Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, a self-represented pediatric dentist, sued the defendant newspaper for defamation, alleging that two articles published by the defendant exaggerated the scope and seriousness of disciplinary proceedings against him. The articles reported on disciplinary actions taken by the Department of Public Health and the Connecticut State Dental Commission, which resulted in a reprimand, fines, and probation of the plaintiff’s dental license. The plaintiff claimed that five statements in the articles were defamatory and that a stock photograph accompanying the articles was independently defamatory.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, concluding that the five statements were either substantially true or protected by the fair report privilege under the First Amendment. The court did not address the photograph as an independent defamation claim, as the plaintiff had not distinctly raised it as such in his pleadings. The plaintiff appealed, and the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment, declining to consider the photograph claim because it was not distinctly raised before the trial court.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision. The court held that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment without treating the plaintiff’s references to the photograph as an independent defamation claim. The court emphasized that the plaintiff’s self-represented status did not relieve him of the obligation to sufficiently articulate his claims. The court also clarified that the fair report privilege is not defeated by demonstrating malice in fact, and that the privilege applies as long as the report is a fair and substantially accurate account of the proceedings. View "Idlibi v. Hartford Courant Co." on Justia Law

A case in Connecticut involved a couple, Aaron Lynch and Jean-Marie Monroe-Lynch, who sought damages for alleged medical malpractice by the state of Connecticut in relation to therapeutic donor insemination (TDI) services and prenatal care provided at a state hospital. The couple were unable to conceive without medical assistance and pursued TDI services. The hospital staff failed to adhere to guidelines regarding the use of cytomegalovirus (CMV) positive donor sperm for CMV negative patients, leading to Jean-Marie being inseminated with CMV positive donor sperm. Jean-Marie later became pregnant with twins. During her pregnancy, an ultrasound revealed conditions associated with an in utero CMV infection, however, the hospital staff failed to inform Jean-Marie or take appropriate follow-up action. One of the twins died in utero from a severe CMV infection and the other was born with severe, lifelong medical conditions as a result of congenital CMV.The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the state could not claim sovereign immunity as the plaintiffs' fertility treatment claims were medical malpractice claims, not informed consent claims. The court also held that the plaintiffs' son, who was born with severe medical conditions as a result of the state's negligence, was entitled to compensation. The court found no merit in the state's claim that the damages awarded were speculative or predicated on the concept that nonexistence can be preferable to impaired existence. The court concluded that common-law negligence principles were adaptable to provide a remedy for injuries such as those sustained by the plaintiffs' son. This decision affirms the trial court's award of over $34 million in damages to the plaintiffs. View "Lynch v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying the State's motion to dismiss the second count of the complaint filed by Celine Escobar-Santana (Celine) and her son Emmett Escobar-Santana (Emmett), holding that the phrase "medical malpractice claims" in Conn. Gen. Stat. 4-160(f) was broad enough to encompass Celine's claim for emotional distress damages under the circumstances of this case.Celine brought this action alleging that she suffered emotional distress damages from physical injuries to Emmett that were proximately caused by the negligence of health care professionals (collectively, Defendants) during the birthing process. The State moved to dismiss count two of the complaint on the ground that the count did not fall within the statutory waiver of the State's sovereign immunity in section 4-160(f) because the count stated a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress or bystander liability rather than medical malpractice. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Celine's allegation that she suffered a traumatic delivery followed by severe psychological distress was inextricably connected to her allegations of medical malpractice and therefore qualified as a medical malpractice claim for purposes of section 4-160(f). View "Escobar-Santana v. State" on Justia Law

In this case determining the scope of immunity afforded by Executive Order No. 7V, as it related to acts or omissions undertaken in good faith by health care professionals and health care facilities because of an alleged lack of resources attributable to the COVID-19 pandemic the Supreme Court upheld the judgment of the trial court concluding that Defendants failed to establish that the immunity afforded by the order applied in this case.Governor Ned Lamont issued Executive Order No. 7V providing immunity from suit and liability to health care providers under certain circumstances relating to COVID-19. Plaintiff in this case filed wrongful death claims against Defendants, Regency House of Walling ford, Inc. and National Health Care Associates, Inc., alleging twelve counts of wrongful death based on medical negligence and medical recklessness. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming immunity under Executive Order No. 7V. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court too narrowly construed the language of the order but nevertheless did not err in denying Defendants' motion to dismiss. View "Manginelli v. Regency House of Wallingford, Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court in his wrongful death action filed by the daughter of the decedent and the executor of her estate, holding that the trial court erred in dismissing counts five, six, and seven of the complaint.At issue was Executive Order No. 7V, which conferred immunity on health care providers in connection with the governor's March, 2020 declaration of a public health emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Plaintiff brought this action against several physicians and a hospital, but Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that they were immune under the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) for allegedly grossly negligent acts and omissions undertaken before the receipt of the decedent's negative COVID-19 test result. The court granted the motions to dismiss as to certain physicians. