Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff was injured at the University of Connecticut Health Center during the course of her employment as a driver for Hartford Elderly Services. Plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits from Hartford Elderly, and the State provided Plaintiff with financial assistance for medical treatment. Plaintiff subsequently filed an action for negligence against the State and the Health Center. The trial court rendered judgment for Plaintiff on the complaint and in part for the State on its counterclaim seeking a setoff. The State appealed, claiming that the court improperly concluded that, under Conn. Gen. Stat. 17b-94(a), the State's recovery on its claim for a setoff of the entire amount of general assistance benefits it paid to Plaintiff was limited to fifty percent of specified proceeds of the action. The Supreme Court reversed with respect to the award of damages, holding that trial court improperly applied section 17b-94(a) to limit the State's recovery on its setoff. View "Cordero v. Univ. of Conn. Health Ctr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an additional insured on a commercial general liability insurance policy, which was issued to Plaintiff's tenant (Tenant) by Defendant, Travelers Property Casualty Company (Travelers). Plaintiff sought to invoke Travelers' duty to defend under the policy after Sarah Middeleer was injured in a fall on Plaintiff's property and brought the underlying action against Plaintiff. Plaintiff's insurer, the Netherlands Insurance Company (Netherlands), provided a defense to Plaintiff after Travelers denied any duty to defend Plaintiff in the underlying action. Plaintiff then brought the present action claiming Travelers had a duty to defend Plaintiff in the underlying action and Travelers was obligated to reimburse Netherlands for the defense costs it had expended. The trial court granted Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. The appellate court reversed, concluding that Middeleer's injuries did not arise out of the use of the leased premises under the terms of the policy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court correctly construed the governing policy language and properly concluded that Travelers did not have a duty to defend Plaintiff. View "Misiti, LLC v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a negligence action against a management company and condominium association after she fell and was injured on the premises of the condominium building where she resided. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that the trial court improperly admitted evidence of subsequent remedial measures taken by Defendants following Plaintiff's injury. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the evidence of subsequent remedial measures was improperly admitted; but (2) the error was harmless, and therefore, the appellate court improperly concluded that a new trial was warranted. View "Duncan v. Mill Mgmt. Co. of Greenwich, Inc." on Justia Law

The vehicle Plaintiff was driving collided with a parked fire truck that was responding to an accident, and Plaintiff sustained serious physical injuries. Plaintiffs subsequently filed this action against the Town and others, alleging that the Town was negligent in that the fire truck and lane closures were inadequately marked and the positioning of the fire truck constituted a nuisance. The trial court granted the Town's motion to strike the negligence counts of the basis of governmental immunity. The court also granted the Town's motion to strike Plaintiffs' nuisance counts on the basis of Himmelstein v. Windsor and entered judgment in favor of the Town. The appellate court reversed in part, concluding that its decision in Himmelstein did not bar Plaintiffs' nuisance claims. The appellate court drew a distinction between the present case and Himmelstein, noting that the nuisance claim in Himmelstein was barred by the exclusivity provision of Conn. Gen. Stat. 13a-149. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' nuisance claims here were clearly distinguishable from those asserted in Himmelstein, as in the instant case, Plaintiffs' nuisance counts did not fall within the scope of section 13a-149. View "Kumah v. Brown" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, the state, commenced this action against the named defendant, Lambardo Brothers Mason Contractors, and twenty-seven other defendants, to recover damages for the allegedly defective design and construction of the library at the University of Connecticut School of Law. Defendants raised time-based defenses to the state's claims by way of motions to strike or motions for summary judgment, with nearly all of them relying on applicable statutes of limitation and repose. The trial court concluded that the rule of nullum tempus, which exempts the state from the operation of statutes of limitation and statutes of repose, was never adopted as the common law of the state, and consequently, the state's claims against the defendants were barred by applicable statutes of limitation and repose. Accordingly, the trial court rendered judgment for the defendants. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on the merits of the state's claims, holding that the doctrine of nullum tempus was well established in the state's common law, and the doctrine exempted the state from the operation of the relevant statutes of limitation and repose. View "State v. Lombardo Bros. Mason Contractors, Inc." on Justia Law

