Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

Nantichoke filed a hospital lien for the cost of Maria Acosta's medical treatment resulting from a car accident. Appellant law firm represented Acosta in a personal injury claim against the tortfeasor who caused her injuries. Nationwide subsequently paid her a sum to settle her claim. Nantichoke argued that its hospital lien attached to the entirety of Acosta's recovery and the law firm contended that the hospital lien did not attach until the attorney's fees have been deducted from the settlement fund. The court held that an attorney's charging lien existed at common law and the law firm's agreed contingent fee must be deducted from the recovery before the hospital lien.

Defendants, Dana and Zoom, appealed from a Superior Court order denying their post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively, for a new trial. A Superior Court jury found defendants partially liable for asbestos-related mesothelioma suffered by decedents. The trial court denied defendants' motions on the ground that the jury verdict was supported by sufficient evidence. Plaintiffs cross-appealed from the trial court's denial of their separate motions for additur or, alternatively, a new trial on damages. On the principal appeal by Dana and Zoom, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment on the basis of its well-reasoned opinion. On the cross-appeal by plaintiffs, the court found that the trial court committed legal error in ruling on plaintiffs' additur motion, and also that trial court erroneously failed to address a potentially determinative issue of Louisiana law. Therefore, the court reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings.

The Delaware Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) appealed from a Superior Court order reversing a DHSS Administrative Hearing Officer's decision to place Madhu Jain on the Adult Abuse Registry for three years, because Jain had "neglected" a patient as defined by 11 Del. C. 8564(a)(8) and 16 Del. C. 1131(9). On appeal, DHSS claimed that the Superior Court erroneously concluded that DHSS had failed to show that Jain neglected the patient within the meaning of the two statutes because Jain's conduct breached basic, fundamental nursing standards. The court held that the facts did not support a finding that Jain committed an act of neglect, recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally. Therefore, the court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

Plaintiff alleged that years of living with her husband, who worked around products containing asbestos as a maintenance technician for defendant, exposed her to asbestos fibers and subsequently caused her to suffer from bilateral interstitial fibrosis and bilateral pleural thickening of the lungs. Plaintiff appealed from a Superior Court order denying her Motion to Amend her household asbestos exposure complaint as futile. The court held that, because the allegations in plaintiff's amended complaint amount to a claim against defendant for nonfeasance, and the complaint did not allege any "special relationship" between plaintiff and defendant, her proposed amendments, if allowed, would be futile. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Sally Jackson appealed from a Superior Court order affirming the judgment of the Industrial Accident Board (IAB) denying her claim for total disability compensation. She claimed that both the IAB and the Superior Court erroneously denied her claim because her retirement did not bar her ability to receive workers' compensation benefits. The court held that the record contained sufficient evidence to support the IAB's decision to deny her total disability benefits where Jackson voluntarily retired for a reason other than her work-related knee injury, had removed herself from the job market without seeking reemployment or contemplating seeking it, and was enjoying her retirement lifestyle with her husband. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Superior Court's order.

Plaintiff sued defendant for injuries she suffered when she slipped and fell on an icy parking lot on defendant's premises. At issue was whether the superior court erred in granting summary judgment for defendant where immunity, pursuant to Title 14, section 1056(h) of the Delaware Code, did not apply to negligence for failing to inspect the premises and failing to warn of known and existing dangers. Also at issue was whether the superior court erred in granting summary judgment for defendant where defendant waived, or should be estopped from asserting, section 1056(h) immunity. The court held that section 1056(h) provided defendant with immunity where there was no legal distinction between the failure to maintain a reasonably safe parking lot free of ice and snow and the failure to warn of a slippery parking lot. The court also held that defendant did not waive, and was not estopped from asserting, that immunity where the record did not reflect that plaintiff was aware of any insurance coverage, the record did not show that plaintiff relied on the conduct of defendant, or that plaintiff changed her position as a result of her reliance. Therefore, the judgment of the superior court was affirmed.