Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

In 1996, Plaintiff was working as a police officer when he felt a sharp pain in his right shoulder after attempting to lift a heavy person. A physician determined that Plaintiff had a labral tear, and Plainiff later underwent shoulder surgery. Plaintiff's pain continued. In 2000, Plaintiff suffered an acute myocardial infarction and was transferred to the hospital where he had bypass surgery. Plaintiff filed a claim in 2001, contending that his shoulder condition was misdiagnosed and that his 1996 symptoms were caused by a cardiac problem. The workers compensation commissioner dismissed the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the statute of limitations was not tolled by Plaintiff's allegation that his heart condition was misdiagnosed following the 1996 incident, and that his 2001 notice of claim was untimely. The compensation review board affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the board properly concluded that Plaintiff had failed to establish that the medical care exception to the applicable one year statute of limitations applied to toll the statute of limitations, as Plaintiff failed to prove a connection between the 1996 incident and his heart disease.

After his bicycle collided with a radar trailer that the Town's police department had placed on the road, Plaintiff filed a complaint against the Town, alleging, inter alia, a breach of statutory duty pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. 13a-149 and a claim of nuisance. The trial court granted the Town's motion to strike Plaintiff's nuisance claim under Conn. Gen. Stat. 52-557n, which provides that section 13a-149 is the exclusive remedy against a municipality for injuries caused by a defect in a road or bridge. Plaintiff thereafter filed an amended complaint removing all claims except his section 13a-149 claim. The trial court granted summary judgment for the Town, concluding that Plaintiff had failed to establish a highway defect claim under section 13a-149. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court properly affirmed the trial court's judgment striking the nuisance claim against the Town on the basis of its determination that section 13a-149 was Plaintiff's exclusive remedy against the Town, when it also affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the Town on the basis of its determination that Plaintiff had failed to establish an essential element of a highway defect claim under section 31a-149.

The predecessor insurance companies to Plaintiff, Arrowood Indemnity Company, brought a declaratory judgment action in the U.S. district court claiming they did not have a duty to defend or to indemnify Defendants, the King family, for liability arising out of injuries sustained by a third party while the King's child was driving his parents' ATV on a private road in a private residential community, claiming that the accident had not occurred on an insured location and the Kings' notice of a claim was untimely. The district court rendered summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer questions of unresolved state law and concluded (1) with respect to a claim for negligent entrustment under a liability policy that provides coverage for accidents involving ATVs that occur on insured locations, the relevant location is the site of the accident; (2) the private road in this case did not fall under the coverage provision; and (3) social interactions between the insured and the claimant making no reference to an accident do not justify delayed notice, but an insurer must prove prejudice to disclaim its obligation to provide coverage based on untimely notice.

Two houseguests suffered serious injuries after their host left her car running overnight in an attached garage and the house filled with carbon monoxide. Plaintiff, the insurer with whom the homeowner had a homeowner's insurance policy, brought a declaratory judgment action against Defendants, the homeowner, the houseguests, and the homeowner's automobile insurer, seeking a declaration that the homeowner's policy did not cover the injuries suffered by the houseguests. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff, finding that the policy did not cover the injuries because they fell within the policy exclusion for injuries arising out of the use of a motor vehicle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the injuries suffered by the houseguests fell under the policy's motor vehicle exclusion.

Plaintiff divorced his wife (Wife) after discovering she had had an extramarital affair with Defendant and had conceived a child (Child) with him. After Plaintiff and Wife divorced, Plaintiff brought an action against Defendant, seeking damages on claims of nondisclosure, misrepresentation, and unjust enrichment. Specifically, Plaintiff sought reimbursement from Defendant for the costs he had expended in raising Child from her birth until his divorce from Wife, when Child was almost fifteen years old. The trial court concluded that although Defendant was Child's biological father, the doctrine of equitable estoppel and public policy concerns precluded Plaintiff from pursuing his claims for reimbursement and denying his paternity. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the court improperly found that Plaintiff was equitably estopped from pursuing his claims because there was insufficient evidence of financial harm to Child, which is required to establish the element of detrimental reliance in a case involving a denial of paternity.