The sole issue in this certified appeal was whether a motorist, who was lawfully stopped in his own lane of travel while awaiting an opportunity to make a left turn, owes a legal duty to oncoming motorists to keep the wheels of his vehicle straight to ensure that he will not be propelled into the travel lane of oncoming traffic in the event that another motorist crashes into him from behind. Defendant appealed from the judgment of the appellate court reversing the summary judgment rendered by the trial court in his favor. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly focused on whether Defendant had breached a general duty of reasonable care by turning his wheels while awaiting an opportunity to make his turn rather than whether he owed a duty to oncoming drivers to foresee and defend against the possibility that a third driver would crash into the rear of his stopped vehicle and thrust it into the path of oncoming traffic. Remanded with direction to affirm the judgment of the trial court. View "Sic v. Nunan" on Justia Law

In two separate cases, Plaintiffs, property owners, filed virtually identical complaints against the Town of Cheshire after a massive sinkhole developed on their properties. The complaints alleged the town failed to disclose information regarding the presence of a discontinued barite mine and a series of sinkholes caused by the mine beneath, and in the vicinity of, the properties prior to their purchase by Plaintiffs. The trial court granted judgment in favor of the Town. In this consolidated appeal, the Supreme Court (1) reversed the judgments of the trial court insofar as the trial court granted the Town's motions to strike count three of Plaintiffs' complaints alleging negligent inspection, and (2) affirmed in all other respects. Remanded. View "Ugrin v. Cheshire" on Justia Law

The principal issue in this certified appeal was whether Connecticut's Dram Shop Act requires a plaintiff to prove that a patron was visibly or otherwise perceivably intoxicated when sold alcoholic liquor in order to prevail on a claim against the purveyor of alcoholic liquor for injuries sustained as a result of the patron's intoxication. Plaintiff in this case, administrator of the estate of Decedent, appealed from the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the trial court in favor of Plaintiff on the ground that the trial court improperly denied the motion of Defendants, the permittee of a restaurant and others doing business as the restaurant, for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that although the appellate court properly determined that Plaintiff was not entitled to judgment in his favor without proving that the patron was visibly or otherwise perceivably intoxicated at the time he was sold liquor, the court improperly concluded that Plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial. Remanded for a new trial. View "O'Dell v. Kozee" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether a national fraternity and one of its local Connecticut chapters may be held liable in common-law negligence for the death of one of its members, which occurred while driving back to New Haven after a fraternity event held in New York City. On appeal, Plaintiff, the administrator of the estate of Decedent, claimed the trial court improperly rendered summary judgment for Defendants, Delta Kappa Epsilon National Fraternity and its Delta Kappa Epsilon Phi Chapter. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) as a matter of law, Phi Chapter voluntarily assumed a duty of care regarding Decedent's safe transportation, and therefore, Plaintiff sufficiently alleged a claim of common-law negligence; and (2) Plaintiff raised a material question of fact regarding Delta National's control over Phi Chapter. View "Grenier v. Comm'r of Transp." on Justia Law

Physician diagnosed and treated Patient for various liver and kidney ailments but failed to warn her of the latent driving impairment associated with her condition. After leaving Physician's office, Patient blacked out while operating her motor vehicle and struck Plaintiff. Plaintiff brought an action against Physician and his employer (collectively, Defendants) for professional negligence. The trial court found in favor of Defendants, finding that Physician owed no duty to Plaintiff to warn Patient of the driving risks associated with her medical conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed, and in so doing, declined to extend a health care provider's duty through judicial modification, holding that the trial court properly found that Physician owed no duty to Plaintiff to advise or warn Patient of the latent driving impairment associated with her medical condition. View "Jarmie v. Troncale" on Justia Law