Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

An overhead garage door struck Respondent Larry Crossgrove in the head while he made a delivery to a Wal-Mart store in Trinidad. Respondent required medical treatment for injuries suffered in the accident. His healthcare providers billed almost $250,000 for their services. Respondent's insurer however, paid the providers $40,000 in full satisfaction of the bills. Respondent subsequently filed suit against Wal-Mart. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the appellate court erred when it held that the trial court incorrectly admitted evidence of the amount paid by the insurer for Respondent's medical expenses as a result of Wal-Mart's negligence. Upon review, the Court held that the court of appeal correctly held that the trial court correctly held that the trial court should have excluded evidence of the amounts paid because of the common law evidentiary component of the collateral source doctrine required the exclusion.

The Supreme Court reviewed an unpublished appeallate court decision to determine whether: the court of appeals erred under Colorado's collateral source doctrine when it admitted evidence of the amounts paid by Respondent State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company for medical expenses that Petitioner Jack Sunahara incurred as a result of a car accident; and whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's ruling that portions of State Farm's claim file and information used by the company to generate reserves and settlement authority were not discoverable. The Court held that the appellate court erred in affirming the admission of evidence of the amounts paid for Petitioner's medical expenses because the pre-verdict evidentiary component of Colorado's collateral source rule prohibits the admission. The Court affirmed the appellate court in excluding portions of State Farm's claim file from admission.

This case arose from the negligence action Plaintiff Donald Smith filed against Defendant Michael Jeppsen after the parties were involved in a car accident. Plaintiff sought to recover, among other things, the cost of past and future medical expenses resulting from the crash. Defendant admitted liability, and the parties agreed that the proper measure of Plaintiff's medical expense damages should be the necessary and reasonable value of the medical services rendered. However the parties disagreed as to whether the trial court, in determining reasonable value, could consider evidence of the amounts billed to and paid by Plaintiff's insurance company (a collateral source). Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court was correct in applying 10-1-135 C.R.S. (2011) in this case because the statute pertained to cases pending recovery as of August 11, 2010. Furthermore, the Court held that the trial court correctly excluded from evidence the amount of the insurance company's payments because section 10-1-135(10)(a) codifies the common law pre-verdict evidentiary component of the collateral source rule and unambiguously required the exclusion.

Petitioner Air Wisconsin Airlines Corporation employed Respondent William Hoeper as a pilot. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) issued Respondent a firearm under the federal statute that authorizes the TSA to deputize pilots as law enforcement officers to defend the aircraft should the need arise. After discontinuing its use of the type of aircraft Respondent had piloted for many years, Air Wisconsin required Respondent to undertake training and pass a proficiency test for a new aircraft. Respondent failed three proficiency tests, knowing that if he failed a fourth test, he would be fired. During the last test, Respondent became angry with the test administrators because he believed they were deliberately sabotaging his testing. Test administrators reported Respondent's angry outbursts during testing to the TSA that Respondent was "a disgruntled employee (an FFDO [Federal Flight Deck Officer] who may be armed)" and was "concerned about the whereabouts of [Respondents] firearm." Respondent brought suit against Air Wisconsin in Colorado for defamation under Virginia law. Air Wisconsin argued it was immune from defamation suits as this under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), and unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment. The jury found clear and convincing evidence that statements made by the airline test administrator were defamatory. Air Wisconsin appealed and the court of appeals affirmed. The court of appeals determined that the question of whether the judge or jury decided immunity under the ATSA was a procedural issue determined by Colorado law, and concluded that the trial court properly allowed the jury to decide the immunity question. Air Wisconsin appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals, adding that the airline was not immune from suit or defamation under the ATSA. Furthermore, the Court held that the record supported the jury's finding of clear and convincing evidence of actual malice.

In this appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the court of appeals' determination that Thomas Banner's assignment of his voting rights and right to receive distributions to Plaintiff Elizabeth Condo was ineffective because it violated an anti-assignment clause in the "Hut at Avon, LLC’s" (Hut Group) operating agreement. Plaintiff brought a tort action against the other members of the Hut Group, Thomas Conners and George Roberts, and the attorney who allegedly assisted them in purchasing Banner's membership interest in the Hut Group. She claimed that Defendants' purchase of Banner's membership interest tortiously interfered with his prior assignment to her and that that interference amounted to civil conspiracy because it was intended to destroy the value of her assignment. The Supreme Court held that the attempted assignment of the member's right to receive distributions and effective transfer of voting rights was invalid because it was made without the consent of the other members of the LLC, in violation of the anti-assignment clause in the operating agreement. Furthermore, because the Colorado LLC statute evinced a preference for the freedom of contract, the Court held that the anti-assignment clause at issue here rendered each LLC member powerless to make an assignment without the consent of all members and therefore was without any legal effect.

