Justia Injury Law Opinion Summaries

The Superior Court in this personal injury action sua sponte excluded a medical expert witness' testimony that it was possible plaintiff's permanent injury might have improved depending on the results of further recommended testing. The jury awarded plaintiff $292,330; defendant moved for a new trial. The court granted defendant's motion. In the second trial, the jury heard the expert's testimony and returned a lesser, $7,500 verdict. Plaintiff appealed the trial court's grant of a new trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge initially made the right decision to exclude the expert; it was an abuse of discretion to order a new trial. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment granting a new trial and all attendant rulings, and remanded the case to reinstate the original jury verdict. View "O'Riley v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Heather Turner appealed a superior court judgment that ruled in favor of Defendants-Appellees Michael Conway, M.D., Eric Kalish, M.D. and their practice, Delaware Surgical Group. Plaintiff sued defendants over what was initially an appendectomy, but ended with a "mass" on her liver from "something that had spilled out from prior surgeries" performed by the two doctor defendants. Plaintiff argued that the trial court abused its discretion in improperly admitting defendants' expert evidence . Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Turner v. Delaware Surgical Group, P.A., et al." on Justia Law

Claimant-appellant Stephen Arrants appealed a superior court order that affirmed an Industrial Accident Board's order granting employer-appellee Home Depot's petition to terminate appellant's total disability benefits. Appellant raised two claims on appeal: (1) the Board's decision was in error because all experts agreed that his condition had not improved since the 2007 Board finding of total disability; and (2) the Board's decision was not supported by competent evidence in the record. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that both arguments were without merit, and affirmed the superior court. View "Arrants v. Home Depot" on Justia Law

Appellant Mary E. Spellman ("Spellman") petitioned the Industrial Accident Board (the "Board") for a workers' compensation award against her employer, Appellee Christiana Care Health Services ("Christiana"). The Board denied the petition and the Superior Court affirmed. Appellant worked as a home health aide, where she used her personal vehicle to attend to Christiana's clients at their homes. While Appellant was reimbursed for mileage between client appointments, she was not reimbursed for travel to the first appointment, from the last appointment, or "off the clock" when she attended to personal business. In the middle of her work day, Appellant was off the clock when her car hit a patch of ice causing Appellant to crash her car. She sustained injuries to her head and hip. In her petition, Appellant argued that her status as a traveling employee exempted her from the "going and coming" rule that precludes workers' compensation for injuries suffered while going or coming from work. Alternatively, Appellant argued her injuries were compensable because she was engaged in a "mixed purpose" trip at the time of her accident. Having "no difficulty" sustaining the judgment of the Superior Court, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Spellman v. Christiana Care Health Services" on Justia Law

Two employees of Connections CSP, Inc. were killed in an automobile collision during the course and scope of their employment. Connections owned the vehicle and had purchased underinsured motorist insurance (UIM) for the vehicle and also worker's compensation insurance which covered the employees. The UIM insurer paid its policy limit of $1,000,000. The worker's compensation insurer also paid benefits to the representatives of the decedents. The worker's compensation insurer then sought to enforce a lien upon the UIM payment equal to the worker's compensation benefits it paid. But the UIM policy specifically excluded the direct or indirect benefit of any insurer or self-insurer under a worker's compensation claim. Notwithstanding this exclusion, the Superior Court enforced the lien based upon its interpretation of 19 Del. C. 2363(e), which allows reimbursement of a worker's compensation carrier "from the third party liability insurer." The UIM insurer appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that General Assembly eliminated the ability of a worker's compensation insurer to assert a lien against the UIM payments made pursuant to the employer's UIM policy. Because the Superior Court erred as a matter of law in enforcing a lien, the Supreme Court reversed its decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Simendinger v. National Union Fire Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Pro se appellant Holly Noel-Liszkiewicz appealed a superior court's decision to affirm the Industrial Accident Board's denial of her claim for worker's compensation benefits. Appellant was a customer service representative for Employer La-Z-Boy before being laid off. Almost two years after the lay off, Appellant petitioned the board seeking compensation for occupational asthma, pulmonary fibrosis, and respiratory failure allegedly caused by exposure to chemicals at La-Z-Boy’s facility. La-Z-Boy denied that Applicant suffered any illness or injury that was causally related to her work. Finding Appellant's arguments to be without merit, the Supreme Court affirmed both the Board and the superior court. View "Noel-Liszkiewicz v. La-Z-Boy" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Superior Court abused its discretion by dismissing a “trip and fall” case because appellant failed to file an expert report. Appellant’s counsel did provide medical records, but insisted that a formal expert report was unnecessary because such a report would provide no additional information. "Counsel’s stubborn refusal to appreciate that an expert report had to be filed is difficult to understand." But the Supreme Court concluded that the sanction of dismissal was inappropriate under the circumstances. "The claim appeared to have merit; there was time to submit the report without impacting the trial date; and the trial court had not imposed lesser sanctions that were ignored." Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "Hill v. DuShuttle" on Justia Law

The trial court precluded appellants’ experts from testifying at trial because they failed to provide the experts’ reports in accordance with the trial scheduling order. Without any expert testimony, appellants’ claims failed as a matter of law, and judgment was entered for appellees. But appellants had requested a conference with the trial court six months before the trial date to discuss the need to revise the scheduling order. The trial court refused to meet with counsel or change the trial date. Appellants appealed the trial court's refusal to confer, and the Supreme Court held that was an abuse of discretion: "A conference held at that point would have allowed the trial court to determine whether the circumstances justified a new trial date. If not, the trial court could have set new discovery deadlines that would have maintained the original trial date. . . . Because experience has shown that sanctions are not always effective [when counsel fails to abide by set deadlines, and to address crowded, high volume docket problems of the courts]," the Court has determined that it is necessary to refine the "Drejka" analysis. "Henceforth, parties who ignore or extend scheduling deadlines without promptly consulting the trial court, will do so at their own risk." View "Christian v. Counseling Resource Associates, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case stemmed from the Superior Court’s dismissal of appellant’s complaint for failure to provide discovery to appellees. Appellant was acting pro se for the first 18 months after she filed the complaint. During that time appellees, who had filed a counterclaim, filed several motions to compel answers to interrogatories and production of documents. The trial court held hearings on the motions; explained exactly what appellant needed to do in responding to the discovery; and warned that failure to comply with the court’s order could result in sanctions and dismissal. Appellant ignored the trial court’s warnings, and the court dismissed the complaint. She appealed, arguing the Superior Court abused its discretion in dismissing her case. Applying the "Drejka" factors, the Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed. View "Adams v. Aidoo" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Superior Court abused its discretion in refusing to reopen a summary judgment entered against appellants after they missed the deadline for filing a response to appellees’ motion. Appellants mistakenly believed that they had 20 additional days to respond because appellees filed supplemental materials two weeks after filing their motion. The trial court apparently accepted the fact that appellants had made a mistake, but refused to reopen the case because appellants were unable to justify their mistake. Upon review, the Court concluded that the trial court failed to give adequate weight to the policy in favor of deciding cases on the merits, and reversed. View "Keener v. Isken" on Justia Law