Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

This case, which involved the summary suspension of the medical privileges of Plaintiff by Defendant, Bradley Memorial Hospital and Health Center, Inc., came to the Supreme Court for the second time. In Plaintiff's appeal, the Court reversed the judgment of the trial court granting Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and denying Plaintiff's motion for punitive damages. On remand, Plaintiff was awarded punitive damages and offer of judgment interest. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment, holding that Defendant was entitled to immunity as a matter of law under the federal health Care Quality Improvement Act from money damages arising from its summary suspension of Plaintiff's privileges. Remanded with direction to render judgment in favor of Defendant. View "Harris v. Bradley Mem'l Hosp. & Health Ctr., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought these premises liability actions on behalf of her minor daughter, alleging that her daughter had injured her ankle while playing soccer at Defendants' indoor soccer facility because Defendants negligently had installed a playing surface inherently dangerous for indoor soccer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. The appellate court reversed. At issue on appeal was whether the appellate correctly concluded that Plaintiff had established the existence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning Defendants' actual or constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court improperly reversed the trial court's summary judgment because Plaintiff produced no evidence that Defendants knew or should have known of the hazardous condition. View "DiPietro v. Farmington Sports Arena, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, an obstetrician and gynecologist, contending that Defendant's failure to advise her that she should have her ovaries removed due to a family history of cancer resulted in her developing ovarian cancer. After a jury trial, the trial court found in favor of Plaintiff. Defendant appealed, arguing primarily that the trial court improperly permitted expert testimony and instructed the jury in a manner consistent with a claim of traditional medical negligence and asserting that Plaintiff's complaint necessarily sounded exclusively in informed consent rather than in medical negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, that the trial court's decisions were proper because Plaintiff's complaint properly alleged medical negligence. View "Downs v. Trias" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Christine Sapko sought survivor's benefits following the death of her husband, an employee of the state of Connecticut. The workers' compensation commissioner denied Plaintiff's claim, determining that the decedent's ingestion of Oxycodone and Seroquel constituted a superseding cause of his death and, therefore, the decedent's compensable work injuries were not the proximate cause of his death. The workers' compensation review board upheld the commissioner's decision. The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) the board incorrectly concluded that the superceding cause doctrine applied to the present case, but (2) this impropriety was harmless because the board correctly determined that the commissioner properly decided the issue of proximate cause. The Supreme Court affirmed but for different reasons, holding that the board correctly concluded that the commissioner's finding that superseding events broke the chain of proximate causation between the decedent's compensable work injuries and his death constituted a proper application of the law to the facts.

Plaintiffs, Erik and Carrie Pin, brought a medical malpractice action against Defendants, orthopedic surgeon David Kramer and Danbury Orthopedic Associates, seeking, inter alia, compensatory damages for Kramer's negligence in his surgical treatment of a spinal tumor suffered by Erik. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendants. The appellate court reversed, holding that a new trial was required because the trial court had failed to grant Plaintiffs' request for a curative instruction following remarks by Defendants' expert witness, during his direct examination testimony, concerning increased health care costs caused by defensive medicine practices arising from the proliferation of medical malpractice claims in Connecticut. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court court did not err in its judgment.

The named Plaintiff, Judy Rettig, commenced this action against Defendants, several towns and others, seeking damages for injuries she sustained when she slipped and fell in the course of her employment as an animal control officer for the district animal control. The district animal control was established by Defendants pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-330, which permits two or more towns to form a district for the performance of any municipal function that the member towns may perform separately. The trial court granted summary judgment judgment for Defendants, concluding that Defendants were Plaintiff's employer and, therefore, that Plaintiff's claims were barred by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act (Act). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an employee of a municipal district established pursuant to section 7-330 is an employee of the towns comprising the district for purposes of the exclusivity provision of the Act, and therefore, the trial court properly granted Defendants' motions for summary judgment.

Defendant was the wife of Kenneth Otto, who was convicted of the murder of Shamaia Smith. Before his conviction, Otto transferred title to certain property to Defendant. Otto and Defendant subsequently received a judgment of dissolution, which included a division of the marital property. During a hearing in the wrongful death action filed by the estate of Smith against Otto, the trial court found that Smith's estate was a creditor of Otto and that the transfer of Otto's assets to Defendant was fraudulent. Plaintiff, administratrix of Smith's estate, filed an action against Defendant pursuant to the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, along with an application for a prejudgment remedy. The trial court concluded that there was probable cause to show that the assets transferred from Otto to Defendant through the dissolution action were fraudulent transfers and awarded Plaintiff a prejudgment remedy. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff had standing to bring a claim under the Act; (2) the trial court's determination that the dissolution action was undertaken with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud Smith's estate was proper; and (3) the trial court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claim because it could grant practical relief under the Act.

In 1996, Plaintiff was working as a police officer when he felt a sharp pain in his right shoulder after attempting to lift a heavy person. A physician determined that Plaintiff had a labral tear, and Plainiff later underwent shoulder surgery. Plaintiff's pain continued. In 2000, Plaintiff suffered an acute myocardial infarction and was transferred to the hospital where he had bypass surgery. Plaintiff filed a claim in 2001, contending that his shoulder condition was misdiagnosed and that his 1996 symptoms were caused by a cardiac problem. The workers compensation commissioner dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the statute of limitations was not tolled by Plaintiff's allegation that his heart condition was misdiagnosed following the 1996 incident, and that his 2001 notice of claim was untimely. The compensation review board affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the board properly concluded that Plaintiff had failed to establish that the medical care exception to the applicable one year statute of limitations applied to toll the statute of limitations, as Plaintiff failed to prove a connection between the 1996 incident and his heart disease.

After his bicycle collided with a radar trailer that the Town's police department had placed on the road, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Town, alleging, inter alia, a breach of statutory duty pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 13a-149 and a claim of nuisance. The trial court granted the Town's motion to strike Plaintiff's nuisance claim under Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557n, which provides that section 13a-149 is the exclusive remedy against a municipality for injuries caused by a defect in a road or bridge. Plaintiff thereafter filed an amended complaint removing all claims except his section 13a-149 claim. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Town, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to establish a highway defect claim under section 13a-149. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly affirmed the trial court's judgment striking the nuisance claim against the Town on the basis of its determination that section 13a-149 was Plaintiff's exclusive remedy against the Town, when it also affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the Town on the basis of its determination that Plaintiff had failed to establish an essential element of a highway defect claim under section 31a-149.

The predecessor insurance companies to Plaintiff, Arrowood Indemnity Company, brought a declaratory judgment action in the U.S. district court claiming they did not have a duty to defend or to indemnify Defendants, the King family, for liability arising out of injuries sustained by a third party while the King's child was driving his parents' ATV on a private road in a private residential community, claiming that the accident had not occurred on an insured location and the Kings' notice of a claim was untimely. The district court rendered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer questions of unresolved state law and concluded (1) with respect to a claim for negligent entrustment under a liability policy that provides coverage for accidents involving ATVs that occur on insured locations, the relevant location is the site of the accident; (2) the private road in this case did not fall under the coverage provision; and (3) social interactions between the insured and the claimant making no reference to an accident do not justify delayed notice, but an insurer must prove prejudice to disclaim its obligation to provide coverage based on untimely notice.