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a claim under Colorado law for civil theft of a copyrightable work required a trial court to instruct the jury on principles of federal copyright law. Petitioner Steward Software hired Respondent Richard Kopcho to develop and market a new software program. Steward never entered into a written agreement governing the ownership of the software with Holonyx, Inc. (one of Respondent's multiple corporate entities) or Respondent. By the time the software was ready for testing, the relationship between the parties had become strained. Steward refused to make further payments and under Respondent's direction, Holonyx locked Steward out of the software code and refused to turn it over. Holonyx then filed a copyright registration for the software with the U.S. Copyright Office, listing the software's author a new corporation Respondent controlled called Ruffdogs Software, Inc. Steward sued Respondent for breach of contract and civil theft. Before trial, the parties tendered proposed jury instructions; one of Steward's proposed instructions pertained to the ownership and registration of copyrightable works. The trial court determined that copyright law did not pertain to Steward's civil theft claim and rejected the tendered instruction. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that ownership of the copyright in the code was irrelevant. The Court thus concluded the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury on the principles of copyright law. The court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the trial court's opinion.

Petitioner Monica Vickery sought review of the court of appeals' judgment that affirmed a district court's reduction of exemplary damages in her defamation suit against the mother and sister of her deceased husband in "Vickery v. Vickery," (2010 WL 963204 (Colo. App. March 18, 2010)). Both the district court and court of appeals understood section 13-21-102 C.R.S. (2011) to limit Petitioner's exemplary damages to an amount equal to the compensatory damages figure returned by the jury, before any adjustment for prejudgment interest. But the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, disagreeing with its interpretation of section 13-21-102. The Supreme Court found that "the amount of the actual damages awarded," to which "reasonable exemplary damages" are statutorily limited, refers not to the jury's assessment of total compensatory damages but to the compensatory damages awarded against the defendant as the direct result of that assessment, which necessarily includes statutorily mandated prejudgment interest. The case was remanded for further proceedings.

In June 2002, Codiejo Apodaca and her stepsister (the Insureds) were injured in an automobile accident. At the time of the accident, the Insureds were covered as resident relatives under an auto policy and a personal umbrella policy both issued by Respondent Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate). The policy included uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in addition to bodily injury coverage. The umbrella policy provided excess liability for "occurrences" arising out of, among other things, "occupancy of a land vehicle by an insured for personal transportation." Allstate did not offer separate UM/UIM coverage in connection with the umbrella policy. The Insureds brought suit against Allstate for reformation of the umbrella policy to include UM/UIM coverage. In their view, Colorado law required Allstate to offer UM/UIM coverage in connection with the umbrella policy because the policy included automobile liability coverage. As such, the Insureds contended that UM/UIM coverage should have been incorporated into the umbrella policy as a matter of law. The trial court granted Allstate's motion to dismiss the suit, finding that only liability policies expressly linked to a specific, licensed Colorado vehicle were required to include mandatory UM/UIM insurance. The appellate court affirmed the trial court, and on appeal, the Insureds argued that both the trial and appellate courts misread both the policy and Colorado law. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that an umbrella policy is not an "automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy" as specified by Colorado law. Therefore, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision.

Respondent Michael Strauch was stabbed by an intoxicated person outside of Eden Nightclub on New Year's Eve. Eden is owned by Petitioner Build It and They Will Drink, Inc. (Build It). Mr. Strauch filed a number of claims against Build It, including general negligence, premises liability claims and a "dram shop" claim for his injuries after the stabbing. The trial court dismissed all claims after determining that the attack was not foreseeable, and that Build It had no duty to insure Mr. Strauch's safety once he left the nightclub. The Court of Appeals reversed only the dram shop liability claim, holding that Colorado law does not require consideration of "foreseeability" in assessing liability against a club that serves alcohol. Build It appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the plain language of Colorado Dram-Shop Statute defined the criteria for liability without mentioning "foreseeability." The Court held that an injury does not have to be foreseeable after the sale or service of alcohol. The Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment that held Build It liable for Respondent's injuries.

Petitioner Loretta Day was referred to Respondent Dr. Bruce Johnson, M.D., for treatment for hypothyroidism. Dr. Johnson determined that surgery was needed to remove both lobes of the thyroid. A few weeks later, Mrs. Day's vocal cords stopped working, and she suffered a permanent speaking disability that she alleged was caused by the surgery. Mrs. Day and her husband sued Dr. Johnson for negligence, asserting that the Doctor incorrectly assessed Mrs. Day's condition, recommended inappropriate treatment, and improperly removed part of her thyroid. The trial court submitted the issue of Dr. Johnson's negligence to the jury which included a jury instruction that mirrored the language of a pattern jury instruction pertaining to negligence. The Days objected to the court's use of this instruction, arguing that the instruction included a misstatement of Colorado law. The court overruled the objection. The jury found that Dr. Johnson was not negligent. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's use of the instruction. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Days argued that both the trial and appellate courts erred by using the instruction. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The Court found that the portion of the pattern jury instructions accurately stated Colorado law.