Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Respondent and former employee Andrew Blood suffered severe and permanent injuries while working on a wood utility pole owned by Petitioner Qwest Services Corporation (Qwest). Blood sued Qwest for negligence, asserting that Quest failed to implement a routine inspection program that would have detected the rotting that caused the pole to collapse on top of him. A jury awarded Respondent close to $30 million, finding Qwest 100% at fault. Qwest appealed the verdict and award, and the appeals court affirmed the trial courtâs decision. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Qwest argued that the âexemplary damagesâ awarded to Respondent violated its due process rights. Furthermore, Qwest challenged whether the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support âexemplary damagesâ and the juryâs subsequent award. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decisions, finding that Qwestsâs due process rights were not violated by the trial courtâs decision. Furthermore, the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that Qwestâs failure to implement an inspection program for 46-years prior to Respondentâs accident to support the exemplary damage award handed down by the trial court.

Respondent Lincoln General Insurance Companyâs insured drove a rental car under the influence of methamphetamines, and led police on a high-sped car chase that ended when he struck a vehicle containing Petitioner Julie Bailey and her son. Her son was killed. The insured pled guilty to five felonies, including second-degree murder. The insured assigned his rights to Petitioner to collect on a $1 million excess-insurance policy issued by Lincoln General. Lincoln General denied coverage for damages caused by the insured, relying on an exclusion in the rental agreement that voided coverage if the car was used to commit a crime that could be charged as a felony. The trial court and the court of appeals held that the criminal-acts exclusion of the policy was enforceable. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courtsâ decisions to uphold the criminal-acts exclusion of the insurance policy, finding that Lincoln Generalâs use of the exclusion was a proper exercise of its freedom to contract and provide coverage or damages caused by fortuitous events instead of for damages caused by intentionally criminal acts.

The Supreme Court reviewed the appellate courtâs decision against Plaintiffs Jack and Danette Steele. In their claim, Plaintiffs alleged that attorney Katherine Allen gave them incorrect information about a statute of limitations, which led to missing a filing deadline in a negligence suit. The trial court dismissed both their claims of negligent misrepresentation and professional negligence. Plaintiffs only appealed the dismissal of their negligent misrepresentation claim. The appellate court held that Plaintiffs had a claim against the attorney. However, the Supreme Court disagreed, finding that Plaintiffsâ evidence was not sufficient to support their claim. The Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings.

At trial, a jury found that Defendant Holly Pippin was not negligent in causing an accident in which her car hit that of the Plaintiff, Cheryl Kendrick. The main issue at trial was whether the driving conditions on the day of the accident were âexpected.â Driving conditions were icy, and Ms. Pippin testified that she knew it had been raining the night before to cause potentially icy roads the next morning. Ms. Kendrick challenged Ms. Pippinâs argument that the icy roads were âunexpected,â therefore her attempt to avoid hitting Ms. Kendrickâs car was actually just negligent driving. Ms. Kendrick appealed to the Court of Appeals, claiming the trial court made three mistakes: (1) the court should have instructed the jury to consider a âsudden emergency;â (2) that it should not have instructed the jury on âres ipsa loquitur;â and (3) there should have been a new trial because of alleged juror misconduct. The Supreme Court reviewed the lower courts' decisions, and agreed with the appellate court on two of the three issues presented. The Court held that Ms. Pippin failed to present evidence that she was confronted with a âsudden emergencyâ from the road conditions. The Court agreed with the appellate court's dismissal of the jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur. The Court did not find the allegation of juror misconduct credible. The Court therefore reversed the appellate courtâs decision and remanded the case for a new trial.