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the trial court erred in concluding that Defendants were entitled to immunity under the PREP Act. View "Mills v. Hartford HealthCare Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in favor of the Town of Bloomfield, the Bloomfield Police Department, and one of its police officers, in this personal injury action, holding that the defense of discretionary act immunity provided by Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557n(a)(2)(B) does not apply to claims arising from the manner in which an emergency vehicle is operated under the privileges provided by Conn. Gen. Stat. 14-283.Plaintiff and her children sustained personal injuries when police officer Jonathan Sykes collided with the driver's side of Plaintiff's vehicle. Plaintiff brought this action claiming negligence, negligent supervision, and respondent superior. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the claims were barred by discretionary act immunity under section 52-557n(a)(2)(B). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the discretionary act immunity provided by § 52-557n(a)(2)(B) does not apply to the manner in which an emergency vehicle is operated by virtue of the codified, common-law duty to drive with "due regard" pursuant to section 14-283(d). View "Adesokan v. Bloomfield" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court dismissing the appeal brought by the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities in this housing discrimination case, holding that this Court was compelled to affirm.For several years, Richard Cantillon harassed his neighbor, Kelly Howard, by making obscene gestures, calling her racial epithets, and physically menacing Howard. Howard eventually filed a neighbor versus neighbor claim with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, alleging that Cantillon had violated her civil rights on account of her race. Cantillon defaulted, and the referee awarded Plaintiff $15,000 in damages. The Commission appealed the award as insufficient, but neither Howard nor Cantillon participated in the appeal. The trial court dismissed the appeal, concluding that there was no legal basis for it to second-guess the amount of the award. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court appropriately resolved the Commission's claims under the circumstances of this case. View "Comm'n on Human Rights & Opportunities v. Cantillon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that absolute immunity attaches to statements made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and that while Jane Doe was not entitled to absolute immunity, a qualified privilege is appropriate for alleged victims of sexual assault presented in the context of this case.In disciplinary proceedings conducted at Yale University by the University-Wide Committee on Sexual Misconduct (UWC) Doe accused Plaintiff of sexual assault, resulting in Plaintiff's expulsion from Yale and criminal charges being brought against him. Plaintiff was acquitted. At issue in this appeal was whether Doe, who enjoyed absolute immunity in a subsequent civil action challenging her testimony given during Plaintiff's criminal proceeding, should likewise be afforded absolute immunity from suit for her statements made during the UWC proceeding. The Supreme Court held (1) absolute immunity attaches to statements in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) the USC's proceeding did not meet the conditions necessary to be considered quasi-judicial, and therefore, Doe was not entitled to absolute immunity; but (3) due to the public interest in encouraging the proper reporting of sexual assaults a qualified privilege is appropriate for alleged victims of sexual assault at institutions of higher education. View "Khan v. Yale University" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the decision of the Compensation Review Board upholding the finding and award of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for the Second Districting ordering the town of Waterford to accept as compensable Plaintiff's claim for heart disease benefits pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-433c, holding that the appellate court erred.In concluding that Plaintiff was entitled to benefits the Commissioner determined that section 7-433c does not define the phrase "uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department." The appellate court affirmed. On appeal, the town argued that the appellate court erred in determining that the definition of "member" in Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-425(5) does not govern whether the plaintiff was a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department for purposes of section 7-433c. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the definition of "member" in section 7-425(5) governs eligibility for benefits under section 7-433c. View "Clark v. Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Dep't" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Plaintiffs' pending motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of a final judgment and transferred the case to the appellate court for further proceedings, holding that Defendant asserted a colorable claim to a right to avoid litigation under the anti-SLAPP statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-196a.Plaintiffs brought this action claiming that Defendant made false accusations against them and alleging defamation, invasion of privacy by false light, and other claims. Defendant filed a special motion to dismiss under section 52-196a, arguing that his challenged conduct arose from the exercise of his constitutional rights to free speech, to petition the government, and to associate as a member of a labor union. The trial court denied the motion. The Supreme Court transferred the case to the lower court for further proceedings, holding that Defendant failed to meet his burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the complaint was based on the exercise of his right of free speech, to petition the government, or of association. View "Robinson v. V.D." on Justia Law