1) reversed the court of appeals to the extent that it held that the consideration of one CGIA waiver provision affirmatively precluded consideration of any alternative waiver provisions; and (2) the recreation area waiver's requirements were not met in this case because the walkway at issue was not itself a "public facility" nor was it a component of a larger collection of items that qualified as a "public facility." View "Young v. Brighton School District 27J" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter was one of first impression: whether an injury that occurred on a "zip line" on a public school playground met the requirements of the "recreation area waiver" of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act. A student was playing on the zip line during lunch recess when she fell and fractured her wrist. Her parents sued the school district in tort. Using the three-step analysis announced in "Daniel v. City of Colorado Springs," the Supreme Court held that a collection on playground equipment considered as a whole qualified as a "public facility" under the recreation area waiver. The court of appeals erred when it held that the zip line individually (rather than the playground collectively) constituted a "public facility." View "St. Vrain Valley School District RE-1J v. A.R.L." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was one of first impression: whether the requirements of a statutory "recreation area waiver" can be met by a party injured in a public golf course's parking lot. Specifically, the issue was reduced to whether a public golf course's parking lot qualified as a "public facility" under the Governmental Immunity Act, and whether such lot is "located in" a "recreation area." Respondent Marilyn Daniel drove to a public golf course in Colorado Springs to see her Congressional Representative speak at the clubhouse. Instead of parking in a lot close to the clubhouse, respondent parked on a street a block away. As she crossed the golf course parking lot, she stepped in a hole, fell and fractured her hip. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a parking lot serving a public golf course is a "public facility" under the recreational area waiver. A three-step analysis should be used to determine whether a public facility is "located in" a "recreation area:" (1) determine which specific portions of the property should be considered a "putative recreation area;" (2) determine whether the public entity's primary purpose in building or maintaining that area was for the promotion of recreation; and (3) determine whether the facility at issue was located within the boundaries of that recreation area. The Supreme Court found that the appellate court erred in categorically holding that the recreation area waiver did not apply to this type of parking lot. View "Daniel v. City of Colorado Springs" on Justia Law

Respondent Helen Rodriguez injured herself after falling down a flight of stairs at work. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether an "unexplained" fall satisfied the "arising out of" employment requirement of the Workers' Compensation Act. The Court agreed with the appellate court that respondent's unexplained fall was compensable, but it disagreed with the reasoning. The Supreme Court concluded that the appellate court erred when it agreed with respondent's view that her injuries arose out of employment, and held that an unexplained fall necessarily stemmed from a "neutral" risk attributable to neither the employment nor the employee. "Under our longstanding 'but-for' test, such an unexplained fall 'arises out of' employment if the fall would not have occurred but for the fact that the conditions and obligations of employment placed the employee in a position where he or she was injured." View "City of Brighton v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. appealed the appellate court's decision to reverse an Industrial Claim Appeals Office decision disallowing respondent Elaine Loofbourrow's award of temporary disability benefits. The ICAO concluded that once respondent's treating physician placed her at maximum medical improvement, temporary total disability benefits could not be awarded for the injury for which she was initially treated. The appellate court concluded that under the circumstances of this case, such an independent medical exam was not a prerequisite to temporary total disability benefits. After its review of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court was correct in its decision: because a determination of maximum medical improvement has no statutory significance with regard to injuries resulting in loss of no more than three days (or shifts) of work time, respondent's award of temporary total disability benefits was not barred by her failure to first seek a division-sponsored independent medical examination. View "Harman-Bergstedt, Inc. v. Loofbourrow" on Justia Law