Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a construction company, agreed by contract to perform site work for Hoffman Enterprises on several parcels of property. Plaintiff later filed this action against Hoffman Enterprises and Jeffrey Hoffman for negligent misrepresentation, among other claims. The trial court granted Hoffman's motion to strike the negligent misrepresentation claim. The appellate court reversed. Hoffman appealed, asserting that Plaintiff could not, as a matter of law, satisfy the detrimental reliance element of its claim because Hoffman's apparent authority to bind Hoffman Enterprises contractually meant that Plaintiff could not have relied to its detriment on Hoffman's statements. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the fact that allegations pleaded in a complaint might also state a contractual claim against a corporate entity under the apparent authority doctrine does not preclude a separate claim of negligent misrepresentation against a principal of that corporate entity as a matter of law; and (2) Plaintiff pleaded a legally sufficient claim of negligent misrepresentation. View "Coppola Constr. Co. v. Hoffman Enters. Ltd. P'ship" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured when she rode her bicycle into a pipe gate on property maintained by Defendant, a water supply company. Plaintiff brought this action claiming that Defendant was negligent in its maintenance of the gate. After a trial, the jury awarded damages to Plaintiff. Defendant appealed, claiming that no reasonable juror could have found that the alleged negligence had an "inherently close connection" to Defendant's proprietary function of supplying water and that, in the alternative, it was entitled to immunity under the Recreational Land Use Act. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant was liable because the maintenance of the gate was inextricably linked to a proprietary function; and (2) Defendant was not entitled to immunity pursuant to the Act. View "Blonski v. Metro. Dist. Comm'n" on Justia Law

Doctor was a physician who worked for Hospital on a study he claimed would assist in the treatment of children with abnormally low rates of growth. In actuality, Doctor was a child pornographer and pedophile and used the study as a cover to recruit and sexually exploit hundreds of children. The named plaintiff (Plaintiff), one of the exploited children, brought this action against Hospital alleging (1) Hospital negligently failed to supervise Doctor's activities in connection with the study, and (2) Hospital breached the special duty of care it owed to children in its custody. The trial court rendered judgment for Plaintiff on both claims and awarded him $2,750,000. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury. View "Doe v. Saint Francis Hosp. & Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this action for trespass after Defendant removed multiple trees on Plaintiff's property without Plaintiff's permission. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Plaintiff and awarded damages reflecting the diminution in the value of Plaintiff's land as a result of the removal of the trees. The appellate court affirmed. Defendant appealed, contending that the appellate court improperly determined that Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-560, which Defendant claimed provides the exclusive measure of damages in a tree cutting case, does not preempt a common-law cause of action for intentional trespass under the circumstances here. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly concluded that section 52-560 does not preempt the common law but, rather, enhances the common law by providing for treble damages when the proper measure of damages is the reasonable value of the trees as timber. View "Caciopoli v. Lebowitz" on Justia Law

In 2003, multiple residents of a nursing home (Greenwood) died or were injured when another resident set fire to the facility. Consequently, thirteen negligence actions seeking damages for serious bodily injury or wrongful death were filed against Greenwood, the owner of the property housing Greenwood, the lessee of the property (Lexington Healthcare), and the operator of Greenwood. Plaintiff issued a general liability and professional liability insurance policy to Lexington Healthcare. At issue in this case was the amount of liability insurance coverage available for the claims. The trial court determined the amount available under the policy and rendered judgment accordingly. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court improperly interpreted a policy endorsement in the policy relating to the aggregate policy limit; and (2) the trial court improperly applied a self-insured retention endorsement to reduce the available coverage. Remanded. View "Lexington Ins. Co. v. Lexington Healthcare Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Spouse divorced in 1979. In postdissolution proceedings during which Plaintiff sought modification of the alimony award, Spouse was represented by several different attorneys (Defendants). All defendants failed to disclose the true financial circumstances of Spouse. In 2008, the trial court ruled that information concerning Spouse's inheritance had been concealed from Plaintiff, causing Plaintiff to incur more than $400,000 in legal expenses and other costs. Plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint against Defendants for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The superior court rendered judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding that such claims against attorneys for conduct that occurred during judicial proceedings were barred as a matter of law by the doctrine of absolute immunity. The appellate court affirmed, determining that the claims were precluded by the litigation privilege. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the appellate court properly determined that attorneys are protected by the litigation privilege against claims of fraud for their conduct during judicial proceedings; and (2) therefore, Plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, which was derivative of his claim of fraud, was also properly rejected. View "Simms v. Seaman" on Justia Law

Decedent commenced an action (first action) against Defendants, a hospital and two individuals, alleging that Defendants were negligent in failing to treat him for a lesion in his lung. Decedent died of cancer while the first action was pending. The trial court granted Defendants' motions to strike for failure to comply with Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-190a. Six weeks later, Plaintiff, Decedent's surviving spouse, commenced the present action alleging the same causes of action alleged against Defendants in the first action and seeking damages for wrongful death and loss of consortium. Defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which the trial court denied. The appellate court reversed based on res judicata, concluding that the first action was decided on its merits because a motion to strike is a judgment on the merits. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the appellate court incorrectly concluded the trial court should have granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment on the basis of res judicata; but (2) the present action was time barred and was not saved by Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-592, the accidental failure of suit statute. View "Santorso v. Bristol Hosp." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was injured at the University of Connecticut Health Center during the course of her employment as a driver for Hartford Elderly Services. Plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits from Hartford Elderly, and the State provided Plaintiff with financial assistance for medical treatment. Plaintiff subsequently filed an action for negligence against the State and the Health Center. The trial court rendered judgment for Plaintiff on the complaint and in part for the State on its counterclaim seeking a setoff. The State appealed, claiming that the court improperly concluded that, under Conn. Gen. Stat. 17b-94(a), the State's recovery on its claim for a setoff of the entire amount of general assistance benefits it paid to Plaintiff was limited to fifty percent of specified proceeds of the action. The Supreme Court reversed with respect to the award of damages, holding that trial court improperly applied section 17b-94(a) to limit the State's recovery on its setoff. View "Cordero v. Univ. of Conn. Health Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an additional insured on a commercial general liability insurance policy, which was issued to Plaintiff's tenant (Tenant) by Defendant, Travelers Property Casualty Company (Travelers). Plaintiff sought to invoke Travelers' duty to defend under the policy after Sarah Middeleer was injured in a fall on Plaintiff's property and brought the underlying action against Plaintiff. Plaintiff's insurer, the Netherlands Insurance Company (Netherlands), provided a defense to Plaintiff after Travelers denied any duty to defend Plaintiff in the underlying action. Plaintiff then brought the present action claiming Travelers had a duty to defend Plaintiff in the underlying action and Travelers was obligated to reimburse Netherlands for the defense costs it had expended. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The appellate court reversed, concluding that Middeleer's injuries did not arise out of the use of the leased premises under the terms of the policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court correctly construed the governing policy language and properly concluded that Travelers did not have a duty to defend Plaintiff. View "Misiti, LLC v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a negligence action against a management company and condominium association after she fell and was injured on the premises of the condominium building where she resided. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of subsequent remedial measures taken by Defendants following Plaintiff's injury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the evidence of subsequent remedial measures was improperly admitted; but (2) the error was harmless, and therefore, the appellate court improperly concluded that a new trial was warranted. View "Duncan v. Mill Mgmt. Co. of Greenwich, Inc." on Justia Law