Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The named plaintiff, on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor son, brought this action against defendant city (Defendant), claiming that her son incurred injuries when a fellow student pushed him into a broken locker. Defendant filed its its answer and a special defense claiming municipal immunity. Plaintiffs denied the special defense but failed to plead that any exception to the defendant's immunity applied to them. The court instructed the jury on principles of negligence but made no reference to the special defense. The jury rendered a verdict for Plaintiffs. The trial court then granted Defendant's motion for a directed verdict and the motion to set aside the verdict on the ground of governmental immunity and rendered judgment for Defendant. The appellate court affirmed on the alternative ground that Plaintiffs failed to plead the identifiable victim, imminent harm exception to municipal immunity in their reply. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because Plaintiffs did not have adequate notice of this alternative basis or sufficient opportunity to address it, the appellate court improperly decided the case on the basis of Plaintiffs' failure to plead the imminent harm exception to discretionary act immunity. View "Haynes v. City of Middletown" on Justia Law

At issue in this certified appeal was whether a landlord may be held liable, under a common-law theory of premises liability, for injuries sustained by a tenant after being bitten by a dog owned by a fellow tenant and kept on premises owned by the common landlord, when the landlord knew of the dog's dangerous propensities but did not have direct care of, or control over, the dog. Defendant, the town of Wallingford housing authority, appealed from the judgment of the appellate court reversing the judgment of the trial court following its decision granting Defendant's motion to strike a complaint brought by Plaintiff, seeking to recover damages for such injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a landlord's common-law duty to alleviate known dangers includes dangers posed by vicious dogs. View "Giacalone v. Town of Wallingford Housing Auth." on Justia Law

The named defendant, EAPWJP, LLC (EAP) appealed from the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiffs and the defendants-cross claimants a prescriptive easement over a pathway crossing property owned by EAP that the plaintiffs and the defendants-cross claimants had used for many years to access a nearby beach. The pathway traversed protected tidal wetlands and was covered in part by a wooden walkway installed without appropriate permits. The Supreme Court granted certification to appeal to ask whether the appellate court properly concluded that construction and use of a walkway deemed to be a per se public nuisance could establish a prescriptive easement over the underlying tidal wetlands. The Court dismissed the appeal as improvidently granted, concluding that the issue raised by the certified question went beyond the scope of the record below, and therefore, the issue was not properly preserved. View "Murphy v. EAPWJP, LLC" on Justia Law

This case, which involved the summary suspension of the medical privileges of Plaintiff by Defendant, Bradley Memorial Hospital and Health Center, Inc., came to the Supreme Court for the second time. In Plaintiff's appeal, the Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and denying Plaintiff's motion for punitive damages. On remand, Plaintiff was awarded punitive damages and offer of judgment interest. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that Defendant was entitled to immunity as a matter of law under the federal health Care Quality Improvement Act from money damages arising from its summary suspension of Plaintiff's privileges. Remanded with direction to render judgment in favor of Defendant. View "Harris v. Bradley Mem'l Hosp. & Health Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought these premises liability actions on behalf of her minor daughter, alleging that her daughter had injured her ankle while playing soccer at Defendants' indoor soccer facility because Defendants negligently had installed a playing surface inherently dangerous for indoor soccer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The appellate court reversed. At issue on appeal was whether the appellate correctly concluded that Plaintiff had established the existence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning Defendants' actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly reversed the trial court's summary judgment because Plaintiff produced no evidence that Defendants knew or should have known of the hazardous condition. View "DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, an obstetrician and gynecologist, contending that Defendant's failure to advise her that she should have her ovaries removed due to a family history of cancer resulted in her developing ovarian cancer. After a jury trial, the trial court found in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant appealed, arguing primarily that the trial court improperly permitted expert testimony and instructed the jury in a manner consistent with a claim of traditional medical negligence and asserting that Plaintiff's complaint necessarily sounded exclusively in informed consent rather than in medical negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that the trial court's decisions were proper because Plaintiff's complaint properly alleged medical negligence. View "Downs v. Trias" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Christine Sapko sought survivor's benefits following the death of her husband, an employee of the state of Connecticut. The workers' compensation commissioner denied Plaintiff's claim, determining that the decedent's ingestion of Oxycodone and Seroquel constituted a superseding cause of his death and, therefore, the decedent's compensable work injuries were not the proximate cause of his death. The workers' compensation review board upheld the commissioner's decision. The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) the board incorrectly concluded that the superceding cause doctrine applied to the present case, but (2) this impropriety was harmless because the board correctly determined that the commissioner properly decided the issue of proximate cause. The Supreme Court affirmed but for different reasons, holding that the board correctly concluded that the commissioner's finding that superseding events broke the chain of proximate causation between the decedent's compensable work injuries and his death constituted a proper application of the law to the facts.

Plaintiffs, Erik and Carrie Pin, brought a medical malpractice action against Defendants, orthopedic surgeon David Kramer and Danbury Orthopedic Associates, seeking, inter alia, compensatory damages for Kramer's negligence in his surgical treatment of a spinal tumor suffered by Erik. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. The appellate court reversed, holding that a new trial was required because the trial court had failed to grant Plaintiffs' request for a curative instruction following remarks by Defendants' expert witness, during his direct examination testimony, concerning increased health care costs caused by defensive medicine practices arising from the proliferation of medical malpractice claims in Connecticut. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court court did not err in its judgment.

The named Plaintiff, Judy Rettig, commenced this action against Defendants, several towns and others, seeking damages for injuries she sustained when she slipped and fell in the course of her employment as an animal control officer for the district animal control. The district animal control was established by Defendants pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-330, which permits two or more towns to form a district for the performance of any municipal function that the member towns may perform separately. The trial court granted summary judgment judgment for Defendants, concluding that Defendants were Plaintiff's employer and, therefore, that Plaintiff's claims were barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an employee of a municipal district established pursuant to section 7-330 is an employee of the towns comprising the district for purposes of the exclusivity provision of the Act, and therefore, the trial court properly granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment.

Defendant was the wife of Kenneth Otto, who was convicted of the murder of Shamaia Smith. Before his conviction, Otto transferred title to certain property to Defendant. Otto and Defendant subsequently received a judgment of dissolution, which included a division of the marital property. During a hearing in the wrongful death action filed by the estate of Smith against Otto, the trial court found that Smith's estate was a creditor of Otto and that the transfer of Otto's assets to Defendant was fraudulent. Plaintiff, administratrix of Smith's estate, filed an action against Defendant pursuant to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, along with an application for a prejudgment remedy. The trial court concluded that there was probable cause to show that the assets transferred from Otto to Defendant through the dissolution action were fraudulent transfers and awarded Plaintiff a prejudgment remedy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff had standing to bring a claim under the Act; (2) the trial court's determination that the dissolution action was undertaken with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud Smith's estate was proper; and (3) the trial court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim because it could grant practical relief under the Act.