Plaintiff's car was rear-ended by a tractor trailer truck owned by Defendant. Defendant admitted liability for the accident, and the jury returned with a verdict of $700,000 in damages. The trial court subsequently ordered a remittitur of $508,608, resulting in a total award of $191,392. After Plaintiff refused to accept the remittitur, the court set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the remittitur. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the evidence supported the jury's award of damages, the trial court abused its discretion in ordering remittitur.

Plaintiff filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits for injuries she sustained while working for Employer. The workers' compensation commissioner awarded Plaintiff total disability benefits and reimbursement for certain prescription medication payments and mileage under the Workers' Compensation Act. The compensation review board affirmed but remanded for a determination of the specific amounts to be reimbursed to Plaintiff. Defendants, Employer and Insurer, appealed the commissioner's supplemental findings and award. The appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-301(a) required Defendants to appeal to the board. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the appellate court had jurisdiction over the appeal because the jurisdictional requirements of Conn. Gen. Stat. 31-301(b), which governs appeals from the board to the appellate court, were fully satisfied in this case.

Plaintiff, American Diamond Exchange, brought an action against Defendant, Jurgita Karobikaite, and her husband, Scott Alpert, after Alpert, who was working as an estate buyer for Plaintiff, diverted Plaintiff's customers so that he could personally purchase their jewelry. Defendant shared in the profits. A judgment of default was entered against Alpert. The court found Defendant liable for tortious interference with a business relationship or expectancy and civil conspiracy and awarded Plaintiff $118,000 in damages. On appeal, the Appellate Court reversed the judgment of the trial court as to damages and remanded for a recalculation of damages based on the existing record. On remand, the trial court awarded $103,355 in damages to Plaintiff. Defendant appealed, claiming, inter alia, that Plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence from which its lost profits could be determined with reasonable certainty. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Defendant was not precluded from challenging the sufficiency of the evidence by failing to raise it in her direct appeal or because the appellate court decided the claim against her in the first appeal; and (2) the evidence was insufficient to support an award of damages.

These two consolidated appeals arose from the collision of two city fire trucks. As a result of the collision, firefighter John Keane died, and firefighter William Mahoney suffered serious injuries. Monica Keane brought an action against Defendants, the firefighters who drove the trucks, alleging negligence in their operation of the fire trucks and that their negligence caused John Keane's death. In the second case, William and Erin Mahoney filed a complaint against Defendants, two firefighters and the city, alleging that the firefighters were negligent and that their negligence caused William Mahoney to sustain injuries. In both cases, the trial court granted the motions of Defendants to strike all counts of the complaint, concluding that Conn. Gen. Stat. 7-308 barred firefighters who are eligible to receive workers' compensation benefits from bringing negligence actions against other firefighters for their injuries. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the trial court, holding that section 7-308 does not violate equal protection and, therefore, the trial court properly granted Defendants' motions to strike on the ground that the actions were barred by the immunity provision in section 7-308.

Plaintiff and Defendant were former husband and wife. Following the dissolution of their marriage, Defendant was granted joint custody and visitation rights of the parties' two daughters. Defendant then reported that her eldest daughter had been sexually abused by Plaintiff. As a result of the investigation, Defendant was charged with risk of injury to a child, false reporting of an incident, false statement in the second degree, attempt to commit malicious prosecution, and sexual assault in the fourth degree. Following Defendant's guilty plea, Plaintiff filed a complaint sounding in intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court found in favor of Plaintiff. The appellate court reversed, holding that the trial court improperly improperly applied the continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll the statute of limitations and that Plaintiff's claim was time barred. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, holding that the appellate court improperly concluded that the existence of an original duty must be established before applying the continuing course of conduct doctrine to toll the statute of limitations in a nonnegligence cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.